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This thesis studies the acquisition of technological capabilities in
Newly Industrialising Countries (NICs). General problems concerning
methods of learning and processes of economic and technological
development are addressed by way of an extended case study of the
development of the Computer Numerical Controlled (CNC) machine tool
industry in South Korea from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. More
briefly, material relating to the machine tool industries of Japan and
Taiwan is mobilised for comparative purposes: the former illustrates the
orientation and structural role of a recently matured East Asian industry
which Korea seems in part to be following and the latter is an example of
a successful NIC industry whose place in the manufacturing economy is
markedly different from that of Korea.
The findings of the Korean study, and the Japanese and Taiwanese
comparative materials, are brought to bear upon recognised questions
concerning the contribution of a machine tool industry to an
industrialising economy, the proper policies of NIC governments vis-A-vis
that industry, and the methods of learning that have proved most
effective in the acquisition of technological capabilities in developing
economies. In broad agreement with the arguments of Nathan Rosenberg
and many other analysts, it is argued that an indigenous machine tool
industry may offer extensive and valuable support to the whole of the
machine-using sector and that this can be a sufficient reason for
government promotion.
A main aim of the study was to consider whether Korea, which had
demonstrably acquired a range of capabilities in production, had started
to acquire capabilities in the design and development of new products.
The companies studied had relied to a great extent on foreign technology
agreements as a mechanism for initially acquiring design and production
technologies. However, these firms were not passive recipients in such
agreements: several actively prepared themselves to learn by
experimenting with the new product. A notable feature of the agreements
was the transfer of skilled personnel, and the thesis argues that such
direct interaction greatly facilitated the transfer of capabilities. The
Korean machine tool industry is beginning to develop its own designs and
to work with manufacturers in other sectors. Such inter—firm linkages
were also found to be an important feature of the technological
development of both machine tool producers and users.
The study points to a range of environmental factors that bear upon
the acquisition of technological capabilities within the sample firms.
These include the nature of the domestic market they supply (particularly
requirements for specialised machinery for the emerging vehicle industry),
their position within a business structure (especially the significance of
conglomerate membership for technological interaction), and the nature of
the technology itself. It is argued that an adequate understanding of
the process of capability acquisition must consider the potential barriers
constituted by different aspects of the product to be designed and
manufactured.
I hereby declare that this thesis Is based on my own research work
and has been composed by myself.
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This thesis is about the process of acquiring technological
capabilities in the design and production of machine tools in Newly
Industrialising Countries (NICs). The NICs are a group of countries whose
state of industrial development has been considered intermediate between
the under-developed Third World and industrially developed countries.
East Asian NICs include Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan,
and, in Latin America, Argentina, Brazil and Mexico.1 The study
concentrates on the acquisition of technological capabilities in the
production of Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machine tools in South
Korea (hereafter simply "Korea"). It also, more briefly, compares the
technological development of Korea's machine tool industry with the
development of the same industry in another NIC, Taiwan, and in an
industrially developed country, Japan.
1.1 NICs. Industrialisation, and the Machine Tool Industry
While much of the initial rapid economic and manufacturing growth
of the NICs occurred in labour—intensive, export—orientated, industries,
several NICs have now moved into more technology— and skill—intensive
industries, including the production of capital goods. In the case of
Korea, textiles, plywood and wigs were major growth industries in the
1960s. In the 1970s, Korea commenced the development of heavy industries
such as steel, shipbuilding and vehicle production, as well as the
manufacture of more complex consumer goods such as video cassette
recorders and microwave ovens. These industries have become central to
Korea's growth and exports in the 1980s.
This study partly arises out of problems concerning the future
prospects of Korea, and other NICs, in technology—intensive industries:
their ability to sustain rapid growth and their prospects of escaping
their present intermediate state to become fully industrialised countries.
The machine tool industry is a legitimate focus for engaging with these
questions; firstly, because of its strategic position in relation to the
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development of other Industries, and, secondly, because it is itself a
technology-intensive industry.
The machine tool industry is a strategic industry because of its
contribution to the technological development and productivity of many
other industrial sectors rather than because of its quantitative
contribution to industrial output. The industry supplies machinery used
to manufacture capital goods and provides a large proportion of
production machinery used to manufacture metal goods of all types.
Through its supply of production machinery, it is an important channel
for the transfer of new production technology and productivity
improvements. The machine tool industry is also the major supplier of
production equipment to the military sector, and, indeed, it is often
because of its vital role in the military-industrial complex that it is
given special attention by governments.
In one of the most influential accounts of the role of the capital
goods industry in economic growth, Rosenberg argues that the existence of
a "well-developed capital goods sector" is the major difference between
an industrialised economy and an under—developed one. He believes that
the ability of this sector to produce and adapt machinery to comply with
the changing requirements of production in other sectors enables a
country to absorb and diffuse new technologies. This, Rosenberg says,
makes these economies "viable" and "sustainable". Furthermore, he
suggests that "[industrial societies, through the role of their highly
developed capital goods producing industries, have, in effect, internalized
in their industrial structure a technological capacity which undertakes
technological change and adaption almost as a matter of course and
routine" (1976: 99). Rosenberg stresses that the ability to design and
produce specialised machinery "constitutes an external economy of
enormous importance to other sectors of the economy" (1976: 144).
Because of the industry's strategic nature and these potential external
economies, the machine tool industry has been promoted by governments of
many industrialising countries, including Korea, and offered the protected
status of an "infant industry".2 Although it is, of course, possible for
countries to rely on imported machinery, Rosenberg concludes that "this
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expedient deprives them of a learning experience in the production,
improvement and adaptation of machinery which may be vital to economic
growth" (1976: 100). Thus, Rosenberg's view places the machine tool
industry at the centre of any attempt to explain industrialisation and, in
particular, the experience of the NICs.
It must be emphasised that the benefits and external economies that
Rosenberg sees flowing from the existence of a machinery industry can
only be realised, firstly, if an indigenous technological capability to
design machinery is present as well as the ability to manufacture it, and,
secondly, if the machinery industry is in close contact with the consumers
of its goods so that technology and information can flow easily between
them. The mere existence of an indigenous ability to manufacture
equipment does not necessarily put machinery users in a better position
than users in countries with no machinery production.
1.2 Korea's Technological Capabilities
Definitions of technology have centred upon the collection of the
physical processes which transform inputs into outputs. Conceived this
way, a technology may be enclosed in the form of production equipment and
its operation: a product, and a set of blueprints. Loosely speaking, such
conceptions treat technology as "hardware". However, in the present
connection a far more useful notion is that of "technological
capabilities" - the "software" without which physical technology is
useless. Technological capabilities are a complex combination of
scientific knowledge, engineering techniques, craft skills, tacit knowledge,
and social relations.5 They are, therefore, the human and social
resources which make technology work. A technology, conceived as
hardware, may be traded or transferred as a commodity, but it remains
useless without a matching set of technological capabilities.
Technological capabilities may be roughly divided into two types:
manufacturing capabilities, which are the skills, or "know-how", required
to use a technology in the manufacture of a product or in the operation
of a process; and design capabilities, which include a greater
understanding of the operating principles behind the technology, or
b.
"know-why", enabling technologies to be developed, adapted or created.
There is, naturally, a considerable overlap between the two types of
capabilities.4
The position of Korea with respect to the indigenisation of
capabilities is problematic. Jacobsson's important study of the CNC lathe
industry in Argentina, Korea and Taiwan concluded that some design
capabilities had been acquired in Korea.5 However, he only considered one
small sector of the industry - the manufacture of low—to—medium
performance lathes. Furthermore, he discussed these capabilities only
from the point of view of NIC lathe producers becoming more competitive
on the world market, neglecting any links between the industry and other
industrial sectors and the benefits these may be receiving from the
machine tool industry. Among more general studies, Amsden and Kim's
research (1986) concluded that some design capabilities were now present
for a limited subset of products in Korea's machinery industry. Enos and
Park <1988: 235) and Westphal et al. (1984: 291) both argued that, while
Korea had acquired considerable capabilities in production (including
machinery manufacture), few capabilities in product or plant design had
been indigenised. Westphal et al. add a caveat to their conclusions,
suggesting that the bias in Korea's capability acquisition stems from the
"natural sequence according to which plant operation is learned before
the capability for plant design is acquired" (1984: 291). Chudnovsky's
study of the complex capital goods industry in Korea, Brazil and India
concluded that
CBlasic design and, in some cases, even detailed design for
complex capital goods are not yet mastered by leading
producers in the countries studied. Accordingly, they
suffer from a major handicap which affects their ability
to fulfil their role as eventual generators of
technological innovations (1986: 86).
Thus, Korea was widely perceived by analysts in the early 1980s to
stand at a crucial stage in its industrial development. It had entered
technology—intensive industries, including the machine tool industry, but
still had inadequate technological capabilities to design these products.
The absence of these capabilities was seen to have two implications for
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Korea. Firstly, it meant that Korea still depended on foreign technology
for its industrial growth and development. Secondly, as Chudnovsky has
shown, the lack of these capabilities meant that the machinery industry
was not supporting productivity improvements and product developments in
other technology—dependent industrial sectors <1986: 86). Without
acquiring these technological capabilities, Korea would not be able to
sustain its future development in technology—intensive industries and
become, according to Rosenberg's sense, a fully industrialised economy.
If, as Westphal et al. suggest, it is a natural sequence to acquire design
capabilities after production capabilities, questions concerning Korea's
present position in this sequence must be asked. This thesis engages
with such questions by considering in detail the development of
capabilities within the machine tool industry in Korea and the links
between Korean machine tool builders and users.
The thesis uses a case study of the machine tool industry to
investigate Korea's attempts at acquiring the technological capabilities
to design, as well as to produce, specific types of machinery. The
leading questions informing the case study are:
(i) Is the Korean machine tool industry beginning to indigenise
design capabilities, and, if it is, how is it acquiring such
capabilities?
<ii> What is the relative importance of different learning methods,
e.g., learning by doing, learning by copying, etc., in this
process?
(iii) What are the technological difficulties experienced in the
build up of these skills? What are the non-technological
factors which aid or hinder their acquisition, e.g., government
policy, industrial structure?
(iv) What relations are there between the Korean machine tool
industry and user industries? What effects do these
relationships have on the development of design capabilities
and on the competitiveness of user industries?
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There are two main specific findings from the case study: firstly,
that Korea in the mid-1980s was indeed beginning to acquire design
capabilities to complement its existing production capabilities, and,
secondly, that the Korean machine tool industry was also beginning to
provide its users with significant technological support, thus illustrating
one of the major justifications for NIC promotion of that industry.
1.3 Methodology
The coherent study of the acquisition of technological capabilities
must be an interdisciplinary enterprise; it requires the skills of the
economist, the country and area specialist, the student of politics, and
even the skills of the sociologist and anthropologist. It must also have
a important place for those versed in the actual technologies involved,
and the environment required for their successful operation.
In order to understand such processes as technology transfer and
the acquisition of technological capabilities, it is simply necessary to
understand the nature of the relevant technologies. They should not be
treated - as they sometimes are - as "black boxes". If we understand the
nature of the technology, we can break down the technological capability
requirements for its use or reproduction into what may be called "skill"
or "capability areas". What is the relative difficulty of acquiring
capabilities in each of these areas? Which areas make the greatest
demands on existing knowledge-bases? In what sequence do the different
skill areas need to be acquired? Consequently, compared to many
exis3ing studies in development economics and technology transfer, this
thesis devotes greater attention to the technology involved and to the
technological capabilities required.
It would, however, be equally mistaken to limit any such study to a
narrow technological focus. The machinery industry is, by its nature,
intertwined with many other industries and institutions, relying on some
industries for materials, parts and components, and on other industries to
constitute a market for its products. The availablity of inputs affects
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the competitiveness of the machine tool industry's production. The type
of market it supplies, and the technologies used within the market,
influence its product strategy and, hence, its technological requirements.
The role of government policy in the promotion and protection of the
industry must also be considered.
The study itself is highly empirical and specific, based on fieldwork
undertaken in the machine tool industry in Korea and other countries in
1985. The fieldwork deliberately concentrated on one sector of the
machine tool industry, the manufacture of CNC metal cutting machine tools.
CNC machine tools are controlled by a programmable microprocessor which
is linked directly to sensors on the machine. These machines are
produced only by the more technically advanced NIC firms; therefore, by
limiting the study to this sector, only the leading firms were included.4
The introduction of microprocessor controls has also had an enormous
impact on the technological skills required for the production and
development of these machines. Consequently, the firms considered were
in the process of indigenising new skills, and it was therefore possible
to obtain a large amount of data on the methods and difficulties they
were having in acquiring the relevant capabilities. Finally, CNC machines
are the basic production machines around which more automated
manufacturing systems are produced, and the role of machine tool
manufacturers in the design and installation of these systems is also
considered.
1.4 Thesis Organisation
The thesis is divided into two parts; the first part, Chapters 2, 3
and 4, considers technological development, machine tool technology, and
the global machine tool industry, providing a detailed background to the
second part, which contains the empirical work of the case study and the
comparative studies.
Chapter 2 examines the process of industrialisation in greater
detail. The debate over whether developing countries should make or buy
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their machinery is engaged with, and justifications are assessed for
infant industry promotion and protection. This includes a more complete
description of the external economies available from the machine tool
industry. A range of theories about the division of technological
capabilities and the range of learning methods used to acquire them are
described and evaluated. The relative advantages, disadvantages, and
effectiveness of different learning methods are surveyed. In particular,
this discussion addresses the alleged dangers of becoming too dependent
on foreign sources of technology through the continued use of licensing
agreements and direct foreign investment.
Chapter 3 describes the technological principles of CNC machine
tools, permitting an appreciation of the capabilities required to design
and produce these machines. Changes in machine tool design, construction,
and operation accompanying the introduction of computer control are a
central theme of this chapter. And the final section presents a
comprehensive list of the capabilities required to design and manufacture
both conventional and CNC machine tools. It is shown that the
technological capability requirements for CNC production are more varied
and complex than those used in conventional production.
Chapter 4 provides an overview of the world machine tool market and
the special characteristics of the industry which supplies it. The
description of the global industry shows how product strategy is directly
influenced by the market sectors which are important to various national
industries. This includes an analysis of changes that have taken place in
the international leadership of the industry in the last twenty years, and
the reasons why some nations have declined while others have improved
their position. Particular attention is paid to the entry by some NICs
into the international trade in machine tools and their product
strategies.
The second part of the thesis deals entirely with material on Korea
and the comparison of Korea with Japan and Taiwan. Chapter 5 provides an
overall introduction to Korea's industrial development and the general
growth of its machine tool industry, including an account of the Korean
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government's extensive intervention in industrial development, the
structure of Korean industry, and the role of Korea's educational and
research institutes. As well as describing the growth of Korea's machine
tool industry, this chapter documents the expansion of industries which
are large machine tool users. This provides information on the industries
which may benefit from their links with the machine tool industry and on
the structure of the Korean machine tool market.
The next chapter mobilises data from the Korean case study. The
data are analysed to show which technological capabilities have been
indigenised and which have not. The most important learning methods used
in the acquisition of these capabilities are described. It is shown that
at present the Korean industry relies extensively on imported critical
components. The entry by Korean firms into the production of these
components is described and its significance considered. Finally, there is
a discussion of the factors influencing Korea's acquisition of
technological capabilities: government policy, the domestic market, the
structure of the conglomerates to which some firms belong, and the
purchase of foreign technology.
Chapter 7 assesses the development of the Korean machine tool
industry in comparison to the experiences of the same industry in two
other East Asian countries, Japan and Taiwan. Japan provides an example
of a successfully developed industry, which grew rapidly in the 1950s and
1960s to become the largest machine tool industry in the world by the
mid-1980s. An examination of this industry enables a range of
comparisons to be made between Korea's experience and that of a
neighbouring nation with a relatively recently matured industry. What
lessons can Korea learn from Japan? The Taiwanese industry offers an
example of an alternative development strategy and the effects this has
had on its technology acquisition. Is Taiwan a model for other NICs to
copy or to avoid?
The concluding chapter summarises the findings of the thesis in
relation to: (i) analytic methods in the study of technology acquisition;
(ii) the position of the machine tool industry within a machine-using
10.
economy; <iii) the advantages and disadvantages for a machine tool
industry of being strongly linked to a domestic defence industry; <iv) the
role of government in industrialisation, and particularly in technology




1. There are various descriptions and definitions of NICs. Harris
considers them to be countries which "have experienced high growth
of output in the sixties and seventies, sometimes but not invariably
on the basis of expanded manufacturing exports" <1986: 9).
Balassa's more quantitative definition represents them as countries
with "per capita incomes between US$1,100 and US$3,500 in 1978, and
where the share of the manufacturing sector in GDP was 207. or
higher in 1977" <1981: xix). Along with the seven countries noted
above, the following are sometimes also considered as NICs: Chile,
Greece, India, Israel, Pakistan, the Philippines, Portugal, Spain,
Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Yugoslavia.
2. Infant industries are those promoted or protected by a country's
government during their establishment and early growth. Without the
introduction of government measures, these industries would either
take many years to develop or would not develop at all. Infant
industries are usually given such treatment because it is felt that
the whole economy will benefit from them existence.
3. In this thesis the terms "capability" and "skill" are generally used
interchangeably. Accordingly, the term "skill" is given a slightly
broader and more consequential sense than is typical, but, as
Chapter 8 will briefly indicate, there is some point in doing so.
4. These definitions have been adapted from discussions in Stewart
<1984: 81), Molina-Fuenzalida <1987: 466-74), and Dahlman and Cortes
<1984: 602).
5. Jacobsson's research has resulted in many publications covering
broadly similar ground. For the most part, his 1986 book is used,
since this is his most comprehensive publication. Other publications
listed in the bibliography are referenced as appropriate.
6. Although only the technologically leading firms were included in the
study, they accounted for a significant proportion of Korea's total
machine tool output <47% in 1984).
CHAPTER TWO
Acquisition of Technological Capabilities
2.1 Analysing Development and Technology
Until the mid-1970s, studies of NIC and LDC industrial development
were characterised by what might be called an "economic" paradigm. They
typically emphasised the importance of economic variables, such as
relative factor prices, paying little attention to the acquisition of
technology or to the role of technical change.1 In explaining NIC
success, economists often used the theory of comparative advantage, which
in these countries usually derived from the cheapness of labour used in
the production of laboui—intensive items, e.g., textiles and low—cost
electrical goods. Although this theory explains the export success of
NICs after entering a specific industry, it does not in any way account
for the processes by which a country reaches this point nor does it
satisfactorily analyse prospects for future growth. Fransman <1986c:
1376—77) discusses three further problems in relying on the theory of
comparative advantage: <i> that the determinants of technical and
productivity change are omitted; (ii> that a passive role for the state is
implicitly assumed; and <iii) that the theory does not in fact explain
economic growth in these countries.
Technology was not entirely neglected in studies of developing
countries. However, attention to it was typically restricted to only two
approaches. Firstly, the "appropriateness" of technology was considered.
Analyses concentrated on the question of labour or capital intensity in
production techniques. Theoretical work in this area assumed that there
is a virtually unlimited choice in the combinations of labour and capital
input required to produce a given item. Thus, having found the right
combination of labour and capital for a certain production function, it
was then purely a matter of using the technology and production
techniques appropriate to that combination. While a number of options
are theoretically possible, the technological determinists argue that, in
reality, very few choices do exist in the form of technically efficient
alternatives, and, therefore, that the choice of labour and capital mix for
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any single production function is limited. Thus, to achieve the required
combination of labour and capital inputs, the choice becomes one of
industrial composition rather than of technique (Stewart and James, 1982:
1—2). The second approach focussed upon the transfer of technology.
Technology was treated as an item belonging to the industrialised
countries which was transferred to passive developing countries (Lall,
1982b: 6). These studies concentrated on the high cost and difficulties
of technology transfer, and the ensuing dependency of developing
countries on industrialised countries for new technology. Yet both of
these approaches neglected to study the processes by which indigenous
capabilities are built up together with relevant knowledge and skills.
And when such processes are studied in detail, the picture of developing
countries as wholly passive and dependent is seriously undermined. As a
result, the credibility of dependency theory itself has been eroded.
In the mid-1970s, a different approach to the study of development
emerged; this approach, far from neglecting technology, concentrated on
the build up of skills and capabilities in industrialising and developing
countries themselves. This newer approach entails a change in point of
view. Whereas traditional studies saw development in terms of economic
variables, the new tendency has been to see development from the micro-
level and from the perspective of the firm in the process of acquiring
technology. How do individual firms acquire technological capabilities?
What factors influence this acquisition? Of particular importance was
the work of Katz (1978a, 1978b, 1984; see also Dahlman and Fonseca, 1978)
on the development of indigenous capabilities in the Latin American steel
industry, and the improvements in process engineering and techniques
which had been enabled by these capabilities. Thus, firms in
industrialising countries were no longer seen as passive users of foreign
technologies but active adapters and developers of new technologies.
Similarly, Lall (1980, 1982a, 1987, and especially 1982b) examined the
growth of technological capabilities in industrialising countries,
focussing on their exports of technologies to other countries.2
Nevertheless, there still does not exist a wholly satisfactory
understanding of the process of technology acquisition and the build up
of technological capabilities. In particular, there is a gap in the
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understanding of the factors which influence and affect the process - in
developing, industrialising, and industrialised economies. This thesis is
a contribution towards the further analysis of this process.
This chapter poses and responds to three quite general questions
concerning the acquisition of technological capabilities and, in
particular, those associated with the machine tool industry in NICs.
<i> What benefits accrue to a developing country, and to its
manufacturing industry as a whole, from the establishment and promotion
of an indigenous machine tool industry? What are the costs of doing so?
(ii) What methods of learning have been used to acquire the relevant
capabilities? (iii) What sorts of factors, both internal and external to
individual firms, bear upon the development process?
In answering all these questions, the importance of types of
interaction is stressed. The benefits of an indigenous machine tool
industry flow from its ability to interact with the rest of manufacturing
industry and the technological support it gives to other industries. The
learning methods which appear most efficient similarly proceed from the
interaction between machine tool makers, users, component suppliers, and
competitors. And, finally, among the internal factors which bear most
significantly upon the acquisition of technological capabilities is the
place of a firm within a business structure which facilitates its
interaction with machine tool users.
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2.2 The Role of the Machine Tool Industry in Industrialising Countries
The introductory chapter noted the critical and strategic nature of
the machine tool industry in an industrial (machine-using) environment.
Its major input to other industries stems from its supply of production
machinery and its diffusion of new production technologies over many
industrial areas. All machine-using industries require new or modified
machinery in order to introduce new products and enhance productivity.
They are, in this way, dependent upon machinery producers. Many of these
newly adapted or developed machines may then be utilised in other user
industries, as well as in the original initiating user industry.3 This
section examines the role of the machine tool industry in a machine-using
economy. Why and when does an industrialising country need a machine
tool industry? What precisely are the benefits of an indigenous
capability in the manufacture of machine tools? To what extent and,
importantly, at what cost is it thought that development of these
capabilities should be promoted? Finally, which types of machines is it
considered necessary to manufacture domestically?
For industrialising countries, the import substitution of consumer
durables is often the first step in the development process, followed by
the expansion of low—technology exports. Datta Mitra (1979: 4) points
out that these countries are then caught at a crisis point: sustained
economic growth, based on the import substitution or the export
orientation policies of the government, is followed by a fairly rapid rise
in the wealth of the population, a greater demand for more consumer
goods, and an increase in wage rates. Unless these wage increases are
balanced by a corresponding rise in productivity, the industrialising
country will soon face severe competition in its export markets from
other newly emerging exporters, which have the benefit of even lower
wage rates. Thus, to remain internationally competitive, industrialising
countries must either improve their productivity to retain their export
market share or they must enter new markets.
One way to sustain the development process is to deepen industrial
structure. This may be accomplished by increasing the range of goods
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produced, expanding into more technology— and skill—intensive
manufacturing, and reducing the country's reliance on a narrow range of
export goods. There are two principal directions in which deepening can
occur: the country can enter either the manufacture of previously
imported materials, parts and components, or the manufacture of
production equipment itself. Production of many of the goods exported by
industrialising countries relies on the import of materials, parts,
components, and production equipment. Raw material production facilities,
such as steel works and petrochemical plants, can be economically
established after the commencement of the industrial activity which has
created a domestic market for these goods. For most industrialising
countries, machinery and equipment form a large share of their total
import bill: in Korea in 1977 they accounted for 27% of that bill (Datta
Mitra, 1979: 2). At the extreme, Patel suggests that if the requirements
for machinery, which increase with the expansion of industrial activity,
continue to be met by imports, eventually there will be a crisis caused
by a shortage of available foreign exchange. This crisis would, in
effect, halt the development process (1983: xiii). If Patel is right,
backward integration into the capital goods sector therefore represents
not only an opportunity for import substitution in the NICs, but a
financial imperative for industrialisation to continue in the long term.4
Datta Mitra (1979: 1-4) observes that for middle—income countries,
such as Korea, Brazil and Mexico, production of final and intermediate
goods had reached a high enough level that there was sufficient local
demand to justify backward integration into capital goods production.
Additionally, as these countries needed to move from labour—intensive to
skill— and capital—intensive industries, the machinery industry, by virtue
of its skill intensity, was appropriate. Finally, he argued that as
industrialised countries started to protect their domestic markets against
the traditional NIC exports of textiles, footwear, etc., NICs needed to
restructure the composition of their exports. As the capital goods
sector was unprotected and skilled labour intensive, this sector provided
a logical option for development.5
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Nevertheless, new market opportunities and purely financial
considerations are largely peripheral to the main inherent value of an
indigenous machinery industry. This arises from the ability of the
machinery industry to support the technological development and
competitiveness of other machine-using industries. This technological
support includes the enhancement of productivity in user industries, the
acceleration of the general diffusion of new technologies, and, eventually,
the facilitation of "new" product introductions by user industries. The
local availability of machinery suppliers enables the utilisation of the
skills and knowledge of machine producers in the operation and
enhancement of machine users' plants. This support function is crucial
and cannot be stressed enough in the present study.
Such user take-up of machinery producers' capabilities can only
occur if there are close linkages between the two types of firms. Lall
(1980: 204) defines these linkages as "direct relationships established by
firms in complementary activities which are external to 'pure' market
transactions". These non-market linkages between buyer and seller can
take many forms and are established for different reasons. In some
cases, links may be made to ease the direct buyer-seller market
relationship by reducing uncertainty and creating goodwill. This includes
such actions as giving information to suppliers on anticipated orders or
requirements so that they can plan their production accordingly. For the
machine tool industry and its users, the main benefits of inter-firm
linkages are technological.4 This type of link includes technical
assistance and the exchange of information, ensuring a matching of needs
and facilitating innovation.
A major use of the skills generated in the production of machine
tools is in the maintenance and repair of existing machine tools and
other machinery. Such skills are a necessity in any machine—using
economy. If they do not exist, the costs of utilising complex imported
machinery are extremely high, and the efficiency of these machines may be
considerably reduced. Such skills can be deployed to extend the useful
life of machinery, thus contributing to further capital savings which may
be a particularly important consideration in NICs and developing
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countries. Datta Mitra (1979: 9) notes that these skills are also of
benefit as they increase the range of machinery that can be imported and
maintained using indigenous skills. Furthermore, as Rosenberg (1982: 271)
has shown, increased knowledge in the operation and performance of
machinery should improve the knowledge—base on which decisions to import
specific machinery are made. This has two consequences: (i) the NIC firm
is able to negotiate with the seller from a position of knowledge of its
exact needs, and (ii) machinery more appropriate to the needs of the
country will be imported. Rosenberg refers to this as the ability to
make an "intelligent choice" and suggests that this knowledge—base is
very difficult to build up if there is no domestic experience or
production capacity. Machine tool producers also acquire capabilities in
the installation of production facilities and plant layout, which may then
be applied in all sectors of manufacturing industry. These capabilities
can be used to improve existing plant layouts and to install imported
specialised machinery.
Technical and developmental support given to machinery users by the
machine tool industry can also influence their overall competitiveness.
This type of support may either be in the development of new production
machinery to manufacture completely new products, or, more commonly, in
the form of improvements to existing machinery and its operation/layout,
enabling an increase in productivity. Both these mechanisms can
considerably enhance the competitiveness of users in the domestic and
export markets. Indeed, the loss of such a technical support network is
now of great concern to the US vehicle industry, which increasingly relies
on imported machinery to meet its requirements. One of the purchasing
managers in General Motors noted that their dependence on imported
machinery caused a considerable delay in their installation of new
equipment compared to producers in countries with an active machine tool
industry: "if you buy the very best from Japan, it has already been in
Toyota Motors for two years, and, if you buy it from West Germany, it has
already been in BMW for a year and a half"; "it is in GM's own best
interest to foster its domestic vendors. Only with suppliers on the
leading edge can GM gain an edge in production over its Japanese and
European competitors" (American Machinist. Jan. 1986: 45). For most
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industrialising countries, consideration of this leading—edge technological
support from its machine tool industry is a requirement for the future.
However, a domestic industry may enable the production of machinery more
appropriate to the needs of users in these countries, rather than obliging
them to accept the technological standards set down by producers in
industrialised countries.
The technological benefits of domestic inter-firm links are not
uni-directional; no links would ever be created if this were the case.
Along the channels which exist between machine tool producers and users,
there is also a transfer of technology and technological support from
user to producer. The technological relationship between the machine tool
making and using sectors should, therefore, be regarded as symbiotic. The
initial development of capital goods production is dependent on the
existence of a machine-using sector, as this sector provides machine
builders with their domestic market. In the establishment of machine tool
production, the users supply skills gained from the operation, basic
repair and maintenance of machinery.7 Once established, the machine
builders can give users technical support. However, users continue to
transfer technology to builders during development and after maturation.
Large machine tool users are usually acutely aware of new developments
in their supplier industry, and they transfer this information to other
suppliers. The new demand for specific types of machinery will also
sometimes promote the entry of domestic firms into their production.
Finally, the requirement for either new or adapted machinery entails the
transfer of technological details and quality control specifications from
user to producer. While it is often said that a healthy machinery
industry contributes to a healthy economy, the reverse is equally true: a
healthy user industry contributes significantly to a technically
progressive machinery industry.
Although some of these linkages could be built up with foreign
machinery suppliers if the machine tool users continued to rely on
imported machines, this process would not only be very slow but it would
also have many costs and disadvantages. The distance between user and
producer means that regular or frequent contact is difficult to achieve,
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and, consequently, the solution of minor machinery problems would have to
be undertaken by the user and not the producer. Such solutions may be
sub-optimal due to an incomplete understanding of the detailed technology
incorporated in the machine. Repairs take longer because of the time
taken for a technician to arrive on site and for any new parts or
components to be delivered. Such delays are expensive, as they mean that
machines may be inoperable for a considerable length of time, and they
can also disrupt production of an entire unit or plant if the machine
manufactures a critical component.
Machine tool producers will, of course, design special machinery or
adapt existing machinery for all their users, including their foreign
buyers. However, the industrialising or developing country user, as a
small and infrequent buyer, will probably go to the end of the producer's
queue. Furthermore, without a precise knowledge of operating conditions
and requirements in the user country, the machines may not be suitable
for the job for which they were intended. Indeed, many machine tool
producers are now in the business of supplying and installing Flexible
Manufacturing Systems (FMSs), which by their nature (see Chapter 3)
entail a close working relationship between producer and customer.
Accordingly, the export of such systems is a difficult matter. As
industrialising country firms become more competitive on the world
market, improvements to their manufacturing methods and enhancement of
their productivity become more important. Given linkages only with
foreign producers, such improvements are difficult to achieve, and, when
they do occur, take much longer than for direct competitors in countries
with such a support mechanism. Finally, in this competitive position it
also becomes important to firms not to reveal their new manufacturing
methods, so that they can gain a lead over direct competitors. If new
machinery has to be imported, this not only involves time delays, but a
greater risk that competitors in the export market will be able to
purchase the machine quickly and reduce any technical or market lead open
to the innovative firm.
21 .
2.2.1 A Role for Government?
Because of the range of technological and commercial benefits which
can accrue from an indigenous machine tool industry, it is frequently
regarded as suitable for "infant industry" support by NIC governments.8
Government policies intended to encourage the establishment and growth of
such industries are designed around the protection of the domestic market
and the subsidy of indigenous production. (The specific types of
measures introduced by NIC governments to promote machine tool
production are discussed in detail later in this chapter and in Chapters 6
and 7.) The establishment of a machine tool industry should, in principal,
be beneficial to all sectors of industry and to all sizes of firms.9
However, in some cases national machine tool industries are promoted by
government solely because of their specific technological and production
support of the defence sector. In these cases, benefits to other sectors
of manufacturing industry still accrue, but, because of the emphasis on
the production of machines to defence specifications, such benefits may
be limited.
For all the undoubted importance of government measures, a
machinery industry may still develop without government support through
an evolutionary process. This form of development usually takes place by
the backward integration of large machinery users into in-house
production for their own requirements, and by the growth of small repair
shops which start making machines similar to those they repair, usually
by direct copying. Traditionally, textile machinery producers often took
up machine tool production, while, the Korean case study shows that,
several vehicle producers have developed their own capabilities because
of the direct benefits they consider they will receive. However, from the
point of view of a government of an industrialising country, such
evolutionary development may have unsatisfactory features. Firstly, it
takes much longer for the emergence of a technically capable industry
which can support production facilities in other industries. Indeed, it
may never reach this point since it may not be able to sustain its slow
development. Secondly, when the backward integration of large machinery
users occurs, their main concern is to support their own production. Such
producers may be unwilling to establish links with competing firms and
slow to establish links with firms in other industries.10
Discussing Korea, Brazil and India, Chudnovsky et al. (1983: 102)
claim that "Ctlhe development of the capital goods sector in the three
countries could not have taken place without explicit government policies
aimed at fostering the domestic manufacturing of capital goods". In
other words, they consider that environmental and market conditions would
never have been sufficient to stimulate the evolutionary development of a
capital goods sector. The case study of the Korean machine tool industry
in Chapter 6 shows the undeniable importance of government intervention
in accelerating the acquisition of technological capbilities and enhancing
user-producer links. Nevertheless, contra Chudnovsky et al., it appears
quite plausible that a machine tool industry would have developed through
the backward integration of vehicle producers and increased domestic
demand.
So far, only the benefits of an indigenous machine tool building
capability have been considered, and it has been assumed that these
will accrue automatically. But it must be stressed that the domestic
production of machine tools does not necessarily mean that other
indigenous production industries will benefit. In order for these
benefits to be realised, the machine tools manufactured must meet
domestic demands as to type, size and quality; linkages must form between
users and producers; and the machine tool industry must acquire
technological capabilities adequate to support its user industries and to
solve their production problems. (Capabilities and their acquisition are
considered in greater detail in the next section.) Secondly, the complete
import substitution of all machinery imports, or even all machine tool
imports, would be economically inefficient. In fact, no industrialised
country is totally self-sufficient in machine tool production. The
governments of some NICs have encouraged production in those sectors of
the machine tool industry in which they consider that the benefits from
an indigenous capability may outweigh the costs. Specialisation in these
sectors is therefore often seen as desirable.11
Little <1982: 240-50) has questioned the validity of the argument
that the capital goods sector should be given special promotion in NICs,
contending that the costs are too great and that NIC production in this
sector is likely to be inefficient. He considered that, although
developing countries and NICs have a comparative advantage in some areas
of capital goods production, the production of capital goods is not, by
itself, a sufficient condition to promote technological development and
innovation. Little gives four reasons for caution in the promotion of the
capital goods sector: (i) for most LDCs the development of an indigenous
capital goods capability is a long-term goal and should not be aimed at
prematurely; (ii) there may only be a minimal contribution from this
sector to a more egalitarian and labour—intensive development; (iii) the
transfer of technology and know-how is especially difficult in engineering
industries; and <iv) there may never be any reduction in the dependence
on foreign designs and innovations. Accordingly, Little argues that most
of the capital goods produced in industrialising countries are copies of
designs from industrialised countries; thus, indigenously produced capital
goods are no more appropriate to the demands of an industrialising
country than imported ones. However, while pointing out all the
difficulties in entering such industries and the high costs associated
with them, Little does not consider the substantial problems which flow
from a decision not to enter. Firstly, if an industrialising country does
not enter the capital goods or machinery industries, it will never be able
to support its own development, and it will always have to rely on
inefficient industries and imported technology. Secondly, although Little
accurately stresses that production does not guarantee long-term
technological development, he does not consider that there may be other
potential benefits from production and from the inter—firm linkages which
may be set up.
Although the lower labour costs of NICs and developing countries
have been identified as giving them a competitive advantage in the
capital goods sector, Pack (1981) questions that claimed advantage. He
shows that levels of productivity are often much lower in developing than
in industrialised countries, thus nullifying any cost advantage gained
through the lower cost of skilled labour. Sources of low levels of
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productivity in developing countries are numerous, a major problem being
the lack of investment in production machinery and tools. Productivity is
further lowered by poor plant layout, low capacity utilisation, inadequate
training, and lack of information on machinery performance and operating
parameters. Losses therefore occur not only in the inadequate use of
machinery but also in inefficient use of skilled labour. Pack generally
supports the idea that there can be growth potential in the mechanical
engineering sectors of industrialising countries, and recognises that
success in such sectors depends upon greater attention to machinery
design and production. However, he warns about the risks and costs of
expanding into high—technology areas. He suggests that industrialising
countries should not expand into industries in which production
technologies require high levels of scientific training or into those in
which the product is undergoing very rapid design changes. In Pack's
view, the production of standardised components, such as gears and
bearings, is an achievable and appropriate goal for firms in
industrialising countries. For these products, increased experience in
production and quality control is necessary, but there are few demands
for design skills.
Nevertheless, Pack's recommendations carry a cost for the
industrialising country. While such a strategy may be successful, by
increasing production capabilities and improving production management,
expansion into such areas will not benefit other industrial sectors. Pack
also suggests that such components production may also provide a source
of export earnings. Indeed, there are such cases; for example, both
Korean and Indian firms have exported cast-iron machine beds to firms in
industrialised countries. But where these exports have taken place, they
were at the specific request of the purchasing firm which sub—contracted
the production. Without some form of help, either from foreign buyers or,
alternatively, from government, it will be very difficult for the
industrialising country firms to enter foreign markets with these
products, and any export earnings from them will probably be small.
Without doubt, there are considerable potential problems in the
development of a machinery industry by industrialising countries.
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Nevertheless, governments in such countries have encouraged and continue
to promote their indigenous industries. How, as a practical matter, can
governments assess costs and benefits? Such calculations are in
principle, so complex that, in practice, they may be treated as impossible.
Their difficulty is increased by the importance of what are usually called
non-economic factors, such as those involved in military or nationalistic
considerations. Jacobsson calculated the direct costs of promoting the
machine tool sector from governmental fiscal measures introduced in
Argentina, Korea and Taiwan, but did not consider the benefits from their
establishment. He suggested that because Taiwan has a much higher
export level, its benefit—to—cost ratio was higher than Korea's
(1986: 208). Significantly, the benefits of a technological capability in
machine building, if it is adequate to support other industries, were not
included. (Remarkably, these benefits were, in fact, proposed by Jacobsson
as one of the reasons why governments should support the development of
a machine tool industry (1986: 209).)
Such benefits are probably impossible to quantify. While it is
possible to measure the reduction in installation costs on major projects,
the potential savings from being able to make a better choice, the faster
repair of machinery, and the design of specialised machinery are more
difficult to estimate. However, for long—term development, the absence of
these skills may entail very high costs for other manufacturing sectors,
originating from dependence on foreign machinery and inability to improve
existing equipment or install new plant. While the initial costs of
establishing and promoting the machinery industry may be high compared
to its short-term returns, the long-term costs of not having capabilities
in this industry are potentially even greater. The cost-benefit
calculation is, of course, very different if the machine tool industry is
promoted especially to support defence production. In these cases,
national security is the highest priority, and the high costs of
initiating a machine tool industry may be considered small in comparison
to its ability to support the domestic defence industry. Moreover, once
the machinery industry has been initiated for predominantly defence
considerations, the cost environment for a civilian sector may be
substantially affected.
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Of course, for some countries the potential benefits of an
indigenous machine tool industry may never outweigh the associated costs
of its promotion. This is true for countries with either a very small
manufacturing industry, such as New Zealand, or those, such as Denmark,
which have easy access to machine builders in other countries. In these
countries, the domestic machine tool market is too small to be able to
support an economic domestic industry, and they have few export
possibilities because no competitive export advantage exists.
For those countries in which there is either a large enough domestic
market to support an indigenous industry or in which there is a
competitive advantage in machine tool production, the main question is: in
which areas should production be concentrated? This is really a question
about specialisation, which is crucial if the machine tool industry is to
become economically viable. Rosenberg argues that specialisation should
be seen in a dynamic as well as a static framework:
CTlhere is an important learning process involved in
machinery production, and a high degree of specialization
is conducive not only to an effective learning process but
to an effective application of that which is learned
(1976: 17).
The preferred direction of specialisation is a decision which depends upon
a variety of considerations. What capabilities are required to
manufacture different types of machines? What is the nature of the
domestic and export markets for various machines? (These considerations
are dealt with in Chapters 3 and 4.)
To summarise, there are three major reasons why governments of
industrialising countries may consider the establishment of an indigenous
machine tool industry to be beneficial: (i) the machinery produced may be
more suitable for operating conditions in these countries; (ii) the
externalities of machinery production are of benefit to all sectors of
manufacturing industry; and (iii) the indigenous manufacture of capital
goods offers potential savings in foreign exchange requirements and can
contribute to an increased rate of domestic capital formation. Of these
factors, it has been shown that the potential externalities from the
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technological capabilities formed in the machine tool industry, and its
technical linkages to other industries, are essential requirements if a
country is to become fully industrialised and able to introduce its own
new products. Because of these important benefits to other sectors of
manufacturing industry, and because the natural evolution of a machine
tool capability may take a long time, governments in industrialising
countries have concluded in practice that the costs justify the benefits.
Although governments of industrialising countries have taken a variety of
positions on import substitution and protection of their machine tool
industries, a strong case can be made for the advisability of
specialisation. Such a case would argue the appropriateness of
specialising in those areas of production whose capabilities are of the
greatest benefit to domestic industries and in which some competitive
advantage may be secured.12
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2.3 Technological Capabilities and Learning Methods
In order merely to sustain the development of an indigenous machine
tool industry a certain range of technological capabilities are required.
(Indeed, Bell et al. (1984) argue just this case for any infant industry.)
However, for the machine tool industry to effectively contribute to the
development of the manufacturing sector in general, a greater range of
capabilities is needed. There is no necessity that a national machine
tool industry will acquire that greater range of capabilities. The
Taiwanese machine tool industry, to be discussed in Chapter 7, is an
export-orientated industry with a limited range of technological
capabilities, contributing little to other Taiwanese manufacturing
industries. That situation has developed as an historical outcome of a
structure in which there hac been relatively few inter-firm linkages
between machine tool makers and users. Yet in other countries, such as
Japan and Korea, a far greater range of technological capabilities have
built up in the machine tool industries, and these have proved an
important source of technological support for the whole manufacturing
sector. And, as Chapters 6 and 7 will show, that situation developed as
an historical outcome of situations in which intei—firm linkages between
machine tool makers and users have been many and close.
In the previous chapter, technological capabilities were defined as a
complex combination of formal and tacit scientific knowledge, engineering
techniques, craft skills, and social relations; and the development process
was considered as the continuous accumulation of such capabilities.
Technological capabilities were broadly divided into two types: those
which required "know—how" and those requiring "know—why", In this
section, technological capabilities are examined in greater detail. How
have capabilities been categorised? How are capabilities acquired or
enhanced? What forms of learning mechanisms operate in industrialising
country firms, and which are the most effective methods of quickly
assimilating technology? How can capabilities be measured?
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2.3.1 Types of Technological Capabilities
Perhaps the most comprehensive categorisation of technological
capabilities is that of Dahlman and Cortes (1984), which identified five
broad and overlapping categories of capability required for setting up
and operating manufacturing facilities: (i) The ability to acquire existing
product and process knowledge. This includes the ability to search for
technology, select that which is most suitable, and negotiate the terms on
which it is transferred. (ii) The implementation stage, i.e., the ability
to install and commence the operation of technology. (iii) The ability to
operate established production plants, including the skills required to
operate the plant, and to repair and maintain production equipment.
<iv) The capability to adapt, adjust and improve production equipment, raw
materials used, or the final product, in order to remain competitive. (v)
The ability to create new technological knowledge in either the product
or the production process, in order to adapt them to local conditions or
to operate more efficiently.15
The ordering of the capabilities should not be seen as stages of
development nor is one capability a prerequisite for the next. As Lall
(1987) points out, not all these capabilities have to exist within each
firm, or even within the industrialising country, for it to undertake
manufacturing activities, but it has to be able to buy in the capabilities
it does not have. For example, few industrialising countries have the
capabilities to install large plants, especially if this is their first
experience in a specific industry. In these cases, new plant may be
acquired on a turnkey basis, i.e., a complete plant is bought, which is
installed and commissioned for them by the vendor. Alternatively, foreign
consultants may be hired to supervise installation. However, each firm
must acquire a basic repertoire of capabilities:
CTlhere are certain core technological activities which
have to be be provided by the enterprise itself - they
define the boundaries of the firm itself as a distinct
economic entity. The ability to select the right project
and source of technology, to provide efficient day—to—day
plant operation, to make necessary adaptations, to select and
induct new generations of technology — these cannot be
bought in (Lall, 1987: 12).
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These "core" technological activities are mainly based on product
and production "know-how", and there is only a small requirement of
"know—why" necessary in the choice and introduction of new technologies.
However, if the firm is going either to make major adaptations to the
product <or production equipment), or if it wants to develop its own new
products, there is an increasing need for a greater understanding of the
product/production equipment. That is, the firm needs a greater amount
of "know—why" to undertake such developments. This is especially
important for the machine tool industry. Only with a considerable
knowledge of machine tool design and construction can firms undertake
their support function decribed earlier. (In the following chapter, the
specific technological capability requirements for the manufacture and
design of machine tools are examined, including an analysis of the
additional capabilities required by conventional machine tool producers
commencing CNC machine tool production.)
As product and production technologies are continually changing, the
acquisition of technological capabilities, or, in later stages, the process
of innovation, are also continuous. Consequently, new choices have to be
made about the expansion or installation of further plant, and the
introduction of different technologies and production methods. At each
stage, the ability to search for new technology and to negotiate its
acquisition will make subsequent technology acquisitions easier. Once
experience in the installation and operation of similar plant has
occurred, firms' ability to make an intelligent choice is enhanced.
2.3.2 Learning Processes in the Acquisition of Technological
Capabilities
National industrial development depends on the build up of
technological capabilities, usually within firms, or in technological
institutes or universities. How are these capabilities learnt? Lall
suggests that "Q]earning is based partly on the experience of production,
partly on importing 'ready made' knowledge from industrialized countries
and partly on a deliberate process of investing in the creation of
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knowledge" (1987: 230). Lall thus offers a useful initial breakdown of
different types of learning, and these categories may be used to examine
in greater detail the extremely wide range of learning methods that firms
use to acquire new technological capabilities and to enhance existing
ones.
(a) Learning from Experience of Production
This type of learning is often referred to as "learning by doing",
and has traditionally been regarded as a learning process which is both
automatic and costless. Bell et al. (1984) have strongly argued that
learning by doing is not costless, and, unless there is considerable
technological effort incorporated in this learning process, it is also
likely to be ineffective. They argue that learning in production only
occurs if there is a feedback of information, enabling an understanding of
the production process, and a flow of information which can be used to
improve the productive system. This gathering of information and its
transfer only occurs if there is a deliberate "allocation of resources to
an effort that can generate, interpret, and act upon that flow"
(1984: 120). To illustrate this point, Bell et al. cite Dahlman and
Fonseca's (1978) study of technological change in the Usiminas steel plant
in Brazil, where the introduction of a standard cost system initiated the
feedback of information on plant performance. By monitoring the system
in this way, knowledge of the factors behind variations in performance
and a more thorough understanding of the system was built up. This
increased knowledge was then utilised to identify problem areas and to
implement improvements. Although this type of learning can be used to
make considerable improvements in productivity, Bell et al. think that
firms cannot rely only on this type of learning in order to continue
developing. If the firm is to achieve and maintain international
competitiveness, it must supplement this method with direct training and
with investment in new technologies.
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<b) Learning by Importing "Ready Made" Knowledge
There are numerous methods by which firms in developing countries
acquire technology from industrialised countries, and, in their early
development, learning processes which can accompany the import of
technology are probably the most important source of technological
capability expansion. It should be emphasised here that the importation
of technology does not imply that there is little technological effort on
the part of the importer; indeed, as in the case of copying foreign
products, the reverse may be true. Technology can be imported in many
different forms: foreigners can be either active or passive in its
transfer; and the actual transfer of the technology can be either formally
regulated or informal. Table 2.1 shows different types of technology
transfers, distinguishing between formal and informal, and the active or
passive role of foreigners in each type of transfer.
Table 2,1 Different Methods of Acquiring Foreign Technologies
ACTIVE ROLE FOR PASSIVE ROLE FOR
FOREIGNERS FOREIGNERS
Direct Foreign Investment, Machinery and Plant Imports
FORMAL Joint Ventures, Purchase of
AGREEMENTS Turnkey Facilities, Hiring
Consultants, Licensing,
Overseas Training
INFORMAL Feedback from Exporting Crude and Adaptive Copying,
TRANSFERS Inforiation in Journals, etc,
Adapted from Fransman (1985; S77)
There are various types of learning processes which accompany the
different methods of technology acquisition. The types of capability
built up are also considerably affected by the mode of technology
transfer, and, when foreigners have an active role, the nature of their
involvement.
Imported plant and machinery often incorporate technology which is
new to the industrialising country. When these imports are standardised
and fairly small in size, there may be very little contact with the
foreign vendor. Although initially these imports may be used
inefficiently, if active learning—by—doing occurs, its use should improve.
The higher quality of new equipment may enable manufacturers either to
increase their productivity or their product quality. (When the imports
are on a larger scale or are designed especially for the purchaser, it is
likely that the vendor will have an active role and this can be regarded
as similar to the purchase of turnkey facilities.)
In many industrialising countries, the early build up of
technological capabilities depends on copying imported goods, employing
skills that have been built up through using the goods (for example, the
small machine tool repair shop reproducing the machines it repairs).
According to Chudnovsky et al. (1983), there are two distinct types of
copying: crude and adaptive. Crude copying involves the simplification of
imported goods, removing complicated parts, and reducing the
manufacturing requirement. After the initial simplification work on the
product has been completed, it is very easy for other firms to then
reproduce the technology. Although this type of acquisition of technology
and production does give the country an entry into the industry,
Chudnovsky et al. show there are major limitations to the subsequent
development of the industry and the build up of capabilties. Firstly, as
the product is for the bottom (cheap) end of the market, prospects for
improving the product while retaining its low price are remote, and any
improvements will reduce the potential market share. Secondly, if any
developments are undertaken, these may be subsequently copied, at little
or no cost, by other domestic producers. Thirdly, as production is
usually low volume and responsive to fluctuations in the level of demand,
constraints are placed on the scale, and, consequently, on the
standardisation, of production operation. Finally, because of the low
quality of the product, there are few opportunities for expanding the
market through exporting. Thus, there is little incentive for firms to
attempt such developments, and there may be considerable risk involved.
When the copying process is accompanied by the adaptation of
product design to improve quality or marketability (or both), this can be
considered adaptive copying. For a firm to undertake adaptive copying, a
greater skill level and a greater depth of manufacturing experience are
required, i.e., adaptive copying also requires an element of "know-why" as
well as "know-how". Chudnvosky et al. (1983) suggest that a firm's size
affects whether it is able to allocate adequate resources to adaptive
copying, and they conclude that larger firms may be the only ones able to
undertake it. As with crude copying, other factors, such as the
availability of cheap machinery and the nature of the domestic market,
also affect producers' ability to enhance product design.
All copying activities have associated costs. The original product
being copied usually has to be purchased. And the time taken by
engineers to learn about the product, reproduce it, and refine either the
product or its production all have associated costs. Crude copying may
be regarded as a fairly low-cost activity, while the costs associated with
adaptive copying are greater since they incorporate a continuing technical
effort and investment. Once a successful copy has been made, there are
no further costs, such as those involved when a royalty still has to be
paid to a foreign licensor. Furthermore, if there is a potential export
market, unless the copied product has directly infringed a copyright or
patent, the manufacturer has the chance to exploit these opportunities.
Manufacturers using foreign technology agreements frequently have their
exports limited or regulated as part of such agreements.
If a firm commences production using some form of copying, is this
method sufficient to build up enough design and technical skills to
become fully competitive on the international market? It has already
been shown that there are limits to technology acquisition through crude
copying. Chudnovsky et al. (1983) claim that firms relying solely on
imitation will reach a limit of technical ability and will be unable to
progress further without help from some outside agency. Bell (1984)
reaches similar conclusions and suggests several different learning
mechanisms which may be used to overcome these problems. "Learning by
hiring" may be one such effective method. However, to be able to buy in
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the appropriate knowledge and skills, they have to be readily available,
and this is not always the case. Existing personnel may be trained
either by sending them abroad to learn new techniques in established
plants or by hiring foreign experts to work in the plant and train new
workers on site. Specific gaps in knowledge and skills may be filled by
hiring consultants or by working with a research institute. This kind of
learning is referred to as "learning by training", and in many cases it
involves more formal participation by foreigners. While this type of
learning can accompany the formal transfer of technology, it does not
necessarily do so. For example, students from an industrialising country
studying in more developed countries return with considerable skills and
knowledge, yet there is no direct transfer of technology as usually
understood.
There can be considerable capability development accompanying the
formal import of new technologies or techniques. There are three
distinct types of technology that can be included in such agreements: (i)
basic product design; (ii) detailed design of parts and components; and
(iii) manufacturing technology. Licence and co-production agreements vary
as to which of these technologies are contained, and the depth of design
and production know-how and methodology transferred will also be specific
to the agreement. The whole technology package is incorporated, with
some provision for training, in joint ventures and the installation of
turnkey plants.
Depending on the form of agreement and the technology transferred,
there will be different emphases on the types of capabilities built up.
With joint ventures and direct foreign investments, the technological
capabilities developed tend to be concentrated in production and the
repair and maintenance of plant and machinery ("know-how"). Little
"know-why" is included, and few skills in product design or development
are ever transferred, as this work is usually undertaken by the parent
company in the developed country.14 Similarly, with the purchase of
turnkey plants, the main capabilities acquired are in production, repair
and maintenance. However, in many cases there is also a transfer of
installation capabilities incorporating an element of "know-why". These
capabilities may be used in subsequent expansion projects and in the
construction of new plant.15 Licensing agreements are probably most
variable in the capabilities transferred, depending on their precise terms.
In some cases, design skills are transferred, and personnel from the
licensor firm are trained in the licensee's own plant. Some production
capabilities may be transferred as well. Alternatively, the licence may
only cover a small part or component of a larger product, and, if the
licensor is already skilled in the manufacture of this product, the
agreement is accompanied by only very limited learning.
The cost of acquiring a new technology is more than the cost of a
set of blueprints, since the utilisation of resources in the transmission
of the technology and in the absorption of technological capabilities must
also be accounted for in the final figure. Teece (1977) lists four
additional project costs, beyond royalty costs, incurred in the transfer of
technology. These expenses are: (i) the cost of pre-engineering
technological exchanges, so that the buyer understands the basic
characteristics of the technology to be transferred; (ii) the engineering
costs associated with transferring the product design and its production
engineering; (iii) the R&D costs incurred in the installation and
adaptation of the technology in solving unexpected problems and modifying
the technology to suit local conditions; and (iv) the pre-start-up costs
in de-bugging the system and training costs to enable the manufacture to
continue as efficiently as possible. These are all one-off costs at the
start of the agreement, but there are other costs which are continuous
throughout the operation of the agreement. Established in the agreement
will be a royalty payment as a percentage, usually between 2% and 5%, of
licensed sales. There are also implicit costs built into the agreement
and continuing through its life, including the tied import/supply of
certain parts and components, export restrictions and grant-back
provisions.1 4
The costs incurred within the firm in the acquisition of the
technology will depend to a large extent on the indigenous capabilities
which already exist. Both Chudnovsky et al. (1983) and Teece (1977) show
that the existing technological capacity in the firm affects the success
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of transfer. Greater technical knowledge will aid in the negotiation for
the technology and in the conditions set out in the transfer agreement
(referred to earlier as the capability to a make an "intelligent choice").
Included in these conditions will be the training and technical assistance
(i.e., the "unembodied" knowledge) to be transferred in the package.
Moreover, the R&D capabilities of the firm are important in solving
problems encountered during the transfer of the technology, and during
subsequent modifications.
Firms in industrialising countries have been critical of many
aspects of licensing agreements, and especially of the type and quantity
of technology contained therein.17 The main criticism is that the
transferred technology is often old and the transferors are unwilling to
license any of their new technology. Thus, the licensees are unable to
compete at the leading edge of the technology. A second criticism is
that the information contained in the agreement does not cover the design
methodology. This means that the undeveloped design skills in the
licensee firms canCnot be effectively enhanced or built up. The build up
of design skills is therefore a very slow process and the new firms are,
in effect, forced to rely on imported technology for longer.
The characteristics of the transferor are often neglected in
analyses of technology agreements since it is assumed that one source
will be as good as any other. Teece (1977) points out that the extent to
which the technology and its response to different conditions are
understood by the transferor is an important factor to be considered. As
the technology matures, the transferor gains more knowledge of the
effects of different parameters and changes in design. And there are
other advantages of matured technology. Firstly, the design will be in a
final form, which will make it easier to transfer and to understand.
Secondly, if the technology is widely diffused, it should also be cheaper
for the licensee, who can choose from whom he purchases the technology.
These factors mean that new technology, which has not been widely tested
and diffused, is difficult and hence costly to transfer, both for the
licensee and the licensor.
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Finally, there is the learning method known as "learning by
exporting", discussed by Westphal et al. (1984b: 286). At first sight,
this seems a rather odd inclusion in a discussion of learning by
importing "ready made" knowledge, since it is not immediately obvious how
the export of goods leads to an import of capabilities. Yet this import
is just what occurs from the feedback of product information and
technical help following the supply of export goods. Westphal et al.
argue that this was an important influence on improvements made in both
productivity and quality control in some Korean industries. This type of
learning frequently took place when foreign purchasers visited the Korean
producer and suggested changes in the production process and engineering.
Although the flow of information is virtually costless for the
industrialising country firm, there are costs associated with this
learning method, since firms have to allocate resources in the
implementation of suggestions and recommendations concerning the
improvement of their product or production methods (Fransman, 1985: 579).
(c) Learning from Investment in Knowledge Creation
In order to be effective, the learning methods treated above
necessarily involve some degree of investment in knowledge (or capability)
creation. Indeed, Bell suggests that "Celxplicit investment in
technological capacity becomes ... a necessary condition for any further
progress" (1984: 200). And, as noted earlier, Bell et al. (1984) have
asserted that costless learning by doing does not create technological
capabilities. Similarly, unless there is a dedicated investment in the
learning processes accompanying technology imports of all kinds, whether
foreigners are taking a passive or an active role, few indigenous
capabilities will be acquired.
Nevertheless, firms and governments may take deliberate decisions to
build up their knowledge bases. Investment in knowledge creation is
important in the field of marketing and in the observation of
technological trends in both the domestic and international markets. Bell
(1984) refers to this type of knowledge creation as "learning by
searching", for example, collecting information about technologies which
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may not be acquired or which may only be acquired at a later stage. This
process increases the knowledge—base on which future decisions about
changes in product or production can be made, and, therefore, it can be an
important input into the success of new technology imports. There are
many ways that firms can acquire this type of information. Trade
journals and periodicals are a common source, and, trade associations
often publish their own journals, which contain information about general
technological trends and, sometimes, synopses of new patents. Trade
fairs, especially the larger international ones, are also an important
opportunity for firms to increase their awareness of both technological
developments and market trends. Governments, notably in Japan, have
established centres to collect this type of information and disseminate it
to industry.
The creation of design and development teams to work on specific
new technical projects also represents a considerable investment, and
commitments of this sort are usually made only after production has been
established and firms have acquired some "know—why" as well as
"know—how". These investments are not just made at the firm level: in a
number of countries national institutes, funded totally or partly by
government, have been established to support industrial development.
Although much of the work undertaken by both these types of development
groups frequently relies on technology imports, and they rarely undertake
anything more than applied research work, they do represent a
formalisation of technological endeavour.
(d) "Interactive Learning"
In addition to the three learning processes identified by Lall, there
is another mechanism that appears to have been of great importance in
the acquisition of capabilities by both Korean and Japanese machine tool
firms. This mechanism is related to learning from experience of
production, but it is embedded in the structure and dynamics of technical
inter—firm linkages. The closer the links between producers and users,
the more effectively both appear to learn from each other and to transfer
capabilities. Learning through these links may be either through the
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transfer of technical information from supplier to buyer, through the
development of specific products at the request of the buyer, or through
feedback on potential product improvements from buyer to supplier.1* In
the development of specific products, there is frequently a considerable
amount of technological information which is transferred between firms.
Machine tool producers have considerably enhanced their own capabilities
through the manufacture and adaptation of machines for their users. In
addition, machine tool makers have benefitted from technological
innovations made by their component suppliers, and from suggestions and
feedback from users on the domestic market and on international markets.
Because of the active role of both suppliers and users in this type of
learning, it is best referred to as "interactive learning". This method of
learning will be documented and illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7.
2.3.3 Measuring Technological Capabilities
When "technological developments" are referred to in industrialised
countries, they are usually taken to mean the introduction of new
products or processes. The technological creativity of firms in these
countries can, therefore, be measured by an analysis of new products
developed or the number of patents applied for. This type of measurement
in industrialising or developing countries is largely meaningless. It is
important to stress that indigenous technological capabilities in
industrialising countries are rarely at the leading edge, or frontier, of
relevant technologies. Consider, for example, Stewart's definition of
indigenous technology:
I take [indigenous technology] to be a local capacity to
create/adapt/modify technology. In other words, as well as
the creation of some completely new technology, it includes
the development of technology already known elsewhere and
the local modification of imported technologies <1984: 81).
Thus, any measure of the increase in indigenous technological capabilities
must include developments which enable the firm, or the industry, to move
closer to the international frontier or which enable it to develop its own
frontier. Such a measure would also cover the increase in capabilities
required to master and use all imported technologies. This definition of
acquired capabilities is close to Nelson and Winter's view of innovation:
they suggest that "almost any nontrivial change in product or process, if
there has been no prior experience, is an innovation" (1977: 48).
Even with this much broader definition of what should be considered
as an innovation and an increase in technological capabilities, there is
still the difficulty of trying to measure both the level of technological
capabilities within a firm or the increase in such capabilities. One
indicator of the accumulation of technological capabilities is the change
in direction of technology flow. While in the early stages of development
a high proportion of technology is imported, as technology is absorbed
and diffused imports decrease. The end result would be the achievement
of technological mastery and the ability to develop new
products/processes. Then, exports of technology can exceed imports.
However, for countries still in the process of industrialising such a
measure is not possible. Even for countries which are now considered to
be industrialised there are still problems. Chapter 7 shows that in Japan
the reversal of technology trade had not occurred by the early 1980s,
because payments were still being made for agreements made several years
earlier.
The ability to export technology can be used by itself as an
indicator of technological capabilities, and indeed has been used
extensively by Lall (see, for example, 1982b). Lall only includes exports
of technology which are skill based, while excluding exports of
commodities and equipment. The latter are excluded because they can be
manufactured with few indigenous capabilities, for example, by assembling
imported parts or with considerable foreign influence in a direct foreign
investment firm. Skill—based technology exports do, however, indicate an
accumulation of capabilities. Although this may be an adequate indicator
for the build up of capabilities, it does not necessarily follow that
countries lacking such technology exports have not reached high
capability levels. Additionally, this measure can only be used to show
the build up of certain types of capabilities. For example, capabilities
in the installation of equipment will be well represented, but
capabilities in adapting, adjusting, and improving products will not.
Enos and Park suggest four different measures to indicate the
absorption of imported technology (1988: 13). The first two concern the
specific activities involved in the absorption of the new technology (e.g.,
the design of the plant and equipment, its purchase and installation).
Reductions in the time taken for these activities to be completed and the
increase in the proportion of the workforce originating in the importing
country can both be used to show an increase in capabilities. However,
neither are foolproof; activities may be terminated prematurely or a
foreign expert replaced too soon, both of which would result in
inefficiencies and increased costs. The other two measures apply to the
actual production undertaken in any new venture. Both the rate of output
compared to design capacity and the cost of output show increases in
operating capabilities. And in industrial sectors where there is little
product variation such measures can be effectively compared to show
different rates of accumulation in various firms.
However, for the machine tool industry such a measure is extremely
difficult because of the great variations in products and the capabilities
required to manufacture them. For example, Chapter 6 shows that the
design and production skills needed in the manufacture of machining
centres are greater than those required for the production of CNC lathes.
Quantitative comparisons are also protfematic here. Comparisons of output
are only indicators of firms' size and commercial success; they do not
address the depth to which capabilities have been acquired. Thus, by
relying on imported technology, firms can manufacture very successfully
with very few capabilities in the design or adaptation of machine tools.
Similarly, comparisons of the specifications of the products themselves
give no insight into the origins of their design, the skill input of the
firm, or the reputation of the machines on the market. Furthermore, as
machines are designed for different markets, for different purposes, and,
to cut to different tolerances, direct comparisons of specifications are
probably useless.1*
Jacobsson (1986: 105-09) ambitiously attempts to rank firms
according to quantitative measures of their production and design
capabilities. He bases his measure of design capability on five factors:
the type of design, the origin of the design, the number of models
produced, the number of designers and electronic engineers in the firm,
and the establishment of a marketing network in the US. However, he
admits that "Celvaluating the importance of the five factors that indicate
the technological capabilities of the firms is problematical" (1986: 109),
and proceeds to give a qualitative justification for his ranking.20
Indeed, given the complex nature of the firms and their products it is
highly doubtful whether any such quantitative typology can adequately
indicate levels of technological capabilities. Any meaningful comparison,
therefore, has to be qualitative and needs to take into consideration both
the complexity of the products and the depth to which development, design
and production capabilities have been absorbed.21 In order to undertake
this sort of analysis it is necessary to examine in detail the
technological requirements for the design and production of the machine
tools studied. This is the task of Chapter 3.
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2.4 Factors Influencing the Acquisition of Technological Capabilties
Firms' acquisition and development of technological capabilities, and
the learning mechanisms they choose, are heavily influenced both by the
make-up of the firms and the environment in which they operate. A broad
"environmental" approach has been recommended by several analysts,
notably Stewart. She also pointed out deficiencies in existing work which
identified a range of causal factors and interactions between them but
which said little about how these factors actually operated (1984: 93).
In a similar vein Katz writes that "Ca3 point not yet explored in the
recent literature is that both the rate and specific nature of the
technological learning sequences seem strongly to depend upon nationality,
size of company and general macroeconomic atmosphere underlying firm
operation" (1984: 125).22 It is possible to divide influencing factors
into two groups: (i) those which are specific to a particular firm and,
therefore, may be considered internal to the firm, and (ii) factors which
are industry or country specific and, therefore, external to individual
firms. An important point to note is that a factor should not be treated
in isolation, as each factor may interact and influence the others.
2.4.1 Internal Factors
Three internal factors can be considered here: (i) the size and
organisation of the firm, (ii) its skill profile, and (iii) the other
products it manufactures. All these factors affect the firm's knowledge
of technology, the capabilities that have already been acquired, and the
learning mechanisms that it can undertake.
(i) Size and Organisation
The number of employees in a firm, its turn-over, and its
capitalisation affect its ability to expand, to acquire new machinery, and
to enter new product areas. These factors primarily influence the firm's
resources and, consequently, its capacity to take risks and invest in
technological development. As already noted, Chudnovsky et al. (1983)
suggest that size is an important factor when considering whether firms
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are able to undertake adaptive copying. And the case study in Chapter 6
finds that size was also a particularly important consideration for firms
wanting to enter formal technology import agreements. For small firms
there are great difficulties in establishing overseas links and
negotiating the terms of technology agreements, and, compared to larger
firms which can draw on their own internal resources, they have much
greater difficulties both in entering into formal agreements and in
enhancing their technological capabilities. Larger firms are able to
establish close links with foreign companies, negotiate effectively for
the transfer of technology, and invest in training schemes and technology
creation. Bessant (1983: 50) has suggested that although small firms are
restricted in their access to finance and technical resources, their size
enables them to react faster to market and technology changes. Similarly,
Freeman (1974) thinks that smaller firms have an advantage in new
product developments stemming from their flexibility, concentration and
more efficient internal communications.23 While such factors may have an
effect on firms in an industrialised country, the Korean study indicates
that small firms in NICs have much greater difficulties in approaching
the technology frontier. And, because of their relatively low investment
in capability formation, it takes them longer to build up a full range of
technological capabilities.
When a firm is part of a larger company or industrial conglomerate,
it becomes important to consider how it operates within that structure.
Is the firm closely tied to other firms within the group? Are there
close, collaborative technological links between firms in the group which
manufacture similar products or which utilise similar technologies? Have
these links "internalised" interactive learning? This is an especially
important consideration for the machine tool industry. Firstly, some
firms integrate backwards into the manufacture of machine tools in order
to support the manufacture of their main product, typically vehicles. The
production strategies of such machine tool firms, which sell a large
proportion of their machines to a parent or sister company, will obviously
be very different from those of independent firms which sell nearly all
their machines on the open market. Secondly, since interactive learning
seems to be an important mechanism through which firms build up their
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capabilities, the internalisation of this mechanism may be a major
influence on the development of some firms.
Firm organisation is also an important factor in the Korean case as
the structure of its industry is slightly unusual compared to other NICs,
proceeding from the existence of very large conglomerates, known as
chaebols. In the 1970s, the chaebols dominated industrial growth and
technological development. (Similar conglomerates, known as keiretsu,
exist in Japan.) Membership of these large industrial groups may give
firms several advantages over independent firms. These advantages appear
to be an inherent part of the firm structure and did not arise solely
because the chaebols were favoured by the Korean government in the
industrial incentives it offered. The inter-firm linkages between
companies within the same group can be very close, and may affect many
aspects of their technical development. For example, conglomerate firms
may have access to centrally— or jointly—run R&D facilities, in which case
extensive and formal interactive learning may occur. Internal trade
within the chaebol also gives individual firms a captive market and
increases the feedback of information regarding the supplier firm's
product and the supply of knowledge on technology and product changes.
Such close contact means that suppliers can be especially responsive to
changes in user demand, and, consequently, changes in product and
production techniques can be implemented more rapidly.
(ii) Existing Skills and Technical Knowledge
The skill profile of a firm is to a large extent dependent on the
other two internal factors: the size of the firm and the other products
it manufactures. The skill profile (or the number and nature of
capabilities a firm possesses) influences the firm's new product
developments and its acquisition of new capabilities. Rosenberg (1975:
156—57) points out that there are common skills, techniques and know—how
used in the manufacture of all mechanical engineering products. Thus, as
already noted, experience in the operation of machine tools and metal
working manufacture gives the firm a basic set of skills on which to base
its entry into machine tool manufacture. Because of this transfer of
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skills from one product area to another, the Korean firms described in
Chapter 6 were specifically asked what products they had manufactured
before they commenced machine tool production. Even skills which are not
industry— or discipline—specific, e.g., in organisation and management,
marketing, purchasing, and production planning, are important elements in
the expansion of production or entry into new product areas.
Arguably, a firm's existing technical knowledge should be understood
as including personnel's knowledge of the market and their personal
contacts in that market. This sort of knowledge is unquantifiable, yet it
can be a valuable source of market and product information for the firm.
Experience from previous employment, friends in other plants/factories,
contacts in government, research institutes and industry associations are
all important sources of information and knowledge for the firm. Von
Hippel's important study (1987) of steel minimills, has shown that
networks of contacts evolve between engineers with similar interests who
work for competing (and non-competing) firms. Through these links firms
receive help in the solution of product and production problems. In the
expansion of exports, information on foreign competitors, access to
foreign agents, and links to an aftersales service network are all
crucial. Similarly, if firms want to enter formal foreign technology
agreements, contact with foreign competitors must be established. One
way firms are able to build up contacts with foreign firms is by
attending or exhibiting at the relevant international trade fairs.
Chapter 6 shows that several Korean producers which had entered formal
foreign technology agreements maintained close contact with their foreign
licensors, even after the formal agreements had been terminated. These
contacts had been used to obtain technical information and help in the
solution of design and production problems.
Firms' investment in skill and capability creation is to some extent
dependent on the national industrial environment. It has been suggested
that employment practices are importantly related to decisions on
investment in training. Thus, large Japanese firms with a tradition of
life-time employment tend to invest heavily in training their personnel,
there being little likelihood that they will leave to work for a
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competitor (Peck and Goto, 1981: 241-42). Conversely, where there is a
rapid turnover of employees firms are unlikely to invest in training. In
such firms there may be no, or only a slow rate of, skill formation.
(iii) Compatibility with Other Products
A firm's existing products not only affect its skill profile but also
influence financial aspects of entering new product areas. For example,
if there already is plant and machinery within the firm which may be
utilised in new product areas, entry costs will be lowered. Similarly, if
operations or activities which need high volume or high utility to make
the whole process economic can be shared with another product or
production process, then the overall economic scale of production may be
reduced. Such features influence the strategy of firms considering a new
product area. Teece, for example, discusses the concept of "economies of
scope". He contends that such an economy exists when "for all outputs y,
and y2 the cost of joint production is less than the cost of producing
each output separately" (1980: 224). The direct application of this
formula to the backward integration into machine tool production is
problematic as there are few shared processes and cost advantages may
only accrue to one product. For example, two Korean vehicle producers
have found that by producing y, (production equipment) they can enhance
the production processes by which y2 (vehicles) is manufactured. This
gives the main product (y-j,) higher quality and/or lower costs without
necessarily reducing the cost of production equipment (y,).
Within conglomerates the compatibility of products is also an
important issue. If firms within a conglomerate manufacture compatible
products, they are able to take advantage of the close technological and
trading links discussed earlier. Moreover, if there is a considerable
overlap of their technology and their training requirements, they are able
to establish centralised R&D and training facilities, which would be
difficult for individual firms to finance.
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2.4.2 External Factors
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) suggest that a firm's innovation
attempts and production strategy will vary with its environment.
Similarly, a firm's environment will influence its technological
development. However, unlike the internal factors discussed above,
individual firms will only be able marginally to change the environment in
which they operate. Firms must, therefore, adjust their strategy to fit
in with the prevailing environment. Three external factors are considered
here: product technology, government policy, and industrial structure.
(i) Product Technology
In theory, technology could be considered as an internal factor, as
it is in itself a product of the firm. However, as noted earlier, few
industrialising country firms are at, or even close to, leading edge
technology. These firms, therefore, are still principally importing
technology and adapting it to their own specific needs and capabilities.
And, as a result, technology is for them an external factor.
In analysing the acquisition of capabilities, the specific technology
of the product must be considered. It is the technology which dictates
the types and levels of capabilities required to operate efficiently in
the relevant product sector. These capabilities can be importantly
affected by changes in the product and in its production process, and
such changes can either raise or lower capabilities requirements. For
example, Hobday (1985) shows that in telecommunication switching systems
the replacement of electromechanical devices by fully digital systems has
reduced the skill requirements of assembly operations. The need for
electromechanical interfacing has thus been reduced to a minimum and the
majority of components needed may be purchased off the shelf. But new
requirements have been created in other areas, such as the mastering of
the complex software in the system. This, of course, has implications for
the levels of skills required to enter production, and the ease with which
they may be acquired.
50.
The age of the technology and the emphasis on current developments
in the product sector will also Influence the strategy of the firm.
Utterback and Abernathy (1975) contend that there are three stages in a
product's development. Initially, there is an emphasis on the performance
of the product; then product variety becomes the main priority, followed
by attempts to increase product standardisation and to reduce costs.
These stages not only affect the firms' competitive strategies, but also
influence the extent to which they are prepared to transfer the
technology. Only in the later stages are firms willing to license
production, and, as noted above, the cumulative knowledge about the
technology built up within the licensor firm will also influence the
success with which it is transferred.
<ii) Government Policy
A primary role for government is the construction and maintenance
of an infrastructure which can adequately support industrial development.
Infrastructure consists of those organisations and installations which are
necessary for economic and social activities but are only passively or
indirectly involved in its functioning.24 Installations include the supply
of electricity, water, transport, and communications systems. Educational
systems are also a vital component of industrial infrastructure and
government's role in providing these is vital. In some countries
governments also establish research institutes and training facilities
whose services are generally available to all firms. These facilities do
not constitute essential inputs, but, as they aid and accelerate
industrial development, they can be seen as performing a catalytic role.
Governments also directly intervene in industrial activities to
promote or protect certain sectors. Indeed, the machine tool industry has
been heavily influenced by such intervention. In some cases, government
intervention into the industry is as a purchaser of machinery to support
its own defence interests. But in Japan the main thrust of government
policy was to promote the machine tool industry so that the technological
development of other sectors of industry would benefit.
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Whatever aim government has in view, promotion of the machine tool
industry can proceed by two distinct policies, protecting the domestic
market or subsidising domestic production, which may be implemented
individually or simultaneously. (The specific forms in which such
policies have been implemented in different countries are treated in
Chapters 4, 5 and 7.) Analysts have debated which type of government
measure is of greatest benefit to the machinery industry and to machinery
users. Datta Mitra (1979) argues that the imposition of tariffs is
preferable to quantitative import restrictions, considering that the
latter severely limit the choice of machinery on the domestic market,
reduce foreign competition, and create inefficiencies. Tariffs, by
contrast, give domestic producers an opportunity to exploit the domestic
market, but allow machines to be imported if domestic products are
inappropriate or unsatisfactory. The utilisation of schemes to subsidise
domestic production for a limited time is also recommended, and this is
the policy measure most favoured by Jacobsson (1986: 220). As the
machine tool industry is internationally highly concentrated, and as there
is a large gap between NIC producers and industrialised country
manufacturers, this subsidy should, in Jacobsson's view, be limited to only
a few makers who would then have the opportunity to catch up. Thus,
while market protection gives all firms the opportunity to expand, the
direct subsidy of domestic production enforces choice as to which firms
are subsidised.
In the Korean case, both measures have been employed. The domestic
market was protected, giving producers an assured market. But the
measures introduced also ensured that machine tool users were not
disadvantaged by these restrictions. Imports of sophisticated machinery
which was not produced domestically and machinery which was manufactured
domestically but of inferior quality continued to be permitted. Certain
firms were also given considerable subsidies to enter or expand machine
tool production. The firms chosen to receive this support were either
chaebol members or the larger, and more technically advanced, independent
firms; and, in the main, the technological development of these firms was
far more successful than that of those which did not receive such
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Governments also subsidise the acquisition of technological
capabilities. The establishment and funding of research institutes can be
seen as direct subsidy of firms' product developments. A similar subsidy
occurs when various tax incentives are given to firms to encourage
investment in R&D and training. Additionally, governments can control the
formal import of technology by domestic firms. These measures, which
often include limits to the amount of royalty payable and the time span
of the agreement, are usually implemented to try to ensure that
technology and capabilities are effectively transferred.
The types of measures introduced by government are a major factor
influencing firms' orientation towards import substitution or export. The
overall protection of the domestic market and the strict regulation of
imports encourages firms to be inward looking and to manufacture goods
only for domestic consumption. Alternatively, firms can be given many
incentives to concentrate on manufacturing for export. In Korea,
exporting firms were given many subsidies compared to firms
manufacturing goods solely for the domestic market. Through this form of
influence, governments have fostered different types of technological
development within domestic industries.
The Indian government, for example, introduced very strict protection
measures with the aim of encouraging industrial self-reliance. Imports
of all types were affected and indigenous production in nearly all
industrial sectors, including those in which India had no comparative
advantage, were consequently promoted. All industrial development and
expansion was heavily regulated by government bureaucracy. The
government also invested very large sums in scientific and technical
research institutes. While there has been a considerable build up of
technological capabilities in many sectors of Indian industry, there is
little doubt that there still remain enormous technology gaps and that
capabilities are often used very inefficiently. As Lall (1987) observes, a
large amount of technological effort has been expended in coping with the
high levels of import substitution required by the government. Moreover,
the exclusion of imports also impeded the need to upgrade product
technologies, since products developed elsewhere and containing new
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technologies were not imported. Although, of course, there were many
other factors which influenced the development process in India, Lall
concluded that
[lit does appear ... that an overwhelming portion of the
blame for the failures of technologic call effort in India
was economic: and can be traced directly or indirectly to
economic policies pursued by the government <1987: 228).
In contrast, government intervention in Taiwan has been mainly in
the promotion of exporting industries. However, the domestic market was
also often protected for indigenous producers. Because of the
requirement to export, these industries were forced to keep up with new
technological developments and to manufacture competitively. As a result,
the range of capabilities indigenised by export—orientated industries is
concentrated in production and few capabilities in product design or
development have been acquired. Thus, this strategy appears to have
encouraged the acquisition of only certain types of capabilities. (The
effects of this orientation on Taiwan's machine tool industry are
discussed in Chapter 7.)
Teubal (1984) analyses the direct effects of Brazilian government
policy on technological learning and exports of capital goods. He
considers that an increase in Brazil's capital goods exports in the 1970s
was not caused by changes in government policy at this time but occurred
because of firms' increased technological capabilities. Firms had
initially supplied the domestic market and their subsequent exports
benefitted considerably from this experience. Consequently, Teubal
recommends that prior to the acquisition of technological capabilities
firms should be supported as infant industries and their main production
should be for import substitution. He argues that direct export
subsidisation of these goods at this time would have very high associated
costs and a high chance of failure. Once firms had achieved an adequate
quality in their production and had acquired a range of technological
capabilities, then their exports could be promoted.
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(iii) The Market: Buyers. Suppliers and Competitors
When trying to understand the development of an industry, it is
important to consider the industrial structure in which it exists and the
other industries which it influences and by which it is influenced, i.e.,
buyers, suppliers and competitors. Thus, Rosenberg notes that,
In examining the sources of productivity improvement in
both industry and agriculture, we must pay attention to
the fact that the performance of individual industries
will frequently depend not only on resources available
within the industry but on the availability and the
effectiveness of industries which stand in an important
complementary relationship with it. The technological
inputs (including knowledge) which crucially affect the
success of industry A are produced by industries B, C and
D. Much of the discussion of the prospects and
possibilities for technical improvement in poor countries
has suffered from ignoring such interindustry
relationships. We have to take account of these
relationships and learn how to exploit them (1976: 169).
Similarly, Teitel (1984: 55) suggests that an understanding of the
inter-industry flows of technical information and skills will help in the
analysis of technical development.
The requirements of the domestic market are major influences on any
product development. In the case of the machine tool industry, this
market dictates the type of machine, the size, quality and price of
products that will be sold easily. These factors influence the product
strategy of the firm and, hence, the type of technology that has to be
acquired and, indirectly, the method by which it is acquired. The
international market exerts similar influences on export-orientated firms,
but, because of the distance between maker and user, these linkages are
much weaker and the feedback of information much more sparse. It should
also be noted that many machine tool producers have their own internal
market. With the exception of very specialised machinery manufacturers,
firms use some of their own machines in their own production plants, and
they are, consequently, both users and producers. This internalises
feedback on machines, and can be an important element in product
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development. This has been the case with the development of FMSs by
some larger machine tool producers.
The importance of the machine tool industry to the domestic
manufacturing sector has been widely acknowledged, but the nature of
their relationship has scarcely begun to be explained.2 s For the machine
tool industry, the structure of its market is extremely important, as it
influences product strategy and the types of skills which need to be
acquired. And vice-versa, only if the machine tool industry successfully
acquires these skills can it supply its markets with the machines
required. This consideration is far more important with respect to the
industry's domestic users than to its foreign markets. On the domestic
market, the machine tool industry is very important in the supply of
skills relevant to the choice and installation of new machinery, repair
and maintenance of existing machinery, customisation and special purpose
design. Chapter 4 describes the precise way in which certain domestic
industries have shaped the character of their main machine tool suppliers,
and Chapter 6 considers the importance of certain sectors of the Korean
domestic market and their influence on the development of the industry.
The role of users in product innovations has been discussed by
several analysts. For example, Von Hippel's study of innovation in the
manufacture of scientific instruments (1976) showed that about 80% of
innovations in that industry were, in fact, invented, tested or
manufactured as prototypes by users themselves. However, this
relationship in industrialising countries is not only a mechanism by which
new innovations are transferred, but it also appears to be an important
aspect of the learning process. Makers and users work closely together,
in order to upgrade their respective technologies, increase their
knowledge, and improve quality.
There is a similar relationship between the machine tool industry,
as a user, and its component suppliers. Innovations, knowledge and skills
transferred through these links are limited to the technology of the
individual part or component being supplied. The machine tool industry
has always utilised and responded to product developments by its supplier
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industries, in order to improve its own products. For example, in
response to the introduction of high-speed steel cutting tips by tool
makers, machine tool producers designed machines with much greater
rigidity, able to withstand the increased stress during operation at far
higher cutting speeds. Because the manufacture of CNC machinery is far
less vertically integrated than that of conventional machinery, machine
tool producers have become more dependent on component suppliers. In
particular, many machine tool producers (and in the industrialising
countries nearly all) rely on specialist controls producers. The
technological dynamism of these component firms therefore influences the
technological progress of the machine tool industry as a whole. Moreover,
there appears to be considerable variation between different countries as
to the closeness of this relationship and the subsequent development of
national industries.
Competition within an industry is an important factor both in
technological development and innovation. The introduction of a
successful new product, or a low—priced item, by one manufacturer forces
other firms in that sector to evaluate such changes and make adjustments
to their own production.2 4 The absence of such competition can, as
demonstrated by the Indian case, lead to technological stagnation.
Inevitably, competitors are also an important source of technical
knowledge and suppliers of technology to other firms.
Potential competitors are the main source of new technology when it
is acquired through a licensing agreement, and in these cases there is
often considerable technical support given to the licensee. The licensor
is directly selling its technology, and, in order to try to minimise direct
competition from the licensee, regulations on the sales of the item are
included in the agreement. There are also less formal ways in which
firms help competitors with technological problems and in which there is
no direct payment. This occurs both between firms which are direct
competitors and those which are not (see Von Hippel (1987, 1988) and
Allen et al. (1983)). Such transfer of knowledge and technology
principally occurs through the personal contacts established by employees
at competing firms who consult each other on specific problems.
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However, when a product is bought by a producer and then copied, the
original manufacturer has no involvement in the transfer. In these cases
the firm which developed the product is only unintentionally the source
of a competitor's new technology.
This chapter has shown that the major benefits of an indigenous
machine tool industry flow from the pool of technological capabilities
built up by that industry and its consequent ability to support the whole
manufacturing sector. Yet the nature of those capabilities is strongly
influenced by the type of technology incorporated in machine tools.
Technologies and capabilities evolve together. A given mechanical
technology requires a certain set of capabilities to construct, operate
and maintain it. And that pool of capabilities then forms a base for
further product development both in the machine—making sector and
elsewhere in the machine—using sector. What is required, therefore, is a
detailed account of CNC technologies and the capabilities they demand.
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Notes
1. See Little <1982) for a comprehensive review of many of the
approaches taken.
2. Many of these studies were part of a research project on "The
Acquisition of Technological Capability" financed by the World Bank.
More general reviews and edited books containing similar material
include: Stewart and James <1982), Fransman and King <1984), and
Fransman <1985).
3. For comprehensive accounts of the historical role of the machine
tool industry in technical development, see Rosenberg <1976: Ch. 1)
and Fransman <1986a: Ch. 1).
4. Such a crisis is to some extent demonstrated by the case of Mexico.
Singh suggests that the huge increase of imports into Mexico
between 1977 and 1981 led to a national crisis because of the
disequilibrium of the balance of payments. A very high proportion
of these imports <90%) were capital and intermediate goods. Singh
says that "the development and growth of the indigenous capital
goods industry must play a central role" in the restructuring of
Mexico's productive system <1986: 264).
5. While this was the case when Datta Mitra wrote in 1979, Chapters 4
and 7 show that this is no longer so, as the US has protected its
markets against Taiwanese machine tool exports and warned Korea
against increasing its exports.
6. This type of linkage is important between many other complementary
industries, as well as between machine tool producers and users. In
fact, Lall suggests that it may be the most important of all the
linkage types he examined in his empirical study <1980).
7. In the NICs, these skills are often initially formed in small
work—shops and repair shops, as well as in manufacturing industry.
8. "Infant industries" are those industries which are being established
for the first time in an economy, and which, without special
treatment, would either not be started up or develop sufficiently.
For a detailed analysis of the case for government promotion of the
capital goods industry, see Datta Mitra <1979).
9. There are, of course, many questions about the appropriate
allocation of resources between the machinery sector and the
machine-using Manufacturing sector). The so—called Feldman-
Mahalanobis model designed to show the consequences of various
strategies was initially developed in the Soviet Union in the 1920s
and was extended in the 1950s for the Indian case. This model
shows how different allocations of machinery output into either the
machinery sector itself, in order to manufacture more machines, or
into the machine—using sector for the production of consumer goods,
affect the build up of machinery in the economy. The model has
been further extended by Harris, to include foreign trade, and by
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Cooper, to incorporate the effects of learning by doing. For a full
description of this model, see Cooper (1984) and Fransman
(1986a: 4-8).
10. In Japan and Korea, the machine tool industry was promoted as a
part of a more extensive plan to develop heavy industries, so that
the machine tool industry could support domestic industries at an
early stage.
11. For example, in the Basic Development Plan for the Machine Tool
Manufacturers introduced by the government of Korea in 1977,
different sectors of the industry were promoted for different
reasons, and some were specifically excluded: basic conventional
machines were promoted for export; some more complex machines were
encouraged for import substitution; high—precision and highly
automated machine tools were not promoted at all (for details, see
Bendix et al., 1978: 44).
12. For example, the Indian government regulated the import of nearly
all types of machine tools, while in Korea and Japan governments
were very careful to continue to allow the importation of high—cost,
sophisticated machines, and protected only the sector of the market
in which domestic industry could fairly quickly reach international
standards.
13. Lall (1987: 4-11) also uses these five categories of technological
capabilities and describes them in great detail.
14. Kim Young-Woo (1981) compares technical development in two vehicle
producers in Korea, one a joint venture and the other almost
entirely Korean owned. In the joint venture, the foreign parent
company ran extensive training schemes in assembly, maintenance and
quality control. These schemes were available to a greater
proportion of the employees and were more detailed than those run
by the Korean—owned firm. However, there was no attempt to
transfer capabilities in product design from the parent company to
the joint venture.
15. Park Woo Hee (1983: 80-81) describes how the agreement for the
installation of a petrochemical plant in Korea by Dow Chemical
included the training by Dow of Korean engineers in many technical
areas, including the construction, testing and start-up of the plant.
The capabilities gained through this venture were utilised in the
later construction of a second plant.
16. See Chudnovsky (1986: 75-77) for an analysis of these costs.
17. See Chudnovsky (1986: 73-78) for a more detailed discussion of the
disadvantages of formal technology transfer agreements.
18. See Fransman (1984b: 312) for a brief survey of other studies
pointing to this type of information flow as a source of
technological capability.
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19. Fransman compared several specifications of his sample Taiwanese
firms' machines to those manufactured by their direct competitors,
thus comparing like with like. From this comparison, he was able to
derive an indication of the gap between his sample and the "best-
practice technology frontier" (1986c: 1391). While this analysis was
valuable in showing the overall performance of the firms in
comparison to the international market, it gives little indication of
the actual capabilities acquired and, consequently, reveals little
about the firms themselves.
20. There are also a number of intrinsic difficulties in using the
variables Jacobsson (1986: 105—08) suggests to measure design
capabilities. The establishment of a marketing network is, for
example, more an indication of the scale of production and exports
than of the technical capabilities of the firm. In many of these
cases, a marketing service was established for the sales of
conventional machines, and, as such, gives no indication of
capabilities in the production of CNC machines.
21. The sophistication of products manufactured and the level of
indigenous capabilities can be represented on a matrix. See Nolan
(1986: 46) for an illustration of a matrix constructed to show the
sophistication of defence production and the level of production
capabilities acquired.
22. Similarly, Enos's game theoretic approach (1982) to the choice of
technology views only the process of decision making as continuous,
and considers that to focus on a particular time or event misses
influences that have occurred before and elsewhere as well as
neglecting subsequent developments. Furthermore, he argues that to
focus on one individual misses the contribution of others, and to
focus on a new technology misses alterations that occur through
adaptations and improvements.
23. For a more detailed account of the relationship between size of firm
and the rate of innovation, see Freeman (1974: Ch. 6) and Rothwell
and Zegveld (1982). See Schon (1982) for a discussion of why large
corporations may resist the introduction of new innovations.
24. An adequate definition of infrastructure is offered by Miiller: "a
general denominator for all projects and services which the state
establishes, controls or maintains for the purpose of its actual
production development policy ... and which in principle can be
collectively utilized or consumed" (1980: 31).
25. As already noted, Jacobsson (1986) recognised that there were
potential benefits from the capabilities built up in an indigenous
machine tool industry through its technological input to other
industrial sectors and its role in the diffusion of new technologies.
However, while examining the potential size of the domestic market
in Taiwan, Argentina and Korea, he did not cover the specific
requirements of the users in these markets, or the nature of links
between producers and users. Fransman, while recognising the
importance of maker-producer links, and noting the importance of
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users as a source of improvements, does not explore in detail why
these links are so different for the two countries he considers or
how these links have influenced technological development in the
machine tool industries (1986a). A notable exception is Watanabe
(1983) who did relate market structure and technological development
in the Japanese machine tool industry. He suggested that Japan's
vehicle industry had played an important role in the development of
the machine tool industry. (This case is covered Chapter 7.)
26. Schumpeter suggested that such actions compelled other competitors
to introduce changes (Fransman, 1986a: 18-19).
CHAPTER THREE
Machine Tool Technology and Capabilities
If an industrialising country is to establish a CNC machine tool
industry a range of technological capabilities must be acquired. Not all
of these capabilities can be secured with equal facility and, indeed, some
capabilities may, in practice, prove impossible for certain countries or
companies to acquire. Thus, the acquisition of technological capabilities
constitutes a set of requirements and a set of potential barriers to
entry. This chapter argues that one cannot properly appreciate the
process of technological development, in general, or the build up of
technological capabilities, in particular, without confronting the detailed
skill requirements of the relevant technologies.
How do the technologies embedded in CNC machine tools differ from
those of conventional machines? How does control unit technology differ
from the technologies of the CNC machines whose cutting they control?
Conventional machine tool capabilities are largely mechanical. Such
capabilities have proved relatively easy to acquire for NIC producers, as
a pool of relevant skills typically develops within a machine—using
economy. By contrast, CNC design and production make special capability
demands; their configuration is more complex, their assembly is difficult,
and their design requires specially skilled personnel. An adequate pool
of appropriate capabilities does not usually pre-exist in a NIC and
deliberate steps have to be taken by firms to acquire them. Finally,
control unit technology exerts the most exacting capability demands. And
neither of the NIC CNC machine tool industries surveyed in this study
have, as yet, successfully acquired relevant capabilities in this
technology.
3.1 Machine Tools and Their Operation
Metal cutting machine tools can be classified by the two main ways
they cut the workpiece: those in which the workpiece is rotated and those
in which the tool is rotated.1 The principal type of machine in which the
workpiece is rotated is the lathe, and it is used to cut cylindrical parts.
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(Figure 3.1 shows an engine lathe.) The major parts are the bed, the
chuck, the head and tail stocks, and the carriage. One end of the
workpiece is fixed into the chuck, which is mounted on the main spindle
of the machine; the other end is mounted on the tail stock. The tail
stock may be clamped at various positions on the bed to accommodate
different lengths of workpiece. If the workpiece is short, it only needs
to be gripped by the chuck. The workpiece is rotated in this position,
the power being supplied through the main spindle. A single point tool
is clamped into a tool post on the carriage, and may be moved in two
directions in relation to the workpiece - longitudinally and radially, i.e.,
on the Z and X axes. The cutting edge of the tool is pushed onto the
rotating part to cut the metal. If the cylindrical part is large, and
therefore heavy, it is impractical to mount it horizontally, so a vertical
boring machine is used, on which the workpiece is mounted on a horizontal
rotating table.
The simplest machine using a rotating tool is the drill press, in
which a twist drill is rotated and may be fed along its axis of rotation.
For larger pieces of work a radial arm drill is used. On this type of
machine, the head is supported by an arm which may be rotated, raised and
lowered on a column so that large areas of workpiece can be covered. The
most important type of machine in this second category is the milling
machine. These machines may have their spindles mounted horizontally or
vertically, and are consequently called either horizontal or vertical
milling machines, an example of which is shown in Figure 3.2. To operate
these machines, a multi-faced tool is attached to the spindle in the head
of the machine, and the workpiece is clamped to the table. The table may
be moved in three axes, X, Y and Z, but usually only the X and Y axes can
be co-ordinated in order to shape profiles, while the Z axis is set for
each cut. On larger milling machines, the saddle is mounted directly on
the bed of the machine, and motion in the Z axis is achieved by moving
the head up and down on the column. When the depth of cut is set for
each cutting operation, and is not altered while the table is moved in the
X and Y directions, this is known as 254-dimension control. Only when the
depth of cut can be varied, to produce contours, does the machine have








Figure 3.2 Main Parts of a Vertical Milling Machine
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full 3-dimensional control, i.e., the Z axis can be fully co-ordinated with
the X and Y axes.
Two other types of metal cutting machines are planers and grinders.
On planers, a single—edged tool is held at a constant height while the
workpiece is moved reciprocally beneath it and the cutting tool is fed at
right angles to this motion. Planers are used to generate flat surfaces
on very large parts. Grinders have an abrasive wheel which is attached
to a spindle and rotated at high speed. Grinding machines may be built
on similar lines to either lathes, milling machines or planers, and so can
cut either flat surfaces or cylindrical parts.2
These types of machine tools were principally developed in the
latter part of the eighteenth and the early nineteenth centuries. They
were initially invented to cut pistons accurately and to bore holes in
cylinder castings used in the first efficient steam engines (Gilbert,
1965: 421).s The horizontal boring machine developed by John Wilkinson in
the 1770s was used to produce parts for steam engines and to bore
cannon. The lathe was extensively developed and improved by Henry
Maudslay in the 1790s. Maudslay applied to general metal working
standards of precision which had previously been used only in the
manufacture of small items such as scientific instruments (Rolt,
1965: 86). He also adopted an all—metal construction for his machines.
The milling machine, although in use in the early nineteenth century, was
improved upon after 1850, and the first universal milling machine was
delivered in 1862 (Floud, 1976: 29).
An early development which increased the productivity of lathes on
medium—batch production was the introduction of the turret or capstan
lathe in the 1850s (Floud, 1976: 26-27). On these lathes, the tail stock
is replaced by a tool holder in which a number of tools are clamped in
different pre-set positions. The tool holder can be quickly rotated so
that a sequence of cutting operations may be undertaken without having
to re-fit the tool for each separate cut. The first automatically
controlled lathe was introduced in the US in 1873 by C.M. Spencer, using
what he termed a "brain wheel" - in effect a cam.4 Two separate brain
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wheels controlled the cutting tool and the turret (Rolt, 1965: 169). The
use of cams was extensively developed to control screw-cutting and other
special purpose machines. A further development was the semi-automatic
lathe, on which bar stock is automatically fed through the chuck and the
different tools are brought into position using a camshaft.
The "American system" of interchangeable manufacture - the
manufacture of standardised parts to fit an established production model
rather than the customised production of each part - was first introduced
by Eli Whitney in 1798 to manufacture muskets. However, it was not until
the early 1850s that these principles were applied to all stages of
production at the Colt Armory in Hartford, Connecticut. And in 1853 the
"American system" was introduced into Britain's workshops (Galloway,
1965). Interchangeable manufacture promoted the development of jigs and
fixtures. Jigs guide the machinist in locating and directing the cutting
tool, while fixtures hold the workpiece in position on the work table.
Both jigs and fixtures are specifically designed for use with a particular
workpiece and are therefore mainly used in batch production, when the
size of batch merits their manufacture. The introduction of jigs and
fixtures and capstan and semi-automatic lathes enabled machines to be set
up by skilled machinists and then operated by semi-skilled workers.
Although their set-up time was longer and their tooling costs greater
than on basic machines, the actual cutting time for each piece was
considerably reduced and repeatability was improved.
3.1.1 Special Purpose and Custom Designed Machine Tools
The machines described above have been considerably developed into
the late twentieth century and form the core of general metal working
machines used at present. But for particular machining jobs - such as
large-scale or mass production, very high precision work, very large or
very complex workpieces - standard machines may be substantially modified
or a special machine designed: these types of machines are known as
"custom designed" and "special purpose" machines. In the case of large-
scale production, special purpose machines are designed to automatically
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manufacture one part or at most a few simple variations of a single part.
Because these machines are set up to manufacture only this type of part,
they are able to work at a much greater rate. Consequently, the higher
cost of the machine is compensated for by a reduction in workpiece cost.
High precision machines are commonly used in defence production,
aerospace manufacturing (rockets and satellites), and the machining of
turbine blades. Some of these parts need to be machined to the
sub-micron level. Small precision machines are also manufactured to cut
very small workpieces, including watch and clock parts. The structure of
precision machines has to be very rigid to eliminate distortions during
the cutting process. This requirement means that higher quality
materials must be used and the precision to which the parts of the
machine itself is made needs to be greater than for standard machines.
In addition, extra instrumentation is often added to the machine to check
the dimensions of the workpiece as it is being cut. Because of the very
high quality of these machines, they are extremely expensive.
Most machine tools are designed to cut relatively small parts.
Lathes have beds approximately a metre and a half long (although some
heavy duty lathes have beds up to four metres long), and can turn
workpieces with a maximum diameter between a quarter and a half a metre.
Milling machine work tables have areas of less than a square metre and
the tool can move vertically by less than half a metre. These machines
can also only take workpieces up to certain weights. Machine tools may
be customised in order to accommodate work pieces of larger sizes, or
special machines may be designed. The machine tool industry itself uses
very large planing and grinding machines to machine the surfaces and
slides of cast-iron beds. Very large lathes are used to turn wheels for
rolling stock and large—scale milling machines are used for cutting some
aircraft parts. Other machines are designed to cut shapes that cannot
be, or are not easily, cut by standard machines. This includes the
cutting of gear wheels, cams, crankshafts and some types of threads.
There is no strict division between standard, custom designed, and
special purpose machines. Standard machine tools contain a very high
proportion of standardised components - generally more than 80 percent
(Sciberras and Payne, 1985: 22). Customised machine tools are built from
standardised components and a significant proportion of non-standard
components; the latter are custom designed so that the machine meets the
specific requirements of a particular user. Special purpose machines may
be entirely made of custom designed parts or, if they are manufactured in
any number, may contain a high proportion of standardised parts.
There is an additional group of metal cutting machine tools of
recent origin which use non-traditional methods of removing metal. The
most widely used type in this group is the electro-discharge machine
(EDM). These machines only work on metals that are good electrical
conductors. The workpiece and the shaped tool are charged so that one is
a cathode and the other an anode. Both electrodes are placed in an
electrolyte, so that there is a spark discharge in the small gap (less
than a millimetre) between the tool and the workpiece. The sparks remove
small quantities of metal and, hence, shape the workpiece. On some
machines a thin wire is used for the cutting electrode instead of using a
shaped cutting tool. EDMs are mainly used for cutting tools and dies in
the plastics industry. Lasers are also increasingly being used to cut
metal and other materials, as well as being attached to other cutting
machines as measuring devices. Lasers can cut and engrave very hard
materials fairly easily; they can be used to cut very intricate shapes and
small holes, and to cut thin metal sheets and wood in general production
areas. In addition, laser cutters and markers are used in the electronics
industry. Other devices in this category include machines cutting with
ultrasound, abrasive and water jets, electrochemical reactions, and ion
beams.s Together, these machines only form a very small part of the
metal working machine tool industry. Their use is, however, increasing as
they can be used to machine very hard and brittle materials, as well as
to cut complex shapes.
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3.2 Development of Machine Control
The introduction of automatic and semi-automatic lathes enabled the
production of some mass—produced components to be automated. But the
design and manufacture of cams is a long and complex process. And,
although cams can be changed in order to manufacture different parts,
this is not an easy task. Therefore, automatic and semi-automatic lathes
have to manufacture long runs of a single item to be economic. Different
methods of control which could be more flexible in their application were
experimented with from the eighteenth century. The control of machinery
by punched cards goes back to the development in the 1720s of the
Jacquard Loom, which produced knitted patterns. Tracer technology was
applied to woodcutting lathes by Thomas Blanchard in 1818, in Worcester,
Massachusetts, in order to reproduce gun stocks. On Blanchard's machines,
a stylus followed a template. The stylus was linked directly to the tool
cutting the workpiece, so that all the power required to move the tool
came from the operation of the stylus. However, this type of control
could not be applied to metal cutting machines because of the greater
leverage required (Rolt, 1965: 241).4
Early applications of tape control to metal working machine tools
occurred in the US in the first decade of the twentieth century. However,
it was tracer technology that was first developed to any extent. The
Keller electro-mechanical duplication system for metal working was
invented by John Shaw in 1921. On this machine, the stylus was used
solely for information, and power from an electric motor guided the
cutting tool. In the 1930s and 1940s, tracer technology was further
developed, using a combination of electrical, mechanical, hydraulic, and
pneumatic mechanisms. The most popular system was a hydraulic one
developed by Cincinnati Milling Machine Co. and used on their "hydrotel"
tracing machine. By 1942, General Electric had developed an
all-electronic control system. This technology was superseded in 1946 by
"record playback", also developed by General Electric. Record playback
involved a skilled machinist making a part while the motions of machine
and tool were recorded on magnetic tape. The tape was then played back
through the machine, so repeating the operations and automatically
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producing an identical part (American Machinist. Nov. 1977). (David
Noble's admirable Forces of Production [19841 documents the American
development of record control and numerical control in the 1940s and
1950s and much of this account is informed by his valuable work.)7
3.2.1 Development of Numerical Control
Numerical control (NC) is a system for controlling machine tools
using digital information (prepared away from the machine) which details
the shape of the part to be machined. The digital information is then
fed into the machine to control its movement. This technology is
different from either tracer technology or record playback as no
prototype part has to be manufactured for the machine to copy
automatically. The original development of NC for machine tools is
generally considered to have been the work of John Parsons (incidentally
a machine tool user and not a producer). During World War II, Parsons
had been a US defence contractor producing army ordnance, and in the
course of his work he developed ingenious methods to automate production.
After the War, military demand was still high. Furthermore, this demand
reflected the technological advances made during the War. Parsons wanted
to diversify his business, so he turned to the production of rotor blades
for helicopters, in the ultimately mistaken belief that the commercial
helicopter business would expand rapidly in the early 1950s. For the
production of the complex helicopter blade templates, he used an IBM 602A
multiplier to calculate the aerofoil co-ordinates. He then used these
data points on a Swiss jig-borer to cut the template. Previously,
seventeen points along the curve were calculated, and the points were
joined manually. This method was time consuming and subject to large
inaccuracies. Using the new method, 200 points were calculated and
accuracy was significantly improved. For example, the tolerance was
reduced from ± 0.009" to ± 0.001". The use of the IBM multiplier
eliminated the majority of the tedious bench work, but the jig-borer was
positioned manually at each of the 200 co-ordinates for holes to be
drilled. Parsons reasoned that if a punched card could direct a
tabulating machine to a co-ordinate, it could also direct a machine tool,
i.e., the data he had from the multiplier could be fed directly into the
machine tool. (Noble, 1984: chs. 5 - 6)8
The U.S. Air Force became interested in Parson's idea and its
potential application to the production of parts for its new
high-performance fighter. In June 1949, the Air Force contracted Parsons
to design and build an automatic contour cutting machine which could be
controlled by punched cards or tape, and which would be able to perform
automatic contour cutting. Having obtained a contract to build a machine,
Parsons then had to find collaborators to work on the parts of the
machine that could not be designed and built by the Parsons Corp. itself.
In the original plan, a machine manufactured by Snyder Tool and
Engineering Co. was to be adapted and fitted with a control unit
developed by the MIT Servomechanisms Lab. and a card reader developed by
IBM. Parsons Corp. would assemble the whole machine, and would
manufacture and market the new machines.
Having been included in the project, the Servomechanisras Lab. began
to exert influence on the development of the new machine. Firstly, they
changed the type of machine to be adapted from a Snyder special milling
machine to a Cincinnati "Hydrotel"; secondly, they replaced the IBM card
reader with MIT's tape reader; and, finally, they changed the specification
of the machine to make the motion more sophisticated, by using full
three-axis control, which Parsons had not envisaged in his original
specification. By insisting on all these changes, MIT successfully
managed to force Parsons out of the project and to develop the new
machine themselves, with further financial support from the Air Force. In
September 1952, a three-day public demonstration was arranged at MIT to
show the newly developed machine. The machine was controlled by "the
director", which consisted of six standard relay racks, constructed on
flat panels, each relay rack containing approximately 125 relays and 270
electron tubes. Nearly 300 pilot lights continuously indicated the state
of every important circuit and relay in the system (Servomechanisms Lab.,
1953).
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The system utilised servomechanisms in its control of the machine's
movement. This was also a radical innovation in the control of machine
tools as it involves feedback to enable the machine to correct itself.9 A
servosystem has been defined as,
an automatic control system incorporating power
amplification and feedback designed to make an output
variable quantity follow an input variable quantity
closely. The feedback system compares the output and
input variables and produces an error signal, which
depends on their difference, and which is then amplified
and used to correct the output signal continuously
(Martin 1983: 289).
MIT continued to develop NC with Air Force support. In 1952, MIT
collaborated with Bendix Corp. on an NC application to make cams for
aircraft fuel control devices; and, in 1953, they worked with Kearney and
Trecker to make the first commercial NC machines. In addition to
supporting the work at MIT, the Air Force took over financial
responsibility for getting this technology into defence factories (Noble,
1984: 134). In 1955, the Air Materiel Command Budget allocation for the
stockpiling of machine tools changed from tracer controlled to NC
machines. The Air Force undertook to pay all the expenses of purchase,
installation, maintenance, and training for 100 NC machine tools to be
placed in factories of important sub-contractors. In total, the military
spent at least $62 million on the research, development and transfer of
the technology between 1949 and 1959, when the Air Force withdrew its
formal support for the development of software.
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3.3 Advances In Control Unit Technology
Machine tool control units have developed in line with the rapid
advancements in microelectronics. Advances in electronics have
contributed to three areas of improvements in machine tool control.
Firstly, there has been an increase in the complexity of the cutting path
that the control unit can process and in the number of machine functions
which can be simultaneously controlled; secondly, control units have
become far more reliable, and, thirdly, the cost of the control unit has
been reduced, meaning that more control can be bought for less. The
types of control unit and the electronics technology used may be divided
into seven generations, as shown in Table 3.1.







1st 1954 Vacuum tubes and relays
(analogue circuits),
2nd 1959 Transistors (digital
circuits),
3rd 1965 ICs (digital circuits),
4 th 1970 Softwired, LSIs, built-in
microprocessors,
5th 1974 Built-in one chip
microprocessors,
6th 1979 VLSI, bubble memories,
increased use of CRT,
7 th 1981 Interactive methods,
customised software for
automated systems.
Source; Metalworking. July 1987; 19,
The first three generations were generally known as "hardwired"
controls, since they consisted of discrete components connected by wires.
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Later generations are known as "softwired" controls, because the outputs
are wired directly to the electromechanical devices on the machine, and
the switches and sensors are wired to inputs through an input/output bus
without the use of relays. In 1974, control units were built
incorporating a microprocessor. Because these units had a computing
ability, they were distinguished from NC units and designated as Computer
Numerical Control <CNC> units.1®
The main components of an NC unit are shown in the block diagram in
Figure 3.3. The punched paper tape is fed through the tape reader
intermittently and read just one step ahead of the machining operation
being performed. This information is stored in the buffer, so that the
eventual input command to the machine is continuous. It is important
that the instructions are continuous, so that the tool does not dwell
during the cutting operation (except where explicitly required) while it
waits for the next instruction. The signal from the buffer goes through
the interpolator, which processes the information and issues commands in
the form of electrical pulses to the axes and spindle motor
simultaneously. Each axis is geared to a feedback mechanism, usually a
rotary digital instrument.11 The feedback pulse and the input from the
interpolator are both fed into the error register, which compares the two
signals and transmits the difference to the servo-amplifier. The servo-
amplifier and the related circuitry convert the error signal into analogue
form and amplify it. The signal then activates the drive mechanism on
the machine axis (Sung, 1958: 436).
The first NC control units have been described as "huge, unreliable,
masses of vacuum tubes and relays" (Merdinger, 1977: 695). They were
also expensive, in comparison to the machine cost, and very complex.
Those sold commercially utilised electromechanical relays rather than
vacuum tubes (Groover and Zimmers, 1984: 204). As relays were
susceptible to wear, these systems were inherently unreliable. The later
replacement of relays by transistors avoided this wear problem and, thus,
increased reliability. These components were also smaller and allowed for
more complex circuitry. This meant that more sophisticated logic




















Figure 3.3 Block Diagram of an NC Uni
















Figure 3.4 Schematic Diagram of Direct Numerical Control
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offset, tool radius and cutter radius compensation, word address control,
and spindle speed control. There were still reliabUility problems which
were exacerbated by the heat sensitivity of the electronics: in some
cases fans or air-conditioners had to be installed in the control cabinet
to enable the controls to operate in the work—shop environment. The use
of integrated circuits reduced the number of separate components in the
system by 90%, as well as reducing the cost considerably (Groover and
Zimmers, 1984: 205). In addition, more features were incorporated in the
control unit; these included hyperbolic interpolation routines, duplicate
functions (such as inch to metric conversions), absolute or incremental
co-ordinate specification, and vector feedrate computations.
All the hardwired systems had a number of problems. Often mistakes
were made in part—programming, and several runs of the tape had to be
made to prove the tape before it could be used in production. The
part—programmer also had to set feeds and speeds in the program for the
worst case, to ensure that the program would function under all
conditions.12 As there was no opportunity for these variables to be
changed later during the cutting process, the machine was usually run at
sub-optimal speeds and feeds. The control units themselves were
difficult to modify or update, because any programming of their operation
had to be performed by re—wiring the components to the unit. A major
problem was the use o£ paper tape and tape readers to transfer the
program into the control unit. The punched tape was fragile, becoming
worn and susceptible to tearing after repeated use. Additionally, the
tape readers were frequently the most unreliable components in the
control unit hardware, either through mechanical breakdown or misreading
tapes (Groover and Zimmers, 1984: 204).
The use of a dedicated computer as part of the control unit was
achieved as early as 1964. But because of the very high cost of
computing power at the time, this method of control was not commercially
viable. The only feasible approach was to use one big computer to
control a number of machine tools on a time-shared basis. This system
was developed in the late 1960s and is known as Direct Numerical Control
(DNC). DNC consists of four basic components: (i) the central computer;
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(ii) the bulk memory, which stores NC part programs for transmission to
the different NC machines; (iii) the telecommunication lines; and (iv> the
machine tools themselves. (The layout of these components is shown in
Figure 3.4.) There is two-way information flow between the machines and
the computer. The machines request instructions and send other
information to the computer, which must respond with instructions so that
the machine is not left idle. Instead of using punched tape for program
storage and as the input medium, disc storage may be used.
In 1971, Intel introduced the microprocessor chip, on which there
was a central processing unit (CPU) capable of operating as a computer.
Its introduction reduced the cost of dedicated computing power, and so
made it viable to add a programmable logic controller (PLC) to the
numerical control unit. This addition changed NC to Computer Numerical
Control (CNC). (The main components of a CNC control system are shown in
the block diagram in Figure 3.5.) The core of the control unit contains
both a numerical controller and a PLC, and these organise the control of
the machine axes and other functions of the system as a whole. The NC
component deals with the real time control of the machine axes and
spindle motors, while the PLC controls such functions as tool management,
and pallet changing, as well as undertaking computational functions for
the NC part. There is also a memory to store the system software.
Commands are relayed to an input/output system, which, through an
interface, links the control to the machine itself, and to different
outside peripherals.15
The major advantage of CNC is that the memory in the control unit
can be changed by altering the program, rather than by re-wiring the
whole system. Softwired controls also allow for standard control systems
to be built for groups of similar machines, and then adapted by
programming, to control specific machines. More functions were made
possible, including programming aids and diagnostics. The systems also
allowed for program editing on the machine, enabling programs to be
proved on the machines and faults rectified or changes made instantly.
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Display and

















Figure 3.6 Recirculating Ball Screw
Further refinements of the CNC unit have been enabled by the
miniaturisation of integrated circuits: the number of circuit boards used
in the control unit has been reduced from 280 to one. While the number
of discrete components was decreasing, there was a rapid rise in
processing power contained in the unit. Large producers of control units
are able to design and make customised large-scale integrated (LSI) chips
for use in these units. LSI chips give a reduction in the number of
semiconductors in the unit and make the system more reliable. Custom
LSIs are used in the feedback loop, giving higher quality servo-control
and improving machine performance, especially in areas such as thread
cutting and circular interpolations. It is claimed that the introduction
of the microprocessor reduced the price of the control unit by about 60%
(Watanabe, 1983: 7). This reduction has also led to a steady decrease in
the price ratio between CNC machine tools and conventional machine tools:
the price ratio of CNC lathes to conventional lathes in Japan dropped
from over 8:1 in 1974 to just over 3:1 in the early 1980s (Jacobsson,
1986: 11).
Major additional improvements to the control unit include:
(i) Data Input: As the control unit has the processing power to edit
the program loaded in its memory, a keyboard and display screen are now
standard on CNC machines. This enables manual data input (MDI), allowing
the operator to view the program, edit programs easily, and write new
programs straight into the control unit. Many control units now also
have background programming facilities — the ability to insert and edit
programs, while a different part-program is running on the machine and
controlling a cutting operation.
(ii) Memory: Initially, CNC units used Read Only Memories (ROM), in which
all software is permanently fixed. This was seen to be an advantage over
the memories in mini-computers, for which expensive software had to be
written (Hollinguun, 1976: 31). Subsequently, there has been a trend to
use Random Access Memories (RAM), which are more expensive but allow for
the software to be re—written. The ability to change the software allows
users to load their own processing "know—how" into the control system,
and permits more sophisticated systems to be controlled (Watanabe, 1983:
7). The introduction of bubble memories for the storage of system
software (e.g., part-programs, macro-libraries, and utilities) has greatly
increased the capacity of the memory. The bubble memory is only used for
the storage of the system software, and programs are copied from it to
the faster dynamic RAM for execution (RAnky, 1986: 191). The two main
advantages of bubble memories are, firstly, that they are completely
sealed and have no moving parts, making them highly reliable even in the
harsh environments of the factory floor; and, secondly, that the memory is
non-volatile, so the control unit does not need to have either continuous
power, or arrangements for back-up power, as a precaution against power
failure, in order to retain the contents of the memory.
(iii) Additional Features Controlled: An increase in computing power has
made it possible to control more axes simultaneously. Many lathes now
have four-axis control, and machining centres have five. Additional
mechanical hardware has been added, including Automatic Tool Changers
(ATC), pallet changers, and robotic arms to load and unload parts. All
these features are also controlled or activated by the CNC unit. When
ATCs are used, the control unit may also have a tool library which will
record data on the tools, including the amount of use they have had. In
the case of tool breakage, a similar or identical tool in the ATC may be
substituted automatically. (Many of these features are discussed in
greater detail in the next section.)
3.4 Design Changes
Standard conventional machine tools are estimated to be physically
cutting metal for only 2.5% of their operating time (McPherson, 1979: 1).
And the "average" workpiece on the "average" shop-floor undertaking batch
production spends just 1.5% of its total time on the shop-floor being cut
on a machine; the remaining 98.5% is spent being moved, loaded,
positioned, and waiting (Sigurdson, 1986: 21). While CNC does not reduce
the actual cutting time, if used efficiently it does increase the
proportion of time that the machine is cutting metal. This increase is
accomplished by reducing the number of set-ups and the set-up time,
reducing workpiece handling, and, in some cases, speeding up tool
changes.14 CNC machines may also increase the proportion of time the
workpiece is being worked on while on the shop-floor. This leads to a
decrease in work-in-process, the total inventory that needs to be carried,
and the lead time for new products.15
The movements of the tool and/or workpiece on CNC machines are
carried out much faster than on manual machines, resulting in more severe
loading conditions on the feed mechanisms, motors and guides. The CNC
machine also has to be fitted with sensitive measuring systems which
need to operate continuously - even when the machine is taking heavy
cuts - to provide feedback to the control unit. Therefore, CNC machine
tools have to be designed for longer and more arduous periods of
continuous operation than conventional machines. These considerations
mean that the mechanical hardware of CNC machines has to be stiffer,
freer from vibration, and more robust than that of conventional
machines.14 A further consequence of the increase in cutting time is the
increased quantity of swarf (the small pieces of metal that have been cut
off the workpiece) that has to be efficiently removed from the machine to
prevent blockages and jamming.
Wear is a problem on conventional machines, and the mechanical
nature of the machine tool also results in lost motion. Both these
problems result in inaccuracies which may be corrected to some extent by
skilled machinists, who know the inaccuracies of the specific machines
with which they work. These inaccuracies cannot be efficiently
compensated for by a control unit, and, therefore, the design of the
machine has to be changed in order to reduce or eliminate them.
There have been significant changes in the design of components and
the utilisation of new components in order to cope with these new
requirements. Such up-graded components may be fitted to conventional
machines to convert them to CNC machines, and this type of machine is
known as a "retro-fitted" CNC machine tool. Alternatively, a totally new
machine may be designed which is more suited to the special requirements
of CNC.
3.4.1 Improvements in Components
Conventional machine tools use a screw turning in a nut to operate
the motion of the table, saddle, and knee, and these screw threads are
particularly prone to an inaccuracy known as "backlash".17 The screw
mechanism is also very inefficient (often less than 25%) due to high
frictional resistance between the flanks of the screw and the nut. This
also causes an increase in the temperature of both parts, resulting in a
further inaccuracy. A backlash eliminator may be fitted to the screw and
nut, but this causes an increase in friction which further reduces the
system's efficiency and increases its temperature.
On CNC machine tools these problems are overcome by the use of the
re-circulating ball screw, in which the contact between the screw and the
nut is achieved through an endless stream of. steel balls. The assembly
consists of a shaft with a semi-circular helical groove, a nut with a
corresponding groove, and a set of precision ground steel balls which fit
into the groove, as shown in Figure 3.6. The stream of balls is deflected
through a return channel at the end of the nut, so ensuring a continuous
flow. A single nut assembly of this type will still have some backlash,
but this may be eliminated completely by using a double nut assembly and
by pre-loading the balls. The efficiency of this mechanism is high,
typically over 90%, and the temperature rise is low (Martin, 1983: 37).
Because of these advantages, ball screws are used extensively in CNC
machine tools. Other losses come from the wind-up of drive shafts, the
deflection of machine tool members, and the stick slip of slides. Many of
the sliding components in conventional machine tools have been replaced
in CNC machine tools by rolling components, in order to provide nearly
friction-free movement, and to retain the alignment and close fit of the
slide.
The castings used for the beds of CNC machine tools are generally
more heavily ribbed than on conventional machines, making the bed more
rigid. Additionally, the hollow space between the ribs and under the bed
may be filled with moulding sand to damp down vibrations (Simon, 1973:
225). Some experimentation is being done on the use of concrete beds,
which have a sheet-metal casing braced internally by steel rods and
filled with concrete. Concrete offers advantages from its ability to damp
vibrations and its greater thermal stability, which results in longer tool
life, better surface finish, and the potential to retain accuracy over
very long periods of continuous operation. The use of fabricated steel
structures and granite for the bed is also being investigated (UNIDO,
1985: 39-40).1 •
On conventional machines, the main drive power is supplied by
standard electric motors, which are connected through gear trains in
order to change the drive ratios and hence the speed. For most machining
and manufacturing operations, it only became possible to use numerical
control systems with the development of the servo-motor. Servo-motors
respond directly to an electrical signal and produce a constant torque,
the motor speed varying linearly with the input current.1 * Most servo¬
motors used on CNC machines are DC, but AC servo-motors are being
developed, and they are likely to be used to a great extent in the future.
AC motors require less maintenance than DC motors, but they are
approximately 50% more expensive (UNIDO, 1986a: 59).
If feedback is not required, for example on the main spindle, a
"steppa-motor" could be used. Steppa-motors are a special type of servo¬
motor which have the input command and the position of the motor
synchronised. Because they may be controlled by an open loop system,
they have faster real-time control and eliminate the need for position
feedback devices. In practice, steppa-motors are rarely used on machine
tools as they do not have the power and range of speeds required.
Steppa-motors are, however, used extensively on robots and on other
transport and pick-and-place devices.
3.4.2 Changes in Machine Design
As the design of components used in machine tools has changed with
the introduction of CNC control, so too has the overall design of the
machine itself. A major development from the milling machine has been
the concept of the machining centre. Like milling machines, machining
centres may have a vertical or horizontal configuration, and they have the
same basic structure as a milling machine, i.e., a bed mounted on a
saddle, with the cutting tool mounted vertically or horizontally on a
column. The machining centre is more versatile than the milling machine,
being capable of drilling, tapping, reaming, boring, and milling. This
enables the machine to perform many of the cutting processes required on
one workpiece in a single set-up (rather than having to set up the
workpiece several times on different machines for different cutting
operations), thus giving a considerable saving of time. With the
reduction in set-up time, the machine can cut metal for a much greater
proportion of its operating time, so increasing its utilisation rate.
To undertake all the different types of cutting operations,
machining centres need to be able to change tools automatically. On
small drilling machines, it is possible to use a turret to store a limited
number of tools. But this is not a viable solution for larger machining
centres, as turrets would be far too large and heavy if they were to take
all the tools required. There are two principal types of tool storage
mechanism in general use: the tool carousel and the chain system. Tool
carousels, sometimes referred to as drums, usually contain up to 30 tools.
In the chain system, tools are stored in pots linked by a continuous
chain. This second system is virtually limitless; chain systems can be
linked in parallel, allowing storage of over 200 tools. Figure 3.7 shows
a machining centre with the second type of tool storage. The tools are







Figure 3.8 Layout of Machining Centre with Pallet Pool
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changed by a simple mechanical arm which rotates about its centre, and
has grippers at each end. The tool changer operates by taking the new
tool out of the storage system, after which the arm is relocated so that
it is within reach of the main spindle. It then removes the old tool
from the spindle with its empty gripper, rotates through 180", and places
the new tool in the spindle. The old tool is then replaced in the tool
storage system. The use of automatic tool changers (ATC) has
considerably reduced the machining time lost in tool changing. The time
taken for tool-to-tool changes can be as little as a few seconds, and the
chip-to-chip time is, in some cases, less than ten seconds.20
The flexibility of the machining centre has been further enhanced by
an increase in the number of controlled axes from three to a possible
five. The workpiece may be re-positioned by a rotating table, which
enables the job to be machined on several surfaces in one set-up. A
further axis can be added by the rotation of the spindle head, so that
the machine may cut in both horizontal and vertical modes. The addition
of these two axes means that if a cube of metal is fixed to the
worktable, five of its six faces may be machined in a single set-up.
To further reduce the set-up time on machining centres, some
machines have two work tables, or the ability to load and unload pallets
on the work table. This enables the machine to continue cutting one
workpiece while the last workpiece is unloaded and the next workpiece is
being fixed to the work table. This system can contain only two work
tables, which are operated alternately. However, some systems have pallet
pools containing up to ten pallets. (This type of system is shown on
Figure 3.8.) Not only does this increase in the automation of loading and
unloading allow for increased utilisation of machining time, but periods
of unmanned operation are also made possible.
In the case of the lathe, the major design change has been the
development of the slant bed. Instead of the bed being horizontal, it is
tilted at an angle between 40° and 65° to the horizontal. This
configuration has two advantages. Firstly, it makes the machine more
rigid in operation; secondly, swarf and used coolant are more easily
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disposed of as they fall to the bottom of the bed, where they may easily
be removed without interfering with the cutting process. As on
conventional capstan lathes, the most common way of storing tools on CNC
lathes is in turrets. Some machines have two turrets and are capable of
machining both internal and external surfaces simultaneously. On early NC
and CNC lathes with only one tool, two axes were controlled, the radial
and the longitudinal axes relative to the workpiece. With the addition of
a second tool, which also has to be controlled in the radial and
longitudinal axes, four-axis control has to be used.
On some more advanced CNC lathes, the workpiece may be held rigidly
and statically in the chuck while a rotating tool, such as a drill,
machines it. This combines the traditional turning functions of a lathe
with the cutting functions found on other types of machine. Lathes with
these additional machining functions are often referred to as "turning
centres".21 The addition of rotating tools increases the flexibility and
productivity of the lathe. In some production areas this can eliminate
the need for secondary machining, giving reductions in capital cost, work-
in-progress, and setting-up time. As more cutting operations can be
undertaken on a single set-up, errors from re-positioning the part,
including the possibility of loss of concentricity, are reduced.
To further automate the operation of CNC lathes, robotic arms can be
attached to the machine to load and unload parts. These arms are usually
small and dedicated, and, because of their dedication, they are fairly
unsophisticated and inflexible. Unmachined and machined workpieces may
be stored in pools next to the lathe in a similar way to the pallet pools
of machining centres, and are loaded and unloaded by the robotic arm.
This capacity for workpiece storage and automated loading/unloading
enables the lathe to run unattended.
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3.5 Factory Automation
CNC is only one example of the many different applications of
microelectronics control to equipment on the factory floor, in the office,
and in the home.22 With the increasing availability and lower cost of
computing power, and the development of more sophisticated software, the
control of many machines may be coordinated. Kaplinsky (1984a: 24-28)
divides the changing nature of automation into three distinct phases, as
shown in Figure 3.9. In the first stage, intra-activity automation takes
place within the three separate areas (or spheres) of production:
manufacture, design, and coordination. Discrete functions within these
spheres are automated, e.g., the control of a standalone machine tool
using a CNC unit. In the second, or intra-sphere, phase automation
technologies link activities within the same sphere. This includes DNC,
where several CNC machines are linked to the same computer and Flexible
Manufacturing Cells (FMC). An FMC consists of a CNC machine tool, a
workpiece store, workpiece and tool handling devices, and automatic
control. Thus, the machining centres and turning centres, with pallet
pools, high—capacity tool changers and robotic arms, discussed in the
previous section, can be considered FMCs.
Finally, activities in different spheres of production are
coordinated, and automation is, therefore, inter-sphere. An example is
the linking of a Computer Aided Design (CAD) system to a CNC machine
tool, so that the design developed on the CAD system can be directly
loaded into the control of the CNC machine: this is usually referred to as
CAD/CAM. Intel—sphere activity also includes Flexible Manufacturing
Systems (FMS) which contain several CNC machine tools and/or FMC. These
are linked together by an automated workpiece flow system, enabling the
simultaneous machining of different workpieces which pass through the
system along different routes. These systems incorporate some production
planning, so there are links between manufacturing and coordination
activities. The most advanced example is the coordination of
manufacturing systems, inventory control, warehousing, and design; this is
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The automation implemented by firms depends to a great extent on
the type of production they are undertaking. There are two main
variables influencing the way producers manufacture their goods: the
scale of production and the variety of designs. Since mass producers
typically make only a small range of products, whereas small batch
producers manufacture a very large number of different products, the type
of automation varies accordingly. (Figure 3.10 illustrates the different
forms of automation applied for these production variables.)
Large-scale production makes it viable to use dedicated systems, or
special purpose machines, which are only capable of producing one type
and size of component.zs Less dedicated systems, which enable the
production of similar products with slightly different specifications, are
known as Flexible Transfer Lines (FTL). These are made up of special
purpose machines, or automated universal machines, linked in a line by an
automated workpiece flow system. In these systems, different workpieces
are machined simultaneously and run through the system along the same
line. The variety of workpieces produced in these systems is small,
usually less than ten variations of a similar part. Because of the
difference in cycle and setting times for various parts, there may be
buffers between the machines (Wsrnecke and Steinhilper, 1985: 4-5).
Small and medium batch production account for a very significant
proportion of industrial output: it is estimated that in the US between
50% and 75% (in terms of value) of metal working production occurs in
batches of less than 50. The production of goods in these small batches
is far more costly than mass production; the ratio of costs may be as
great as 100:1 (McPherson, 1979: 1). It is in this type of production
area that FMC and FMS have been installed and where they have been most
effectively exploited. Indeed, the availability of economies in batch
production is a major part of the definition of FMS used by the UK
Department of Trade and Industry:
Flexible manufacturing is a system which combines
microelectronics and mechanical engineering to bring
economies of scale to batch work. A central on-line
computer controls the machine tools and other work
stations and the transfer of components and tooling. The
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computer also provides monitoring and information control.
This combination of flexibility and overall control makes
possible the production of a wide range of products in
small numbers (Quoted in Edghill and Davies, 1985: 37).
The manufacturing philosophy of Group Technology (GT), originally
developed in the USSR in the 1950s for organising production using
conventional, standalone machines, is often used to decide which type of
component is manufactured in a system. GT works on the principle that
there are many families of components with similar configurations, which
have to be machined in similar ways. Using this principle, the layout of
machines on the work-shop floor is changed from having the same types of
machines grouped together or in lines, to having several groups of
different machines. Each group of machinery is capable of all the
machining processes required on a certain family of components. Thus,
instead of a piece of metal being moved around the factory floor for
different machining operations, the part is machined completely in one
area. This gives reductions in throughput time, work-in-progress,
inventory, setting-up time, and work handling.
The first FMS was designed by Theo Williamson for Molins in 1962;
it was known as the Molins System 24, as it was capable of 24-hour
operation. The system was designed to cut various components for
cigarette making machines. The components were all cut from a standard
block of aluminium and the blocks were moved to different stations for
different cutting operations (Bessant and Haywood, 1985: 11). As these
parts were made of relatively soft aluminium, the system could not be
used for cutting harder metals. This was one of the many reasons why
the system was not widely adopted within the metal cutting industry. The
main inhibiting factor to the system's development was that the control
technology available at the time was very limited. Although the first
FMS was produced in 1962, it was only in the early 1970s that FMSs
started to be significantly developed and utilised, but their subsequent
diffusion in manufacturing industry has been slow. Bessant and Haywood
estimated that by the late 1970s the world-wide population of FMSs was
less than 75, and by 1984 there were only about 200 (1985: 18).
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Despite their name, FMSs have only limited flexibility. Systems can
only machine a certain type of component, the size of which is limited by
the size of the machines in the system. The number of possible machining
operations is also limited by the types of machine in the system. This
inflexibility is often caused by the fixtures used in the system to hold
and transport the workpieces, and not by the machines themselves, which
are capable of machining any shape within their size limit. Fixtures can
usually only hold similar parts, and therefore limit the size and shape of
the components that can be manufactured (McSherry and Hill, 1986).2 4
According to whether prismatic or rotational parts are being
produced, different methods of workpiece loading and transport are used.
Thus, it is rare for an FMS to produce both prismatic and rotational
parts and FMSs are more frequently installed for the production of the
former. In Edghill and Davis's global study (1985), 85 out of a sample of
107 systems surveyed produced prismatic parts. Items principally chosen
for processing in FMSs are mainly high-value critical components. And, as
rotational parts are usually low-cost items, they are not generally
considered for FMS production because it is harder to justify the
investment costs (Edghill and Davis, 1985: 45-47).
FMS and FMC are important to machine tool companies not only as
production methods, but also as product areas. Many of the larger
machine tool builders have already expanded into the installation of FMS
as a part of their manufacturing strategy, and others are manufacturing
FMCs as well as standalone CNC machines. Most of these producers have
installed such systems within their own manufacturing plants in order to
learn more about difficulties in their design, installation, and operation.
Indeed, one large Japanese producer has installed three FMSs, undertaking
different types of work, to gain such experience. Producers also
demonstrate these systems to potential customers. As a consequence, the
machine tool industry is one of the largest users of FMS, in one survey
almost a quarter of the sample of 80 FMSs were installed in machine tool
firms (Bessant and Haywood, 1985: 21). Even for those producers which
have not commenced the production of these systems, the requirement to
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design standalone CNC machines that can be integrated into systems built
by others is becoming an important consideration.
3.5.1 A New Focus in Manufacturing
A major concern of manufacturers has always been to reduce
production costs and to improve product quality. Many firms are
currently attempting to achieve these aims by the implementation of
"Japanese manufacturing methods". The two main Japanese concepts that
have had the greatest influence on the design of new manufacturing
systems are Just-in-Time (JIT) production and Total Quality Control
(TQC).2S It should, however, be noted that these manufacturing methods
are not technology dependent and can be implemented in plants using
conventional or standalone CNC machines, as well as in those that have
installed more automated systems.
The principle of JIT is that parts, sub-assemblies, and finished
goods are only produced, or delivered, just before they are required in
the production process. JIT is sometimes referred to as "stockless
production", as its main aim is that all materials in the factory should
be currently worked on, and stores of inputs, buffer stocks in production,
and stores of finished goods should be eliminated. JIT has other
implications apart from being an efficient inventory control system. JIT
improves quality control and reduces the quantity of scrap, as it draws
attention to faults as they occur, rather than finding them later.
Further, the plant configuration may be streamlined to raise the process
yield and improve production rates. To approach stockless production, a
cut in batch size is required so that excessive buffer stocks which incur
carrying costs are not produced. But the batch size must be large enough
for the set-up costs for each batch to be economic. With this aim in
mind, the designer must develop a system or production layout in which
the changes required to alter set-ups for the production of various
different types of components are negligible. In an ideal system, the
economic batch size would be one, and the set-up time for parts would
approach zero.24
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The goal of TQC Is that quality in production should be continually
improved and that there should be "zero defects". This is achieved by
transferring quality control checks on parts from a specific department
to the actual person manufacturing the part, and increasing the number of
parts actually checked for quality. In some cases, all parts are so
checked. In many FMSs, some form of measuring machine is often
incorporated into the system, in order to check manufactured parts.
Further, many individual machines are now equipped with their own probes,
enabling them to measure a loaded part and ensure that it has been
machined correctly.
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3.6 Technological Capability Requirements for the
Manufacture of Machine Tools
What technological capabilities does a firm need to manufacture
conventional machine tools? How is the manufacture of CNC machines
different from that of conventional machine tools and what new
capabilities does the firm have to acquire to begin producing these
machines? Two main areas of capabilities need to be considered: (i> those
required to actually make machine tools, i.e., the skills and capabilities
required on the shop-floor to make the component parts of the machines
and to assemble them; and (ii) the capabilities used to design new
machines and adapt existing ones. A major difference between
conventional and CNC production is the use of specialist components, which
conventional producers cannot, without considerable investment, make
in-house. This difference means that the production of CNC machines is
less vertically integrated than conventional production. For producers in
industrialising countries, there are further consequences, as there can be
difficulties in purchasing these components. These difficulties and the
capabilities required to begin the indigenous production of some of these
specialist components will be discussed in this section.
3.6.1 Production Capabilities
In a conventional machine tool factory, the majority of the work
undertaken on the factory floor consists of the casting and machining of
the bed, the general machining of parts, and the assembly of these parts
to make the machine tool. A basic requirement of machine tool
manufacture is the availability of cast-iron and the existence of foundry
facilities for casting the machine bed. Many machine tool producers have
their own foundries, but it is also common for firms to sub-contract this
work. The surfaces of the bed on which slides are positioned have to be
machined, and it is critical that these surfaces are flat. As the bed is
too large to be worked on standard machines, machine tool producers use
large piano-millers and grinders to cut these surfaces, but producers
making fairly small machines can file and scrape them by hand if they do
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not have the capital to invest in the larger machines. Although the
quality of the surface finish obtainable by machining is fairly high, the
surface is often finished by hand scraping, and this is particularly
common in the manufacture of special purpose machines. Slideways can
then be positioned and ground on the bed.
Many other small mechanical components also have to be
manufactured. These include the head and tail stocks, tool holders, the
chuck, and, for conventional machines, gear trains enabling running speeds
to be changed. This work includes gear cutting, milling, turning, and
grinding. Some components may also need to be heat treated in order to
improve their durability. As well as the casting work, some component
manufacture and heat treatment may be sub-contracted to other firms.
For some of the sub-contracted production work, it may not be viable for
the individual firm to invest in the necessary capital equipment, or the
sub-contractor may be able to obtain a higher quality finish than the
machine tool firm can achieve in-house. The machine tool making firm
will routinely buy in some components, including all the electrical parts,
e.g., motors, lubricant pumps, electrical wiring, and switches.
While the firm may be able to sub-contract a large proportion of
this preliminary production work and buy in many parts, the final
assembly must be undertaken in-house. For many products, assembly skills
are fairly trivial, but, in the case of machine tool manufacture, they are
an important element in final quality and performance. Sub-assemblies,
such as the gear boxes and head stocks, are made and tested before the
whole machine is assembled. If the machine tools produced are to be
accurate in operation, they must be built with all parts in alignment and
adjusted with great care during assembly. Once assembled, the machine
has to be rigorously tested and further adjusted to ensure that it will
remain accurate in long-term use.
In the conventional machine tool plant, semi-skilled workers are
employed to work in areas such as material movement, basic machine
operation, loading and unloading, and some basic fitting and assembly.
The major technical requirement for these workers is that they know how
to use measuring instruments and to read engineering drawings. Skilled
workers are principally employed to operate metal working machine tools,
to undertake quality control, to assemble high-precision components, and
to fully test and adjust the finished machines (UNIDO, 1986a: 26).
Traditionally, these skilled workers require several years of
apprenticeship, usually between three and seven, to learn their skills.
Skilled employees have considerable knowledge of the operation of machine
tools, including tooling technology and machine calibration. They are
also able to maintain and undertake minor repairs on conventional machine
tools. Skills built up from operating, repairing, and rebuilding machine,
tools may be utilised in the assembly of new machines. A very large
proportion of these skills is readily available in the general metal
working industry, and it is therefore fairly easy for producers in the
metal working sector to enter conventional machine tool manufacture.27
All the skills just described are also used in the production of CNC
machine tools, but the quantity of component production is considerably
reduced. This is due to two changes: firstly, many special mechanical
components are bought in by the firm from specialist producers (e.g., the
ball screw), and, secondly, there are fewer components, as all the
mechanical controls and some gear boxes have been eliminated by the
introduction of the control unit and variable speed servo-motors. The
total number of components used in the manufacture of a CNC machine tool
has been reduced by 30-40% (Watanabe, 1983: 28).
The skill area which has changed most, and in which capability
demands have been most increased, is assembly. Sensing devices have to
be fitted to the machine, carefully aligned with the slideways, and
connected to the interface. The commissioning of the machine is also
more complex, necessitating tests on the electric drives and the CNC
system. While the experienced user and repairer of machine tools will
have few difficulties in beginning conventional machine tool production,
for the manufacture of CNC tools there is a production barrier
confronting the conventional producer. Firms have to acquire the new
skills required to make the electronic circuits in the interface and the
electrical wiring to join the interface to the sensors fitted on the
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machine. (Similarly, there are increased demands for electrical and
electronics capabilities in the design of CNC machine tools, and these are
treated in detail below.) Although most CNC producers gain operating, but
not repairing, experience of CNC machine tools on their own shop-floor
before commencing CNC production, these skills are only of limited use in
the final assembly and testing period.2 • Chapter 6 notes that several
Korean conventional producers, with many years' experience in that
production sector, encountered considerable difficulties in the production
and assembly of CNC machines. These problems were, in the main, overcome
by the training of personnel overseas, the employment of consultants, or
through the technical support accompanying a foreign technology
agreement.
For producers entering the manufacture of FMCs and FMSs, there will
be an increase in assembly work and in the number of components
produced. However, the technical skills required to manufacture these
parts are not significantly different from those used in making of CNC
machine tools and, therefore, should not be a problem for the firm to
acquire. Some components in the system may be bought in from a
specialist producer rather than produced in-house, e.g., robotic arms for
FMCs and automated guided vehicles for FMSs.
Finally, it is necessary to consider the changes in skills required
in the repair and maintenance of CNC compared to conventional machine
tools. These concern machine tool producers both as machine users and
machine vendors. On conventional machine tools, most repair and
maintenance work can be undertaken by the skilled machinist, and, in a
mechanical work-shop, simple machine tools can be dismantled,
reconditioned, and rebuilt. In fact, many machine tool producers
originated from firms which were machine tool users, and built their first
machines using the experience they had gained from using and repairing
machine tools. Thus, for conventional manufacturers, existing skills
within the firm are adequate to repair and maintain their own production
equipment, and, as most machine tool users can undertake basic repair and
maintenance work, there is no significant requirement for producers to
offer after-sales services to their customers.
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The situation is entirely different in the case of CNC machine tools.
On these machines, the operator is only able to undertake a small
proportion of repair and maintenance work. Skills in trouble-shooting on
CNC machine tools, the repair of the electronics components, and the
correction of software faults are all new skills that have to be learnt.
As the majority of CNC machine tool producers buy in control units from
specialised producers, they cannot easily build up these skills themselves
nor can they supply after-sales services of control units to their
customers.2 * The specialist controls producer or its agent is the usual
source of back-up repair and maintenance service. However, in
industrialising countries this can still be a problem, as controls
producers will not establish such facilities until there is a certain
level of use of their controls.50
3.6.2 Design Capabilities
The distinction between the roles of skilled and semi-skilled
workers in production is mirrored by a similar division in companies'
design departments, where the corresponding types are usually designated
as "core designers" and "detail designers". Core design involves the
development of the original machine tool concept, its layout, and its
basic specifications. Thus, all the originality and new innovations
included in the design of the new machine are the responsibility of the
core designers. Although core designers do not form the largest
proportion of firms' design personnel - often less than 25% - they are,
nevertheless, vital for innovation. The type of work undertaken by core
designers will to a large extent depend on the product strategy of the
firms in which they work. Designers may solely copy existing machines,
and in some cases simplify their designs. (This was referred to in the
previous chapter as crude copying.) Some adaptations may also be
incorporated in the copying process (adaptive design), or the design may
be an enhanced version with new innovative features (developed design).
Finally, the design may be totally innovative (new design). In the main,
most design work undertaken by machine tool producers is of either the
adaptive or developed type. The work of detail designers involves
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drawings, specifications, and assembly diagrams for all parts of the
machine, including the detailed design and assembly of small mechanical
components. Many of these designers are draughtsmen working to the
original ideas and drawings supplied by core designers.31
For the conventional producer, the skills of design personnel (both
core and detail) are principally in the area of mechanical engineering,
including some work with hydraulics (and/or pneumatics), and, to a lesser
extent, metallurgy and tooling. If the firm produces many special
purpose machine tools, demands on both core and detailed designers are
greater, as new or altered designs have to be made so that the machines
fulfil the specifications agreed with the purchaser. Many of these
machines are custom designed and built, so the demand for design
manpower is high, and such work utilises designers skilled in only certain
aspects of the machine, e.g., cam design. In general, the design of such
machines is only undertaken by firms with considerable design experience.
Clearly, firms undertaking a large proportion of special purpose or custom
design work will need to have much larger design departments than those
which only manufacture standard machines.
There are two different approaches to the design of CNC machine
tools. One can either retro-fit a control unit onto an existing
conventional machine design, or one can design a new model specifically
for CNC control. When producing a retro-fitted design, new motors,
sensors, and leadscrews must be fitted to the existing machine,
necessitating minor alterations. Specifications for the new components
must be decided upon by the core designer (s), and these components have
to be acquired. If a new model is to be produced, changes in the
structure and configuration must be incorporated into the new design.
The overall design of this type of CNC machine tool is more difficult for
the new entrant. New cast-iron beds have to be designed and tested and
moulds need to be made. Not only are these beds a different shape but
they also need greater rigidity than beds for conventional machines in
order to withstand the increased stresses that occur with the higher
acceleration and deceleration made possible by the use of new motors.
New machine parts, such as automatic tool changers, also have to be
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designed. Friction in the machine must be minimised, and the machine has
to be consistently more accurate in operation, since the operator of CNC
machines cannot correct for any inaccuracies. These changes in the
operating parameters mean that many standard parts and sub-assemblies
used in conventional production have to be completely re-designed. In
the case of machining centres and four-axis lathes, the mechanical
designs are also considerably more complex as they involve the movement
of parts in more axes. For the experienced core designer of conventional
machines, the design of the mechanical parts of the new CNC machine
should not present insuperable difficulties. Knowledge of the operation
and mechanics of other CNC machines will obviously be advantageous to the
CNC designers, giving them a better understanding of the operating
principles of the new machine.
In conventional machine tool design and production, electrical work
involves the design of circuits to link the motors on the machine to the
control panel. Such design is fairly basic; consequently, conventional
producers do not need highly trained or skilled personnel in this field.
In CNC production, there is a requirement for some electronics design.
Although firms usually buy in the control unit, containing all the complex
circuitry, they still have to undertake some design work to attach the
control unit to the machine tool. The circuitry involved is known as the
"interface", and usually consists of ladder relay circuits using basic
logic. Interface design is specific to the model of machine tool, since it
has to take into account the types of sensors being used and the
operating parameters. In order to design interfaces, some electronics
skills must be acquired. Machine tool producers are, however, frequently
given technical support in this design area from controls manufacturers,
who often train personnel from the machine tool firms. The controls
suppliers sometimes also help with the choice of specifications for other
electrical components, i.e., the motors and sensors.
Core designers of CNC machine tools should in practice be able to
develop the automated materials handling parts required for FMCs and
FMSs. The design of these systems will, however, involve the firm in a
much greater proportion of electronics work and some computing. At the
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initiation of the project, there will be considerable work in production
planning and finding an optimal layout for the system. This planning
stage can draw heavily on computer analysis in order to test various
layouts and production schemes. In the construction of the system, there
is a much higher proportion of electronics design in order to interface
all the components of the system to the main controller. If the machine
tool firm is buying in the controls system from a major producer, it can
collaborate with that supplier in this design field. Finally, in order to
implement production planning, software for the system controller needs
to be written. Again, this can be undertaken by the machine tool firm or
the controls supplier. As the development work involved in such systems
incorporates many more core designers from different disciplines, the firm
needs to be able to effectively manage such a development group.
The design requirements of standard conventional machine tools
should not create major difficulties for firms with engineering
capabilities. The skills that have been generated in the operation,
adaptation, repair and re-building of the company's existing stock of
machine tools can easily be utilised in the initial design and production
of machine tools. The design of more specialist conventional machines
(for example, special purpose machines in which very high accuracy is
needed) will require a greater build-up of core design skills, people who
are experienced in machine design. Hence, entering specialist sectors of
the market will be more diffiuclt.
The core design capabilities used for conventional machine tools may
also be used in the development of the mechanical elements of a CNC
machine. However, while these skills are certainly adequate for the
design of retro-fitted CNC machines, in order to develop new CNC machines
designers need more information and experience of the operation of
machine tools designed specifically for CNC control. Furthermore, these
machines can rarely be designed by a single person, as new skills in
electronics and electrical engineering are a requirement. Thus, an
interdisciplinary team is typically involved with the development of new
CNC designs. Conventional machine tool producers do not have personnel
with these skills, nor are they generally available on the NIC employment
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market, and this requirement may create some problems for conventional
producers during the entry stage.
Whether conventional or CNC machines are involved, a firm wishing to
undertake more than the crude copying of imported machinery critically
requires core designers. Core design skills evolve within firms as
personnel gain more experience in machine design and knowledge of the
principles of machine tool operation. NICs will not usually have a large
pool of such people and, since they rarely move between firms, direct
recruitment of these types of personnel is virtually impossible. This is
a major difficulty for all firms and the only long-term strategy enabling
a company to overcome the scarcity of these skills is active encouragment
of their in-house build up.
If firms do not have sufficient in-house capabilities to design new
machines, there are several different measures they can take. The
various learning methods described in the previous chapter can be used to
accelerate the development of in-house capabilities. Firms can also
collaborate with government-funded research institutes, in which a
nucleus of such skills has already formed. In the development of
electronics skills, it has already been noted that the controls suppliers
themselves are often a key source of new capabilities. These are,
however, short-term solutions for such firms, and there is an unavoidable
need for them to build-up some level of their own design capabilities.
3.6.3 Component Manufacture
Traditionally, the conventional machine tool industry is vertically
integrated. The firm produces the majority of the mechanical parts it
uses, sub-contracts very little, and only buys in a relatively small
number of components. A firm's principal material requirements are cast-
iron, and a small quantity of high-grade specialised steels, used for some
of the moving parts, such as the spindles and slides. The firm also
needs a supply of standard motors, switching gear, and cables. All of
these requirements should be readily available in a country with some
established engineering production.
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This chapter has already discussed the new types of components used
in CNC machine tools. The majority of these components are produced by
specialist firms and not by the machine tool manufacturers themselves.
In terms of cost, the main bought-in components are the control unit,
servo-motors, and ball screws; lower-cost components include sensors,
cables, special couplings, and bearings. The cost structure of a
machining centre is shown in Figure 3.11. Combined, the bought—in
components typically account for about 50% of the final machine tool
cost. But the proportion can be as high as 75% if some simple machining
and manufacture of sub-assemblies is sub-contracted out. (The proportion
does vary depending on the type of machine being produced. In general, a
larger proportion of the final cost of a CNC lathe is accounted for by
bought-in parts than a machining centre, as less assembly and machining
work is undertaken by the machine tool firm in its construction.) Because
of the importance of these bought-in components, the CNC machine tool
industry, unlike the conventional industry, is not highly vertically
integrated. Moreover, the work undertaken within the machine tool firm
has changed substantially with the reduction in the amount of component
production. Thus, the main emphasis is on the design of the machine and
its final assembly.
For firms in industrialising countries, the purchase of specialised
components is fairly easy, but in NICs these are not always readily
sourced. NIC firms entering CNC production have to establish links with
suppliers and make arrangements for the importation of such parts. This
considerably extends the lead-time for developing a new machine, and,
with the added difficulties in discussing specifications with the supplier,
there is always some risk that an inappropriate type or size may be
ordered. These difficulties are particularly great for the first entrants
in a NIC, but as links are established, component importation may become
easier. Of course, the NIC entrant firm may not help a competing firm
establish contact with its supplier. But suppliers are more likely to
either appoint an agent, or, as in the case of controls suppliers, set up
a sales and after-sales facility in the country concerned once some
demand has been established.
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Having to import a large number of components has financial
implications for NIC firms, which often have to pay a much higher price
for their components than producers in countries where there are
indigenous suppliers. Jacobsson notes that the price of the control unit
to special or large consumers may be reduced by as much as 50%, and that
of mechanical components by up to 20% (1983: 200). NIC producers may be
able to obtain part of this discount if they buy in large quantities.
Furthermore, as the labour content of the final CNC product is relatively
small compared to conventional machine tools, NIC producers are unable to
make up much of this differential from their lower wage rates.
The most critical, complex, and expensive components of a CNC
machine tool are, mechanically, the ball screw and, electronically, the
control unit. If these components were to be made indigenously, there
would be a further set of material and skill requirements. Ball screw
manufacture necessitates the availability of suitable high-quality steel
to make the lead screw, and the special purpose machine tool which can
cut the helical grooves in the screw with the required precision. The
assembly of ball screws requires a clean area to ensure that dirt does
not enter when the balls are being loaded into the nut: this would impede
the operation of the ball screw and increase wear, shortening its
operating life. These three requirements should not be too difficult for
engineering firms or machine tool producers, the major obstacle being the
large investment required in this area of production. The special machine
required to cut the helical groove is expensive. Therefore, in order to
establish ball screw production, there needs to be substantial existing
domestic demand. This applies to the production of many of the other
mechanical components used in CNC machine tools.
The skills used in the development and production of control units
belong to the disciplines of electronics design, electronics manufacture,
and software engineering. The control unit has to operate in "real time",
i.e., the response of the control unit has to be related to the time taken
by the physical process, so that the results of the computation are
available to instantaneously guide the machine. Thus, most of the control
functions are in the operating hardware of the system and cannot be
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written in slower operating software. Because of these requirements, the
system architecture of control units is custom designed and customised
chips need to be produced. As there are different numbers of axes and
functions to control on different types of machines, control units are
designed specifically for lathes, machining centres, grinders, or special
purpose machines. Production of these customised large-scale integrated
chips requires a high level of electronics design skills and access to
chip fabrication facilities. For these reasons, it is very difficult for
all but the largest machine tool producers to enter control unit
production. Only developments in faster operating software and cheaper
customised and semi-customised chip fabrication will reduce these
barriers. Simpler control units can be produced using standard chips,
but, in order for them to operate in real time, fewer functions can be
controlled. Entry into the production of this type of control unit is
obviously easier, but the potential market is small, as these controls are
only suitable for use on the most basic machines.
Indian analysts have asserted the need for indigenous production of
all critical components, including the control unit. They see the absence
of such indigenous production as a constraint on the development of their
CNC machine tool industry (CMTI, 1983: 92). However, Chapters 6 and 7
will document that the Korean and Taiwanese machine tool industries have
successfully proceeded without indigenous control unit production.
Although there have been attempts to develop control units in both these
countries, at present virtually all controls are supplied by Japanese
producers. Korean government and industry thinking recognises the
eventual advantages of developing indigenous controls production. Yet
they also recognise that at present the Japanese technological lead is
practically insurmountable. As relevant electronics and software skills
develop elsewhere in Korean industry, so Korea may, in future, possess the
capability base that would allow successful entry into controls
production.
However, the ability of the Korean CNC machine tool industry to
perform its major function of supporting the manufacturing sector has not
been compromised by its present limitations. That industry, as well as
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the Taiwanese, is able to secure its supplies from Japanese producers.
Arguably, there may be a price to be paid. Japanese producers have
competed to sell controls on the Taiwanese market, largely because of
those producers' export orientation towards the US. But the emphasis the
Korean industry has put on manufacturing for its domestic market has
meant that there has been less competition between Japanese controls
producers in this market. Thus, the price the Koreans pay for their
control units is somewhat higher. Nevertheless, even that situation may
be subject to rapid change. It is plausible that, as the Korean market
expands, there may be increasing competition in this market among
Japanese controls producers, with corresponding effects on price.
Additionally, there were signs that the Korean CNC producers themselves
were starting to import controls from other suppliers.
The introduction to this chapter argued that industrial development
depends crucially upon the acquisition of a relevant set of technological
capabilities. Which capabilities need to be acquired similarly depends
upon the nature of the technologies concerned. Design and production
capabilities may be differentially difficult for an industrialising country
to obtain. Yet the entire range of capabilities may not need to be
acquired for a country to successfully enter CNC production and, indeed,
the experiences of both the Korean and Taiwanese industries discussed
below establish that case. The capabilities which appear to be essential
for long-term development are those involved in design, interface
development, and final assembly.
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Notes
1. Machine tools can be divided into two general categories; those
which cut metal and those which form metal. This thesis
concentrates on the manufacture of metal cutting rather than metal
forming machines, since the former category accounts for a much
large proportion of all machine tools manufactured. (In 1986 metal
cutting machines accounted for over three—quarters of all machine
tools produced American Machinist. Feb. 1988: 63.)
2. For a more detailed explanation of the operation of all types of
metal cutting machine tools, see How Things Work (1972, 2), and
Boothroyd (1981).
3. Metal cutting machines before this time had mainly been used for
the production of armaments, especially the boring of cannon, but
these tools were too inaccurate for the production of components
for steam engines. For more details of the early development of
machine tools, see Rolt (1965), Galloway (1965), and Gilbert (1965).
4. "A cam is a specially shaped component that serves to guide the
motion of a component called a follower": How Things Work
(1972, 2: 212). A camshaft has several cams spaced along its length
to control different operations; these may be either differently
shaped cams or the same cams at different orientations.
5. For more details of non-traditional metal cutting processes, see
Snoeys et al. (1986).
6. A form of tracer device had been used in the early eighteenth
century in Sweden to manufacture long and heavy iron leadscrews for
lathes (Rolt, 1965: 63-64).
7. Noble (1979, 1984) also thoroughly documents the development of
servomechanisms and their subsequent application to machine tools.
Additional information is drawn from American Machinist (Nov. 1977),
which also contains details of other automation systems developed at
the same time.
8. Noble also notes that Parsons was not the only engineer to develop
digital methods of machine control in the immediate post-War period.
In the early 1940s, the Kalkulex computing system developed by
Killian was applied to a milling machine to control two of its axes
automatically. This work was in part sponsored by a large US
machine tool producer, Kearney and Trecker. Stibbitz, at Bell Labs,
designed a control system which used sample data feedback provided
by a commutator. The system controlled one axis on a cam cutting
milling machine. In 1950, Cunningham, at Arma Corp., demonstrated a
lathe on which the position of the tool, and the speed of movement
to that position, were both controlled by wide-punched paper tape.
With the outbreak of the Korean War, Arma Corp. stopped work on the
lathe, but the firm later used a similar system to produce non-
circular gears for the military. To control this gear cutter, 16mm
film was exposed and, in the control of the machine, the film was
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projected onto a battery of photo-electric cells. The preparation of
the film took 100 hours for a typical gear. In 1949, an
automatically controlled programmable lathe was designed and built
by Carruthers. This lathe used special stepping switches and relays.
The control system was programmed by rearranging electrical
connections between the switches and relays, initially by
re-soldering the connecting wires in different configurations.
Because of the impractical nature of the re-programming, a plug
board was used, and this method was subsequently replaced by a tape
reader using 35mm film. While all these systems were used to some
extent within the firms in which they originated, they were not
developed past the prototype stage and were never commercially
available (Noble, 1984: 86-93).
9. Feedback has been used in control mechanisms for centuries.
Probably the simplest, and one of the earliest, examples is
controlling the water level in a cistern with a ballcock. The
ballcock opens a valve when the water level falls below its upper
limit, and water flows into the cistern until the water regains its
upper limit, when the valve is shut by the ballcock. In the steam
age, mechanical speed governors were extensively developed to
regulate running speeds. Early industrial applications of control
with feedback took place in the continuous process industries, where
mechanisms were used to control variables such as temperature,
pressure, and flow rates. Initially, these controls were based on
pneumatic and hydraulic techniques, and later on electro-mechanical
devices. The development of electronics and basic electronics
components - such as phototube amplifiers in the 1930s, followed by
large electronics projects in World War II, and the introduction of
the transistor by Bell Labs in 1947 - led to the emergence of
electrical servomechanisms. Many advances in the theory and
practice of electrical servomechanisms were due to military projects,
notably the project at MIT's Servomechanisms Lab. to develop a
radar—directed gunfire control system.
10. It should however be noted that the term NC is often used to refer
to both NC and CNC machines. This is the case in both Japan and
Korea, where NC is generally used to describe all machines fitted
with control units.
11. For details of sensors used on CNC machine tools, see RAnky (1986:
174-85).
12. Part programs contain the information which describes the geometry
of the cut to be made in the workpiece and the steps by which it is
to be machined. These programs are usually written in a special
language (known as APT) developed for use in NC and CNC control
units. See Simon (1973: 430-37) for a description of APT and its
development.
13. For more details of the system architecture of CNC units, see R£nky
(1986: 189-93).
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14. Reductions in setting-up time and workpiece handling stem from the
increased accuracy of the machines and the reduction in the use of
fixtures to position the workpiece. This results in further
economies, as fixtures are expensive to design, make, and store.
15. For an analysis of the economic considerations of using standard,
turret, automatic, and NC lathes, see Huq and Prendergast (1983:
Ch. 4). For the financial (and other) considerations of installing
CNC machines instead of conventional machines, see American
Machinist (Oct. 1981: 185-92).
16. In general, the stiffness and rigidity of conventional machine tools
have been improved in response to the development of high-speed
cutting tools, which increased the stresses in the machine.
17. Backlash is caused by the play between the screw thread and the nut
when the direction of movement is changed. As the screw changes
direction, it will turn a small amount before the other flank of the
screw engages with the nut. The loss in motion is therefore
irregular.
18. Granite is at present used for the beds of co-ordinate measuring
machines which need to have a very flat and stable base, but it is
considered too expensive for use on standard machines.
19. This is achieved by varying the voltage supplied to either the
inductor or the armature to control the motor. For a more detailed
explanation, see Coiffet and Chirouze (1983).
20. These tool-to-tool and chip-to-chip times are taken from publicity
material supplied by Japanese machine tool producers.
21. For a detailed review of turning centres, see American Machinist
(Feb. 1985: 97-116).
22. For a more detailed summary, and technical information on the
applications of microelectronics, see Forester (1980, 1985), Bessant
et al. (1981), Scientific American (Special Edition on Automation),
Sept. 1982.
23. The utilisation of dedicated systems is to some extent being eroded
by two trends in the market for mass-produced items. Firstly, the
product life of commodities is being shortened, meaning that
machinery installed must be flexible in the long run. This is often
achieved by making the tooling flexible, so that it is relatively
easy to re-tool the system to produce an up-dated version or a new,
but similar, product. Secondly, a greater number of varieties of the
finished product are being offered, so that there is more variability
in some of the parts produced and a reduction in the batch sizes of
these parts. For this type of production, systems need to have
built-in flexibility,
24. In his survey of 60 Japanese and 35 US FMSs, Jaikumar (1986)
suggests that the Japanese systems are far more flexible (on
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average each Japanese system produced 93 different parts while
those in the US only made 10). He also found that the Japanese
systems were more reliable and better integrated into the factories
in which they operate. He argues that the major reasons for Japan's
lead stems from the different approach taken by management.
25. Schonberger (1982) describes Japanese manufacturing methods, their
application and advantages. He also notes that total quality control
was, in fact, first used by an American, A.V. Feigenbaum, but that it
was Japanese producers which first managed to implement it in their
factories <1982: 47). Chapter 7 considers the effects of using
these manufacturing methods on competitiveness, especially in
international trade.
26. Of course, the ability of JIT to fulfil these ends is absolutely
dependent upon availability of materials and component supply. If
that supply should be interrupted, then the consequences for the
plant may be disastrous.
27. Entrance into machine tool production by either machinery users or
small workshops which repair and maintain machines has been a
continuing feature of the industry. Floud's study of the British
machine tool industry between 1850 and 1914 notes that:
The frequency with which machine tools were made in
conjunction with other products suggests that entry
into the machine tool industry must have been
relatively easy for firms already established in other
branches of the engineering industry, at least in the
sense that most engineering firms would be technically
competent to produce machine tools, even if they did
not have particular commercial or design knowledge of
the problems of machine tool production <1976: 42).
28. Frequently, firms will buy one or more CNC machine tools and use
them in their own production plant in order to learn about their
design and operation before they begin their own production. This
is a situation similar to that of CNC producers installing their own
FMS before they commence producing them for other firms.
29. For firms with at least fifteen CNC machines, it may be economic to
acquire skills in the repair of electronics components.
30. As there is a large capital outlay involved in the purchase of a CNC
machine tool, it is important that any downtime, due to machine
failure, is minimised. A network of after-sales and service
facilities must, therefore, be established by machine tool suppliers
(including agents).
31. For a distinction between core and detailed design in relation to
different types of work undertaken, see, for example, Westphal et
al. (1984a: 8).
CHAPTER POUR
The Global Machine Tool Industry:
Its Structure and Trading Patterns
4.1 Introduction
When an industrialising country contemplates entry into a given
industry, it confronts an environment already shaped by the history of
that industry in developed countries and by long—established patterns of
global trade. This chapter describes the historical development of the
machine tool industry, the factors which have typically influenced its
development, and the traditional trading patterns which have been
established. The international trade of machine tools has changed
considerably in the last decade with the expansion of Japan's exports.
Why were Japanese machine tools such a success in the markets of other
industrialised countries? Why couldn't existing domestic producers in
these countries compete with these imported machines? And what are the
implications of these changes on NIC and developing country
manufacturers?
The overall structure and trade of the global CNC machine tool
industry as it has developed from the 1970s reflects patterns which
extend back to the nineteenth—century history of the machine tool
industry. From a relatively early period the global machine tool industry
has been characterised by a high degree of national specialisation and
close links between each national industry and the manufacturing sectors
that consume its products. Indeed, this chapter will show how global
specialisation has emerged out of a variety of national producei—user
links, and how in turn the significance of international trade in machine
tools is a consequence of that specialisation. The organic patterns of
interaction between machine tool manufacture and use have constituted an
enormously consequential economic and technological environment for the
industry. Close interactions between national machine tool industries and
the general manufacturing sector have created and sustained the most
important competitive environment for machine tool producers; they have
imposed a formidable cost discipline; and they have provided both a
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source and a direction of technological innovation. These relationships
and their consequences apply no less to the CNC industry than they do to
the conventional sector.
By contrast, relations between national machine tool industries and
the military might be seen as an anomaly in this organic historical
pattern. A number of machine tool industries, notably in the United
States but also in other industrialised countries, have developed
extremely close links with the military. Short—term profitability from
supplying this sector has seemed to carry with it long-term risks. While
the military influence was crucial for the early development of CNC
machine tools, its legacy has been a continued direction of innovation
towards a highly specialised sector and away from general manufacturing.
Moreover, a military environment has loosened the competitive discipline
which the civilian sector historically imposed upon machine tool firms.
And the political unreliability of military consumers has exacerbated the
endemic uncertainty constituted by normal manufacturing cycles. This has
made already difficult investment decisions even harder to plan and take.
Given these historical patterns, the CNC industries of both Japan
and Korea (discussed in Chapters 5-7) look like continuations of the
organic relations between national machine tool industries and their
domestic civilian users. The most influential links appear to be those
between vehicle and machine tool producers. It is argued here and
elsewhere that these links have not only directed innovation in the CNC
industries of these countries but have exemplified the ways in which an
indigenous machine tool sector can support its national manufacturing
industries. Moreover, both the discipline and the direction imposed on
national machine tool builders by these links have created, especially in
the cases of Japan and Korea, industries which are well adapted to seize
upon and exploit the opportunities offered by the historically shaped,
specialised international market.
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4.2 Features of the Machine Tool Industry
In most industrialised countries, the machine tool industry
originated in other manufacturing industries because backward integration
into machinery production was the only method of acquiring new machinery.
The textile and armaments industries were both important early
manufacturers of machine tools in Britain and America in the nineteenth
century, and it was only in the middle of that century that firms
specialising only in the manufacture of machine tools started to appear.
As well as creating a market for machine tools, the textile and armaments
industries also required different types of machines, or adaptations of
existing ones, to manufacture new products. As different industries have
grown in their importance, so new machine tool producers, and new types
of machine tools, have emerged from these industries. These links have
been a continuing feature of the development of the machine tool
industry. Although defence is still a major influence on the machine tool
industry, it is the vehicle industry that has been most important in the
twentieth century. According to the historian R.S. Woodbury,
A volume should be written about machine tools and the
automobile industry. In no industry has the technical
development of tools been so crucial in all its aspects,
and no industry has had such a great effect on the far
smaller machine tool industry. Not only did the automobile
industry after 1900 become the largest single customer of
the machine tool industry, taking 25 to 30 percent of the
output, but it actually increased its volume consistently
(Quoted in Rolt, 1965: 218).
Other industries influential on the development of the machine tool
industry in this century have been those manufacturing bicycles, sewing
machines, and aeroplanes.
The machine tool industry is dependent on engineering industries for
its market, and, consequently, rises and falls in engineering production
have an accentuated effect on machine tool production. The profitability
of machine tool firms is also affected by these swings in demand. During
periods of high demand, the industry is more profitable than most
manufacturing industries, but during down-swings it is far less
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profitable (DiFilippo, 1986: 46). Because of the cyclical nature of the
machine tool market, it is still fairly common for machine tools to be
manufactured in conjunction with other engineering products or types of
machinery. Multi-product firms are able to reduce their vulnerability to
these swings in demand, reducing their production of machine tools during
depressions and building it up with an economic upturn. For example, one
machine tool firm visited in Taiwan still manufactured its original
product, textile machinery, and altered the composition of its output
depending on the state of the market for each type of machinery. Other
manufacturers have diversified into new product areas. Cincinnati
Milacron, the largest US machine tool producer, has considerably expanded
its product range since the late 1940s, entering into the manufacture of
chemicals used in metal cutting, plastic injection molding machinery, and
silicon wafers (Cincinnati Milacron, 1984). Exporting machine tools is
another method used by firms to try to reduce the effects of cyclical
demand in the domestic market.
The largest rises and falls in demand for machine tools are
associated with defence activity. During the build up of defence forces
and in periods of war, the demand for machine tools expands very rapidly,
and machinery producers have to quickly gear up their production to meet
these demands. Between 1940 and 1943, the US machine tool industry
manufactured more machine tools than had been produced in the four
preceding decades (Cincinnati Milacron, 1984: 81). However, during an
immediate post-war period, there is an extensive stock of machine tools
no longer required for defence production. These machines are often
released, at below market prices, onto the civilian market, and,
consequently, the demand for new machines is further depressed.
Production in the US industry continued to decline for five years after
the end of World War II, and only recovered then because of demand from
the Korean War (DiFilippo, 1986: 30-34).1
The link with defence production means that governments often give
the machine tool industry special protection or promotion. In the Korean
case, an indigenous machine tool industry was promoted as an integral
part of the expansion of heavy industries, in order to support the build
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up of the defence sector. An advanced machine tool industry is also seen
to be an integral part of a military-industrial complex which has to be
continuously prepared for war. Such considerations also operated in the
US, where high levels of protection were given to the domestic industry
in 1986.
Although the industry is very technology- and skill-dependent, the
scale of R&D effort and funding is remarkably low. Usually, only 1-2% of
the value of sales is used for formal R&D, and a similar proportion is
devoted to further product developments and improvements.2 In the main,
this research and development work is directly orientated towards meeting
customer requirements. Only a few of the larger producers are involved
in long-term research work. A probable cause of this low level of R&D
investment is the cyclical nature of the industry. During periods of high
demand, all of a firm's energy is put into the manufacture of machines to
meet demand, while during low demand there are insufficient resources to
invest in such work. Governments also have an important role in funding
industrial R&D, and machine tool industries in many countries are given
support either by direct funding of their own R&D efforts or through work
undertaken by universities or research institutes. The orientation of
this research work is obviously heavily influenced by government policy.
DiFilippo compares government-funded R&D in the machine tool sector in
the US, Japan, and West Germany. He documents the large machine tool
projects funded for military purposes in the US, notably including the
development of NC at MIT, and suggests that most of the technical
sophistication of the US machine tool industry has resulted from military
expenditure. In contrast, the Japanese and West German governments have
helped civilian machine tool producers develop new machines by giving
them grants and loans in high-risk development areas. The emphasis in
these development projects was on machines for civilian use and not for
defence purposes (DiFilippo, 1986: 48-61).
Technological developments by component suppliers to the machine
tool industry have been an important factor in changes in machine tool
design and manufacture. The introduction of high-speed steels in the US
early in the twentieth century, followed by tungsten carbide tools
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(originally developed in Germany in the 1920s) meant that machine tools
had to be able to operate at high speeds in order for these tools to cut
efficiently. The machines had to be rigid at higher speeds to ensure
that there was no vibration in the tool tip, which would result in an
uneven cut and rapid wear on the tool itself. Not only were newly
designed machines about 75% heavier than previous models, but they
incorporated new types of gears and bearings which had been originally
developed for use in motor vehicles (Rolt, 1965: 227-29). Similarly, the
application of electronics developments in machine tool control could only
be effectively utilised with the introduction of other new components and
alterations to the structure and configuration of the machine.
Typically, the historical pattern for national machine tool
industries is one of many small and medium-sized companies and only a
few, but important, large ones. In the US in 1977, of the 919
establishments where metal cutting machine tools were manufactured, only
eight had more than 1000 employees, but these eight accounted for 28% of-fche-
total number of employees. In the same year, 822 establishments had
fewer than 100 employees (NMTBA, 1985: 70). In West Germany, 22% of the
total number employed in the machine tool industry work in the fifteen
firms with over 1000 employees. The figures are similar for other
European countries: in Italy, the UK, and France, firms with more than
1000 employees accounted for 10%, 22% and 25% of total industry
employment respectively. Japan is the only country with a substantially
different pattern: in that country over 50% of the total employed are in
firms with over 1000 employees (Horn et al., 1985: 51). In general, the
larger firms supply machinery to the major consumers of machine tools,
such as the vehicle, defence and aeroplane industries. The smaller firms
specialise in the manufacture of a very narrow range of products, which
are utilised in a wide variety of markets. The narrow range of their
output gives the producers advantages from economies of specialisation.
One analyst has claimed that the small size of machine tool firms
and their high levels of specialisation have been a contributory factor to
the slow rate of technical progress in the industry (Marx, 1979: 43).
This author also suggested that there was a trend in the US industry
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towards increased concentration as larger firms acquired smaller ones in
order to expand their product range. One of Jacobsson's major conclusions
was that significant economies of scale can be achieved in the
manufacture of standardised CNC lathes through reductions in the price of
components. He argued that in the long term firms need to manufacture
about 1000 machines a year to be competitive, and that in order for
European firms to be able to reach such levels of production, there
should only be two firms operating in this product sector (Jacobsson,
1986: 98-100, 222-24). If his recommendations were to be followed, the
industry would indeed become highly concentrated.
Not only do firms specialise in the production of certain types of
machine tools, but certain countries have concentrated their expertise in
specific sectors of the global machine tool industry. This specialisation
has partly resulted from the national origins of machine tool industries.
As noted earlier, it was common for a national industry to develop from
engineering industries which required specific machine tool supplies.
Consider, for example, the development in Switzerland in the early
twentieth century of a jig borer by the Soci6t6 G6n6voise (Rolt,
1965: 225-26). Initially, a pointing machine was developed at the request
of watch-makers, which could be used to accurately mark the centres of
holes to be drilled in watch parts. This machine was adapted so that it
could also drill the holes. It was then enlarged so that it could be used
in more general engineering work, but its accuracy to 1/10,000of an
inch was maintained. This machine is typical of the very high precision
machinery manufactured by Swiss firms, much of which has been influenced
by the requirements of the watch and clock industry.
This international specialisation has a further implication for the
global industry, as it means that no country is now totally self-
sufficient in the production of machine tools. In order to take advantage
of their specialisation, most countries export machines in which they have
either a technical or economic lead and import machines which they do not
have the technical ability to produce or those which they can import more
cheaply than they can manufacture. Over 40% of all machine tools
produced are exported from their country of manufacture.
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While these forms of specialisation have largely developed
organically in industrialised nations, new entrants are faced with a
situation in which firms and/or governments must take deliberate
decisions to follow this general pattern, exporting machines in which they
have some production advantage and importing machines in which they have
none. They must, therefore, establish in which sectors of the
international market they may have some potential advantage. For
countries with very large domestic markets, exports may not be such an
important consideration, as economies of scale and of specialisation in
many areas of machine tool production can be achieved by supplying the
local market. The USSR, the largest machine tool consumer in 1985,
exports only a very low proportion of its production. (In 1985 it
exported 6% of production and a high proportion of this went to Soviet-
run factories in other Comecon countries.) However, this low level of
exports does not indicate that the USSR is self-sufficient. In fact, in
1985 it imported over 30% of its domestic requirements. What it does
indicate is that the USSR has not been able to find, and specialise in,
any sector of the market in which it could expand its exports.
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4.3 Global Machine Tool Production: A Change in Leadership
In the data for world machine tool production and trade prepared
annually by American Machinist, a total of 36 countries were listed in
1985 as having a "significant" level of machine tool production. However,
global production is concentrated in a very few countries. Since 1967,
the biggest four machine tool producing countries in the world have been
the US, West Germany, Japan, and the USSR. In 1985, their combined
production accounted for 63% of total world output. Table 4.1 shows the
production figures for these four countries, as well as the UK and Italy,
for selected years between 1967 and 1985.
Table 4.1 Machine Tool Production By Leading Producer Nations
(in ai11 ion US$)
Country 1967 1971 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
US 1 ,900 1,100 2,451 2,635 4,059 5,111 2,106 2,575
FRS 800 1,550 2,403 2,440 4,006 3,953 3,194 3,123
Japan 4S0 950 1,060 1,602 2,893 4,798 3,541 5,270
USSR 900 1,150 1,984 2,201 2,903 2,932 3,077 3,015
Italy 200 450 873 878 1,354 1,513 1,037 1,056
UK 400 400 728 587 1,001 933 573 723
Total World • 8,148 13,644 15,126 22,920 26,418 19,530 21,918
Production
a. Figure unavailable,
Source: flnierican Machinist, Various Issues
The most dramatic change during this period has been the rise of
production levels in Japan. In 1967, Japan produced less than a quarter
(by value) of the output of the US, then the largest producer in the
world. By 1985, Japan was not only leading the world, manufacturing 24%
of total world production, but was producing twice as many machine tools
as the US. A similar change has taken place between two European
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producer countries. In 1967, the UK industry produced twice as much (by
value) as the Italian industry; by 1971, production levels were almost
equal, and by 1985 the Italian industry was producing nearly 50% more
than the UK. The total world production figures given in Table 4.1 also
shows the suiceptLbility of global production of machine tools to swings
in demand.
Table 4.2 Hachine Tool Exports by Leading Producer Nations
(in aillion US$)
Country 1975 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
US 568 452 649 972 406 445
FR6 1,814 1,823 2,508 2,585 1,950 1,900
Japan 359 616 1,237 1,693 1,264 2,099
USSR 188 280 324 242 246 194
Italy 431 436 689 795 592 612
UK 363 300 473 537 318 336
Total World 5,897
Exports
6,500 9, 661 10,845 8,392 9,502
Total World
Exports as a 43 43 42 41 43 43
tage of World
Production
Source; American Hachinist, Various Issues
Table 4.2 indicates that, while the proportion of total machine tool
production exported has changed little, the export shares of major
exporting countries have altered significantly. In 1975, Japan accounted
for 6% of machine tools sold on the world market, this proportion rapidly
rising to 22% by 1985. While Japan has been increasing its share of the
world market, the US share dropped from 10% to 5% during the same
period. Again, Italy appears to have fared better than the UK; the UK's
123.
share declined from 6% to 4% while Italy's dropped from 7% to 6%. West
Germany, which had been the world's largest exporter of machine tools
since the 1950s, also lost a large part of the world market, its 31%
share of global exports in 1975 declining to 20% in 1985. West Germany
is now second to Japan in the export league. The USSR remains one of
the smaller exporters of machine tools with only a 2% to 4% share of
world trade. However, the USSR imports a large proportion of the machine
tools traded on the world market: in 1985 iir tooK 14% of global exports
(American Machinist. Feb. 1985: 69-73).
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4.4 The Growth of CNC Production
In the last ten years, there have been two major and related changes
In the world trade of machine tools: <i) there has been a rapid expansion
in the output of controlled machine tools; and (ii) Japan has become the
largest overall producing and trading nation, and increased its market
share in many of the industrialised countries. In the production and
trade of CNC machine tools, Japan's rise was even more dramatic. By 1981,
every other CNC lathe purchased outside Japan was of Japanese
manufacture (Jacobsson, 1984: 46). Japan's penetration of the US CNC
market was particularly overwhelming. By 1985, three out of every five
CNC machines bought in the US was manufactured in Japan, and in the case
of machining centres this statistic was nearly three out of every four
(see Table 4.4). How did Japan manage to capture such large sectors of
this market? And why were the US producers unable to compete with
Japanese imports? Japan's machine tool producers also increased their
exports to Europe. Horn et al. show that CNC imports into the EEC from
non-EEC countries increased by 123% between 1976 and 1983, while intra-
EEC trade only rose by 23%. Of the imports from non-EEC countries,
Japan's share rose from 12% in 1976 to 46% by 1983 (Horn et al., 1985:
76). Within the EEC, Italy managed to increase its output and maintain
its export levels, while the UK declined in both output and exports. Why
was the Italian industry able to cope with the changing international
market, while the British industry was not? This section examines the
CNC industries of each of these four countries, covering the important
factors influencing their respective successes or failures in the
transition from conventional to CNC production,3
4.4.1 CNC Production in Japan and the US
Table 4.3 shows production statistics of the Japanese and American
NC/CNC industries for the years 1970 to 1983. Production of CNC machine
tools in Japan grew rapidly between 1976 and 1980, increasing over eight
times (by value) and nearly seven times (by units). During the same
period, the American industry expanded just over two and a half times (by
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both units and value). In terms of unit production, Japan overtook the US
in 1977, and in terms of value in 1980.
Table 4.3 CNC Hachine Tool Production by US and Japan





1970 1,901 209 110 1,451 68 46
1971 1,238 153 124 1,379 71 51
1972 1,630 170 104 1,350 82 60
1973 2,865 272 95 2,765 174 63
1974 4,210 378 90 3,040 200 66
1975 4,136 505 122 2,188 134 61
1976 3,856 501 130 3,312 173 52
1977 4,482 497 110 5,436 300 55
1978 5,688 649 114 7,336 510 69
1979 7,925 1,015 128 14,317 937 65
1980 9,984 1,372 137 22, 069 1,497 67
1981 8,945 1,467 164 25,926 1,968 76
1982 6,218 1,152 185 24,048 1,687 70
1983 4,737 680 143 26,398 1,795 67
a. In Billion US$,
b. In thousand US$,
Source: NMTBA, 1986; 100, 202! fletalworkinq. Nov, 1982; 177,
One reason for the much faster growth of Japan's CNC machine tool
output compared to that of the US derives from the more rapid rate of
transition from conventional to CNC production by Japanese producers.
The graph in Figure 4.1 shows the proportion of CNC to total production
(by value) for Japan and the US between 1970 and 1983. From 1970 to
1975, the proportions of CNC production in both countries were similar.
The CNC proportion of total machine tool production continued to rise in
Japan, reaching 50% in 1980 and over 60% by 1983. The proportion in the
US actually declined between 1976 and 1978, and has only risen slightly
since, to approximately 30% in 1983.
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Figure 4.1 Ratio of QNC to Tptjjl Mighine Tppl EcfldU£tiflD
in Japan and the US 1970-1983 (bv Value)
Year
Sources: NMTBA, 1985: 100, 126, 194 - 98: Metalworkina. Nov. 1982: 175.
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The preceding chapter noted that NC machines were first successfully
developed in the US by the defence industry, specifically for its needs,
and an artificial, subsidised market was created to purchase the machines.
The major subsequent NC and CNC developments in the US were also very
closely related to defence requirements. The defence sector continued to
be a very large consumer of NC/CNC machine tools through the 1960s and
1970s. DiFilippo <1986: 102) observes that throughout the 1970s the
aerospace industry was a major consumer of CNC machinery, and, as an
industry, had the largest percentage of controlled machine tools, using
these machines principally for defence—related rather than civilian
projects. In the mid-1960s, approximately 20% of machine tool demand in
the US was generated by military spending. DiFilippo suggests that this
may have declined slightly in the 1970s. However, using his own estimate
of military-induced machine tool demand in 1978 of US$741.5 million and
the American Machinist figure of total US machine tool consumption of
US$3,159 for that year, military demand actually accounted for over 20%
(DiFilippo, 1986: 107; American Machinist. Feb. 1980: 88). As US CNC
production only accounts for a small proportion of total machine tool
output, and as the major users are in the defence sector, the proportion
of CNC output going to this sector was, without doubt, much higher than
the figure for total machine tool output.
As the defence sector was the major NC/CNC consumer, most of the
development of these types of machines in the 1960s and 1970s was
designed for use by the military. Machines supplied under defence
contracts were the most advanced available and their price was not a
major obstacle. Many of the contracts from the defence industry, and new
sophisticated consumers, the space agencies, were administered on a "cost-
plus" basis. "Historical costing" was also used, which allowed for the
price to be increased not only on engineering estimates but at a rate
calculated from past increases in the project cost. These contracts
encouraged firms supplying this sector to produce expensive and
sophisticated machines and to neglect production costs. Melman
(1983a: 61) suggests that the price of a US machine destined for export
was a quarter that of a similar machine supplied to the Air Force with
sophisticated controls.
128.
The market for this kind of machine tool is very limited. In the US
only defence and space contractors could afford the cost, as such
machines were too expensive for the general metal working and vehicle
industries. Furthermore, because of the strategic nature of the machine
tools produced for the military, exports were often legally restricted.
Under pressure from the machine tool industry, the US Department of
Commerce did relax these restrictions in the early 1980s, but the export
of machine tools for aircraft production, four- and five-axis CNC
machines, high—precision CNC machines, and certain control units were
still subject to restrictions even after 1983 ([US] National Academy of
Engineering, 1983: 42). * These links between the US CNC machine tool
industry and the military have had very significant consequences. The
industry has lost competitiveness and domestic and world market share to
national producers whose development has been mainly shaped by links with
civilian mass-production industries.
In Japan, NC machines were first produced in 1956, using US
technical reports, by Fujitsu, a large electronics company. Two years
later, Fujitsu developed a second NC machine in collaboration with Makino
Milling Machine, a machine tool builder. The Tokyo Institute of
Technology developed an NC lathe in 1957. Other firms which soon
followed with their own NC machine tools included Ikegai and Hitachi
Seiki. In 1957, the Mechanical Engineering Lab. of MITI (Ministry of
International Trade and Industry) started a three-year project into the
"Automatization of Machine Tool Operation" (Metalworking, July 1987: 22).
Development of NC and CNC machines continued steadily, both in industry
and in MITI's labs. In 1970, a total of 123 different Japanese NC machine
tools were exhibited at the Japanese International Machine Tool Fair.
While a large proportion of the development work on these machines was
indigenous, Japanese producers also entered into licensing agreements to
acquire NC technology. (The development of .the Japanese machine tool
industry and its acquisition of technological capabilities is documented
in greater detail in Chapter 7.)
A main feature of the Japanese CNC industry in the 1970s was its
concentration on the production of standardised low-cost machines. The
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figures in Table 4.3 show that the average unit value of CNC machine
tools manufactured in Japan has been approximately half that of those
manufactured in the US. Watanabe, in his study (1983) of the growth of
the Japanese machine tool industry in the late 1970s and early 1980s,
argues that there are two factors that promoted the development of this
type of low-cost production. Firstly, the users of machine tools in Japan
are concentrated in general machinery, vehicles and electrical machinery
manufacture. Of these, the largest single machine tool consumer is the
vehicle industry and its many components suppliers. The links between
these two industries have been very close and some of the major machine
tool producers are either part of vehicle groups or make machinery
entirely for the vehicle industry. Post-War Japan lacks a substantial
aircraft industry and has only a very limited defence sector, so the
Japanese machine tool industry is not orientated towards these markets.
Secondly, small and medium-sized firms, which are used as sub—contractors
to the large industries, provide a large market for standard general
purpose machine tools in Japan. In order to cater for this market, the
machine tools produced, whether conventional or CNC, have to be fairly
low-cost, and it was for this market that low-cost CNC machines were
designed. With the great demand for these machines, the machine tool
builders have been able to make price reductions by producing in batches
that are large enough to justify using mass-production techniques.
It was these standard, low-cost CNC machines which led Japan's
export expansion and which enabled Japanese producers to rapidly build up
a large market share in the US. Japanese producers supplied the same
types of users in the US as they did in Japan, i.e., the vehicle industry
and general metal working firms. But why did the US machine tool
industry concentrate on the requirements of the defence sector and not
develop machines for other sectors of the market?
The importance of a developmental link between the vehicle and the
machine tool industries had been recognised in the US as early as 1963.
A Senate Staff Report then concluded:
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The automotive manufacturers and the [machine] tool and
die industry should establish a close working liaison
regarding _ research in the use of new computerized
numerical control equipment. Only through a close working
relationship and good communications within these two
industries can long-term satisfactory results be
accomplished (Quoted in Marx, 1979: 45).
In fact, no such close liaison was ever achieved. In 1979, T.G. Marx, an
economist with General Motors, claimed that the vehicle producers had
taken over the role of technical leaders in the development of CNC
machinery for their own use and had entered collaborative development
projects with machine tool firms (1979: 45). In spite of these signs in
the late 1970s that the US vehicle industry was getting closer to the
machine tool industry, by 1985 GM was again critically assessing this
relationship. GM considered that a major factor in the low level of R&D
in the US machine tool industry was its own method of buying machinery.
Traditionally, GM asked firms to submit tenders, which might themselves
be expensive to prepare, and the final decision was made principally on a
cost basis. Under these conditions, the machine tool firms always chose
the safe option and did not undertake any significant development work.
Following this report, GM started to establish closer links with a few
machine tool builders who were prepared to collaborate closely with them
and with each other. It should be noted that, unlike many of the
Japanese vehicle producers, GM does not have a machine tool building
subsidiary, although it did establish a joint venture with a Japanese
company, Fanuc, to manufacture robots.
Even without close ties to the vehicle sector, there were also
serious problems within the machine tool industry. Melman (1983a: 61-64)
suggests that a major failing of the US industry was its management. US
machine tool firms not only concentrated on the production of highly
profitable machines for the defence industry, but they did not invest in
their own production equipment. Large-scale military projects tend to
exaggerate normal industrial cycles of demand, and long-term investment
in plant was avoided since it appeared to be an expensive overhead during
periods of low demand.s Thus, the machine tool industry itself was not a
major CNC user.4 Firms continued to make a very wide range of machinery,
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and, therefore, Individual firms could not apply mass-production
techniques. Melman also notes that while the very sophisticated end of
the market was becoming more expensive and profitable for the producers,
the lower end of the industry was also experiencing cost increases. In
the US, the average unit—cost rose 85% between 1971 and 1978, during
which time machine tool prices in Japan only rose 51%, even though
Japanese wage rates were rising much faster than those in the US.
The general metal working industry in the US did not immediately
respond by importing machine tools; it simply relied on its existing
stock. Following the oil crisis of the early 1970s, the US car industry
started to re-tool its production plants in order to produce smaller, more
fuel-efficient cars. Unable to buy domestically-produced standard machine
tools, it, like many other metal working sectors, imported new machines
from Japan. A major problem with US machine tools was their very long
delivery time. In the delivery of machining centres, US producers took
between twelve and eighteen months, while Japanese producers could
deliver within three (DiFilippo, 1986: 71). Furthermore, the lead-time
taken by US producers to develop new products was also much longer than
that of their foreign competitors, which meant that they could not quickly
bring out new products or copies of Japanese machines. The figures in
Table 4.4 show how Japanese CNC machine tool producers have continued
to increase their share of the US market from 1980 to 1985.
Table 4,4 Japan's Shares of US CNC Machine ToqI Markets
Machine Tool Sector 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985
Japan's tage j by value 16 24 25 28 36 41
Share of Total )
US CNC Market j by quantity 25 38 41 43 50 58
Japan's tage Share) by value 23 35 35 29 42 46
of Total US CNC j
Lathe Market jby quantity 40 56 54 51 60 65
Japan's tage Share) by value 17 28 33 46 SO 55
of Total US j
Machining Centre ) by quantity 30 49 56 68 66 71
Market
Source; Metalworkinq. May 1987; 21,
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The high levels of penetration in some export markets have led to
restrictions on the quantities of Japanese machines that can be imported.
In late 1986, Japan entered into a Voluntary Restraint Agreement with the
US, under the terms of which the Japanese industry agreed to reduce its
share of the US domestic market for CNC lathes and machining centres to
1981 levels. The market share for Japanese conventional machines was
limited to its 1985 share. The total effect of these measures was
anticipated to reduce Japanese sales in the US by US$795 million over the
following five years (Wall Street Journal. 17 Dec. 1986: 4). The increased
protection of the US market does not appear to have helped the domestic
machine tool industry and may indeed have been a contributory factor to
the reduction in consumption. In 1987, although global machine tool
production was 8% greater than in 1986, US production declined by 11% and
US consumption declined by 13% (American Machinist. Feb. 1988: 62-63).
Many Japanese machine tool producers have commenced offshore
production, and this has enabled them to by-pass voluntary restraint
agreements and to avoid rising production costs in Japan, following the
appreciation of the yen. Yamazaki began production in the US as early as
1974 at a plant designed to produce 120 machines a month. Hitachi Seiki
has also produced CNC lathes in the US since 1981 and became a member of
the American machine tool manufacturers association (NMTBA). In 1981,
Makino, following a different strategy, bought LeBlond, one of the oldest
US firms which specialised in lathe production, reduced the workforce from
about 1000 to 500, and installed Japanese managers. Makino renamed the
new company LeBlond Makino, in order to "retain the image of being an
'American builder' and to allow the local firms to make full use of that
image in sales" (Metalworking. May 1985: 34). Makino also acquired a 50%
share of a German lathe producer and established a subsidiary of LeBlond
Makino in Singapore. Other Japanese producers have set up close
management and production links with established indigenous producers in
various countries and have entered licensing agreements for their
products to be manufactured and sold overseas.7 This means that in the
1980s Japan was not only the leading producer of CNC machines but also
the principal CNC machine tool technology supplier in the world.
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Moreover, Japan has also become a leader in the development of
Flexible Manufacturing Systems. One of the main features of FMS
production is that the design stage requires intense collaboration
between designers and users. This means that the producer and user
must, for all practical purposes, be based in the same country in order to
liaise on the design, so the export of an FMS as a complete system is
virtually impossible. However, with the expansion of Japanese machine
tool firms into other countries, they are now able to supply these
systems directly to various domestic markets. Indeed, this was one of
Makino's explicit aims in acquiring its American and German firms.
Makino's main specialisation was in the production of milling machines and
machining centres, and, by taking over lathe producers, these links
enabled the company to expand quickly into all types of machine
production. And, as the company now has a strong local production and
engineering base in the US and Europe, it is able to sell systems in
these markets.
Not only did the US machine tool industry lose its technical and
market lead to Japan, but its controls producers were similarly eclipsed
by their Japanese counterparts. Control unit production is extremely
specialised; it has only one consumer - the machine tool industry - and,
within that industry, it sells only to the most technically advanced
firms. Firms manufacturing control units may be divided into two types:
(i) machine tool manufacturers making control units for their own output,
and (ii> electronics firms producing controls to sell to machine tool
producers. By far the largest share of the control unit market is taken
by the second type. The largest controls manufacturer is the Japanese
company, Fanuc, and in 1985 it claimed to have 75% of the Japanese market
and 50% of the world market (The Economist. 29 June 1985: 64). Other
speicalist controls producers include General Electric, Allen Bradley,
Olivetti, Siemens, and Philips.
Japan's domination in this sector is, therefore, principally a result
of the success of one company. Fanuc originated in the mid-1950s as a
research group set up within the electronics conglomerate Fujitsu to look
at the development of controls. The group was led by a mechanical
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engineer, Dr. Seiuemon Inaba, and its main source of information was a
report from the MIT Servomechanisms Lab. which was sent to them by a
Japanese professor who had been working in the US. Inaba later
acknowledged that "the 50-page microfilmed report was excellent. In fact
for us it was a sort of bible on NC" (Metalworking. Nov. 1982: 192). The
first controls they developed used parametrons as the electrical control
element rather than the vacuum tubes which had been used in the MIT
unit.* Parametrons, however, proved to be too unstable in use and the
circuits too complicated, and so were soon replaced by vacuum tubes.
Early development projects were undertaken in collaboration with machine
tool builders. The first machines that were used commercially were
developed with the machine tool builder, Hitachi Seiki, and were financed
by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries' Nagoya Aircraft Factory, in which they
were used. The control system contained about 100 vacuum tubes, of
which at least one burnt out each day and stopped the operation of the
machine. In order for the machine to be operable, a Fujitsu employee
(with a large supply of vacuum tubes) continuously tended the system for
the first six months of its operation (Metalworking. Nov. 1982: 195).
Unlike the MIT system, which had a closed loop, Inaba initially used an
open loop control system, which was technically less sophisticated but
was more reliable.
As new microelectronics components were developed, they were rapidly
incorporated into new control units and made commercially viable. In
1959, a fully transistorised NC unit was introduced by the group. In the
early 1970s, Fanuc, still in collaboration with Fujitsu, developed a
large-scale integrated chip for use in control units and these units
included microprocessor control (Vogel, 1985: 82). In the mid-1970s, the
firm also started to manufacture the other large electrical component
used in CNC machines, servo-motors. Fanuc has also entered other sectors
of the machinery and automated equipment market, manufacturing robots,
EDMs, and plastic injection molding machinery. However, it never
considered entering machine tool production itself, as it wanted to retain
as large a market share as possible and not become a potential competitor
to its users. Fanuc continued to maintain close links with machine tool
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builders by organising regular meetings with them to discuss technical
problems and developments (Watanabe, 1983: 37).
The NC group at Fujitsu continued to develop control systems and
commenced trading under the name Fujitsu Fanuc (Fujitsu Automatic
Numerical Control). The group made a loss on its production and
development of control units for the first nine years of operation. In
1972, Fanuc became an independent company. However, Fujitsu still owns
42% of Fanuc, and they may still be regarded as part of the same
keiretsu. Fanuc also closely collaborated with Siemens from the
mid-1960s, and they jointly established a new company in the US, General
Numeric Corporation, to supply that market.
The major producer of controls in the US has always been General
Electric, which had a long involvement with NC as an early user of NC
machine tools and as a producer of control units. In the late 1950s and
early 1960s, General Electric was the control unit market leader, and had
an appreciable share of the world market. Having developed its Mark
Century range as a market leader, it continued to sell these hard-wired
systems and failed to keep up with rapidly developing microelectronics
technology by incorporating solid—state components in its units.
Eventually, the pressure from Japanese competition, mainly from Fanuc,
forced General Electric to reconsider its product and in 1979 it did
finally introduce a solid—state control unit. The case of Allen-Bradley,
another US controls producer, was similar. In the late 1970s, this
company launched a new hard—wired control unit which was a total failure
on the market. The firm then developed a solid—state controller and
commenced marketing this in 1980, although with only marginal success.
In 1983, General Electric set up a Factory Automation Group. This
group was to develop a new control unit which was to be more elaborate,
with a greater number of features, but it was also to be of a simple
design. The proposed system would be able to simulate the motion of the
machine on a display screen while it was being programmed. A number of
computer and software specialists were employed in the group, but there
was a remarkable lack of knowledge of either machine tools or the cutting
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process. In use, the new control unit was unsatisfactory, largely because
of software problems. The result of this exercise was a further drop of
30% in the sales of General Electric's controls both in the US and on the
world market. General Electric had similar problems in the development
of other automation areas, including robotics and CAD (Petre, 1985). In
1986, it entered into an agreement with Fanuc to establish a joint-
venture company (General Electric Fanuc). Under this agreement, Fanuc's
CNC controls are assembled in the US, and are sold through General
Electric's already established sales and service networks (Metalworking.
July 1987: 31).
Thus, in the manufacture of both CNC machine tools and control
units, US firms lost a large share of their domestic market to Japanese
producers because they did not develop products which were acceptable on
the general metal working market. One factor in their product
developments was a desire for short-term profitability. Machine tool
firms concentrated on the highly profitable defence sector and did not
invest in their own manufacturing activities, in case such investment was
followed by a depression which would result in large losses. In the
controls industry, once a satisfactory product had been developed, firms
continued to reap large profits on these but did not invest in new
technological developments. In contrast, Japanese producers concentrated
on the manufacture of lower-cost, standardised machinery. These were
developed in collaboration with the vehicle industry, where the market for
them grew very rapidly. In controls production, Fanuc continuously
applied new technology as soon as it was available, and worked very
closely with the machine tool industry in these developments.
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4.4.2 Japanese Challenge — European Responses
The US market was not alone in being massively infiltrated by
low-cost standardised CNC machine tools from Japan; Europe also
experienced great increases in imports from Japan and a consequent
decline in indigenous industries. This section assesses the situation in
two European countries, the United Kingdom and Italy, following the
increasing use of CNC machines and Japan's entry into their markets.
(i) United Kingdom Machine Tool Production
Floud shows that the British machine tool industry lost its early
world lead in the production of machine tools to the US and Germany in
the late nineteenth century (1975: 68-74). By the 1960s, most of the
machine tools produced in the UK were of low unit value and basic design,
while imports consisted principally of high-performance and high-precision
advanced machine tools. The majority of exported machines went to
developing and Commonwealth countries. A major problem in the UK
industry was the lack of skilled labour. Skill shortages were a general
problem in most sectors of British industry, but the problem was
accentuated in the machine tool industry because of its higher than
average skill intensity. As in the US, the UK aircraft industry was an
important purchaser of NC machines in the early 1960s. However, with the
cancellation of the TSR2 and other aircraft projects in 1964-65, this
market rapidly contracted and the commercial market only grew slowly.*
Early development in NC technology in the UK was undertaken by
Ferranti in the early 1950s. This firm was manufacturing wave guides
used in radar systems. Production of these guides involved the accurate
machining of a large number of small channels. In 1955, Ferranti
engineers retro-fitted a milling machine with a control unit developed
in-house. In 1956, Ferranti's system was even judged to be more advanced
than those available in America by the US Air Force which was then
starting to place batch contracts for NC machinery. These contracts,
however, were intended to encourage the development of US industry, and
the Air Force was obliged to- buy from the domestic market (Layton et al.,
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1972: 180). Ferranti continued to develop control systems, and sold
several to other British companies including Lucas, BAC, and Hawker
Siddeley. A joint project with British Oxygen Co. commenced in 1960 to
develop a controlled flame cutter, and several of these systems were sold
to shipbuilders. By 1967, three British companies - Elliot, Ferranti, and
English Electric - had a combined 13% share of the world market for
industrial process controls, Ferranti's contribution being in machine tool
control (Shanks, 1967: 166).
The controls developed by Ferranti were aimed at the sophisticated
end of the market and the company continued to invest heavily in the
development of this product. In the late 1960s, the firm considered that
success in this sector required R&D expenditure of at least £500,000. At
this time, the whole of the UK market was worth approximately £4 million
and Ferranti's turnover was less than £3 million (Layton et al., 1972:
182). Because of its very high expenditure on R&D, Ferranti was unable
to invest sufficiently in either a marketing or a service network. In an
attempt to increase its product range and its European market share, in
1969 Ferranti approached a West German company, Grundig, with the
intention of forming a joint venture. In contrast to Ferranti's
sophisticated controls, Grundig had developed a simpler system. Grundig,
however, was not interested in forming a new company and the project was
dropped. Later in the same year, the Industrial Reorganisation
Corporation, a government-sponsored body, decided that machine tool
controls production in the UK should be rationalised. In this plan, the
interests of three firms (Ferranti, Plessey, and Airmec) were combined in
one single group under the general administration of Plessey, and Ferranti
agreed not to re-enter the sector in the next ten years. In fact,
Ferranti never took up machine tool controls production again, although it
has continued developments in drawing office automation and it
manufactures computei—controlled coordinate measuring machines.
Plessey's original controls development work was in collaboration
with Alfred Herbert, a large machine tool builder. In this project, a
control unit for a jig borer, which Herbert manufactured under licence,
was produced. Plessey continued to specialise in the production of
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high-accuracy controls for use on jig borers and had a large share of
this particular market sector. To diversify its product range, Plessey
entered into licensing agreements, firstly with Bendix and then with
Bunker-Ramo, both American companies. In the agreement with Bendix,
Plessey's markets were strictly limited, and the Bunker-Ramo control was
very sophisticated. Thus, Plessey was unable to expand its markets and
its products were still concentrated at the top end. The third firm in
the newly formed group, Airmec, was different from the others as it was a
small company specialising in electronics and laboratory instruments, and
its major project developments had been in small and simple control units
(Layton et al., 1972: 177-84).
The merger of the three controls producers should have given the
newly formed group benefits from a wider product range and a better
sales and servicing network, provided by access to the Plessey
International Organisation which had an established network in both
Europe and the US. Layton et al. considered that:
Of the three British companies .. the company [Plessey]
which has absorbed the others has been the company with
the keenest eye for profit, the largest effort in marketing
and servicing and the most rigorous and disciplined
company-wide system of financial control (1972: 185).
This "keen eye" for profit and a lack of commitment to R&D in the product
proved to be fatal for the newly formed group. The market was still
neither large nor particularly profitable. Only eighteen months after its
formation, the newly created NC division within Plessey was divided up
and sold to Bunkei—Ramo and SIA, a software consultancy, since it was not
regarded as profitable.
A similar merger, with an almost identical result, took place in the
machine tool industry itself. In an attempt to improve efficiency by
increasing the size of production runs, Alfred Herbert, the largest UK
producer, took over several other British machine tool companies, with the
support and encouragement of the government in the 1960s.10 The overall
aim was to try to obtain economies of scale. Moreover, grants were given
by the government in 1970 to establish a joint venture between Alfred
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Herbert and Ingersoll, an American company. The new venture was not a
success; its products were too conservative and the existing management
had difficulty controlling the enlarged company. After several further
injections of cash into the company, totalling £45 million by 1979, it was
finally divided into four parts (Daly and Jones, 1980: 58). The new
companies never recovered, but some of the remaining fragments were
absorbed into a British engineering group, Tube Investments, in the early
1980s. This new company now has fairly close links with its close
neighbour, the car—maker Jaguar.
Subsequent government intervention in the machine tool industry has
been in the form of grants and subsidies for the development and
acquisition of new technology machines by British firms. In the 1970s,
subsidies were given for new machine tool developments, and in the 1970s
and early 1980s grants towards the purchase of new, advanced machine
tools were given to general manufacturing firms. These latter grants
were made to firms whether they purchased indigenously produced or
imported machines. Horn et al. note that nearly half of the grants
awarded in the early 1980s had gone on foreign machinery, thus doing
little to promote domestic machinery production (1985: 65). While the
British industry was having its domestic problems, it also found that it
was losing its export markets. Increasing competition came from Japan
and, in the conventional low-cost machine tool market (the UK's
traditional export sector), from the NICs which had much lower production
costs due to lower wages. The Machine Tool Trades Association, the
British association of machine tool producers, appears to have had little
or no effect on the promotion of indigenous production. One reason for
this is that membership is open to importers and traders of machine tools
as well as to domestic producers.
On the domestic market in the early 1980s, small machining centres
were becoming increasingly important, yet domestic production of these
machines was very limited while imports from Japan were rising. UK
producers were left with three options: (i) develop their own machining
centres and arrive in the market late, (ii) ignore the new growing market
and try to expand in other areas, or (iii) to make the machines
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immediately under licence, thus building up experience in their production
and gaining a share in the market but taking lower profits. In response,
five of the larger firms, including one US subsidiary based in the UK,
negotiated agreements with Japanese companies. These agreements not
only included the transfer of machine tool designs, but in the early
stages included the supply of many components. For example, Bridgeport
entered into an agreement with Yasuda which initially involved assembling
kits from the Japanese firm, but within a year it was producing all the
large machine parts except the control unit (Rodger, 1984).
While many of the British firms have entered into technical
agreements with Japanese companies for the production of CNC machines
and robots, in 1987 one large Japanese firm, Yamazaki, established a
production plant in the UK. This new plant was built with the aid of
£5.2 million from various government assistance grants. Initial
production was set at 35 machines per month, to be manufactured from
kits supplied by the Japanese parent. In the long term, the machines
produced will have an EEC content of 60% and production will increase to
100 machines per month.11 This would double the existing output of CNC
machines in the UK; however, 80% of output is intended for export, some
of which will go to Japan (Garnett, 1987d).
Italian Machine Tool Production
The Italian machine tool industry manufactures highly automated
machines and systems for the vehicle and aerospace industries which form
an important component of its domestic market. The industry also caters
for large numbers of small metal working work—shops, by producing a wide
range of general purpose machine tools. It is traditionally structured,
with a large number of small firms and only a few large companies.
Indeed, its average firm size of 150 employees is the lowest in Europe
(Jones, 1983: 199).
The main vehicle of support by the government has been through the
Sabatini Law, which enabled the Italian machine tool producers association
(UCIMU) to provide a technical advisory service to producers and credit
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packages to consumers. These provisions have proved so successful that
over 80% of sales in Italy are covered by this arrangement. Furthermore,
as the credit offered is only available for indigenously manufactured
machinery, the Italian domestic industry, unlike the situation in the UK,
has been the only beneficiary. Additional provisions operated through
UCIMU allow domestic producers to obtain a credit subsidy on their
exports (Jones, 1983: 199-200). UCIMU was also important in the
development and promotion of basic, low-cost, machining centres in small
machine tool firms, and a large proportion of the recent expansion of the
Italian machine tool industry has been based on these machines (Horn et
al., 1985: 63). Finally, to encourage exports to developing countries,
UCIMU operates a company which establishes vocational training schools,
thus supplying the training required with new investment in these
countries (American Machinist. Jan. 1981: 84-85).
Olivetti is the largest Italian controls manufacturer. It is linked
to Allen-Bradley, an American controls producer, and manufactures and
markets controls in Europe for this company. Unusually for a controls
producer, it is also a machine tool manufacturer. It established its own
subsidiaries to manufacture machining centres and robots, and in 1981 it
acquired a large Italian lathe manufacturer. These internal machine tool
producers benefit from their links with Olivetti because they get control
units at a lower price compared to other Italian manufacturers and have
more access to and influence on the development of controls software
(Jacobsson, 1986: 86). Production capabilities in the mechanical hardware,
as well as in the electrical hard— and software, gives Olivetti the
capability to install complete factory automation systems.
A major change in the Italian machine tool industry in the late
1970s was the emergence of a large machine tool and manufacturing
equipment builder, Comau, under the auspices of the Italian vehicle
producer Fiat. This new subsidiary was created out of three previously
established Italian machinery builders. In the early 1980s, Comau
accounted for 16% of the total Italian machine tool industry workforce
(Jones, 1983: 199). Comau produces advanced manufacturing equipment,
including robots and machine tools, and the majority of its output is
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utilised in vehicle production. In an attempt to expand into the US
market, the firm established a joint venture with Bendix in 1983, but this
was abandoned in the following year when Bendix was taken over. The
short-lived link in the US market did, however, help this firm establish a
base in that market which it has subsequently been able to exploit (Horn
et al., 1985: 64). In 1987, Comau's US subsidiary was the main supplier
of assembly machinery for the manufacture of cylinder heads at General
Motors. Interestingly, General Motors recently acquired a 20% holding in
this US subsidiary, representing a departure from its previously distant
relationship with machinery builders (Lane, 1987).
A major factor in the success of the Italian machine tool industry
has been the role of UCIMU. Compared to other national machine tool
associations, UCIMU is very different in that it not only undertakes
general assistance functions, such as marketing information, export
promotion and government lobbying, but also centrally provides many
commercial functions to its member firms, particularly in the financial
field and in technical developments. By centralising these functions,
small machine tool builders have been able to achieve cost reductions on
their manufacture of standardised CNC machinery and compete more
effectively with Japanese imports. Additionally, the restriction of UCIMU
credit to domestically manufactured equipment protected the Italian
market. The UK industry tried to achieve economies by creating a large
production unit, but management was unable to operate this new firm
efficiently and it failed. Moreover, the provision of grants by the UK
government for investment in new equipment did little to encourage the
purchase of indigenously produced equipment.
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4.5 The Status of the Newly Industrialising and Developing Countries
American Machinist's 1985 production figures included the output of
nine newly industrialising and developing countries. Combined, these
countries only accounted for a small proportion (6%) of total world
production. Table 4.5 shows production figures for these nine countries
for years between 1977 and 1985, and import and export statistics for
the same years are given in Table 4.6. 4% of world exports originated in
these countries in 1985, while they imported 9% of the machines traded on
the world market. Taiwan is the largest exporter and, indeed, exported
more by value than all the other eight countries together. The largest
proportion of Taiwan's exports went to industrialised countries, mainly to
the US but also to Europe. Similarly, in 1985, most of Korea's exports
also went to the US. Most of the machines exported by the remaining
countries go to other developing countries or to specific trading
partners. India, for example, exports many of its machines through barter
agreements with the USSR: in 1983 over 50% of Indian machine tool exports
went to the Soviet Union under such arrangements (IMTBA, 1985: 14),
The largest developing country producer is the People's Republic of
China. Although China's exports of machine tools have increased over the
years covered, only a small proportion (less than 10%) is now exported.
China imports about a quarter of its annual machine tool consumption.
India is the second largest developing country producer, and its trading
patterns are very similar to those of China. India's exports account for
less than 10% of production and imports for nearly 40% of domestic
consumption. India's and China's levels of production, in relation to
other industrialising and developing countries, as well as their trading
patterns, have remained much the same over this period.
Of the four Asian NICs, Taiwan and Korea are the most significant
producers. In 1977, their machine tool industries were approximately the
same size. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, both their industries
expanded rapidly. While Korea's growth has been fairly steady, that of
Taiwan has been more variable. Taiwan's growth was particularly rapid up
to 1981, but then declined in 1983 with the slump in world industry
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before increasing again. In 1985, Korea's machine tool output was about
two-thirds that of Taiwan. Taiwan's exports have also grown rapidly and
in 1985 80% of its machine tool output was exported. Korea, in
comparison, only exports a very small proportion of its production, less
than 15% in 1985. Taiwan's machine tool imports have consistently
accounted for a large proportion of domestic consumption (68% in 1985).
By contrast, Korea's machine tool demand has risen and fallen dramatically
in response to changes in indigenous manufacturing investment. In peak
years, a high proportion of this demand is met by imports (e.g., in 1979
and 1981, 73% and 70% of consumption was imported respectively).
Overall, Korea is a larger consumer of machine tools than Taiwan, and
Chapters 5-7 offer detailed analyses of their national industries.
Table <.5 Machine Tool Production in Industrialising and Developing Countries
(in mill ion US*)
Country 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
China 3SS 420 440 475 453
India 90 127 209 217 283
Taiwan 58 198 249 205 262
South Korea 57 164 178 119 184
Singapore 6 26 44 15 34
Hong Kong • m 13 5 4
Brazil 283 CO oo 305 98 153
Argentina 60 62 35 28 7
Mexico 6 16 24 13 25
Total World
Production
15,126 22,920 26,418 19,530 21,918
a. Not included in American Machinist figures for these years,
Source: American Hachinist, Various Issues,
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Table 4.6 Machine Tool Trade by Industrialising and Developing Countries
(in nillion US*)
Country 1977 1979 1981 1983 1985
I E I E I E I E I E
China SO 10 60 28 125 30 150 35 137 34
India 55 21 46 20 104 23 149 23 162 20
Taiwan 36 50 91 144 99 183 109 132 112 209
Korea 130 2 398 15 325 32 21 36 150 25
Singapore 33 12 84 24 114 27 113 46 143 84
Hong Kong a a a a 4 4 2 1 5 1
Mexico 80 3 85 2 450 4 110 2 155 1
Argentina 57 15 75 12 70 20 24 14 8 1
Brazil 170 11 132 28 124 74 44 24 22 22
Total Vorld 6,500 9,661 10,845 8 ,392 9,502
Exports
I = Imports, E = Exports
a, Not included in American Hachinist figures for these years,
Source: American Machinist. Various issues,
The other two Asian NICs, Singapore and Hong Kong, are relatively
minor producers. Hong Kong was a very small producer when it first
appeared in American Machinist's figures in 1981, and by 1985 its output
had dropped dramatically. In 1985, it was the smallest producer country
considered, and its production levels had continuously declined. The
major factor in this decline was the increasing availability of very cheap
Chinese machinery with which the Hong Kong manufacturers could not
compete. Singapore's machine tool industry is different from that of the
other countries covered as most production is not undertaken by local
companies but through foreign-owned firms. Three large foreign machine
tool manufacturers (Bridgeport, LeBlond-Makino, and Okamoto) have
established assembly plants in Singapore. (A fourth firm, Traub of West
Germany, also established a plant there in the late 1970s but closed it
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down in 1983, explaining some of the variation in production figures.)
There is a notable anomaly in Singapore's production and export
statistics: in several years it apparently exported more than it produced,
a situation explained by Singapore's role in entrep6t trading: many
machine tools destined for other Southeast Asian countries are routed
through Singapore, in order to avoid import tariffs imposed by these
countries on goods from outside the region. A significant proportion of
Singapore's imports are, therefore, destined for re-export and not for
domestic use.
The only large producer country in Latin America is Brazil; Argentina
and Mexico both have much smaller industries. Production levels in these
three countries peaked between 1979 and 1981, and have subsequently
fallen. Brazil and Mexico have since regained some of their lost
production, but Argentina's industry has continued to decline. A high
proportion of the machinery exported by these countries remains within
Latin America. Imports from outside the region have been restricted in
all of the countries. And, because of difficulties in importing machinery
into Mexico, a large number of machines have been smuggled over the US
border (American Machinist. Feb. 1986: 92). In the mid-1980s, import
restrictions in all Latin American countries were relaxed to some extent.
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4.6 CNC Production Strategies for the NICs
Although the output of firms in NICs and developing countries is
very small in relation to total global production, many producers in these
countries are now well established in the manufacture and export of
conventional machines. Indeed, their successful production and export of
machines in this sector was a contributory factor in the decline of
exports of basic low-cost machine tools from the UK industry, which could
not compete with these lower wage countries. As already shown in this
chapter CNC machines are becoming an increasingly important part of the
world market and, in addition, on the domestic markets of the NICs and
developing countries, while the market for conventional machine tools is
declining. Moreover, countries like Korea and Taiwan are now facing
competition in conventional manufacture from producers in lower wage
countries, such as China and India, which can undercut them in export
markets.
For these reasons, some NICs, especially Korea and Taiwan, have seen
the necessity of entering the CNC sector. Several of China's machine tool
firms have negotiated foreign technology agreements with West German,
Japanese, US, and UK firms to manufacture machine tools, including, but
not restricted to, the production of CNC machines, FMSs, control units, and
robots (Metalworking. Nov. 1986: 136-41). India has begun some CNC
production and two companies have entered licensing agreements with UK
firms to manufacture CNC machines. Jacobsson (1986: Ch. 6) describes the
development of a CNC lathe by an Argentine producer in the early 1980s.
The largest NIC CNC producers are Taiwan and Korea, and both these
countries have also exported CNC machines to industrialised countries. In
1985, approximately a quarter (by value) of Korea's output and 15% of
Taiwan's was in CNC machines. However, their CNC output is still very
small in comparison to industrialised countries: in 1985, Japan's CNC
output was over 100 times that of Korea and almost 90 times that of
Taiwan (Metalworking. Nov. 1986: 146, 154; ibid., July 1987: 25). Which
sectors of this new market can such countries contemplate entering? and
in which product areas can they become internationally competitive?
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Production strategies for NIC firms in the manufacture of CNC
machine tools are influenced by many of the internal and external factors
treated in Chapter 2. The main internal factor limiting entry into new
product areas is the pool of skills a firm can mobilise. A crucial
consideration is the technology of the product itself and the difficulties
in building up the new capabilities required to design and manufacture it.
Given its skill base and its opportunities for acquiring new skills, which
types of CNC machines can a NIC firm reasonably aspire to manufacture?
The market for these machines must also analysed. Who will buy the
finished machines? Can they compete with those manufactured by other
domestic or foreign producers? Decisions about these questions will be
influenced by the domestic user market, the existence of potential
competitive advantages, the support available from components suppliers,
the policy of the government, and the mechanisms by which government
implements policy.
The majority of machine tool manufacturing in NICs is still
concentrated in standardised, low-value conventional machinery, and it is
from this skill base that firms enter CNC production. In the manufacture
of CNC machines, the highly specialised and sophisticated sector is not a
viable entry point for NIC producers; they have neither the skills nor the
experience, and these are both difficult to acquire. It would also be
very difficult to export these machines, as firms need first to build up
some "credibility" on the global machine tool market. At the standardised
end of the CNC market, technological requirements are much lower and it
is feasible for NIC manufacturers to enter this sector. Nevertheless,
firms entering production at this level still need to acquire new
technological capabilities. In particular, firms have to be able to adapt
and modify designs in order to follow the technological frontier. And, if
they are to develop their own new models, and not remain as technology
followers, requirements for skilled core designers are considerable.
However, it is in this part of the market that price competition,
especially from Japanese producers, is an important factor. Furthermore,
in this sector the contribution of bought-in components to the final
machine tool price is very high, often over 50%, with a large part of this
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being made up by the control unit. In the manufacture of these machines,
labour only accounts for a small part of total cost, so that lower wage
rates, the traditional source of NIC competitive advantage, can only
marginally contribute to the competitiveness of NIC producers. Indeed,
these firms are often at a distinct disadvantage to large producers in
industrialised countries which are able to benefit from economies of
scale and from significant component price reductions from buying in
large quantities. Jacobsson estimates that in the long term firms
manufacturing in this sector must aim to produce 1000 machines a year to
reap all the benefits from economies of scale <1986: 100). However, as
the Italian case has shown, economies can be achieved in small-scale
production by centralising some marketing, financial, and design functions
within the national manufacturers' association.
A second factor influencing both the price of components and firms'
technical development is the evolution of domestic component suppliers.
As noted earlier, the main Japanese controls supplier, Fanuc, collaborated
with machine tool firms in early NC developments and continued to work
closely with them in producing new generations of control units. It is
highly probable that Fanuc's supply of control units and servo-motors to
Japanese producers was also a major contributory factor behind Japan's
success in low-cost, standardised CNC machine tools. Components may be
manufactured by independent firms or by the machine tool builders
themselves integrating backwards into the production of their own inputs.
However, early entry into the manufacture of components, especially
control units, is difficult in NICs which are just establishing a CNC
production capability, since there is only a very small market for them.
Consequently, a lowering of components price in the initial stages of
production is unlikely to occur. Entering into controls production also
carries very high costs since some form of after-sales servicing network
must be established. On the domestic market this can be an extension of
the firm manufacturing the control unit, but, if exports are envisaged, an
international service network needs to be set up. It is interesting to
note that in the mid-1980s several Japanese machine tool producers
commenced the manufacture of their own control units. In the main, these
firms had already established not only marketing networks abroad but also
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production plants, giving thera a good technical base in the markets where
they were hoping to sell their controls. Only with an established sales
network in overseas markets, or with close production links to foreign
firms, could the export of control units be contemplated.
So far the only strategy considered has been the manufacture of
low-cost standardised machines, as this is the easiest sector for NIC
firms to enter. However, for industrialising countries in which machine
tool production is promoted to provide technical support to other
manufacturing industries, such a strategy is not wholly appropriate in
the long term, because the technological capabilities acquired will not be
adequate to offer such support. Although there will eventually be a
build up of repair and maintenance skills which may be utilised in other
manufacturing sectors, few of the design, development and adaptation
capabilities required for the improvement of user industries'
manufacturing equipment will be acquired. Nor will there be a build up
of skills in plant layout and the installation of production facilities.
It is the development of these latter capabilities which is critical to
the introduction of new products and production improvements in other
user industries, and without them the long-term competitiveness of
manufacturing industries in both domestic and export markets may be
adversely affected.
Indeed, both analysts and some firms in the Korean industry perceive
the necessity of acquiring a broader range of capabilities (Bendix et al.,
1978: 45). And in order to do so, the production strategy of the machine
tool builders is obliged to take into consideration the more complex
machinery required by their main user industries, including the design and
manufacture of customised and special-purpose machines, lines of
machines, and flexible manufacturing systems. It is not considered
appropriate to attempt to produce all the types of machines required by
manufacturers or to enter the very sophisticated or high-precision
sectors of the market. However, some focussed strategy in a product area
in which machine builders have opportunities to enhance their
capabilities, and in which they may be able to reap some economies of
specialisation, is necessary. The general technological requirements for
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entry into such sectors are, of course, much higher than for basic
standardised machinery. But entry by firms into the production of more
specialised machine tools can be undertaken in the same way as more
basic equipment is first manufactured, e.g., through technology transfer
agreements or by copying previously imported machinery. Nevertheless,
this strategy is by no means equivalent to the view that firms must try
to develop machinery at the leading edge of technological developments.
In order to follow this second strategy, machine tool builders need
to identify their major users' needs and attempt to manufacture machinery
accordingly. This strategy, of course, carries much higher risks than the
production of basic standardised machinery, and there are greater costs
involved. Realistically, such a strategy can only be embarked upon in
collaboration with firms in the final user industry in order to minimise
risks and costs. And such collaboration only routinely presents itself
when there is a highly concentrated market, such as that constituted by
the vehicle industry. The formation of close technological intei—firm
linkages between machine builder and vehicle producer is, as the
development of the Japanese CNC industry illustrates, ultimately of
benefit to both user and producer. Because of the advantages of these
close links perceived by vehicle producers, several firms, particularly in
Japan but, notably, also Fiat in Italy, have themselves established machine
tool manufacturing divisions or subsidiaries. In such cases, although
there are risks involved, the machinery manufacturing division is assured
of a market.
Governments influence the strategy of firms both through their
policies and as machine tool consumers. Governments may encourage firms
to manufacture for certain sectors of both the domestic and export
markets. On the domestic market such policies are implemented by either
protecting domestic producers or subsidising their production. The
promotion of specific sectors is, however, a difficult balancing act for
governments to achieve. On the one side, governments want to give
indigenous manufacturers some advantages in these sectors of the
domestic market to enable the industry to develop manufacturing
capabilities and to build up its market share. However, on the other
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side, governments must be careful not to put user industries at a
disadvantage, by forcing them to buy either sub-standard or very
expensive machinery, which may adversely affect their productivity and/or
product quality.
Governments' major machinery purchases are usually in the military
sector. The extremely close defence industry links which evolved in the
US, and the orientation of many US firms towards supplying this highly
sophisticated and profitable market, constitute a cautionary lesson about
the consequences of picking a strategy which is too narrowly defined and
one in which the product or product technology is not easily switched to
other sectors of manufacturing. Thus, Melman's critical analysis of
military-industry links in the US might still prove useful reading for NIC
governments, just as the relative lack of such links in Japan might be
read as a lesson for future policies in other countries. Certain NIC
governments have already begun to be careful in the formation of their
defence procurement policies, giving domestic industry the chance to
expand into the less specialised end of this market, but not demanding or
encouraging it to become a specialist supplier of machinery which can
only be consumed by the military.12
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Notes
1. A detailed account of the increase in production in the US machine
tool industry, and its immediate post-War decline, is in Wagoner
(1968).
2. This statistic is taken from a recent study by Sigurdson (1986: 16)
who reached the conclusion that formal R&D did not play a major role
in machine tool firms, even those at the leading edge; see also
DiFilippo .(1986: 48).
3. The period covered by this analysis relates to the development and
sales of both NC and CNC machine tools. As it is rare for any
production and trade statistics to differentiate between CNC and NC
machines, all statistics used in this chapter refer to both NC and
CNC machines, and therefore represent controlled machine tools as
opposed to conventional machines.
4. Although these machines could not be purchased from the US, some
machines were available on the international market from other
sources. For example, in early 1987, Toshiba supplied the USSR with
a high-precision multi—axis machining centre, capable of machining
very smooth propeller blades for use on naval vessels, including
submarines. This sale promoted retaliatory action by the US
government, which banned imports of certain Toshiba products.
5. DiFilippo details the effect of changes in US defence spending on
the business cycle and on the demand for machine tools (1986: 98-
120).
6. Melraan suggests that where CNC machine tools are used in American
plants, they tend to be utilised very inefficiently. He notes that
in US factories managers have used CNC machinery to increase their
control of workers by dividing and simplifying production tasks. In
many cases operators are not permitted to repair their machines or
change any operating parameters. This results in under—utilisation
of the machines, a waste of skilled labour, and labour disputes. In
contrast, CNC machinists in a Japanese machine tool plant Melman
studied were able to a<&just and alter the settings of machines and
part—programs, in order to improve the machine's operation or to
eliminate malfunctions (1983a: 62).
7. Information on Japanese machine tool production and technical
agreements is derived from various articles in Metalworking. For
more details, see the issues of May 1985, March 1986, and May 1987.
8. A parametron is a resonant circuit in which either the inductance or
the capacitance is made to vary periodically at half the driving
frequency. It was developed and used in Japan as a digital computer
element, in which case each oscillation represents a binary digit
(Handel, 1971: 267).
9. Much of this section is based on interviews with personnel at
Ferranti, TI Matrix Herbert Churchill, the Production Engineering
155.
Research Association, the National Engineering Laboratory (East
Kilbride), and the Machine Tool Industry Research Association.
10. The Ministry of Technology, under its Minister, Anthony Wedgwood
Benn, was then embarked upon the implementation of Harold Wilson's
so-called "white hot technological revolution". In order to create
"an industrial framework strong enough to finance its own high cost
research and able to mount effective scientific marketing
world-wide", a number of mixed enterprises were formed by merging
existing companies. As well as encouraging the merger of controls
production under Plessey and the expansion of Alfred Herbert, the
Ministry also promoted the mergers of Rolls-Royce and Bristol
Siddeley, and Leyland and British Motors (Benn, 1968: 651).
11. It is highly probable that many of the "European" producers of
machine tools, which manufacture CNC machine tools under licensing
and other production agreements with Japanese firms, do not reach
these levels of EEC content, so the Yamasaki machines may be more
"European" than many other CNC machines manufactured in the UK.
12.. For example, Nolan suggests that "[Taiwan] has deliberately avoided
engaging in production projects that might excessively tax its
financial and technical ... capabilities and drain away resources
needed for more immediate defense needs" (1986: 137).
Chi a p> ~t er^ Five
Korean Industrial Development
5.1 Introduction
The rapid and sustained economic development of South Korea since
1960 is well documented.1 Per capita GNP increased from US$82 in 1961
to US$1,884 in 1983 (Economic Planning Board, 1984: 7). Leading this
expansion was the growth of exports, which rose steadily from US$52
million in 1962 to US$33.9 billion in 1986, and in this year Korea also
achieved its first current account surplus, amounting to US$4.6 billion
(Montagnon, 1987). The most rapid growth in exports occurred in the
decade from 1970 to 1980, when exports increased at an average annual
rate of 23.2% in real terms (Enos and Park, 1988: 30). The type of goods
exported from Korea has also changed radically. In 1960, only 18% of
total exports were manufactured goods, but in 1978 these accounted for
88% (Nam, 1981: 191). Initial export growth in the early 1960s was
principally in the light industries, such as textiles and wigs. These
industries used skills that Korea either already had or which could be
easily acquired. Furthermore, Korea also had a comparative advantage in
these industries as their factor intensities coincided with Korea's
relative factor endowment, mainly cheap labour (Westphal et al., 1984a: 3).
While light industry exports have continued to expand with the production
of new items, such as handbags, shoes and plastic goods, since 1970 a
trend has emerged of the increasing export importance of more
sophisticated, skill-intensive products. After 1970, electronics, ships,
iron and steel, rubber tyres, machinery, and petroleum products all became
major export items.
There is no simple single explanation for the success of Korea in
these more sophisticated industries. Unlike industries such as textiles,
which had been established in Korea during its colonisation by Japan, and
which were concentrated in the South, a high proportion of heavy industry
and electricity production that existed before partition was primarily in
the North (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 27). South Korean industry, therefore,
had little experience or knowledge on which to base the growth of this
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sector. Growth in some areas of the heavy machinery and chemical sectors
was the result of backward linkages.2 For example, plants producing
artificial fibres were built with the intention that they would supply the
expanding textile industry (Westphal, 1979: 233). But other areas, such
as shipbuilding, were totally new ventures with no technological base or
large domestic market to supply.
This chapter examines the development of Korea's skill—intensive
industries and the factors which influenced their growth. Some factors
animating Korean industrial development, such as the role of government,
are in many analysts' view, common to all NICs.3 Other factors, such as
the expansion of large conglomerates, are more specifically Korean. Any
assessment of the development of the Korean CNC machine tool industry is
obliged to take into account the overall economic, political and
technological environment in which it has emerged. Government policies,
and their change over time, have, without doubt, been crucial. These
policies have influenced the machine tool industry through their effect on
Korean industrial development in general, and they have at times been
targeted more precisely on the'machine tool industry itself. In addition,
government has had a role in the development of the machinery sector
through its security preoccupations. Changing perceptions of the
contribution of a machine tool industry to the military have been a
marked feature of Korean policy. But, although government has indeed,
been a significant influence on industrial development in general,
features that can be considered internal to the Korean industrial
environment also need to be stressed. For the development of the Korean
machine tool industry, a major influence has been the requirements of its
largest domestic users. Indeed, one of the characteristics of the Korean
CNC machine tool industry has been its orientation towards production for
domestic civilian users, and in particular the vehicle industry. Arguably,
that aspect of the industrial environment has been most decisive in
shaping the development of the Korean CNC industry. Moreover, the
conglomerate structure of Korean industry has in some cases situated
machine tool producers alongside their main users, with significant
consequences for innovation and technological development.
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5.2 Government Industrial Policy
The general direction of Korea's economic and industrial policies
have been profoundly shaped by the political and military environment.
Security considerations have permeated Korea's political patterns, and
these, in turn, have exerted pressure upon government's thinking about the
nature and direction of economic development. Since the end of the
1950-53 War, South Korea has been led almost continuously by
authoritarian right-wing governments and their policies have to a large
extent reflected a fear that North Korea may invade should the South
display any sign of internal strife or military weakness. With national
security as its stated primary motivation, the military has on two
separate occasions taken over the government. In April 1960, President
Syngman Rhee's government was overthrown by a student revolution. An
interim government was formed, but in May 1961 its rule was terminated
by a military coup led by Park Chung Hee, who made himself President.
President Park did allow an election to take place in 1972, which he only
just won. Military rule was almost immediately re—imposed; the losing
candidate, Kim Dae Jung, was found guilty of sedition and sentenced to
death, and a new constitution was introduced which not only gave the
president the ability to directly select a third of the legislature, but
also guaranteed his own position by making the re-election of the
president automatic. Park was assassinated in 1979; however, following
large—scale student demonstrations, the military seized control again
within a year and General Chun Doo Whan became President. A new
constitution was introduced in 1980 limiting the president's rule to seven
years. Chun did step down from the presidency in 1987, and, following a
democratic election, in which the opposition vote was divided between two
candidates, he was succeeded by his military colleague, Rho Tae Woo.4
After Syngman Rhee's fall, all Korean governments have adopted a
highly interventionist role vis—A—vis the country's development patterns.
The basic shape of the government's development strategy since the early
1960s has been contained in a series of five-year plans. Table 5.1
summarises the principal targets and the major industrial objectives of
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plan was formulated by a few civilian advisers to a ruling council,
subsequent plans were drawn up by members of the government and many
advisers, including representatives of foreign aid missions; officials in
the national banking institutions, economic research institutes, and
various industrial associations; academics and journalists (Jones and
Sakong, 1980: 49-51). Each plan stressed the development of strategic
industries, the modernisation of the country's industrial structure and
infrastructure, and the creation of social welfare and educational
structures capable of supporting these developments. The plans set
targets for growth in industry, agriculture, and education, and put in
place a series of incentives to achieve these goals.
In the 1960s and 1970s, the Korean government used a complex
system of industrial incentives to promote growth. Selected industries
were promoted for import substitution, and these were given almost total
protection by the government. In the main these measures were biased
towards industries in the primary goods sector and agriculture. Within
the manufacturing sector, where domestic demand was too small to justify
the establishment of economically sized production plants, exports were
encouraged by a series of incentive measures.s In the mid-1960s, these
incentives included automatic exemption from import duties and indirect
taxes on intermediate goods, parts and components to be used in export
products; generous wastage allowances on raw material imports (already
exempted from duty and indirect taxes), which could be used for
production for the domestic market; reduced prices for a range of
overheads, including electricity and rail transport; tax reductions on
export income, with a provision for accelerated depreciation; easy and
immediate access to subsidised short— and medium—term credit; and,
intermittently, an export-import link allowing exporters to import
popular, but technically prohibited, items (Westphal, 1979: 237). Indirect
exporters, which provided intermediate inputs for exporting firms,
benefitted from these incentives. Leading exporters were also given
presidential prizes, citations and awards, which, although they did not in
themselves carry any tangible benefit, were taken seriously by
industrialists as they accorded public recognition and some indication
that they might secure further financial support (Rhee et al., 1984: 17).
161 .
Many of these export incentives and allowances were not considered
as direct subsidies, but merely gave Korean producers tax parity compared
with other world producers. In effect, the measures allowed export
producers to operate under a virtual free—trade regime (Kim Kihwan,
1984: 5; Nam Chong Hyun, 1981: 192). Since such measures favoured export
producers over those manufacturing for the domestic markets, these
government policies were, therefore, an important factor in the expansion
of Korean export production. But there were also measures designed to
protect areas of the domestic market and to encourage import
substitution, especially in the basic materials used in industrial
production.
The introduction of government incentive measures to encourage
exports was not, of course, unique to Korea. However, their particularly
effective application appears to have been the result of very close links
between government and business. Rhee et al. analyse two mechanisms
introduced by the government in the early 1960s which they consider to
have worked as catalysts in the efficient application of incentive
measures. Firstly, export targets, which were projections made by the
firms, had to be submitted to the government. Firms' combined export
targets were used by the government as a basic measure of expected
growth and as a means of planning future financial and infrastructural
requirements. Targets were also sometimes used informally for the
allocation of specific incentives. And, secondly, monthly meetings,
chaired by the president and attended by both economic ministers and
industrialists, were held to review progress towards the targets. These
meetings provided an important forum for the industrialists to negotiate
with government on incentive measures and to discuss developments in
international trade (Rhee et al., 1984: 15—38). Through its control of
the banking system and inflows of foreign financial resources, the
government was also very effectively able to control which firms were
given loans.
By the early 1970s, it became clear that these incentives were
yielding excessive profits for export producers. In 1973, the government
abolished a number of incentives, including the lower direct tax rates and
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the automatic tariff exemption on imported capital goods, while other
incentives, such as wastage allowances and interest subsidies, were
reduced (Westphal, 1979: 266). And in 1975, automatic access to import
tax relief was stopped; exporting firms had to pay the taxes and then
reclaim them. The government did not entirely abandon export producers;
indeed, it introduced new measures for their benefit: the Export Insurance
Law in 1968 reduced exporters' risks; the Export-Import Bank was
established in 1976 to supply credit to exporters on a medium-term basis;
and preferential loans for export industries continued to be increased
throughout the period (Nam, 1981: 193).
From the early 1970s, the government started to actively promote
the heavy, machinery and chemical industries manufacturing primarily for
indigenous consumption. The government wanted to adjust the structure of
Korean industry from one dominated by light industries to one with a
greater balance between heavy and light industries. The apparent need
for this adjustment and re—structuring arose from several developments.
Firstly, with wages rising in Korea and more competition from other
industrialising countries, the well—established light industries, which had
dominated Korea's industry and exports, were losing their competitive
advantage (Nam, 1981: 191). Secondly, there was rising protectionism
abroad against light industrial products, the effect of which was to limit
the further expansion of Korea's exports (Westphal, 1979: 235). Finally,
the government was anxious to develop an indigenous defence industry.
American foreign policy crucially influenced the government in this rush
to develop the defence sector. The Nixon Doctrine of the late 1960s
planned a reduction in the quantity of arms supplied to Korea and in the
number of troops stationed there. This was followed by the Carter
administration's troop-withdrawal plan in the mid-1970s, which was, in
fact, never carried through. Both these plans were accompanied by
commitments, in the form of a series of co—production agreements, from
the US administration to help Korea build up its own defence industry
(Nolan, 1986: 24-34; Kim Kihwan, 1984: 9-10). But the Korean government's
nervousness about the possibility of abandonment by its major ally
manifested itself in an increasing military focus of its national
industrial policy.
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In the Third Five Year Plan (1972-1976), the principal industrial
sectors promoted included iron and steel, transport machinery, household
electronics, shipbuilding, and petrochemicals. A far greater number of
heavy and chemical industries were selected and given priority status in
the Fourth Five Year Plan (1977-1981). Table 5.2 shows these industries
and the promoted sectors within them. Of these specially designated
industries, the machinery industry was given the "highest industrial
investment priority in the plan" (Government of the Republic of Korea,
1976: 42).
Table 5.2 Priority Industries in the Late 1970s
Industrial Specific Products to be Promoted
Sector
Steel Foundry Products, Forgings, Special Alloy Steel, and
Seamless Steel Pipe
Non-ferrous Metals Refining of Copper, Zinc, Lead, and Aluminium
Machinery Tools, Dies, Hydraulic Devices, Sears, Transmissions,
Bearings, Bolts and Nuts, Automobile Components, Marine
Machinery, Metal Working Machinery, Textile Machinery,
Chemical Machinery, Electrical Machinery,
Anti-pollution Equipment, and Atomic Power Generating
Facilities
Shipbuilding
Electronics Transistors, Integrated Circuits, Basic Materials,
Household Appliances, and Industrial Equipment
(Computers)
Chemicals Petrochemicals, Soda Ash, Fetilizer, Pulp, Ethylene,
Polyethlene, Styrene Monomers, Octanol, Butanol, and
Glycol
Source: Business International Asia/Pacific, 1979: 12!,
In promoting the heavy and chemical industries, the government used
a multitude of incentive measures. In 1974, the National Investment Fund
was established to provide loans at less than market interest rates to
finance the purchase of plant and equipment, and in some cases to provide
working capital. The government also stimulated domestic demand by
164.
making loans available through easily accessible special—purpose funds
(Kang Youngkook, 1984: 2). Low—interest loans allocated to the priority
sectors of industry (i.e., the heavy chemical and machinery industries)
through these various funds accounted for approximately 50% of total bank
lending in the mid-1970s and were concentrated on several large firms
(UNIDO, 1987: 48). Under an act passed in 1973 for the promotion of
industrial complexes, the government invested in the establishment of new
industrial sites - electronics at Gumi, machinery at Changwon, a chemical
industry base at Yeocheon, a shipbuilding centre on Koje Island, and, in
the late 1970s, a complex for small and medium industries at Banwol. On
all these sites, the government paid for infrastructure (e.g., transport
facilities, water and electricity supplies, etc.). Other fiscal policies
included reduced corporation tax for certain strategic industries,
accelerated depreciation, tax exemptions on R&D investments, and tax
rebates on imported raw materials used in export goods. Again, through
its control of finance, the government could to a very large extent direct
new investment. There is also considerable evidence that the President
personally encouraged individual firms to enter specific industries (see,
e.g., Jones and Sakong, 1980: 119—20).
In order to protect the domestic market, quantitative measures were
used in preference to the imposition of tariffs. The level of protection
in strategic industries was increased; in the machinery sector the import
liberalisation rate dropped from 56% in 1968 to 36% in 1976 (Koo Bohn
Young, 1984: 12).6 For products which had achieved a certain degree of
localisation, the government automatically imposed measures to protect
the domestic market. However, if locally manufactured equipment was
judged to be of exceptionally poor quality, the import of these goods was
made relatively easy. But the tax exemptions on such items were kept low
in order to stimulate higher quality domestic manufacture (Amsden and
Kim, 1986: 117). In certain sectors, such as car production, the market
was totally protected and all imports were strictly prohibited.
The actual regulation of the machinery industry, its promotion and
protection, was to a great extent delegated to a parastatal organisation,
the Korean Society for the Advancement of the Machinery Industries
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(KOSAMI), which had been established in 1968 under a section of the
Machinery Promotion Law.7 Membership of the society includes all
enterprises in iron and/or non-ferrous manufacture, a definition which
was intentionally very broad so as to include nearly all mechanical
engineering industries but to exclude primary material manufacturers. An
important feature of KOSAMI's role in the development of the machinery
industry was that it was entrusted by government to act as a
government—surrogate in several spheres. KOSAMI could issue import
permits for items on the government's prohibited import list if they were
needed by one of its members. The import of large machinery was also
regulated by KOSAMI, which had to pass all machinery imports valued at
over US$1 million. Permission could be refused if KOSAMI considered that
the machinery could be produced domestically. KOSAMI, therefore,
represented both users and producers in its policing of imports and in
its decision making it had to reconcile the demands of both.
KOSAMI was also entrusted to designate new domestically developed
machines as the first indigenously produced machines of that type and to
implement a localisation plan for the production of domestic machinery.
These designations were important to producers, since some additional
incentive measures were dependent on them. From 1968 to 1981, KOSAMI
operated a Quality Guarantee Fund, which ensured the quality of machinery
sold against defects in materials or manufacture. This was financed by
the machinery producers who were required to deposit 10% of their sale
receipts in the fund.
In the early 1970s, these measures for the promotion of heavy
industry were focussed on import substitution, with the ultimate
intention of reducing the country's dependence on export activity. But in
later policy revisions, and in the Fourth Five Year Plan, exports from the
heavy sector were encouraged. This change in policy reflected the need
to take advantage of economies of scale in production, which could only
be achieved if a significant proportion of the goods were exported
(Westphal et al., 1984a: 10).
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As well as directing domestic industries, the Korean government has
also controlled direct foreign investment in Korea. In the 1970s, the
government introduced measures to restrict the entry of foreign
producers, limiting the amount of equity foreign investors could hold in
Korean companies and setting minimum investment levels for various
industries. Wholly—owned foreign subsidiaries were not totally
prohibited, but joint ventures with Korean firms were given priority in
receiving government approval. Most of the wholly foreign—owned projects
and the joint ventures approved in the 1970s were located either in the
government—established free-trade zones or in priority industries on the
government's specialised industrial complexes. In general, wholly foreign
investments were only approved if the new developments, or the
technologies used, were in a priority category. In a very few sectors,
including electronics, the Korean government has actively attracted
foreign investment, by giving foreign investors privileges not offered to
domestic producers (Business International Asia/Pacific Ltd., 1979: 123).
Measures to encourage technological development and to control the
import of foreign technology were also introduced. In the early 1960s,
government—run research organisations were operated separately under
relevant ministries. The major activities undertaken by these
organisations were limited to providing testing and analysis services.
The main constraining factors were the small size of each institute, and
their lack of equipment and facilities (Kwon, 1986: 2). In the late 1960s
and early 1970s, the government introduced numerous acts for the
establishment of research and development institutes.8 To raise the
overall level of R&D, and to rationalise the existing spread of the
government's R&D efforts, the Korean Institute of Science and Technology
(KIST) was established in 1966. There were similar problems of
co-ordination in scientific and technical post-graduate education, as only
a few post-graduates were being trained at many different universities
and colleges. To alleviate this problem, and to increase the number and
standard of post-graduate students in these fields, the government
created the Korean Advanced Institute of Science (KAIS) in 1971. KAIS
was located near KIST so that the two institutions could easily
collaborate. Both KAIS and KIST were set up under similar laws which
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guaranteed autonomous management of the organisations, even though
funding was through government endowment.
By the mid-1970s, KIST could no longer meet the increasingly
diversified technological demand from the industrial sector. Separate
specialised research institutes, intended to work with specific industries,
were established under a general statute. The new dedicated research
institutes included laboratories concentrating on shipbuilding, standards,
metals and machinery, electronics and telecommunications, and chemical
technology. Many of these new research organisations were "spin-offs"
from existing research groups at KIST. In 1981, the structure of
research organisations was again altered by the government, which
integrated and re-aligned the sixteen existing institutes into nine new
institutes, whose activities were to be co-ordinated by the Ministry of
Science and Technology (MOST). Under this reorganisation plan, KAIS and
KIST were amalgamated to form KAIST (Korean Advanced Institute for
Science and Technology). The research work undertaken at KAIST was to be
more fundamental and the results of KAIST's work were "expected to be
used by specialty institutes and private R&D institutions, rather than
directly by the industry in the production lines" (Kwon, 1986: 8). Other
laws encouraged the development of vocational training colleges and
universities, and promoted technology and engineering services in
industry.
The import of technology was regulated by several acts, of which the
Foreign Capital Inducement Law, an act that also regulated foreign
investments, was the most important. Under this Law, technologies were
screened and rated by the Economic Planning Board (EPB) as to their
desirability. Highest priority was assigned to technologies with great
potential to expand exports; technology for manufacturing components and
for new processes for the capital goods industry came next, followed by
technology which would be very costly or take a long time to develop
domestically; and, finally, there were technologies which had the potential
to promote cost reductions and productivity increases (Enos and Park,
1988: 36). Technologies outwith these requirements could be imported if
provision was included guaranteeing the quality of the product and
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specifying that any technological improvements by the licensor would
automatically be transferred to the Korean licensee. Regulatory clauses,
such as limits on export markets (where the licensor did not have
exclusive selling rights), and the regulation of access to competing
technology and products, were actively discouraged in the approval
process.
In general, technology agreements were further limited to a duration
of three years and payments to less than 37. of net sales. In several
cases, where licensees and licensors applied for an extension of a further
three years, permission was withheld by the EPB. For example, in 1973
Foremost McKesson of the US and Daeyle Dairy Products of Seoul entered
into an agreement containing technical assistance and the use of a
trademark. In 1976, the two firms applied for a renewal of the
agreement, but this was rejected by the EPB. Daeyle ceased using the
Foremost trademark and formal technical links ended, although an informal
relationship remained (Business International Asia/Pacific, 1979: 133).
In early 1978, the government liberalised licensing approval in
seven priority industries: machinery, chemicals, electronics, electrical
power, metals, shipbuilding, and textiles. Agreements in these sectors
were automatically approved if the contract was for less than three years
and if royalty payments were either less than 47. of advance sales
(without advance payments), or less than 37. (with an advance payment
below US$30,000), or if only an advance payment of less than US$100,000
was made. In 1979, regulations were further relaxed to allow automatic
approval in all sectors except the defence and atomic power industries,
providing the agreements were for less than ten years and the royalties
were either less than 10% of sales, with a maximum advance payment set
at less than US$500,000, or only a single advance payment of less than
US$1 million. For agreements outwith these limits, the time taken for the
EPB to grant approval was to be reduced from two months to a week
(Business International Asia/Pacific, 1979: 132). While these regulatory
changes reflected government's desire to encourage the import of new
technologies, as well as its recognition that the majority of producers
had built up adequate experience in negotiating technology agreements,
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they also reduced the number of agreements that had to be screened by
the EPB and hence made its work more manageable (Enos and Park,
1988: 37).
Although the government passed these measures to facilitate the
import of new technologies, it still maintained the power to reject
agreements if they were considered to be against Korea's interests.
Outdated technologies, and technologies which might cause excessive
competition on the domestic market, were thus excluded. Technologies
which had been selected for domestic research and development efforts
were also discouraged. In this field, MOST was delegated with the
responsibility of assessing the level of technical know-how in Korea and
the desirability of the new technology. Together with these
responsibilities, MOST was given the power to object to technology
agreements, even if they were in a category which allowed them to be
automatically approved (Business International Asia/Pacific, 1979: 133).
Promotion of the heavy and chemical industries in the 1970s was not
as successful as the general promotion of export industries had been in
the previous decade. Up to the mid-1970s, only a few heavy industries
were promoted at a time, such as shipbuilding and steel production, but
in the late 1970s many more heavy industries were encouraged
simultaneously. This led to a concentration of credit in several large
firms in the heavy and chemical sector and, thus, weakened the
development of the export-led sector. By the late 1970s, many of the
large enterprises were in financial difficulties, and in 1978 "the top
economic planning minister was charged with the overriding objectives of
reducing inflation and salvaging the mistakes in heavy industry" (Rhee et
al., 1984: 68). One of the major contributory factors to the difficulties
in this sector was the government's optimistic assessment of the size of
the potential market. The domestic market did not grow as quickly as had
been anticipated, and, as the plants were not competitive on the world
market, exports did not reach the levels planned. This was principally
due to the ovei—valuation of the Korean currency, high wage rises, and
insufficient investment in the development of technology and skilled
manpower (Koo Bohn Young, 1984b: 16). These circumstances led to
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over—capacity in many plants. To salvage as much as possible, the
government reorganised the heavy sector by transferring the ownership of
some firms, forcing some competing firms to merge, and limiting the
number of firms allowed to specialise in certain sub—sectors of the
industry (Rhee et al., 1984: 68). These domestic industrial problems were
exacerbated in 1979 by the assassination of President Park, the second
oil crisis, and, in 1980, a disastrous harvest.
Government policy in the early 1980s continued to reflect
re-adjustment from the distortions in the economy which became manifest
in the late 1970s. The main objectives of new policy were to improve
labour productivity in manufacturing, encourage the mobility of both
domestic savings and direct foreign investment to areas where
productivity gains were possible, and to utilise resources, notably
capital, more efficiently by enhancing allocation mechanisms. The major
thrust of these policy measures was towards liberalising the economy.
Regulations on direct foreign investment were relaxed, so that all
investors not seeking special tax exemptions, and with equity of less
than 50% in projects of under US$1 million, were automatically approved,
unless the industrial activity was on a restricted list. About a third of
the total number of industrial sub—sectors were subject to restrictions,
but it was anticipated that by 1988 only 10% would remain restricted
industries. Limitations on imports were to be reduced, and the import
liberalisation rate was to increase from 80% in 1983 to 95% in 1988.
Tariffs were also to be reformed so that the average tariff rate would
drop from 21% in 1984 to 17% in 1988 CUNIDO, 1987; 51). Part of this
change in policy on the protection of the domestic market was a reaction
to protective moves by several countries, notably the US, where Korea had
important markets.
In the 1970s, most Korean industrial development and growth took
place in the large conglomerates or chaebol, and indeed they had been the
principal recipients of government loans and export finance. In order to
counter this uneven development, in the late 1970s and 1980s the
government introduced measures to restrict the further expansion and
diversification of the chaebol and promote the growth of small— and
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medium—sized independent firms. In 1978, the Small and Medium Industry
Promotion Corporation (SMIPC) was created to aid the establishment and
development of small firms, and to offer them marketing and technological
services. And in 1984, the Ministry of Trade and Industry announced that
intensive support would be available for 1000 small firms, with particular
support for those entering the production of parts and components. Under
this scheme, these firms would be given a range of incentives, including
tax reductions on the purchase of new machinery (lower reductions applied
for the purchase of imported machinery than for the purchase of
domestically produced machinery), and expenses on technological guidance
would be tax deductible (UNIDO, 1987: 55).
Even though the guiding prinlciple behind government industrial
policy in the 1980s has been one of laissez-faire, the government has
still intervened when it felt competition was becoming excessive or when
it wanted to rationalise declining industries. For example, in 1986, over
40 companies in financial difficulties were merged, by government
arrangement, with other more successful companies. The latter were, in
return, given various tax and loan incentives by the government for
taking control of the declining companies (UNIDO, 1987: 52). Specific
illustrations of this type of intervention, and the reduction of
competition on the domestic market, are given later in this chapter and in
Appendix 2. Compared to other countries, the Korean government is still
very active in controlling industrial activity, and, even though the banks
are now in private hands, it has maintained some controls on credit
allocations (Kuznets, 1985: 64).
In order to fund this industrial development, the Korean government
has relied on foreign financing. Up to the mid-1960s, grants made up a
significant proportion of foreign financing, but Korea has subsequently
borrowed heavily. At the end of 1966, Korea's cumulative debt was US$300
million in medium— and long—term loans, rising to US$7 billion by the end
of 1976, and to US$47 billion by 1985. (In 1985, Korea had the highest
per capita level of debt of all developing countries.) Up to 1986, when
it enjoyed its first balance of payments surplus, Korea also had large
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deficits, averaging 7% of GNP in the late 1960s and 5% in the early and
mid-1970s (Hasan and Rao, 1979: 6; Harris, 1986: 38).
The military origins of Korean governments since Syngman Rhee have
already been noted. The security preoccupations of these governments
have been manifested in their attitudes towards economic growth. Such
growth has been a major government objective, not only for its own sake,
but also as a way of damping down political unrest and minimising
displays of internal divisiveness that might be thought to increase the
risk of invasion from the North. Thus, the Korean government has
consistently and vigorously intervened in order to direct national
industrial development. In its control of development, it has been
referred to as a "hard state", ensuring the implementation of its policies
by discretionary measures and, when required, by direct command (Kuznets,
1985: 51—52). The effectiveness of government intervention has been
enhanced by the extent of its control of the banking system and the
allocation of credit, enabling it to target its favoured sectors (Westphal
r
et al., 1984a: 12). Although the government was highly insijjjmental in
industrial development, it maintained close contact with industry through
forums such as the monthly trade promotion meeting, which were attended
by the President, ministers and industrialists. The information gained in
such meetings enabled the government to adjust and refine its policy
measures accurately and rapidly (Rhee et al., 1984: 35-36). In the 1960s,
government policy promoted the expansion of export production, and, in the
1970s, the heavy and chemical sector. Measures in the 1980s have
reflected the changed policy of promoting industrial development in
general, rather than promoting only selected strategic industries. In the
main, the measures introduced by the Korean government were aimed at
encouraging and directing private industry to enter new industrial
sectors, instead of establishing large public enterprises for these
purposes. There were, of course, exceptions: for example, the government
created a public company to enter the steel industry, giving it a
monopoly in the sector. But public enterprises accounted for only 15% of
total manufacturing during the 1970s (UNIDO, 1987: 49).
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5.3 Government Promotion of the Machine Tool Industry
Although the main thrust of government planning moved towards the
heavy machinery and chemical sectors in the early 1970s, it was not until
1976 that many specific industries were emphasised. In part, these
industries were chosen because of the lead they could take in the overall
development process. The Fourth Five Year Plan for 1977-81 announced
that,
In an effort to create more employment opportunities and
to upgrade the manufacturing structure with desirable
forward and backward linkage effects, top priority will be
given to the development of technology and skilled labor
intensive industries [such] as machinery, electronics and
shipbuilding (Government of the Republic of Korea,
1976: 31).
Of the six industries chosen as main priorities at this time, the
machinery industry was stressed as the highest industrialisation priority,
and, within the machinery industry, further encouragement was given to
certain sectors.
The promotion of the machinery industries will be
concentrated on the development of strategic items in the
following categories: basic materials, machine parts,
machine tools, and industrial machinery (ibid.: 43).
The machine tool industry was therefore clearly seen as one of the
government's highest priorities during the late 1970s. In this plan, the
value of output of machines and machine parts was set by 1981 to rise to
four times 1975 production levels, and export levels were set to rise to
five times their 1975 level.
In 1977, the government published a detailed sub—sectorial plan for
the machine tool industry - The Basic Development Plan for the Machine
Tool Manufacturers.9 This plan set a machine tool production goal of
US$166 million, an export goal of US$66 million, and a self-sufficiency
ratio of 74% for 1981. Within the plan, machine tools were divided into
three categories. Group 1 covered all the basic conventional machine
tools of medium precision, most of which were already being manufactured
in Korea. This group was to be specifically promoted for export. The
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second group contained more complex machines, special—purpose machines,
automatic lathes, gear-cutting machines, and some milling machines. This
category included many machines that were not being produced in Korea,
and entry into these products was to be promoted in order to replace
imports. Group 3 consisted of high—precision and highly automated
machine tools, which are R&D intensive to develop and which were not,
therefore, included in the short—term development plan. Of the machine
tool firms in Korea, some were selected as manufacturers of general
machine tools (i.e., Group 1), and others were selected as specialised
manufacturers (i.e., Group 2). Both types of selected firms were expected
by the government to export a certain portion of their production. And
the general manufacturers were also expected to develop and produce new
types of machines within a specified time limit. Significantly, CNC
machine tools were included on this list of machines to be developed.
The numerous measures introduced by the government in the 1970s to
promote and protect the growth of the heavy machinery and chemical
industries were all used in the promotion of the machine tool industry in
the late 1970s. The domestic machine tool industry was totally
protected, with all of the 63 items classified as machine tools at the
CCCN 8-digit level being restricted (Jacobsson, 1984: 226). And, as noted
above, KOSAMI was given the power to issue import permits for prohibited
machinery items. Thus, an organisation representing the interests of both
the machinery producers and users had control of which machinery items
could be imported and which could not. A less important method of
protecting the domestic market was the use of tariffs. In 1981, the
tariff rate on imported general machinery was 10.4%, and 14.8% on
precision machinery (Kim Seung Jin, 1983: 12). These tariffs were similar
in magnitude to those used by Taiwan at the same time, but were much
lower than those applied by some other developing countries (for example,
India).
Domestic machinery producers were directly and indirectly
subsidised through various government-run schemes. Tax subsidies were
offered on corporate and personal taxes. Capital was supplied to the
industry at low interest rates through preferential loans from the
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National Investment Fund <NIF) and the Korea Development Bank. According
to Jacobsson (1984: 227), exporters of machine tools were considered more
favourably when these credits were allocated. Furthermore, an industrial
complex for the production of machinery was established at Changwon. The
government financed the building and operation of the site, including all
the infrastructure, thus effectively subsidising the firms which
established new plants there.
To increase domestic demand for machinery products, the government
introduced several measures. Preferential loans were extended to the
consumers of machinery products through the Machinery Localisation Fund,
the Plant Localisation Fund, and the Used Machinery Replacement Fund
(Kang Youngkook, 1984: 3). Special tax exemptions and depreciation
allowances were also available to purchasers of domestically produced
machine tools (Jacobsson, 1984: 227). All government institutions and
industries were instructed to buy machinery from designated domestic
manufacturers on a priority basis (Bendix et al., 1978: 44). Exports of
machines were also assisted through the Export-Import Bank and the
Export Industry Machinery Fund, which supplied long-term export credit
for foreign buyers.
In the government's reorganisation of its research institutes in
1976, the Korean Institute for Metals and Machinery (KIMM) was
established to support the design and development work of the machinery
industry. KIMM provides technical support to the machinery industry, and
also tests and inspects machinery products, including machine tools, for
export under the Korean Export Products Inspection Law. The work
undertaken by KIMM is directly linked to industrial needs — often the
specific needs of a particular firm. The major support offered consists
of prototype development, industrial consultancy, and the provision of
test facilities. KIMM also has a role in training, and in the
dissemination of technical information through organising seminars and
courses for industry (Barrow, 1983: 10). KIMM's other main function with
regard to the machine tool industry was to inspect machinery and
components, under the standards set out in the Korean Industrial Product
Quality Control Law, the Korean Export Production Inspection Law, and the
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Korean Industrial Standards. An NC centre was set up within KIMM, under
a UNIDO development plan in 1983, to provide "various technical supports
for the implementation of NC machines" (KIMM, 1985: 12). Projects within
the centre include software development, robotics, CAD/CAM, and detailed
analyses of machine tool structure. To enable this institute to work
closely with machinery producers, the relevant departments are located in
the centre of the machinery complex at Changwon.
Incentive schemes were introduced to encourage manpower training
and the acquisition of new technology. A proportion of firms' R&D
expenses and training costs could be deducted from corporate income tax.
In the case of investment in increased capacity using new technologies,
firms had a. choice of a tax deduction on the initial outlay or special
depreciation allowances. Research equipment imported by the government
research institutes was exempted from tariffs. Donations given to these
institutes by firms could be treated as expenses for taxation purposes.
On all new technologies imported by firms, any fees and royalties paid
were totally deductible from corporate taxes for the first five years of
use, after which an allowance of 50% for the next three years was made.
Foreign engineers employed by domestic firms were exempted from personal
income tax. Income from royalties originating in technology transfers
was also exempted from tax for the first five years. In the case of
machinery classified by KOSAMI as "Newly Developed Indigenous Machines",
more preferential loans were available for their production and purchase
in order to encourage technical development (Kim Seung Jin, 1983: 17-31).
As noted earlier, the government set goals for the growth of the
machine tool industry in its 1977 plan. The figures in Table 5.3, show
that machine tool production in the late 1970s grew rapidly, and in 1981
production surpassed the level anticipated. But exports and the
self-sufficiency ratio were less than half the anticipated values. 1981
was, however, a year of very high machine tool consumption in Korea and a
large proportion of the demand was for specialised equipment for the
vehicle industry which had to be imported. Thus, while the industry grew
in line with government plans, the government overestimated its export
potential and underestimated the size of the domestic market.
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There is some evidence that, of the industries selected for
promotion in the mid-1970s, the machinery sector was the greatest
beneficiary of government policy. Firstly, the level of protection of the
domestic machinery market was higher than for most other industrial
sectors. Kim Seung Jin (1983: 4-8) compares import liberalisation rates
to show that the machinery industries were consistently protected to a
greater extent than manufacturing industry in general. His analysis also
shows that, of the machinery industries, the general machinery sector,
which includes machine tool production, was more highly protected than
other machinery sectors, and only one sector, the electrical machinery
industry, enjoyed greater protection.
Secondly, as already noted, the parastatal KOSAMI functioned as a
practical arm of the machinery industry in protecting the domestic market.
KOSAMI could reject the importation of any machinery and could waive
import restrictions to remove impediments to the progress and
competitiveness of a member firm. Thus, to a large extent, the machinery
producers themselves were able to regulate levels and types of machinery
imports. While most other countries' governments consult organisations
representing machinery producers on the implementation of protection, and
especially the equipment which should be included in such measures, the
rej|>onsibility for implementing such measures is more commonly the
prerogative of a government department.
Thirdly, although there are no detailed data available on the exact
distribution of economic development funds from government to the
machine tool industry, some indication of the perceived importance of this
industry and its products can be gathered from a range of sources,
Moore (1980: 12) shows that in 1979 the total subsidy in interest rates
given by the government, for distribution to all industries, amounted to
70 billion won. Of this, the heavy and chemical industries received about
two-thirds of the subsidised loans: the largest loans were for the
purchase of domestic machinery and for the construction of machinery
factories. Indeed, two large machine tool producers received substantial
loans from the government (Jacobsson, 1986: 181), and the case study in
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Chapter 6 documents several Instances of government loans and incentives
to particular machine tool producers.
The government's support for the machine tool industry continued in
the early 1980s. In the 1981 Basic Plan for the Advancement of the
Machinery Industry, the metal working machinery industry was labelled as
a "leading export machinery industry" and machine tools were designated
as "one priority item to be assisted" (Jacobsson, 1986: 180). But by the
mid-1980s, the emphasis of government policy moved from the provision of
preferential low-interest loans for strategic industries to the support of
general technology and product development, and increased the provision
for small and medium—sized firms. Although some tax exemptions and
preferential loans were still available, they were on a smaller scale,
Government policy also encouraged increasing competition in the domestic
market and the competitiveness of Korean products with foreign goods. As
part of this liberalisation of trade, KOSAMI's right to reject the import
of machinery of high value was abolished and was replaced by a reporting
system. Under this system, firms had to inform KOSAMI of the import of
machinery on a list of specific equipment, and KOSAMI could then try to
encourage the firms to source the equipment domestically if feasible.
KOSAMI only had a limited influence over which items were kept on the
list, and its spokesman suggested that, as most of the machinery industry
had not yet advanced from the infant stage, liberalisation would make it
hard for some producers to survive. The tariff rates on imports,
including machinery, were also reduced: the average tariff rate was 22.6%
in 1983, to be reduced to 16.9% by 1988 (Whang In-Joung, 1987: 26).
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5.4 Development of Technology-Intensive Industries
From the early 1970s, the Korean government actively encouraged the
heavy machinery and chemical industrial sectors. A prime example of the
rapid industrial expansion and acquisition of technologies is the
development of the state—owned Pohang Iron and Steel Co. Ltd. <POSCO). In
1973, POSCO commenced production at its first integrated steel mill, with
an annual capacity of one million tons, the technology, and the majority
of the equipment, for building and operating the mill being supplied by a
Japanese company. After a series of expansions, by 1983 POSCO had an
annual capacity of 9.1 million tons, and the final upgrading of facilities
to reach this level was undertaken using the company's own accumulated
technological capabilities (Korea Exchange Bank, 1984: 169; Park Woo Hee,
1983: 83). The POSCO experience was not unique among Korea's
technology—intensive industries, and this section examines the expansion
of four sectors of these industries: machine tools, defence, vehicles, and
electronics.
5.4.1 The Machine Tool Industry
While a detailed analysis of the modern Korean machine tool industry
is the subject of the next chapter, the basic features of its historical
development, especially in relation to government and other industries,
can be briefly summarised. Although the Korean machine tool industry
originated in the late 1940s, it remained a very small sector of local
industry until the mid-1970s. Its products during this period were very
simple: engine lathes and basic milling machines. Following the
government's encouragement of the heavy machinery and chemical industries
from the mid-1970s, the machine tool industry has grown very rapidly. In
the decade from 1975 to 1985, the value of metal cutting machine tool
production rose from 30 million to 1,257 million won (see Figure 5.1).
There has also been a significant increase in the production of CNC
machines and in the proportion of CNC machine tool production to total
machine tool output. The value of CNC production increased from
32 million won in 1981 to 338 million won in 1985, and the proportion of











Figure 5.1 Korean Production of Hctal
Cutting Machine Tools (in 100 Million Won)
Total Production
CNC Production
Source: Metalworkinq, Nov. 1986: 144.
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over a quarter, by value, of total machine tool production. In global
terms, the size of the Korean machine tool industry is still small: in
1985, Korea manufactured less than 1% of world production. In the same
year Japan, the largest producer, manufactured nearly thirty times Korean
output, by value, while Taiwan, the leading NIC producer, manufactured 40%
more than Korea (American Machinist. Feb. 1986: 89).
With the expansion of manufacturing in Korea, and, in particular,
with the government—promoted growth of the machinery sector, domestic
demand for machine tools has also increased. As already noted, the
purchase of domestically manufactured machines was encouraged by the
government which introduced several schemes to subsidise their purchase.
In addition, sectors of the domestic market in which manufacturers were
able to produce machines of a satisfactory standard were also protected.
Thus, Korean machine tool manufacturers benefitted from growth in
domestic consumption. This increase in domestic demand has also made
Korea one of the largest consumers of machine tools; in 1985, it was the
twelfth largest machine tool consumer in the world (American Machinist.
Feb. 1986: 88). (Table 5.3 shows consumption of all types of metal
working machine tools for the years 1976 to 1985.) One feature which
this table shows particularly well is the cyclical nature of demand for
machine tools, a point noted in earlier chapters. Domestic consumption
rose rapidly in the late 1970s and then declined even faster in the early
1980s, before rising again in the mid-1980s. The first rise in
consumption coincided with large—scale investment in the heavy and
chemical industries. The decline in demand in the early 1980s was due to
the crisis in the Korean heavy industries, in part due to over—capacity.
Demand increased again in the mid-1980s with rising investment, mainly in
the expansion of production capacity in the vehicle industry.
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Table 5.3 Korean Trade Statistics for Machine Tools (Cutting and Forming)
Year Production Imports Exports Consumption £ L E.
(P) (I) (E) (C-P+I-E) C C P
< (in million US$) > < (as I) >
1976 10 90 - 100 10 90 -
1977 57 130 2 185 31 70 4
1978 95 156 5 246 39 63 5
1979 164 398 15 547 30 73 9
1980 135 344 26 453 30 76 19
1981 178 325 32 471 38 69 7
1982 158 97 61 194 81 50 39
1983 119 21 36 104 114 20 30
1984 143 135 22 256 56 53 15
198S 184 150 25 309 60 49 14
Source: American Machinist (compiled from various issues),
Korea does export machine tools and the quantity exported has
indeed increased in recent years. However, Korea's machine tool industry,
unlike many other sectors of industrial activity, is principally directed
towards its own domestic market. In 1982 and 1983, exports were much
higher than in other years as domestic demand was very low, forcing many
producers to more actively market their products abroad. However,
domestic consumption subsequently revived and manufacturers reverted to
this market. The majority of the machine tools exported in 1984 were
conventional: 40% were conventional lathes and milling machines; 32% were
drilling, grinding, and hobbing machines. The remaining 28% were CNC
lathes, milling machine^ and machining centres. Early machine tool
exports mainly went to other industrialising or developing countries.
However, from the early 1980s, manufacturers have also exported to
industrialising countries and this is becoming their most important export
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destination: in 1983 and 1984, 60% and 80% respectively of exports went
to industrialised countries. The major destinations for these exported
machines were the US and Japan, which in 1984 took 36% and 26%
respectively of the total value of exported machines, while Canada and
Europe were also important markets (Machine Tool. 9, 1985: 125). The
Korean machines exported have low unit values. For example., in early
1985, the average unit value of CNC lathe exports was US$13,500 and of
exported machining centres US$53,000 (Monthly Foreign Trade Statistics.
April, 1985). These are very low in comparison to the average unit
values of the same types of machine exported by Japan (see below), but
similar to Taiwan's, which on the whole is a low value exporter, although
Taiwan's exported CNC lathes have a significantly higher unit value than
Korea's.1 0
The proportion of domestic consumption met by imports has declined
from 90% in 1976 to 49% in 1985. as domestic production has been 3ble to
supply a larger share of internal demand. Although indigenous production
has increased rapidly, a high proportion of Korea's internal demand for
machine tools is still met by imports. Most imported machine tools come
from Japan, and other major supplying countries include West Germany and
the US.11 Imported machinery is principally either very large, very
complex, or of high precision, and, consequently, of high unit value. In
1984, the average unit value of machining centres and lathes imported by
Korea from Japan was US$205,000 and US$74,440 respectively. These
average unit values were significantly larger than the average unit value
of Japan's total exports of these machines, which were US$95,000 and
US$62,000 respectively in the same year.12
The major Korean consumers of machine tools are the vehicle and
defence industries, together with their associated components producers.
The vehicle industry alone accounts for about 30% of total machine tool
consumption (Metalworking, Nov. 1986: 148-49). The plastics industry is
also a significant consumer of machining centres, mills and EDMs for the
production of moulds and dies. As the Korean machine tool industry is
orientated towards supplying other domestic industries, the expansion and
technological development of its large consumers affects the size of the
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market for Korean producers and influences the production strategies of
firms within the industry. The growth of the defence and vehicle
industries, and their links with the machine tool industry, are discussed
in detail below. Chapter 2 noted the dependence of CNC machine tools on
microelectronics components. The following section assesses the possible
entry of the Korean electronics industry into this production area.
5.4.2 The Defence Industry
The strategic thinking behind the government's encouragement of
heavy industry in general in the early 1970s stressed its potential to
support the defence effort, especially in view of the perceived threat
posed by the reduction of US forces in Korea. Nevertheless, that thinking
was revealed as a failure by the late 1970s, and its consequences for the
whole of Korean industry were quickly appreciated by government and other
analysts. For example, Rhee et al. argue that "underlying this failure
was the adoption of a second principal policy objective - greater
self—sufficiency in meeting the country's defence needs — to be added to
the first objective of export—led economic development", and "the adoption
of this second principal policy objective ... naturally weakened the
previous singular objective" (1984: 67-68). As well as promoting the
development of military—related industry, the government was, of course,
also its major customer.
In the late 1960s, Korea's defence industry was limited to a small
number of government arsenals manufacturing simple munitions. The rapid
development of defence production in the 1970s was undertaken primarily
by private companies. However, their development in this sector was
funded by government subsidies and, consequently, they were insulated
from normal commercial pressures. The distribution of these subsidies
between firms was to a large extent a political decision, frequently made
through personal contact between President Park and the chairmen of the
various chaebol. The funds were used to import expensive equipment which
was often of far greater capacity than could be effectively utilised.
Funds from defence contracts were also used by firms to subside their
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production in other non—defence—related failing industrial sectors.
Companies were also given a wide range of tax incentives to enter the
defence sector, the government guaranteeing them 10% annual profits. In
theory, to ensure that firms did not become too dependent on defence
production, the share of total firm production in defence-related
activities was restricted by legislation to 30%. However, there were many
cases where this limit was not strictly enforced (Nolan, 1986: 62-65,
112-15).
The efficiency of investments made during this period was low, and
capacity utilisation in the machinery and equipment sectors, which
included defence manufacturing, declined steadily from 67% to 53% between
1974 and 1980, while that of the whole manufacturing sector remained
constant at 70% (UNIDO, 1987: 16). Other problems in the industry
stemmed from very poor quality control and from a general shortage of
required skilled labour. A large proportion of the product technology
used was supplied by US defence contractors: helicopters were
manufactured through an agreement with Hughes Aircraft; naval patrol
craft were produced under US supervision; and ordnance and ammunition
were made to US designs or under licence from US firms. The US
government controlled the technologies that were transferred, and
restricted the sale of Korean-made defence products containing US
components or technology. In addition, the US denied the Korean
government permission to manufacture several of the defence items it
requested. As well as using US technology, President Park initiated a
prestige project to develop an indigenous capability in missile technology
(Nolan, 1986: 73-79).
Towards the end of the 1970s (which also marked the end of the Park
regime) and in the early 1980s, the Korean government recognised that
serious mistakes had been made and that the heavy industries had to be
rationalised. This reorganisation included government designation of
firms as sole suppliers in particular defence sectors. Other
manufacturers in the sector were either forced out or became
sub-contractors to the sole supplier. Furthermore, the 30% limit on
defence production was to be enforced more vigorously. Much of the
excess capacity created in the mid-1970s was indeed reduced by these
measures. However, into the mid-1980s several firms were still suffering
from the residual effects of over—investment and had not been able to
re-adjust their manufacturing activities. (The case study in Chapter 6
discusses an example of a machine tool firm (E> which is part of a large
heavy engineering group that did not succeed in re—orientating its
business and was later merged with a more successful chaebol.) Some
current defence production is undertaken by firms which manufacture
similar products. For example, Kia was made the sole supplier of
domestically-manufactured wheeled vehicles purchased by the armed forces.
Kia manufactures jeeps, trucks, and some cannon for the military, and has
been able to integrate this production with its main output of small
vans. The general strategy of integrating similar military and civilian
production where possible should enable manufacturers to benefit from
economies of scale or scope.
The links between the Korean machine tool industry and the military
have closely followed the overall career patterns of military—heavy
industry links. Indeed, as Amsden and Kim observed, the machinery
industry did not "evolve organically" but "exploded jumbo sized on the
industrial scene" (1986: 94). Yet this headlong rush into defence—related
industries did not survive the economic and political crisis of the late
1970s. While the machinery sector continued to be promoted by the
government, it was primarily on the basis of its potential contribution to
civilian manufacturing. Although many of the machine tool producers
supply defence contractors, in only a few cases do they manufacture
machinery specifically for the defence sector, and even in these cases the
machinery produced can be used for other purposes. For example, one
chaebol which is a large explosives manufacturer has a division which
developed small lathes used to produce timing devices. These machines
are now supplied in fairly large numbers to manufacturers of toys and
pens. Thus, while Korea flirted with the military—machine tool patterns
characteristic of the US, these did not persist, and the present situation
strongly links the machine tool industry to civilian production.
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5.4.3 The Vehicle Industry
The close technological links between vehicle and machine tool
industries were noted in the last chapter. The vehicle industry has
become the largest single market for machine tools in Korea, and, indeed,
a number of vehicle producers have themselves become machine tool
manufacturers. Korea's vehicle industry has been fostered by the
government since 1962, when a total ban was imposed on the importation
of complete vehicles and foreign ownership in domestic vehicle—producing
firms was restricted. Production in the early 1960s was at a minimal
level and amounted to little more than the final assembly of imported
semi-knocked-down kits.13 In the late 1960s, completely-knocked-down
kits were being assembled by firms collaborating with foreign vehicle
manufacturers, including Ford and Toyota. By 1972, vehicle production
capacity in Korea was 54,000, divided between four firms. However, their
combined output in that year was only 10,000 units (The Korea Herald.
Auto Industry Supplement, 31 March 1985; Altshuler et al., 1984: 41-42).
In 1974, the government instituted its long-term automobile
promotion plan. The major aims of this plan were: (i) to change the
industry from assembling imported kits to the development of Korean
models; (ii) to increase the local content of the vehicles produced; and
(iii) to encourage indigenous private enterprises to invest in large—scale
production in order to realise economies of scale. Responding to the
government's promotion plan, three firms introduced new models: Kia
introduced its Brisa in late 1974; Hyundai the Pony in 1975; and Saehan
(a joint venture with General Motors) the Gemini in 1977. These main
car—producing firms still maintained close links with foreign companies.
For example, Kia continued to assemble both Peugeots and Fiats, as well
as manufacturing the Brisa. Production continued to rise, but, as so many
firms were still involved in vehicle manufacture, individual companies
could not achieve economies of scale (Altshuler et al., 1984: 43), In
1979, following government moves to rationalise heavy industry, the
government designated the car industry for strategic export development
and undertook measures to reorganise it. Only two firms, Hyundai and
Daewoo (which had taken over the Korean-General Motors joint venture),
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were allowed to continue car production: Dong-A was to produce all
civilian jeeps and Kia was allocated small vans and trucks; various
commercial vehicles, including buses, were to be produced by Hyundai,
Daewoo, Kia, Asia, and Dong-A.14
In the mid-1970s, Korea began exporting vehicles to countries with
no indigenous car industries - mainly in the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America. In 1977, these three areas took over 90% of Korean car
exports (Machinery Korea. April 1985: 8). In 1978, Hyundai expanded into
the European market. At this time, the estimated production cost of a
Hyundai Pony was US$3,972, approximately US$1,700 more than a similar
basic Japanese car. On the export market, the Pony had to be sold for
less than the equivalent Japanese car, because of customer unfamiliarity
with the model and producer. Hyundai exported 19,000 Ponys in 1979.
absorbing its losses with government support (Altshuler et al., 1984: 43).
Declines in both the domestic and the world market further depressed the
car industry. In 1981, the industry's combined losses were over US$100
million and Hyundai, the largest car producer, was operating its factory
at less than 50% capacity (The Economist. 6 March 1982: 79).
Despite huge losses in its car production, Hyundai expanded its
facilities to take its total capacity to 300,000 cars per year. This was
undertaken with the technical collaboration of Mitsubishi, which had
acquired 10% of the company.15 In 1982, Hyundai brought out a re-styled
Pony and developed two new models, the Excell and the Stellar. The
engine and the axle of the Excell were designed by Mitsubishi, and the
body of the car was designed in Italy. The design of the Stellar is
similar to that of the Ford Granada, which Hyundai had previously
produced in Korea under licence. With these new and improved models,
Hyundai started to export to North America: the Pony II was first sold in
Canada in 1983, followed by the two new models, and in 1986 Hyundai
entered the US market. Both these markets have proved very successful
for Hyundai. In 1984, the company exported 50,379 units (35% of
Hyundai's total production for that year), more than two and a half times
the level of the previous year, with Canada taking 54% of these exports
(Company literature, 1985). In 1986, Hyundai sold a total of 168,200
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vehicles in the US market. The expansion of Hyundai's total production
capacity to 600,000 vehicles a year was also completed in 1985 (Garnett,
1987a). In the same year, Hyundai started to build an assembly plant in
Canada, to supply the Canadian market and to export a small number to the
US. This plant is to have a capacity of 100,000 units a year. The cars
will have some local content, and a stamping plant may be added later.
The cost of the construction of the plant has been heavily subsidised by
the Canadian government (Gibbens, 1986).
The growth of Daewoo Motor Corporation, a joint venture between the
Daewoo chaebol and General Motors, has not been as dramatic as Hyundai's.
In 1985, Daewoo had one—sixth the production capacity of Hyundai (Korea
Herald. 31 March 1985). The main vehicles produced were the Maepsy, a
fairly old Korean-designed car, and the Royale, based on the Opel Rekord.
With the technical support of General Motors, Deawoo have commenced
manufacturing the Le Mans, which is to be exported to the US and sold by
General Motors dealers under the Pontiac brand name. It was anticipated
that by early 1988 Daewoo's annual car production capacity would be about
340,000 (Garnett, 1987a).
With the introduction of the Anti-Monopoly laws in 1985, Kia was
allowed to re-enter car production. The new car produced by Kia was
designed by Mazda of Japan, with whom Kia already had technical
agreements covering the production of mini-buses. Mazda has an 8%
holding in the company, and Ford owns a further 10% (Garnett, 1987a).14
These vehicles are to be exported to the US and sold through Ford
dealers. At the same time, Dong-A, a part of the Ssangyoung Group,
started negotiations with Toyota for the production of passenger vans.
Samsung, a conglomerate with no history of vehicle production, is also
negotiating with Chrysler for the production of cars exclusively for
export. In 1989, the government plans to lift all restrictions on the
number of domestic car producers, which will enable both these producers
to enter production. The manufacturing tie-ups between Korean firms and
foreign producers give the former many advantages. Firstly, they receive
designs, production technology, and manufacturing support from the
foreign company. Secondly, they have automatic access to established
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dealer networks in export markets. And, thirdly, the exports of Daewoo
and Kia, as manufacturers for US firms, are less likely to be limited by
any US import quotas introduced to further protect the vehicle market.
Vehicle component production is also a growing sector of Korean
manufacturing and is becoming a large machine tool consumer. This
industry is slightly older than the car industry itself, as it started on
an informal basis in the 1950s to supply cheap replacement parts for US
army vehicles. The domestic demand for components and parts has
increased as the car industry has expanded and as the localisation rates
for vehicle production have risen. The domestic content of cars and
trucks has steadily increased from 60% in the mid-1970s to over 90% in
the mid-1980s. (In 1984, Hyundai claimed that its Pony had a 98% local
content.) Parts which continue to be imported include special bearings,
fuel injection systems, steering systems and automatic geai—boxes
(Machinery Korea. April 1985: 13).
Vehicle components are also exported. Initially, the parts which
were exported were relatively minor; they used little technology in their
production, but were labour intensive to make, e.g., springs and seats.
Exports have become more technologically complex and the technological
development of the industry has depended on the transfer of foreign
technology. In 1982, there were a total of 57 technological cooperations
and 17 joint ventures making vehicle components. These included the
production of transmissions, engines, rubber parts, and electronic devices
(King, 1986b). Three new joint ventures were set up in 1985 with major
American firms (Ford, General Motors, and Chrysler) in order to supply
components to the vehicle production plants of their foreign partners
(Butler, 1985). Even with the expansion of the components industry, Korea
still imports large quantities of car parts and components. In 1986,
Korea imported vehicle and components valued at US$730 million and
special steels destined for vehicle production valued at US$130 million
(Garnett, 1987a).
The car industry in Korea has come to constitute the most important
feature of the economic and technical environment for machine tool
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manufacture. Indeed, the development of the CNC industry cannot be
understood without reference to the vehicle sector. The car industry is
the most important buyer of indigenously produced CNC machine tools; it
works very closely with machine tool firms in the installation of new
equipment and in the solution of production problems. Moreover,
Chapter 6 will document and show some consequences of the close
organisational links between machinery and vehicle makers. These links
have been formed both internally (i.e., when machine tool firms and
vehicle producers are part of the same conglomerate) and externally
(between conglomerates and between independent firms).
5.4.4 The Electronics Industry
At present, the Korean machine tool industry is highly dependent on
foreign suppliers for the electronics components used in CNC and FMS
manufacture. While the Korean industrial electronics sector is still
developing, when and if it matures its role will be largely that of an
indigenous components supplier, supplanting foreign sources, rather than
that of a major user of machine tools. The overall growth of the Korean
electronics industry and its acquisition of technical capabilities have
been spectacular in the twenty years from 1965 to 1985. Before 1965,
the only electronics production in Korea was the assembly of simple AM
radio sets. Black-and-white television sets, stereos, and radio
communications equipment began to be assembled in the mid-1960s, but the
local content of these products was low, all major parts and components
being imported (Kim Linsu, 1980: 258). By the mid-1970s, the electronics
industry had sufficiently built up its capabilities to enable it to
produce colour televisions and assemble computers. This was followed in
1978 by the manufacture of microwave ovens and, in 1979, by video
cassette recorders (VCRs). In 1984, 64K DRAM (Dynamic Random Access
Memory) chips were produced in Korea, followed in the next year by 256K
DRAM chips. Indeed, Korea was the third nation in the world, following
Japan and the US, to manufacture these chips. While nearly all these
advances relied on imported technical know—how, in 1987 a 256K SRAM
(Static Random Access Memory) chip, which worked faster than those
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manufactured in Japan, was produced in Korea by a domestic firm using its
own design and production know-how (Ford, 1987).
Table 5.4 shows the growth in value of Korean electronics production
and exports between 1965 and 1985. The industry is export-orientated:
the proportion of exports to production has been over 50% since 1969, and
Korea became a net exporter in the electronics sector from 1973. The
vast majority of electronics exports are consumer electronics and
electronics parts and components. A high proportion of early electronics
exports originated in foreign—owned firms or joint ventures. In 1974,
Korean-owned firms accounted for only 26% of electronics exports;
however, their share increased to 53% by 1981. Imports consist mainly of
electronics parts and components, and the import of industrial electronics
is becoming steadily more important. Consumer electronics only account
for a very small proportion of imports — 5% in 1982.1 7
Like the vehicle industry, the electronics industry was selected as
one of Korea's priority industries in the First Five Year Plan in 1962.
Initially, the industry was orientated towards import substitution and the
government used various incentive programmes to encourage the
development of the industry while barring the import of consumer
electronics products. The Electronics Industry Promotion Law of 1969 was
aimed at changing the industry's orientation from import substitution
towards exports. Among the measures in this Act were long—term loans at
low interest rates, accelerated depreciation, no import duty on production
equipment, and the establishment of an overseas marketing research
service (Kim Linsu, 1980: 265). Unlike the vehicle industry, the
government's programmes for the electronics industry were not only for
the benefit of indigenous producers. Foreign investors were also
attracted by a variety of special incentives and privileges, applying only
to the electronics industry (Suh Sang Chul, 1975: 109).
The electronics industry was re-emphasised in the Third Five Year
Development Plan (1972-1976). A special industrial estate for the
production of electronics goods was built at Gumi, and many delegations
were sent abroad to attract further foreign investment and know—how. In







E (as a percentage)
1965 11 2 17
1967 37 7 18
1969 80 42 53
1971 138 89 64
1973 435 322 74
1975 860 582 68
1977 1,758 1,107 63
1979 3,280 1,845 56
1981 3,791 2,218 59
1983 5,560 2,980 54
1985 9,600' 5,250' 55
a, Estimate
Sources; Suh Sang Chul, 1975; 111; Chon Kilnam, 1984; 29;
Berney, 1985; 49,
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1978, and again in 1979, government controls of licensing agreements were
relaxed (Business International Asia/Pacific Ltd., 1979: 132). Since 1979,
the government has undertaken a major campaign to upgrade electronics
capabilities, and has targeted the computer and semiconductor industries.
As a part of this campaign, imports of personal and mini-computers were
banned, and a flat—rate tariff of 20% was placed on all imported
integrated circuits (ICs). 32 jointly-funded research projects were
instituted in 1982, linking the public and private sectors, and were given
government subsidies. Of these projects, seven were in the electronics
sector, covering a broad range of technologies: cable telecommunications,
medical equipment, robotics and CNC machine tools, VCRs, digital ICs, and
software. Under the Semiconductor Industry Fostering Plan (1983), the
government lent domestic firms US$346 million to further develop
semiconductor production capabilities. In 1984, an additional US$91
million was added, specifically for the development of the one megabyte
chip (Berney, 1985: 48-49).
The manufacture of consumer electronics accounts for nearly 40% of
electronics production in Korea and is dominated by domestic firms.
Domestic production of black-and—white televisions started in the
mid-1960s, using technology imported from Japan and Holland. The
technology agreements included product specifications, production
know—how, technical personnel, component parts, and assembly processes.
In the initial phase of production, foreign experts were employed to give
technical assistance in production plants, but as local personnel acquired
technical capabilities in production, the use of foreign assistance
declined (Kim Linsu, 1980: 259). For the initial production of more
complex consumer goods in the 1970s, Korean firms continued to use
foreign technology, acquired either through licensing agreements or, in
the case of the electronics-producing chaebol, the establishment of
joint—venture subsidiaries with large foreign producers. Firms also had
close links with the foreign companies to which they sold their products.
Westphal et al. (1984: 286) note that foreign buyers were an important
source of technical help in exporting firms. Representatives of the
foreign buyers, who visited the Korean installations to inspect the
production facilities or to check on quality, frequently helped with
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technical and production problems and recommended improvements in
manufacturing. These contributions of minor innovations from export
buyers to Korean firms were a major factor in increasing the
product-quality and efficiency of exporting firms.
While some of the new consumer products began to be exported only
after local demand had been satisfied and quality had risen to
international standards, other electronics products were specifically
produced in response to export demand. For example, colour televisions
were first produced in 1974, but colour television broadcasting did not
begin in Korea until 1980 (Park Ungsuh, 1984: 9). Other products developed
in this way included electronic calculators, tape recorders, and electronic
digital watches (Kim Linsu, 1980: 266). Most exported consumer products
were sold directly to foreign industrial buyers, who distributed and sold
the products under their own name or trademark. This pattern was broken
by Samsung in 1985, the first Korean electronics producer to start
selling its consumer products in the US and Europe under its own name.
The production of parts and components is now the largest sector in
the electronics industry. It is also the sector in which foreign firms
have most influence; combined, foreign firms and joint ventures account
for over half of production. When electronics production first began, all
major parts amd components were imported, with only simple electrical
parts, such as resistors and capacitors, being supplied by domestic
producers. Localisation rates have gradually increased with the
development of the components sector. However, the components which
still have to be imported are often those most critical for the operation
of the final product.14
One area of the parts and components sector which deserves special
attention is the production of discrete semiconductors. The initial
development of this field in the early 1970s came from investment by
foreign firms, mainly trans-national corporations (TNCs), in transistor
production and IC assembly.19 By 1973, there were 27 US and 56 Japanese
electronics ventures in Korea. TNCs which set up subsidiaries included
Tokyo Sanyo, Toshiba, Motorola, and Fairchild. The products covered in
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the production range varied from transistors to wafer fabrication and IC
assembly. The influx of these foreign firms changed the orientation of
the components industry from import substitution to exports. Of the
electronics components produced in Korea, approximately three-quarters
are now exported - either as components for foreign buyers, or in
Korean—assembled electronics products. For ICs the proportion is even
higher: in 1974, 89% of ICs produced were exported, and by 1981 nearly
100% were exported. The largest markets for these products are Japan
and the US (UNCTC, 1983: 352). The raw materials required for
semiconductor production - silicon ingots, fine—grade chemicals, and very
pure metals - all have to be imported.
The character of semiconductor production in Korea has changed from
its original state as an off-shore production centre dominated by large
foreign electronics companies. Rising wages and the increase in capital
intensity in production equipment have made the country less competitive
as an off—shore location for TNCs, so few new foreign firms have been
established in Korea since the mid-1970s. However, production capacity
has been expanded by domestically—owned firms which have begun
manufacturing ICs and discrete semiconductors. The main buyer of these
parts is the burgeoning consumer electronics sector — often producers
within the same chaebol. These indigenous electronics firms entered
microelectronics production using a variety of technical agreements, and
by setting up joint ventures mainly with Japanese and US firms. The
depth of knowledge supplied in these agreements varied to a great extent:
some consisted solely of the supply of manufacturing equipment, while
others included the detailed training of Korean personnel in design
skills; and some agreements were comprehensive, covering all technology
from process technology and chip design through to production and
maintenance.
Some Korean producers have either acquired or established design
and production centres in California. In Santa Clara alone, three Korean
subsidiaries have been established: Samsung has a subsidiary producing 5"
64K DRAMs using an American design; Hyundai also has a plant
manufacturing 5" wafers; and Daewoo's subsidiary is making private branch
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exchanges and optical fibre systems, under licensing and marketing
agreements with Northern Telecom. And Goldstar has invested US$60
million in a custom IC centre in nearby Sunnyvale. Daewoo had originally
planned to produce semiconductors as well, but this project was dropped
because of high capital costs. Along with these four privately-sponsored
ventures, the government-supported Korean Institute of Electronics
Technology has a liaison office in Sunnyvale, to oversee local
developments (Berney, 1985). While some consumer electronics firms have
established overseas plants using technology that was already established
in Korea, all these ventures have been set up in order to acquire new
microelectronics technology. The results of such technical acquisitions,
in the form of new chips, will later be mass—produced in Korea and used
in Korean products.
Industrial electronics is the least developed Korean electronics
sector and accounts for less than 20% of electronics production. The
majority of domestic production is currently centred on
telecommunications equipment. In this area, as elsewhere, the role of
technology agreements has been important, and the government has
regulated them to ensure compatibility with the existing network.
Computers are the other main product in the industrial electronics field.
Computers were first assembled in Korea in 1976, and their production has
been increasing rapidly. Fujitsu, IBM, and Sperry have 100%—owned local
firms operating in Korea. Korean companies have technology cooperation
arrangements with firms such as Hitachi, NEC, Olivetti, AT&T, Digital
Equipment, Honeywell, Prime, and Hewlett Packard. Most of the agreements
with American firms are in the form of joint ventures. Often, the
agreements include the export of computer hardware peripherals (e.g.,
terminals) and more simple systems, such as personal computers, to the
foreign supplier. Mainframe computers are also produced in the joint
venture firms, for sale only on the domestic market. Industrial
consumption in this sector relies heavily on imports; in 1982, imported
goods accounted for over 60% of this market (Chon Kilnam, 1984: 29).
The main reason for the lack of development in this area is that
industrial electronics relies to a great extent on the use of customised
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chips. The manufacture of these chips is both expensive and difficult,
requiring a high level of design capabilities. One of the aims of the
large companies in setting up research, development and production
facilities in California is to build up the appropriate skills. Semi-
customised chips, which enable the design and production of industrial
electronics chips to be standardised to a greater extent, are being
introduced by Japanese firms. The customisation of these chips, tailoring
the chip to its specific function, is encapsulated within the software.
Korean firms do not yet have the capabilities to manufacture these chips,
but when such chips are locally produced the barriers to entry into
industrial electronics production may be lowered, and may, in turn, enable
the Korean electronics industry to build up its industrial electronics
sector more easily.
The highly successful Japanese CNC industry is characterised by
close working relationships between makers of control units and machine
tool producers. By contrast, Korea has not yet successfully entered
controls production, and reliance upon Japanese control units is almost
total. Nevertheless, there have been various attempts in Korea to
manufacture controls for CNC machines, but these have so far been very
basic in comparison to Japanese versions. If Korea is ever effectively to
enter controls production, the technological capabilities of its
microelectronics sector will have to be much further developed. In
particular, the design skills involved in the development of customised
and semi—customised chips will have to be acquired. The Californian
enterprises represent a substantial and serious effort at developing this
sector. Moreover, microelectronics skills are heavily used in FMS design
and installation. Both FMS and control unit design also make demands
upon software capabilities, and, while Korea is currently attempting to
encourage its software industry, progress has been limited. On current
evidence, it is unlikely that Korean firms will replace foreign suppliers
of sophisticated and complex microelectronics components within the next
decade. However, the capabilities required to make less complex
electronics components are already in place in Korea and their production




The development of Korea's heavy industry in general cannot be
adequately understood without reference to the country's special form of
business structure. For a relatively small country, and one whose
industrial development is of recent origin, Korea has a surprising number
of very large conglomerate companies — known as chaebol. Fortune's 500
(the 500 largest companies outside the US) for 1985 contained ten Korean
companies, two of which (Hyundai and Samsung) are also among the 50
largest companies in the world (including the US). In 1985, these two
companies each had sales of over US$14 billion and over 100,000 employees
(Fortune International, 4 Aug. 1986: 173). Another sixteen NICs and
developing countries also had companies in the Fortune 500, and in total
they accounted for 34 companies in the 1985 listing. Yet, unlike the
Korean companies, many of these other NIC and developing country
companies were petroleum producers/refiners or mining companies, and few
were involved in manufacturing. By contrast, nine of the ten Korean firms
were mainly manufacturing businesses.20
The chaebol organisational form partly reflects the history of its
development. At the centre of each chaebol is a chairman, who is
sometimes the founder of the group and the leader of its expansion. In
older chaebol, this role may have been taken over by direct descendents
of the original founder. As * the group develops, it becomes more
family-based, with successfully established companies being passed on to
other members of the founder's family as the founder himself moves on to
new projects.21 However, this spread of family control has in more
recent years been declining, as groups have increasingly formed holding
companies and employed professional managers. Indeed, government has
actively encouraged the reduction of single family influence. While
family control has been eroded, the hierarchical structure which evolved
as an outcome of family control patterns persists.
Each chaebol produces a vast range of goods. For example, Hyundai
and Daewoo make products from very large crude oil carrying ships to
microchips. To some extent, all chaebol specialise in one area of the
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market. For example, Samsung manufactures mainly consumer goods, while
Hyundai makes mainly producers' goods. Given the sheer size of these
groups, there is not only a high concentration ratio in specific
industries but also a high level of business concentration.22 In 1982,
the top 30 chaebol employed nearly 30% of all Korea's manufacturing
workforce, and accounted for 40% of all sales in the manufacturing sector,
The top five alone accounted for over 8% of the workforce and 23% of
sales (Korean Business Review, Jan. 1987: 38). Nevertheless, there are
areas of Korean industry which are relatively uninfluenced by the chaebol
structure. Thus, in certain areas of manufacturing industry (e.g.,
textiles, paper and printing, and the food industry), there is little
chaebol activity. And in all areas of industry, except those which demand
very large investments, such as shipbuilding and large construction, there
are also a number of small and medium independent firms (Jones,
1980: 43).23
Not only do the chaebol manufacture a very large range of goods,
but they are also highly vertically integrated. This is particularly
visible in the electronics industry. Since there has been a general lack
of small local suppliers and sub-contractors to make complex parts, the
chaebol have established their own subsidiaries to manufacture these
items. For example, Samsung Electronics Co. is a grouping of five
subsidiaries of the Samsung chaebol situated close to each other on the
same industrial estate. Samsung Electronics' main products are consumer
goods — televisions, VCRs, computer peripherals, desk calculators,
refrigerators, and air conditioners. In order to manufacture the glass
tubes used in their televisions, a joint venture with Corning was
established. The tubes manufactured by Samsung—Corning are then
transported to Samsung Electron Devices, another subsidiary of Samsung
Electronics Co., through an underground tunnel linking the two firms.
Here they are fitted with electron guns and then sent to Saiiijyng
Electronics Co. as fully assembled picture tubes. Samsung Electronics
Parts, another member of the group, manufactures several of the other
critical television components. Thus, the output of one subsidiary is an
input for manufacturing in other subsidiaries. Similarly, in Hyundai's
vehicle production, 45% of vehicle parts are made on the same site on
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which vehicle assembly takes place, and, in total, 75% of parts are
sourced within the Hyundai group (Housego, 1988: viii).
The chaebol also have their own R&D facilities. Of the 130
industrial research laboratories registered in Korea in 1984, 115 were
parts of the various chaebol and the rest had been established by
medium—sized independent firms (KIRI, 1985). In the machinery sector, of
the 23 industrial laboratories, only one was part of an independent firm.
The electronics manufacturers have always led in the establishment of
research facilities. Goldstar, an electronics manufacturing chaebol,
established the first privately-run research laboratory in Korea in 1975,
and has subsequently opened another nine. In June 1987, it opened the
largest private research institute in Korea, employing 820 people. The
work of this institute is divided into four areas: basic research for the
development of new materials and systems, consumer products, office
automation, and the design and pilot production of various semiconductors
(Korean Business Review. June 1987: 49). Samsung established its research
centre in 1979 and also operates its own technical graduate school. The
main vehicle producers also have large and active research facilities and
training centres. For example, Hyundai's main vehicle research centre
employs 1,500 people and a further 300 are employed in a separate engine
development centre (Housego, 1988: viii). In many cases, the chaebol
research facilities are far in advance of those run by the state. The
significance and general pattern of chaebol research efforts for
innovation in its component firms is enormous. Individual firms in the
conglomerate have access to a concentration of R&D capabilities which
would be extremely difficult for an independent firm to develop.
A Structural Problem?
The most rapid period of chaebol growth took place in the early
1970s. In 1973, the largest 46 groups accounted for 15% of non-
agricultural GDP; by 1975, they accounted for 19%. A significant
proportion of this increase originated in the top five chaebol, whose
share of non-agricultural GDP rose from 5% to 7% in the same period
(Jones and Sakong, 1980: 268). The expansion of these conglomerates has
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at various times been considered to be a problem by government, some
businessmen, and independent analysts. Firstly, the efficiency and
integrity of market processes were called into question, mainly by
businessmen in smaller firms. It was argued in the late 1970s that the
chaebol not only had opportunities to become monopolistic in specific
markets, but that they might also behave "less competitively" with each
other because of fear of reprisals in the same or other markets.
Individual chaebol could also use cross-subsidisation within the group to
undercut independent firms which were either its suppliers or its
competitors (Jones, 1980: 124-25, 147-48). Secondly, the development of
small and medium firms was thought to have been retarded because they
were given less government support than the chaebol. Industrial analysts
suggested that this slow development of smaller firms meant that an
adequate sub—contracting network had not been established, and, because
specialisation was not viable for small firms, they argued that this
sector might never develop (Amsden and Kim, 1986: 118).
These arguments often pointed to the absorption by the chaebol of a
disproportionately large share of the subsidised credit allocated in the
1970s, leading to allegations that the government and conglomerates were
in league, at the expense of smaller firms. (Difficulties in obtaining
credit forced smaller firms to procure financing from an illegal, and more
expensive, "kerb market", putting them at a further disadvantage compared
to the conglomerates.) It was frequently suggested that the government
favoured the chaebol in the allocation of funds because of their political
donations (see, for example, Nolan, 1986: 65). Jones and Sakong (1980: Ch.
8) suggest that this may indeed have been the case during the Rhee
regime in the 1950s, when a significant proportion of chaebol growth
originated from privileged access to government-controlled markets.
However, they contend that while the chaebol continued to receive some
special benefits under the Park rdgime (1961-1979), these were less
important to their growth in comparison to the expansion of productive
activity. In the main, chaebol expansion during this period was due to
their establishment of new production facilities and the creation of new
subsidiaries. Jones and Sakong argue that in the 1970s the government's
commitment to growth meant that credit was largely allocated to those
companies which already had a record of successful expansion, and these
tended to be the chaebol.
In the mid-1970s, the government introduced measures to try to
check the unbalanced growth of the chaebol. These concentrated on
forcing the large groups to go public. Groups which were financially
unstable were directed to improve their financial structure before going
public and were barred from allocations of foreign loans. In addition,
chaebol firms with severe financial problems were allowed to collapse or
their failing subsidiaries were reorganised under other, more successful,
chaebol.24 Policy measures were also introduced to combat the lack of
development in smaller independent firms. The Small and Medium Industry
Promotion Law was introduced in 1978 and through the 1980s the
development of these firms continued to be particularly promoted by
government. And under the Fifth Five Year Plan <1982-1986) industrial
units affiliated to the chaebol were encouraged to separate and become
independent firms (Government of the Republic of Korea, 1983: 43). One
effect of this promotion appears to have been the build up of small sub¬
contractors around the chaebol. For example, Samsung Electronics Co. has
built up a network of about 200 small and medium firms to supply parts
and undertake service work. Samsung has given these firms long—term
contracts and discusses future needs with them (Park Ungsuh, 1984: 23).
Was the rapid build up of the chaebol a problem in Korea's
development? Or was it the most efficient mechanism of expanding
industry and rapidly acquiring technological capabilities? The very
existence of the chaebol may have promoted faster industrial and
technical development, as they enjoyed many advantages compared to other
firms. Firstly, they could easily transfer management skills, of which
Korea had a shortage, around the group. Similarly, technical skills,
including those in repairs and maintenance, could be transferred between
producers in related areas within the group. Secondly, they could more
easily establish overseas offices from which they could trade and through
which they could also collect marketing and technical information for
product developments. Thirdly, they were able to negotiate more
effectively with foreign technology suppliers for the import of new
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technology. And, fourthly, they had the resources to establish their own
training schemes, colleges and R&D centres to promote the technical
education of their workforces. The question of the role and influence of
the chaebol in Korean development is, therefore, a complex one, and one
which will be further examined in the case study where the development
of both chaebol and non— chaebol firms is considered.
The Chaebol and the Machine Tool Industry
In certain aspects of its structure, the Korean machine tool
industry resembles that of many Western countries. There are a large
number of independent, mainly small, firms and a relatively small number
of large (typically chaebol) producers. Nevertheless, the overall
significance of chaebol firms is very large, especially in the CNC sector.
Of the 46 machine tool manufacturers considered as "relevant producers"
by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry in 1977, only seven had more
than 200 employees and the majority of firms had between 50 and 100
employees (Bendix et al., 1978: 28). By the early 1980s, KOMMA, to which
all the main machine tool producers belong, had a membership of 80 firms,
of which 57 were producers of machine tools, and the remaining 33
manufacturers of tooling, machinery components, and cast iron. The
majority of the new entrants to the production of machine tools were
chaebol members. In the late 1970s, nine chaebol commenced machine tool
and component production, of which seven entered the metal working
machine tool industry. Most of these conglomerates entered by
establishing their own production facilities, and there is only one
instance of a chaebol taking over an existing machine tool producer.
Entry by the chaebol means that there are now two distinct types of
machine tool producers in Korea: chaebol firms and the small and medium
independent producers. Chaebol producers have become a dominant force in
the industry, accounting for a very large proportion of production and for
much of the industry's growth in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In
1984, production by the nine chaebol accounted for over a third (by
value) of all machine tool and component production. Table 5.5 shows the
proportion of total production accounted for by chaebol in several
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sectors of the metal cutting machine tool industry. While chaebols are
important in conventional machine tool production, their dominance is even
more marked in the CNC sector. In the case of machining centres, four
chaebol producers account for nearly the whole of Korean output.
Moreover, the entry of the chaebol has made the industry more
concentrated. In the export of machine tools, the chaebol also dominate,
in 1984 accounting for 53% of total Korean exports (Machine Tool. 9,
1985: 126). The chaebol have, therefore, in a very short time become an
important and characteristic feature of the Korean machine tool industry.
Table 5.5 Total Production of Metal Cutting Machine Tools in Korea in 1384












CNC Lathes 9,616 70
CNC Mills 2,906 23
Machining 7,497 98
Centres
Source: Adapted from data in Machine Tool. 9, 1985: 114-2!
It would, however, be a mistake to suppose that the entry of the
chaebol has pushed independent Korean producers into insignificance. In
the production of most types of conventional machine tools, independent
producers still manufacture a greater proportion than the chaebol. The
low percentage of chaebol production of CNC mills indicates that there
are several independent producers which have successfully entered this
sector. And even with the entry of the chaebol, the largest machine tool
producer in Korea is an old (by Korean standards) independent firm.
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5.6 Technological Development
The foundation of Korea's acquisition of capabilities in
technology-intensive industries has been the import of new technologies
from industrialised countries. In the main, this technology has been
directly imported by Korean firms and not brought in by foreign firms
establishing subsidiaries in Korea (Enos and Park, 1988: 39; Westphal et
al., 1984b: 292). A major exception to this was the manufacture of
discrete electronics components which was initially dominated by direct
foreign investment ventures. Even in this sector the major expansion in
domestically owned manufacturing facilities in the late 1970s and early
1980s was undertaken through formal technology agreements. However,
although the use of imported technology has been widespread, Korean
industry has not become dependent on such imports and has successfully
commenced developing its own new products.
In the execution of large projects (e.g., in the iron and steel and
synthetic fibre industries), Korea bought turnkey facilities or established
joint ventures. Licensing agreements have also been extensively used. A
key feature of Korean firms' use of these agreements has been their
insistence that technology and capabilities be effectively transferred.
Enos and Park's detailed analysis of the contracts used in some
large—scale technology imports stresses that "the success of the
absorption of the foreign technology was [dependent] upon the precise
terms obtained by the government in its negotiations with foreign
suppliers" (1988: 248). Government was able to control not only the
contents of agreements entered into by national industries, such as steel
and electric power, but, up to the late 1970s, also legislatively
restricted those used by private industry. In particular, this regulation
was implemented to ensure that access to new and competing technologies
was not denied, and that too high a price was not being paid.
The transfer of technology was obviously a primary aim of the
government in its negotiations for all agreements, as indeed it continues
to be. In 1986, the Korea Electric Power Co. negotiated with twelve
different international companies for the construction of new nuclear
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power plants. A spokesman for the Korean company suggested that: "Ctlhe
key feature in determining the winner is the willingness of a bidder to
transfer technology. Pricing and financing are secondary" (Butler, 1986b).
The Koreans have managed to achieve their aim of technology transfer
through specific terms of the agreements used. In a Korean study of 603
technology agreements entered into between 1981 and 1983, it was found
that in only 3.8% of the cases was technology transferred solely in the
form of designs or blueprints, and that a further 4.7% took the form of
visits from foreign consultants. In the remaining 91.5% of cases, the
agreements included a broad range of transfer mechanisms, including the
supply of blueprints and operating manuals, consultations, training and
supervision (quoted in Enos and Park, 1988: 42). Frequently, the foreign
firms entering agreements have been required to train Korean personnel
alongside their own employees. For example, in the nuclear plant
technology project, the proposed agreement incorporated a clause stating
that the new reactor was to be designed jointly by the foreign contractor
and its Korean counterpart, in order that technology was effectively
transferred, but that the foreign company would still have to take full
liability for any flaws in design (Butler, 1986b).
However, technology imports have not been limited to formal
technology transfer agreements. New technologies have been acquired
through the import of individual pieces of equipment. Foreign consultants
have been employed to advise in Korean factories and to train personnel.
In some areas, Korean firms have acquired adequate capabilities to
develop and design the major part of new products, but still require some
technical support from foreign firms. This has occurred, for example, in
the development of new models in the vehicle industry. A different
approach has been adopted by the electronics industry, which established
overseas research and development facilities in California's Silicon
Valley, an area where it was relatively easy to employ experts to work to
the firm's requirements. Technological capabilities have also been
acquired by Korean personnel educated in foreign universities and
colleges, or by those who were given additional training in foreign
plants. One less orthodox contribution to the build up of capabilities
and improvements in manufacturing has been described by Westphal et al.
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as "learning by exporting" (1984b: 286). It should be stressed that this
form of learning only occurs when there is direct contact between the
manufacturer and the buyer, and usually results from visits to the Korean
firm by the foreign buyer to advise on production, discuss product
specifications, etc. As this mechanism is dependent on the type of
relationship with the foreign purchaser, and not solely on exporting, a
better description of this learning mechanism might be "learning by
supplying".
Chapter 2 documented three other ways in which a full range of
technological capabilities is built up in industrialising countries:
learning based on experience in production, learning by investing in the
creation of knowledge, and learning through technological links
established between users and producers (interactive learning). All these
methods have also been used in Korea and have complemented their
technology imports. Process technologies learnt in the manufacture of
one item have been transferred to the production of other goods.
Westphal et al. note that this occurred particularly in mechanical
engineering industries, where skills such as casting and machining could
be applied to the manufacture of many different products (1984b: 289).
Furthermore, the basic capabilities learnt in production have been applied
in the manufacture of new, more complex models. For example, both the
electronics and vehicle industries first commenced manufacture by
assembling goods, and the skills acquired in this early stage were used
as a base for later developments. In addition, the product knowledge
gained from assembly activities or basic manufacture helped firms select
suitable partners or licensors for subsequent technological developments
and to negotiate more efficiently in acquiring new technology.
Korea's commitment to R&D investment has increased rapidly: in 1980
the proportion of GNP devoted to R&D investment was 0.57% and by 1987 it
was 2.2%. In comparison, in the mid-1980s approximately 3% of Japan's GNP
was devoted to R&D. There are two distinct levels at which investment in
technology creation takes place; firstly, the government has been active
in establishing and funding technological institutes to support developing
and expanding industries; and, secondly, firms, mainly within chaebol, have
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established their own facilities. In 1987, private industry's investment
in R&D was nearly three times greater than government's, a figure broadly
comparable to the Japanese situation in the early 1970s. A high
proportion of the work undertaken by research institutes, especially those
which are privately financed, is in product development and there is
little fundamental research. Nevertheless, in some industries there are
high levels of development capability, even though they are focussed on
very specific areas. For example, semiconductor research is concentrated
in the development of new memory chips and little work on customised
chips has yet been initiated. The government has also invested heavily
in its educational system, and both government and individual firms have
instituted vocational training schemes.
Because there has been widespread and integrated development, many
firms have been able to obtain technological support from both their
suppliers and their users. In particular, this has occurred within the
chaebol, where producers and users are often under the umbrella of the
same group. In these cases, there has been considerable joint
development work and immediate help in problem areas in application or
production has been available. Finally, the combination of firms in
complementary industrial production has enabled groups to establish R&D
facilities which serve all the individual firms. The increase in the use
of small and medium firms as sub-contractors to the chaebol means that
these firms are now included within the interactive process and are given
considerable technical, and in some cases financial, support by the
chaebol to which they are linked.
Although Korea has acquired significant capabilities in production, a
major bottle—neck is in product and process development. Thus, while
sufficient know—why has been acquired to enable plant operation and some
adaptation work to be undertaken, Korea is still reliant on other
countries to supply the know-how which is incorporated in new designs.
In the machine tool industry, the development of such skills is crucial if
it is to support its user industries. Accordingly, the following chapter
considers exactly how the CNC machine tool industry has acquired
technological capabilities, and, in particular, design skills.
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Notes
1. See, for example, Balassa (1981); Kuznets (1977); Cole and Lyman
(1971); Hong and Krueger (1975); Westphal (1978a, 1979); Westphal
et al. (1981, 1984a, 1984b); Little et al. (1970).
2. The Korean usage of the terra "heavy machinery and chemical
industries" is very broad, comprising basic intermediate products,
electrical and non-electrical machinery and transport equipment.
3. For a detailed review of the literature in this area, see Fransman
(1986b).
4. For details of the Korean political context, see Henderson (1968),
Harris (1986) and Hamilton (1986).
5. Whether goods manufactured for export were favoured by the
government's incentive measures over those manufactured for the
domestic market is not clear. Nam concludes that domestic sales
were favoured over exports in the aggregate of all industries, but
in the manufacturing sector, which accounted for the majority of
Korea's exports, export sales were given greater incentives than
domestic sales (1981: 210; also see Westphal, 1979: 238.)
6. Import Liberalisation Rate = (T - R)/T
Where T = Total number of items by CCCN 4-digit
R = Number of restricted items by CCCN 4—digit according
to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry's Annual
Export and Import Notice (Amsden and Kim, 1986: 115).
7. Information on KOSAMI is derived from personal interviews in 1985.
8. See Choi Hyung Sup (1983: 169-71) for a detailed list of these acts.
9. A detailed summary of the objectives and measures in this plan is in
Bendix et al. (1978: 44).
10. In 1984, the average unit values of Taiwan's exported machining
centres and CNC lathes were US$43,000 and US$37,000 respectively.
Average export values are calculated from production and trade data
supplied by ITRI, Taipei.
11. In 1984, 64% of machine tool imports (by value) came from Japan, 18%
from West Germany, and 7% from the US (Metalworking. Nov. 1986:
148-49).
12. These average unit values of exported machines are calculated from
export data for Japan in NMTBA, 1986: 200-01.
13. In 1965, the vehicle industry in Korea assembled a mere 106
passenger cars and 35 trucks (Machinery Korea. April 1985: 4).
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14. Daewoo took over the management of Saehan In 1978, and the company
was renamed Daewoo Motor Co. Ltd. in 1983 (Korea Herald, 31 March
1985).
15. In 1985, Mitsubishi Corporation and Mitsubishi Motors Corporation
increased their holdings in Hyundai to give them a combined 15%
share of the company (Korea Herald. 31 March 1985).
16. Ford also holds 25% of Mazda (Financial Times. 11 July 1986).
17. All figures in this paragraph are derived from data given in Chon
Kilnam (1984).
18. For example, the precision recording heads used in VCRs are imported
from Japan, and, in the case of microwave ovens, the critical
component, the magnetron, has been imported from the US.
19. TNCs invested US$10 million in transistor production in Korea in
1971 and 1972, and other foreign firms invested just over US$3
million in IC assembly (UNCTC, 1983: 352).
20. Similarly, in the 1985 South 600 (the top 600 companies in the
Third World) Korea had the largest number of companies (93) (South.
Aug. 1986: 65).
21. The Korean chaebol are similar in form to the Japanese zalbatsu, and
are represented by the same kanji (Chinese) characters. The
zaibatsu of the Meiji era had at their centre a chairman who was
the main force behind the group. The chairman would hold a majority
of the shares, and members of his family would usually hold the
remaining shares. In post-War Japan, the major zaibatsu were broken
up. They have reformed as groups of companies clustered around one
or two core banks: these new groups are known as the keiretsu
(Jones and Sakong, 1980: 259). A more detailed comparison of the
chaebol and the keiretsu is in Chapter 7.
22. Concentration ratio is defined as the percentage of total industry
sales (or capacity or employment or value added or physical output)
contributed by the largest few firms (usually the top four), ranked
in order of market shares (Scherer, 1980: 56). Jones and Sakong
define business concentration as "the share of a given number of
affiliated enterprises in all markets" (1980: 258).
23. For a detailed description of some of the small Korean work-shops
and factories, see Brandt (1980).
24. For example, the Shinjin Group, which had been slow to change its
activities in the 1970s, was decimated by the government's measures
(Jones and Sakong, 1980: 127-31). In 1985, the failing Kukje Group
was forced into liquidation and was not rescued by the government.
And in 1986 the government forced through a series of mergers of
failing subsidiaries, many of which were in the heavy industries.
CHAPTER SIX
The Acquisition of Technological Capabilities in the
Korean CNC Machine Tool Industry
6.1 Introduction
The early development of the Korean CNC machine tool industry
manifested many of the same processes, and proceeded in many of the same
structures, as Korean manufacturing industry in general. Indeed, the
introduction of CNC marked a particular response by machine tool
producers to changing market requirements within Korea. By the late
1970s, Korean manufacturing industry, and especially the rapidly expanding
vehicle sector, was beginning to import significant numbers of CNC
machines, largely from Japan. First, a large independent firm, and then
several of the chaebol companies, sensed domestic market opportunities in
entering CNC production themselves.
The Korean enterprise may already be regarded as a considerable
success. Indigenous CNC tools are now very widely used by Korean
manufacturing industry and Korea has begun to export these products.
Nevertheless, the learning process is still incomplete. Korean firms have
not as yet acquired the full range of capabilities required for the
design and development of certain types of machines, nor has control
technology been mastered. Thus, the study of the acquisition of
technological capabilities in this area is an assessment of
skills—in—the—making. And, accordingly, it offers the analyst
opportunities to witness and document the exact learning processes
actually used in acquiring technological capabilities, including those that
fail. This chapter analyses how the technological capabilitiy
requirements for that entry were acquired during the late 1970s and
early 1980s by a range of Korean machine tool makers.
Chapter 3 advanced the argument that one could not properly
understand the relative difficulties of acquiring different capabilities
without a detailed knowledge of the technology concerned. That argument
is further developed here. Technical complexity has counted as a major
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obstacle to the acquisition of design skills in the CNC field. Thus, while
many producers have mastered the design of CNC lathes, the greater
complexity of machining centres has so far been incompletely absorbed.
Chapter 2 summarised current views concerning various learning methods,
their cost and their efficiency. The present chapter surveys these
methods in practice. Which learning methods have Korean CNC producers
favoured, and with what consequences? Special attention is paid here to
the role of what has earlier been called "interactive learning", as well
as the transfer of skills by informal and tacit methods, including the
movement of personnel between producers in different countries. The role
of Korean structures in enabling interactive learning to occur is
particularly considered.
The material in this chapter was the result of extensive fieldwork
conducted in Korea by the author during early 1985. (The detailed
methodology of the fieldwork, including the questionnaire submitted to
sample firms, forms Appendix 1.) The study focussed upon a sample of
nine firms engaged in conventional and CNC machine tool manufacture,1 In
accord with generally accepted practice in this area (e.g., Jacobsson,
1986; Fransman, 1986c), firms are identified by code, in this case by
letter: A, B, ... I. These nine were the only firms in Korea which had
entered the production of CNC machine tools by 1985, and, therefore, they
then accounted for the entire national manufacturing capability for CNC
machine tools. The sample firms also represented a very significant
proportion of Korea's total machine tool production and exports. In 1984,
they accounted for 47% of total Korean machine tool production and 64%
of total Korean exports (see Tables 6.2 and 6.3). Both independent and
chaebol firms were represented in the sample: five firms were members of
chaebol while the rest were independent. Data were obtained from these
firms by interview and by questionnaire. Extensive supplementary
interviews were also conducted with academics and staff at research
institutes, industry associations, machine tool users, and non—CNC machine
tool producers. The situation described here is that obtaining in
mid—1985; subsequent developments are summarised in Appendix 2.
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6.2 Origins and Status of the Sample Firms
Chapter 3 noted the symbiotic nature of the transfer of skills and
knowledge between the machine tool industry and the general mechanical
engineering industry. By considering the origins of the firms, an
estimate of their base level of technological capabilities and skills on
entering the machine tool industry can be made. Which of these skills
were transferrable from the firms' original production activity to machine
tool production, and which did firms have to acquire? This section covers
the early development of the sample firms and their present status in the
Korean machine tool industry. It discusses the background of the nine
CNC machine tool producers, their original product area, the time at which
they started to produce both conventional and CNC machine tools, and
their present range of machine tool production.
Also considered are the growth of their machine tool output, other
production activities in the firm, and their reliance on the production of
machine tools. Data are then presented on the firms' production levels,
the proportion of their production in CNC manufacture, and their principal
markets (both domestic and foreign). This provides some comparison of
the relative sizes of the different firms, and their importance as part of
the Korean machine tool industry. Further, it can be established whether
the production of CNC machine tools has become an integral part of each
firm's manufacturing activities or whether it is still only a minor
element of their total output. The relationship between firms and the
government is also examined, and particular attention is paid to the
direct benefits firms have received from government's various incentive
measures.
For the chaebol firms, additional information on the links between
machine tool production and manufacturing activities in other areas, and
the importance of the chaebol's own internal market, are considered.
There are two distinct types of entrants among the chaebol firms, firstly,
those which commenced manufacturing machine tools for the general market,
and, secondly, those which integrated backwards into machine tool
production in order to manufacture their own production equipment. The
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technical development and product strategies of both these types of firm
are heavily influenced by the sectors of industry which form the major
part of their domestic market. In the first type, the main consideration
for the producer is to be competitive on the domestic, and later on the
export, market and to expand its level of production. In the second type
the chief aim of entering is to improve the main company's production
facilities, including its operation, in the manufacture of its main
product. Market forces and competitiveness in the manufacture of machine
tools are therefore more important influences on the strategy of the
first type of firm than on the second.
Firm A
Firm A is part of one of the largest chaebol in Korea. The group as
a whole employed over 150,000 people and had total sales of over US$14
billion in 1985, in which year the group was listed among the top 25 in
Fortune's International 500 (the largest 500 companies outside the US),
and among the top 50 companies in the world (Fortune International, 4
Aug. 1986: 165-91). The group originated as a construction company in
1947, and has expanded to comprise 31 companies with a diversified
product range. The group's present manufacturing activities include
shipbuilding, large construction projects, vehicle and rolling stock
production, and electronics.
In late 1967, a company was established within the group to produce
passenger cars, buses and trucks. This company is now one of the largest
in the group. Machine tool production started in 1978 and is undertaken
within the same company that manufactures vehicles. Production facilities
for machine tool manufacture are on the same large site which also
includes the main vehicle production facilities. The links between car
and machine tool production in this firm are extremely close, and the
largest consumer of the machines produced is the vehicle division itself.
The director of the vehicle division's planning department commented that
his company had followed the example of many Japanese car producers. He
noted that most Japanese car producers manufacture machine tools and
have found that a machine tool capability within the firm made a valuable
216.
contribution to the maintenance and improvement of their vehicle
production plant. Accordingly, his firm had followed that example and
built up its own capabilities in machinery design and production, though
the physical proximity of the two elements is not a particularly Japanese
feature. Since entering the machine tool industry, the firm's output of
machine tools has grown rapidly; between 1981 and 1984 sales of machine
tools increased over four times by value, and more than doubled by
volume. Nevertheless, machine tool sales formed only a very small part,
less than 1%, of the vehicle division's annual turnover of 750 billion won
in 1984.
The range of machine tools produced is directly aimed at the needs
of the car industry. The firm produces transfer machinery, multi-spindle
drilling, tapping, gear hobbing and gear shaping machines, as well as a
number of special purpose machines, which produce specific car
components. These special purpose machines are the most important
products in its machine tool range. Production of CNC machines started in
1983 and the firm now makes two types of machining centre, one
horizontal and one vertical, and for each type there are two sizes. In
mid-1985, a CNC copy mill was added to the range.
Firm B
The group to which this firm belongs started as a trading company
in 1968 and is one of the youngest chaebol in Korea. In 1985 the group
was listed in the top 50 of Fortune's International 500, with annual sales
of nearly US$9 billion and employing over 90,000 people (Fortune
International. 4 Aug. 1986; 165-91). This chaebol has six major areas of
business interest: trade, construction, manufacturing, leisure, shipping,
and finance. In total, there are 29 companies in the group, of which 17
are in the manufacturing sector. These 17 are divided into seven fields
of production: heavy machinery, automotives, shipbuilding and plant
facilities, electronics and telecommunications, chemicals, textiles, and
other light industries (e.g., shoes, handbags, luggage, and sporting goods).
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One of the companies in the heavy machinery division entered
machine tool production in 1976, when it acquired one of the oldest
independent machinery producers in Korea (a producer originally
established in 1937). The firm commenced producing CNC machine tools in
1979, only three years after entering conventional production. The larger
company of which Firm B is a division manufactures diesel engines,
construction equipment, fork-lift trucks, and rolling stock. The company's
major production facilities are situated in Inchon, where the chaebol's
vehicle producing company is also located. Machine tool production takes
place at a factory on the Changwon Machinery Complex, approximately 300
miles away, where some work on the manufacture of aircraft parts is also
done. Between 1975 and 1984, the heavy machinery company invested more
than US$400 million in its production facilities, of which US$44 million
was for the facilities and machinery used in the production of machine
tools (Kang Youngkook, 1984: 4: Jacobsson, 1986: 185). In 1985, machine
tools accounted for 5% of the division's total turnover.
The product range of Firm B includes conventional and CNC lathes,
grinding machines, milling machines, and machining centres. Out of the
nine firms in the study, Firm B has the most comprehensive series of CNC
lathes, producing five different types, four based on the same design but
with variations in the specification: one of these models has a slant bed
rather than a flat bed. The fifth lathe is much larger and of a
different, and more basic, design. This company also produces horizontal
and vertical machining centres, with two different sizes in each type.
Machine tool sales by the firm increased from 10 billion won in
1981 to over 15 billion won in 1984. During this period, unit output
decreased slightly from 900 machines in 1981 to 855 in 1984. However,
the number of CNC machines produced increased considerably, from 78 units
in 1981 to 164 units in 1984. The total unit output decreased for two
reasons. Firstly, the firm moved into the production of higher value
machines, and, secondly, the production of some conventional machine tools
was subcontracted out to several small independent Korean machine tool
producers. Initially, the company only subcontracted component
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manufacturing and sub-assembly work, but it now subcontracts the
production of entire conventional machines.
Firm C
This chaebol firm was originally established in 1959 to produce
rifles and other armaments, and it is still a major defence producer. The
firm is now part of a much larger group with interests in chemicals,
construction materials, ceramics, and food and drink products. This group
is different from the other chaebol as it is part of an international
religious organisation, the Reunification Church (the so—called Moonies).
Firm C completely bought out a West German thread milling machine
producer in 1982, and acquired a 75% holding of a leading German lathe
producer in 1985. This ownership of foreign companies also distinguishes
the firm from others in the sample and from most Korean firms. The
group is fairly small by Korean standards and does not undertake any
heavy engineering production work. While defence work, principally in
small—arms manufacture, remains a large component of this company's
output, it has become a major supplier of car components, both to the
domestic and export markets, and it is expanding its production in this
field. Machine tool production is based at the Changwon Machinery
Complex, along with several other engineering plants in the chaebol. In
1984, 16% of the machinery division's turnover was derived from sales of
metal cutting machine tools. Machine tool sales by the firm amounted to
approximately 15 billion won in 1983 and 17 billion won in 1984.
Firm C started to make machine tools in 1976, producing its first
CNC machine tool in 1980. Its range of machine tool production is very
wide, with a total of about 90 different types and variations, welding
machinery being the most important product area in terms of sales. The
range of CNC machine tools produced includes three sizes of vertical
machining centre (two of the same design), two sizes of horizontal
machining centre, a CNC lathe, and a CNC milling machine. In 1985, the
company was developing CNC gear hobbing, shaping, and shaving machines.
Many of the production machines used in this firm and its associated
divisions were manufactured in-house. However, because of the large
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scale of machine tool output by this firm, the internal market did not
represent a very significant portion of its sales.
Firm D
This firm started bicycle production in 1944, and its main product
areas are now small vans, trucks, vehicle components, and defence
equipment such as artillery and military vehicles. Like Firm C, the
chaebol to which this firm belongs is fairly small by Korean standards.
The company entered car production in the early 1970s, but when the
government reorganised vehicle production in 1979, this firm was excluded
from car production and given a monopoly of small van manufacture. With
the government's mid-1980s plans to de-restrict many sectors of industry,
it was widely predicted that this company would eventually re-enter car
production. (See Appendix 2.) A machinery company was set up as part of
the group in 1976. As well as machine tools, this company produces large
press machinery and special purpose machines for use in the vehicle
industry. Sales of metal cutting machine tools accounted for about 10%
of the machinery division's annual turnover.
In interview, it was stressed that the main business of the chaebol
was vehicle production, and that even though the production of machinery
was not a profitable area for the chaebol, it was maintained to support
its vehicle production. The chaebol is also a considerable defence
producer, and machinery production also supports this part of the
chaebol's manufacturing activities. The machinery division is always
consulted by other parts of the group when they want to establish new
process or production facilities. As part of feasibility studies of new
projects, the machine tool division gives advice on the proposed new
system, and, if it is capable, eventually supplies machinery and equipment
for the project. About 40% of machine tool production is used within the
chaebol. Machine tool production, however, is not based on the same site
as its present vehicle production, but is situated on the Changwon
Complex with some of the defence and other machinery production.
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The company commenced machinery production in 1976 with special
manufacturing machinery. Machine tool production began in 1977 and the
first CNC machine tools were made in 1982. Machine tool sales by this
firm grew rapidly from 134 units sold in 1981 to 215 units in 1983, but
in 1984 unit sales declined to 163. Of the units sold in 1983 and 1984,
9 and 16 units respectively were fitted with CNC controls. As with Firm
A, the range of machine tools produced includes many machines specific to
vehicle and vehicle component production. General purpose machine tools
produced by the firm include conventional milling machines and lathes,
horizontal machining centres, a CNC milling machine, and a CNC lathe.
Firm E
This firm is part of a chaebol specialising in large—scale and very
heavy metal working production. Its manufacturing activities encompass
production of components for rolling stock (including railroad wheels and
bogies), casting and forging, large—scale machining work, and building
large steel structures. The group grew from a heavy industrial and
forging shop founded in 1937, and is therefore one of the few groups in
Korea which originated during Japanese colonisation. The group
established a machinery plant at Changwon in 1975 for the production of
many types of heavy equipment, and began to produce machine tools there
in 1976. As a whole, the group experienced considerable financial
difficulties during the late 1970s and was placed under the direct
financial control of the Korea Development Bank in 1981. When the firm
was visited, personnel thought that there was a high probability that
several divisions of the company, including machine tool production, would
be taken over by another chaebol. (See Appendix 2.)
In 1985, the firm was producing a range of high-speed precision
lathes, including a very heavy—duty lathe, milling machines, boring
machines, a CNC lathe, and two types of CNC milling machine. As most of
the machinery used by the group is extremely large, very few of the
machine tools manufactured by this firm are used within the group. The
interviewee estimated that, since entering machine tool production, the
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firm had manufactured about 2,000 machines, and of this total he thought
that less than 30 had been used within the chaebol.
Firm F
This firm originally produced valves, other casting work, and
machinery used for the production of coal briquettes. Machine tool
production started in 1960, and the firm has become the largest Korean
machine tool producer. While machine tools are Firm F's major area of
production, with sales accounting for 95% of annual turnover, it still
produces and sells some castings and gears. The origins of the firm are
in Kwang Ju (S. W. Korea), and the majority of machine tool production
still takes place at this plant, although it established a new production
plant in the Changwon Complex in the late 1970s. In the future, the firm
plans to divide production so that the Kwang Ju plant will specialise in
the production of lathes and the Changwon plant in the production of
milling machines and machining centres.
The firm produces a comprehensive range of both conventional and
CNC machine tools. CNC production includes several different lathes, one
with foui—axis control, a machining centre, milling machines, and a copy
milling machine. Firm F has also supplied lines of machine tools to the
Korean vehicle industry. In 1981, it sold machine tools with a total
value of 12 billion won, and in 1984, 18 billion won, with the, majority of
this growth taking place between 1983 and 1984.
Firms Q, H and I
The remaining three firms are all fairly small independent firms
with similar origins and outputs. Firm G, based in Taejon (Central Korea),
was originally established as a foundry in the late 1940s and started to
produce machine tools in 1950. Machine tools are now the firm's main
product, although it still does some sub—contracted foundry work for
other companies. The present range of machine tools includes
conventional milling machines, lathes, and one CNC milling machine (which
it started producing in 1983).
Firm H was established as a spin off from Firm G, in 1968, when the
founder and present chief executive left that firm, where he was employed
as a core design engineer, to start up his own business. Many of the
other employees in this firm also previously worked for Firm G. In 1977,
the firm moved from its original site in Taejon into a small local
industrial complex. The new plant is about five times larger than the
old one, and there was considerable investment, using special loans, in
imported machinery for the new plant. Unfortunately, data on the increase
in the value of output and sales by this firm in the 1980s are
unavailable, but the firm's growth during this period is indicated by the
increase in the number of employees. In 1981, Firm H had a total of 70
employees, rising to 90 in 1982, 120 in 1983, and 160 in 1984. The
workforce, therefore, more than doubled during this period, and it is
highly probable that output kept pace. The firm was established to
produce milling machines, and this is still its major product. The
production range centres around a large heavy—duty milling machine, and
in 1983 the firm started to produce a CNC version of this machine. The
firm has built a foundry on its new site, and, as well as casting its own
beds, it undertakes some casting work for a local EDM producer.
Firm I was established in 1945 and began to produce machine tools
in 1965. The firm has become a large subcontractor for Firm B,
manufacturing complete conventional machine tools which are then sold by
Firm B under its own brand name. Of Firm I's total production of 695
units in 1984, about 300 machines were for Firm B. The firm commenced
production of a CNC lathe in 1978, and, like the other two independent
firms, has not yet added to its CNC production. In conventional
production, the firm manufactured lathes, shaping machines, milling
machines, and some printing and paper cutting machines. Machine tools
were their most important products. In 1982, the firm's annual production
of machine tools amounted to 2.3 billion won; in 1983, this declined to
2.1 billion won and then rose again in 1984 to 3.7 billion won.
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Discussion of Sample Firms' Development
Table 6.1 summarises the basic characteristics of the sample firms,
including details of the firms' origins, the dates at which they commenced
conventional and CNC machine tool production, their main machinery product
sector, and, in the case of the chaebol firms, the major products of the
company or division to which the firm is allied, and the importance to the
firm of the chaebol internal market. This discussion analyses the firms'
similarities and differences and the reasons why they entered the
industry. The direct effects of the government's promotion of the
industry are also treated.
Among the sample firms, a clear division can be made between recent
entrants to machine tool production, all chaebol, and older firms, all-
independents. The previous chapter noted chaebol entry to many of the
industries promoted by government during the 1970s and early 1980s. Yet
the first firms to start experimenting with CNC development were two of
the older independent firms: Firm F in 1977 and Firm I in 1978-79. The
chaebol firms all commenced CNC production in the early 1980s. In the
case of Firm B, this was only after three years of machine tool
manufacturing; the other chaebol firms had marginally greater experience
of conventional production, typically five years.
On entering the machine tool industry, all the firms had previous
experience of operating machine tools, and, in the case of two small
firms, experience in the production of other types of machinery. Two
firms (B and H) obtained practical skills and experience of machine tool
production through other companies. In the case of Firm B, the heavy
machinery division bought an old independent machine tool company, which
was in great financial difficulties at the time, and the original
equipment from this plant and many of its personnel formed the basis of
the new machine tool firm. In the case of Firm H. the founder of the
firm had been a core designer at Firm G. and had acquired considerable
experience and knowledge of the industry before setting up his own firm.
Many of the other new employees also came from Firm G, and therefore
were experienced in the skills required by this industry.
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There are two broad types of product strategies represented among
the sample firms: those specialising in the manufacture of special
purpose and highly end-use orientated types of machines, and those
principally manufacturing standard types of general purpose machine tools.
All the independent firms are in the latter group, although Firm F does
manufacture some specialised machine tools and lines of machine tools,
principally for the car industry but also for mould producers. Two firms
in the first category are the main vehicle producers (A and D), which
manufacture special purpose machinery, mainly for use within their own
vehicle plants or by their subcontractors. For these two firms, the
internal chaebol market is large, while for the other non-specialising
chaebol firms, the internal market for their products is less important.
Although Chaebol B is a major car producer, its car and machine tool
production units are in different divisions within the chaebol and there
are few links between the two. The reasons for this separation are not
clear. However, this car producer is different from the other two vehicle
producers as it is a joint venture with General Motors. Kim Young Woo
has compared car production in Chaebols A and B, and noted that B's
joint—venture vehicle production imported the design of the cars it
manufactured, and its localisation ratio was low, while A had initially
licensed production, subsequently developed its own models, and raised its
localisation rates <1981: 26-28). It may be that the car division in
Chaebol B had in the past similarly procured the majority of its
production machinery through its foreign parent company, or that its
production equipment was specified by the parent with the design of the
vehicles they manufacture.
Government Promotion
All the sample chaebol firms began machine tool production between
1976 and 1978. Almost all of these firms entered the industry in
response to strong government promotion, and the influence of government
was often referred to by interviewees. In all but one case (A), the new
chaebol firms established their production facilities in the
government-promoted and financed machinery complex at Changwon, and, as
J
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such, benefitted from a range of government incentives. In the case of
Firm B, the importance of government policy on the chaebol's decision to
enter the industry is clearly indicated in a recent company brochure,
which states that "[flollowing government directives to develop the heavy
industries in the early and mid 70s, [we] poured massive investments into
the machine tool industry". In a similar vein, the chairman and founder
of the whole chaebol clearly acknowledged the force of government policy
in the 1970s and early 1980s, observing that when "the government tells
you that it's your duty and you have to do it, even if there's no profit"
(Charters, 1984).2 Responding to the government's encouragement of the
heavy machinery industries, this firm invested over US$400 million in new
production facilities in its heavy machinery division alone (further large
investments were made by the group in other promoted sectors, such as
shipbuilding). This type of investment by the chaebol was considerably
subsidised by the government's provision of low—interest loans through
the NIF. In interviews with Firms C and E, personnel also stated that a
major factor influencing their entry at this time was government promotion
of the industry, and, although no figures are available, these firms were
also given considerable government backing through special loans and
incentive measures. For example, Firm C was designated by the government
as a "Manufacturer of Machine Tools" in 1978, and this then ensured the
firm's access to government incentive measures.
For vehicle producing firms (A and D), the need to support their own
production facilities was cited as a more important factor in their
decision to enter the industry than promotion by the government. Firm D
did, however, take advantage of government incentives to companies
setting up in the Changwon Complex, while Firm A established its
production facilities on the same site as its main vehicle plant. Thus,
these firms' entry in support of vehicle production distinguishes them
from the rest of the sample: their production range is aimed directly at
supplying their own production machines, and their internal market for
machine tools is the most important consideration.
The direct influence of government policy on the smaller independent
machine tool firms was also acknowledged by two of the sample companies
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(F and H). These firms expanded considerably during the late 1970s, with
financial support from the government. Firm F established a new
production facility in the Changwon Complex, created a centre for
technical research at its original plant, concentrated more on product
design, introduced some new models, and invested heavily in new imported
production equipment. Jacobsson (1986: 189) notes that this firm received
government financing of between US$5 million and US$10 million to
undertake this expansion. Firm F also received several accolades from
various governmental bodies for its industrial merit: these included being
chosen as a "Quality Control Company" by the Ministry of Trade and
Industry in 1975, a Saemaul Service Award for Exports in 1977, and
appointment as a "First Grade Quality Control Factory" by the Industrial
Advancement Administration in 1983. Firm H expanded rapidly after its
move to a new larger site on the local industrial estate, and several
Japanese machines were imported in 1977, with the use of government
subsidised loans, to improve production facilities. This firm was
selected by the Ministry of Trade and Industry as a "Specialised Machine
Company in Metal Cutting Machine Tools" and was designated as a
"Manufacturer of Export Products" in the late 1970s. The managing
director stressed that his firm had been helped by government policies to
promote the machinery industry and had also benefitted from their more
recent policy to promote small and medium firms. The awards of the
numerous accolades to both firms had tangible consequences: it meant that
they had easier access to the various government schemes, and were
consequently able to receive more government financial and technical
support.
In contrast, the interviewee at Firm G stated that his firm was
aware of the government's promotion of the industry, but it had received
very little help. Although the firm had tried to obtain financial support
through various government schemes, it had experienced great difficulties
in the application process. The interviewee implied that the actual
accessibility to the government's funding was very difficult. The
remaining independent firm (I) suggested that the major help it had
received from the government had not been from incentive schemes, but
from various programmes run to help develop technical skills within the
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firm. Only one of the chaebol firms (D) commented on the greater
government promotion of the small and medium firms in the 1980s. This
firm suggested that it had been discouraged from entering product areas
which were more suited to production by smaller firms, such as small
presses and small, basic machine tools. But in the production of larger
machines, the firm was free to develop whatever products it wanted.
Thus, one undeniable outcome of government promotion was the entry
of the chaebol firms into the machine tool industry, a consequence of the
fact that chaebol firms were the major target of government
encouragements. In some cases chaebol entry was an indirect effect of
government promotion, which directly stimulated vehicle production.
Independent firms were less important in the government's promotion
strategy in the late 1970s, but, notably, more technically advanced and
larger independent firms were significant beneficiaries of government
encouragement.
Summary
Several different types of firms have been identified, each with
different machine tool production strategies. The firms can be initially
divided into two groups: those which are members of various chaebol (A-E)
and those which are independent (F-I). Moreover, there are two types of
chaebol firms: those firms which entered the machine tool industry with
the specific aim of manufacturing and maintaining their own production
equipment, and those which entered to supply the general machine tool
market. These two types of chaebol firms have very different production
strategies, the first group concentrating on special purpose machinery and
the second specialising in general purpose machine tools. Of the
independent firms, Firm F is different from the rest as it is far larger
than the other three firms and has a very large production range.
Government incentives to the industry were significant for the chaebol
firms as well as for two of the independent firms.
The most notable feature of the sample firms' history is the means
by which all of them — chaebol or independent, large or small — acquired
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their base of skills in this area. Without exception, all firms gained
knowledge of the operation, repair and maintenance of machine tools as
users before they entered production themselves. These skills were
invaluable in the translation from machine tool using to making, providing
a capability base upon which new skills might be built up.
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6.3 Levels of Production of Conventional and CNC Machine Tools
Changes in the level of output during the 1980s for several of the
sample firms have already been noted. In two cases (Firms E and G), no
information on growth or contraction in production was available.
However, in both of these cases there was probably very little growth, if
any, as they both were experiencing financial difficulties. All of the
other firms grew during the period between 1981 and 1984. Table 6.2
shows the value of machine tools and parts, as well as general purpose
metal working machine tools, produced by each of the sample firms in
1984. The metal working machine tool figures are broken down into CNC
and conventional categories. The firms vary to a great extent in the
scale of their production and in the proportion of their output devoted
to the manufacture of the three major types of general purpose machine
tools considered in this study (lathes, milling machines, and machining
centres). Firms B, C and F are the three largest producers in the sample
and in Korea. Combined, the value of their production amounted to over
50 billion won, representing over 70% of the total sample value and over
30% of overall Korean production in 1984. For all three of these firms,
production is principally concentrated in the manufacture of general
purpose machine tools; in each case over 80% of the value of total
production came from the manufacture of the three types of standard
metal cutting machine tools considered here. These three firms were also
dominant in the production of CNC machine tools, manufacturing over 80%
of total output.
The other six firms are all fairly small producers in comparison to
the "big three", with annual value of production ranging from 1.6 billion
to 5.1 billion won. Of these six firms, three (G, H and I) are independent
firms whose principal product area is in the manufacture of general
purpose metal cutting machines. The other three firms (A, D and E> are
all part of different chaebols. These firms differ from the rest of the
sample as they do not specialise in the production of general purpose
metal cutting machine tools. In Firm E, a large proportion of total
machine tool and parts production (over 50%) is in the manufacture of
boring machines, grinding machines, and rollers. It has been noted in the
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cases of Firms A and D that their production strategies were directly
geared towards manufacturing equipment. In both these firms, special
purpose machines account for a high proportion of output.
Table 6.2 Production of Machine Tools by Sample Firms in 198A
(in billion won; units in parenthesis)
Firm Total Metal Cutting Conventional CNC
Production* Production6
ft 4,4 (not known) (not known) 0,3C
(2)
B 15,7 12,7 4,0 8,7
(715) (491) (224)
C 15,1 14,4 9.9 4,5
(2,225) (2,141) (34)
D 4,4 2,7 1,9 0,8
(146) (133) (13)
E 5,1 2,6 2,3 0,3
(356) (332) (24)
F 20,6 18,2 14,8 3,4
(2,169) (2,106) (63)
S 2,5 2,4 2,0 0,4
(291) (277) (14)
H 1,6 1,6 1,5 0,1
(224) (222) (2)






a, Includes production of all types of machine tools and machine parts/components,
b, Metal cutting production includes only the production of lathes, milling machines,
and machining centres (drilling, boring, hobbing, and gear cutting machines were
excluded),
c, Machining centres only; see text below,
Source; Firm data and Machine Tool, 1985, No,9; 114-24,
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Although the exact figures for the production of general metal
cutting machines by Firm A are not available, circumstantial evidence
suggests that this comprises only a small proportion of its general
machine tool output, In 1984, this firm manufactured special purpose
machinery to a value of 1.6 billion won, "other metal cutting machines"
(i.e., of non-standard type) worth 1 billion won, and hobbing, drilling and
gear shaping machines worth 1.4 billion won (Machine Tool, 1985, No. 9:
118-23). Thus, of this firm's total machinery output, 60% was in special
purpose or unusual types of machine and a further 30% was in the
manufacture of more general metal cutting machines not covered in detail
in this study, Therefore, the two machining centres manufactured in 1984
probably represent the firm's sole production of the specific types of
machines under consideration.
Production data for the general purpose machines made by each firm
are broken down in Table 6.2 to show the quantity of conventional and CNC
machines of this type. In eight of the firms, the production of
conventional machines accounted for the majority of their sales. For
these firms, the proportion of output by value represented by CNC
machines ranged from 6% to 31%, with an average of 20%. Only in Firm B
was the majority of production, 69% by value, in CNC machine tools. As
the unit value of CNC machines is much higher than the average unit value
of conventional machines, it is not surprising that, when expressed in
terms of units, the proportion of CNC machines to total production is
extremely low. In eight of the nine firms the proportion was less than
10%, with an average of only 5%.
Growing proportions of CNC production indicate that a firm has
absorbed the intricacies of the new technology and organised its
production for this new product area. Further, the transition from
dependence on conventional production to CNC manufacturing, and the scale
of CNC production, reveals a firm's ability to compete with its new
product in the marketplace. While only one of the sample firms in 1985
had achieved a transition to CNC concentration, it would, however, be a
mistake to imply that only this one has successfully entered CNC
production. Two of the firms (C and F) produce a significant number of
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CNC machines each year <84 and 63 respectively), and four others (D, E, G
and I) have obviously progressed further than the manufacture of single
"one-off" prototype or experimental CNC machines, with production levels
of 13, 24, 14 and 15 units per annum, respectively. For the remaining
two firms (A and H), CNC production was very low indeed and provided
these firms with few sales.
Finally, scale in itself is an important measure, since increases in
the scale of production can, as the career of the Japanese machine tool
industry has adequately demonstrated, improve cost competitiveness.
Jacobsson suggests that production of over 100 CNC lathes a year gives
manufacturers a large proportion of cost advantages available to them
through economies of scale, while output of between 500-700 will give
them all the available cost reductions (1986: 100). In the production of
milling machines and machining centres, scale economies may be achieved
at slightly lower levels of production, due to higher levels of value
added in their manufacture. Only in the leading three firms is it likely
that any economies of scale in production are being achieved either from
production methods used within the factory or the bulk purchase of
components. But as CNC production in each of these firms is spread over
different types of CNC machines, any cost savings through scale economies
are probably very small.
Major Markets for Sample Firms
What is the market for machine tools produced by these firms?
Specifically, what is the relative importance of domestic and foreign
markets? Table 6.3 shows the value of machine tools exported by sample
firms in 1983 and 1984 and the approximate proportions of total machine
tool production and CNC machine tool production exported.
Of the sample firms, only one (A) had no exports or experience of
exports up to 1985; all the other firms exported at some level. The
combined exports of the rest of the sample form a highly significant
proportion of total Korean machine tool exports, accounting for 71% and
64% of total Korean exports in 1983 and 1984 respectively. Approximately
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90% of the sample's exports are accounted for by just four firms (B, C, F
and I), of which C is the dominant exporter, this firm alone accounting
for over a quarter of Korea's total exports.
Table 6.3 Exports of Machine Tools bv Sample Finis
Firm Exports Xage of Kage of CNC
1983 1984 production production
















a, This firm does export CNC machines, but proportion is
unknown,

















These data also give an indication of the export orientation of each
firm. Thus, Firm C is more export orientated than the other firms,
exporting 60% of its total machine tool production. Several other firms
(B, E, H, and I) exported a significant proportion of their total
production, between 30% and 40%. Of the remaining firms (D, F and G),
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exports form only a minor part, less than 10%, of total sales. In the
case of Firm F, however, because its overall production level is very
high, this small percentage amounts to a large absolute export value.
Firm F concentrates principally on the domestic market and estimates that
it had a 35% share (by value) of the domestic market.
Only two firms (B and C) have successfully entered the world market
for CNC machine tools. They lead in absolute value of exports, as well as
in the proportion of their machine tool output sold abroad - 70% of Firm
C's and 35% of Firm B's (by value) being sold abroad. For all the other
firms, CNC machine tools are either not exported or account for only a
very small proportion of their CNC production. The numbers of CNC
machines exported by these firms were in single figures. Although the
proportion of CNC machines exported by Firm F was not available, the
interview established that a few CNC machine tools had in fact been
exported.
As a whole, exports of the sample firms were directed towards
markets in industrialised countries, rather than those of developing
countries and other NICs. For most of the exporting firms, the major
overseas markets are in the US, Japan, Canada, and, to a lesser extent,
Europe. Taken together, the markets of these industrialised countries
accounted for about 80% of machines exported by the sample firms. The
major markets for the remaining 20% of exports are in Southeast and East
Asia, Malaysia and Indonesia being the principal customers. For only one
firm in the sample was this pattern reversed. 90% of Firm H's exports
went to Southeast and East Asia, while only 10% went to developed
countries.
The three largest exporting firms have established a number of
overseas offices to sell and distribute their products. Chaebol C has a
large number of overseas offices, of which three, in the US, Japan, and
West Germany, are closely linked to Firm C and were especially established
for the sale of its machinery products. Firm B has established two
overseas offices, one in the US and one in West Germany. These were set
up primarily to service sales of CNC lathes, machining centres, and
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robots. Firm F has similarly established its own marketing network in
the US. The other exporting firms, and Firms B, C and F in countries
where they have no offices, appoint specialist machine tool distributors
or agents.
The Korean Domestic Market
Interviews and questionnaires were concerned to establish the
importance of the domestic market to each of the producers, and, in
particular, to determine what their clients' major products were. For all
the chaebol firms and for Firm F, the major domestic buyers were the
automobile industry and manufacturers of components for this industry.
And all the firms anticipated that these two industries would remain as
their major market in the forseeable future. In the case of Firm F, sales
to one particular domestic vehicle producer had amounted to approximately
5 billion won over the previous two years, about 15% of total production,
including the installation of a new automatic line consisting of 25 CNC
lathes. In 1985, Firm F had submitted a tender to the vehicle plant for
a new 50—unit line. Several firms noted that die and mould producers
supplying the plastics industry were important buyers of milling machines
and machining centres.
For the two vehicle producers (A and D), internal demand is
obviously very important, as their major motive for entering production
was to support their own production facilities, and, as noted above, many
of their products are specific to vehicle and vehicle component
production. A large number of Firm A's machines are sold to
subcontractors producing components for vehicle production and are
closely linked to the chaebol. A director of the division estimated that
the machine tool division had supplied machines to about 300 different
subcontractors in this way.
Firm B differs from Firms A and D, because, although vehicle
production is undertaken within the chaebol, only a small proportion of
its production (about 10%) is utilised within the chaebol and only part of
this is used within the vehicle producing division. In the main, the
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products of this firm are of a more general purpose type and are not
specific to the vehicle industry. One director of the division
incorporating Firm B predicted that, with the introduction of FMS in many
production areas of the group, internal demand for the products of the
machine tool firm and its services would increase. Like Firm B, the
internal chaebol markets for Firms C and E were not considered to be
large, As the production work undertaken by Firm E in other parts of
the group is of a very heavy nature, the machine tools it produces cannot
be used internally, and, consequently, internal demand is negligible. Many
of Firm C's own machines are used within its own factory; it does produce
special purpose machines in—house when it needs them, but, relative to
overall production, this internal demand is low, probably less than 5%.
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6.4 The Development of Indigenous Technological Capabilities
How, and with what success, have CNC machine tool capabilities been
acquired by the sample firms? Chapter 2 analysed the range of learning
methods that can be used in building up indigenous technological
capabilities in general, e.g., learning by adapting, learning by copying,
learning by searching, learning by hiring, learning by supplying, and,
finally, what has been called interactive learning. Which of these
methods were used by sample firms, and with what consequences? The case
study permits an assessment to be made of the relative importance of
different learning techniques at different stages of development. This
analysis also allows an examination of the different areas of capabilities
which have been most difficult for the firms to acquire, and which were,
therefore, the highest technical barriers to entry.
Four main sectors of technological capabilities and skills are
considered: design, interfacing, production and assembly, and R&D.
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 emphasised the great importance of acquiring an
indigenous design capability: <i) to supply the domestic market with the
production machinery it requires and to be able to tailor this machinery
to specific domestic needs, and (ii) to remain competitive on the
international market. Thus, the major part of this section is devoted to
examining the acquisition of design skills. In analysing the acquisition
of this capability, entry by each firm into the production of CNC machine
tools and its subsequent development in the design and manufacture of
CNC machines are considered individually. The proportion of custom design
work undertaken by each of the firms is also treated here. Following
sections consider the firms' overall experiences in acquiring interfacing
and production and assembly skills, and the establishment of R&D
facilities by two of the large firms is specially analysed.
6.4.1 Design Capabilities
In order to build up a picture of the development of CNC machine
tool design capabilities in each firm, the origins of designs used by the
firms have to be considered. Where did the design of each firm's first
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CNC machine tool come from? What was the nature of subsequent CNC
machine tool design undertaken? What assistance did firms receive from
outside bodies? How much custom design work is undertaken? This type
of work is undertaken by the firms either to adapt or produce machines
which are specific to a certain process or production requirement. The
indigenisation of these skills is, therefore, important to all domestic
machine tool users as it can greatly influence the costs of specialised
machinery and improve the productivity of machinery available on the
domestic market.
Chapter 3 discussed two basic types of CNC machine tool design:
retro-fitted machines, which are conventional machine tools that have
been adapted to take CNC controls, and new machines which have been
specially designed for CNC control. That chapter also considered
alterations to configurations of machine tools following an increase in
the range of functions that could be controlled by the control unit.
These alterations resulted in new types of machine: the four-axis lathe,
the slant bed lathe, and the machining centre. These machines are more
complex in design than CNC lathes or milling machines. CNC machine
design can therefore be divided into three categories: retro-fitted
machines, basic CNC machines, and complex CNC machines. The depth of
technological and design capabilities required to produce and design these
different types increases through the three levels of design complexity.
In the subsequent analysis of the designs produced by each firm, the type
of design is clearly indicated in order to assess the complexity of
design work being undertaken by the firm. Jacobsson's typology of CNC
lathe design broadly categorises design types by age, i.e., "very old",
"old", and "modern" (1986: 105-07). That typology needs to be refined on
a more technical basis. While it is true that retro-fits were the first
type of NC machines to be produced, followed by basic and complex
machines, the progression may also be seen as a feature of the learning
process. By breaking down the different machines into their relative
complexities, it is possible to show the extent to which an understanding
of the operating principles of each type of machine has been absorbed.
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Firm A
This firm used a licensing agreement for the development of its
first CNC machine tool, a machining centre, and has also used licensing
agreements to manufacture a new hobbing machine and a new special
purpose machine. All these agreements were with Japanese companies. In
each of the licensing agreements, the firm insisted that some training at
the licensee's plant be included. Consequently, many of the firm's design
engineers have had between three and six months training in a Japanese
plant. The interviewee observed that the major benefit of using licensing
agreements derived from that training, as it enabled the firm to acquire
highly skilled personnel within a short time.
Although this firm has not designed its own CNC machine tools, its
design department has developed special purpose machine tools for use in
its own car plant and by its subcontractors. Indeed, this is a major
element of the design work undertaken by the firm, and almost a quarter
of the personnel in the design department work full-time in this area. A
second important area of work of the machine design department is the
improvement of productivity and quality control. As productivity
improvements in the manufacture of vehicles is an important goal in this
firm, the interviewee stressed that a main design requirement is to keep
machinery as simple as possible. The firm had found that greater
sophistication in its machinery often decreased operating speed, while
simplicity enhanced versatility of use. Thus, while this firm does not
have much experience in the design of complex CNC machine tools, design
capabilities within the firm are high, and are principally directed
towards the development of machinery for specific requirements and for
improving the productivity of car production.
Firm B
Although this firm entered the machine tool industry by taking over
an established producer, its first machine tool (a conventional lathe) was
produced under a licensing agreement with a Japanese company. Its first
CNC machine, a basic engine lathe retro-fitted with controls, was built in
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1979 and was developed within the firm. This machine was very basic but
unreliable in operation, and, consequently, was not commercially viable.
Following this initial attempt, the firm designed and produced various new
CNC lathes: all these machines were of a basic design, but were not
simple retro-fits. Jacobsson (1986: 185) documents this firm's production
of a total of six different designs of basic CNC lathes between 1980 and
1982, of which only the last was manufactured and sold in significant
numbers (approximately 140 units). Although no formal technology
agreements were entered into by the firm to acquire this design, the
design team principally copied a Japanese CNC lathe, but fitted their
machine with a lower powered motor.
At the end of 1982, the design department commenced a new project
to develop a series of CNC lathes. The project was completed in 1984,
and there are four lathes of complex design, including one with a slant
bed. A small, simple robotic arm, which could be attached to the CNC
lathes to undertake material handling operations, had also been developed
and produced in small numbers. The firm continued to produce a fifth
model of CNC lathe, using one of its earlier designs. Although this
machine is of a basic design, it is much larger and of heavier duty, thus
complementing the other lathes in the series. This range of lathes has
been fairly successful, accounting for the majority of CNC machines
produced in 1984 and 1985, and machines from this range are also the
firm's principal CNC exports.
Entry into the production of machining centres followed the firm's
CNC lathe developments. The first machining centre (horizontal) was
produced under licence from a Japanese company in 1980. A second foreign
technology agreement for a horizontal machining centre was entered into
in May 1983, again with a Japanese company. Instead of using a licensing
agreement, a co-production agreement was used here, since the firm felt
that there would be fewer restrictions on alterations to the machine and
on its export. Having used the co-production agreement for two years,
the firm wanted to renegotiate to make it a standard licensing agreement.
The reasoning behind this seemingly backward step was the firm's belief
that it had been given none of the details of the machine design or its
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control unit, and, by entering a licensing agreement, it would learn more
about the principles behind the design. Also in 1983, a new licensing
agreement for a vertical machining centre was negotiated, this time with
a West German company. Firm B has also entered into other licensing
agreements with Japanese firms to produce a tool grinder and a boring
machine. While the firm is expanding its product range, it does not
produce any special purpose machinery and the proportion of custom design
work it undertakes is minimal.
Firm B has thus followed two different strategies in the design of
its CNC machine tools, having used indigenous designs for its CNC lathes
and foreign technology agreements to produce machining centres. And
while the firm has indigenised the design capabilities required to develop
new and complex CNC lathes, it does not yet have the capabilities
independently to design machining centres. Jacobsson (1985: 186)
suggests that these two different strategies were followed because the
firm felt unable to stay at the international frontier for both products,
and therefore concentrated its own design efforts on the development of
CNC lathes. While this suggestion is plausible, it does not adequately
take into account the greater complexities of designing machining centres
compared to CNC lathes.
Firm C
This firm has many foreign links, and it therefore has had a
substantial input of foreign technology, particularly in the form of
foreign experts working in the Korean plant.3 The majority of these
foreign workers are located in the firm's design and development office.
It entered into a joint project with a Japanese firm to produce its first
machining centre in 1981. In 1982 the firm acquired a West German
machine tool company and used the German designs for two horizontal
machining centres it started to produce in 1983. The design group in
Korea, a combination of Korean and foreign engineers, has also designed
three machining centres, two of which are of the same design but of
different sizes. All five machining centres have high—powered spindle
motors, between 15 and 22 kW, and there must be ample rigidity in the
243.
design and construction of the machine to take these large motors. A
retro-fitted milling machine, with a small (3.7 kW) spindle motor, was an
early development by the firm's design group and is still manufactured.
In 1985, Firm C produced only one type of CNC lathe, using its own
design, again with fairly large motor power (18.5 KW). At the same time,
the firm acquired a 75% holding in another West German producer. It is
highly probable that designs, and design skills, will be transferred from
the German to the Korean company, in order to upgrade its lathe
production, just as machining centre technology was transferred from its
other German subsidiary. Firm C was then also manufacturing prototypes
of its internally designed gear shaping, gear hobbing, and gear shaving
machines, all with CNC controls. Again, these machines were being
designed in—house, with considerable design input from the firm's foreign
employees. These were the first of these types of CNC machines to be
designed and produced in Korea. The design group also undertakes a
considerable amount of custom design work, principally developing special
purpose machines, which are becoming an important feature of the firm's
output. The interviewee estimated that approximately 30% to 40% of
design work was in the development of special purpose machinery.
This firm has considerable capabilities in the design and
development of standard and complex CNC machine tools. In the main,
these capabilities have been built up through buying in foreign
technology by two means: firstly, by employing highly skilled and
experienced foreign engineers; secondly, by acquiring foreign enterprises
and transferring skills from the foreign firm. These foreign technology
inputs are acknowledged by the firm's executive president:
As a result of the early introduction of modern technology
from the United States, the United Kingdom, West Germany
and Japan, ... [we have] the experience, the facilities and




This firm has very close connections with a Japanese company from
which they have licensed several different machine tool designs. In the
firm's initial manufacture of conventional machine tools, it produced
milling machines, grinding machines, and a turret lathe under licence from
this Japanese firm. These licences incorporated all production details
required for the manufacture of the machines. In addition, under the
agreement, the Japanese firm sent an engineer to work in the Korean
factory in order to train Korean personnel in all areas of production —
"from the bottom to the top" (interview with Japanese licensor). Although
the licence for the milling machine is no longer in operation, the firm
still sells them under an amalgamated name of the Korean and Japanese
companies. The design of this machine was developed using the originally
licensed design as a guide, but the firm wanted to retain the Japanese
image, considering that under the joint name the machine had more
"credibility" on the domestic market.
Before entering CNC machine production, Firm D bought several
foreign CNC machines for in—house study. It also sought information on
the operation and production of CNC machines from KIST and on the control
unit from Fanuc. The firm's first CNC machine, a milling machine, was
produced at the end of 1981 using an indigenously developed design.
Although this machine was not a retro-fit or an exact copy of a foreign
machine, the basic design of its milling machine was altered to take CNC
controls, and the foreign machines on the shop floor were an important
source of additional operational and technical information. A second CNC
milling machine was similarly developed in 1982. In 1983, the firm
entered into a collaborative project with KIST, and a machining centre was
jointly developed. Less than ten units of this model were produced and
they were all sold to another chaebol.
It was only after these machines had been developed and produced
that the firm entered into licensing agreements to acquire the designs of
a machining centre and a CNC lathe. (In the firm's sales literature this
lathe is referred to as a turning centre, but it is a fairly standard
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two-axis CNC lathe, with no additional controlled features.) Both these
agreements were with the same Japanese firm from which the licences for
the conventional machines were obtained. Like the licences for
conventional machines, these agreements included the total specifications
of the machines, all the design information, as well as information on the
production process. The inclusion of production technology was an
important input for the firm, as it has greatly helped its build up of
internal capabilities and improved the quality of its products.
Subsequent to this licensing agreement, the firm upgraded the horizontal
machining centre it developed with KIST, and now produces about 40 units
a year of this model. The firm has also continued to maintain close, but
informal, links with its Japanese licensor.
A high proportion of this firm's production is in special purpose
machine tools, and about half of its design work is devoted to custom
design. Indeed, this is an area in which the firm has considerable skills.
Since the firm first started to work with CNC machine tools in 1981, it
has built on its base of design skills and is capable of developing its
own basic CNC designs. The firm has received considerable help in its
acquisition of the skills required to design more complex CNC machine
tools. While it has utilised the knowledge it acquired through a
licensing agreement to improve an existing machining centre design, the
firm would probably have many difficulties if it wanted to develop an
entirely new model of machining centre, as it would almost certainly have
in designing a complex CNC lathe. The firm lacks design experience at
the relevant level, and because the main design emphasis is on special
purpose and customised machines, the number of designers able to work on
such a project are small.
Firm E
Firm E started to produce machine tools in 1976 using several
licensing agreements with Japanese companies in the production of milling
machines, boring machines, and lathes. The licences included drawings,
process plans, working diagrams, and the supply of some basic raw
materials. These agreements contributed to the early accumulation of
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technical knowledge amd design capability within the firm. The first CNC
machine, a milling machine, was produced in 1981 using skills built up
within the firm since 1976. A machining centre was developed in
collaboration with KIST in 1982-83 as part of a national project, and was
mainly government funded. However, since the firm could not find a
market for it, this machine was never produced commercially. The firm
has also designed and produced a very basic CNC engine lathe, with
technical help from the Japanese licensor of the original conventional
lathe. This machine is simple, low—powered, and cheap, selling for about
half the price of most CNC lathes on the Korean market.
The firm has also designed the body of a CNC milling machine in
collaboration with a Japanese company. The machine bodies are
manufactured by the firm in Korea and exported to the Japanese company,
which then fits the controls and sells them under its own name. Although
it is now fairly common practice in the machine tool industry for the
more laboui—intensive, mechanical body to be subcontracted by firms in
high—wage countries to producers in lower—wage countries, it is
interesting that in this case some of the design work was also contracted
out to the Korean firm. While this firm has adequate skills to undertake
the design of both a basic CNC milling machine and a simple retro-fitted
lathe, it does not yet have the skills required to design more complex
CNC machines, nor does it have much experience in custom design, as only
a very small amount (less than 10%) of its design output is in this field.
Firm F
The first CNC lathe built by Firm F in early 1976 was also the first
CNC machine tool developed in Korea and the first collaborative project to
design a CNC machine that KIST entered into. The machine tool body (a
conventional lathe) was built by Firm F and then retro-fitted with a
steppa motor and a control unit by researchers at KIST, who also
undertook some basic design alterations. A working proto-type of the
new machine was fabricated by December 1976. This lathe was purely for
development and experimentation purposes and was never produced in
quantity. In 1977, a second CNC lathe was developed with KIST; this
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machine was fitted with higher powered servo-motors rather than steppa
motors. Several units of this machine were produced and used by the firm
in-house. (These early machines were still in use in one of the firm's
plants in 1985.) Again, this machine was not commercially developed,
since there were several technical problems with it. The machine was,
however, displayed at the first Korean Machinery Exhibition in 1977 and
at international machine tool fairs in the US and West Germany.
In 1977, Firm F entered into a licensing agreement for a CNC lathe
with a Japanese company, and this agreement was utilised by the firm over
a period of three years. Although the firm did not produce or sell many
of this model, it did acquire detailed technical information and
production know-how from the licensee. As well as using a licensing
agreement to acquire foreign technology, the firm sent several technicians
to Japan and the United States for training. The interviewee said that
the main motivation for sending these engineers abroad and for using the
licensing agreement was not just to acquire technology but to improve the
quality of its products.
The firm has subsequently designed and developed several CNC lathes,
a special foui—axis lathe for use by a car producer, and in 1985, it
started to design its own turning centre. Using the experience the firm
had gained in the design and production of CNC lathes, it began to
produce CNC milling machines and machining centres. A CNC milling
machine was first developed in 1981-82, followed by a CNC copy mill in
1985. (This particular machine was specially designed to meet growing
demand for specialised milling machines from Korean mould producers.) In
1983, the firm designed and started to produce its own machining centre,
only a few of which have been sold.
Firm F has a very competent and experienced design department and
is widely regarded in Korea as the leading domestic problem-solving firm.
It not only possesses the capabilities to design complex CNC machines but
also has considerable experience in the design and production of lines of
machinery for use in the car industry. Although the firm's products are
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principally standard general purpose machine tools, it does undertake a
fairly high proportion of custom design work.
Firm G
Between 1975 and 1981, Firm G had very close links with a Japanese
company through which it obtained designs for three different models of
milling machine. The technology agreement through which the designs were
transferred was very comprehensive. The Korean firm acquired the whole
set of blueprints for the machines, including all the detailed design and
assembly drawings, as well as the basic machine drawings and
specifications. Furthermore, the Japanese company trained some of the
Korean firm's technicians, and a Japanese technician worked in the Korean
plant for a time to help with production. Finally, some key components,
for example, the gears, bearings and some of the electrical parts not
produced locally were also supplied by the Japanese firm. The exact form
of this agreement is unclear; the interviewee referred to it as "a
technology co-operation agreement", but, since there was no technical
input by the Korean firm, this seems an inadequate description. As the
designs transferred were fairly basic and old, and as the Korean firm was
allowed to make alterations to the design, the agreement was not as
restrictive as most licensing agreements.
In 1983, the firm retro-fitted its turret mill by changing the
motors and drives and interfacing it to a control unit. Although the
formal agreement with the Japanese firm ended in 1981, Firm G did receive
some help from its former collaborator, and the machine is sold under the
names of both the Korean and Japanese firms. The interviewee commented
that the Japanese name adds extra "legitimacy" to the machine and helps
in the marketing of the machine in Korea where Japanese products are
widely thought to be vastly superior. (This is similar to the case of
Firm D which still sells its milling machines under its former licensor's
name.) With only minor changes, this machine has continued to be Firm G's
only CNC product.
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In spite of comprehensive technical aid from the Japanese company,
Firm G has the lowest design capabilities among sample companies. The
design department is extremely weak and the firm has had great
difficulties recruiting both experienced designers and graduate engineers.
When the firm was visited in 1985, three of the four employees in the
design department were young engineers who had been seconded as part of
their military service to work in the factory. Without considerable
internal training and the extension of the firm's technical links with the
Japanese company, it is unlikely that the situation will improve. One of
the firm's core designers left because he felt that the management was
uninterested in developing new products, and this may be taken as one
indication that radical changes in management attitude are required for
the firm to acquire suitable skills.
Firm H
Firm H was established in 1968 by a design engineer who left Firm
G. This designer wanted to develop a heavy duty milling machine, and, as
Firm G did not wish to enter this product sector, he established his own
company. This man is still the managing director; he is knowledgeable in
the design of machine tools and keen to develop new and improved designs.
The firm has continued to specialise in the production of heavy duty
milling machines, and, has had considerable success in exporting to other
Southeast Asian countries.
In 1981, it developed its first CMC milling machine. To gather
information on CNC machine specifications, the firm collected and studied
catalogues and technical materials for Japanese manufactured CNC mills.
The firm also participated in a CNC school that had then been set up at
KIST. The design for the new CNC machine was developed in Firm H, and
was based on the large milling machine which is that firm's principal
product. This design was then reviewed and improved in collaboration
with researchers at KIST.
The managing director of Firm H considered that machining centres
would come to dominate the CNC market in future and that the firm should
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enter this product sector, but he also felt that, as the firm's design and
production experience was in the manufacture of milling machines, it did
not have the capabilities to undertake this work. The firm has, however,
bought two machining centres from Japan for use in its factory in order
to improve productivity and the quality of its milling machines, and to
learn about the operation of machining centres. The managing director
said that he would also like the firm to enter a licensing agreement for
a machining centre, but had as yet been unable to find a licensor. He
was, however, very reluctant, for political and historic reasons, to enter
a licensing agreement with a Japanese firm, and this had made the search
for a licensor difficult.
Because of this firm's origins, design has always been regarded as
important. In the specialised field in which the firm operates, its
capabilities are very good and it has built up the skills needed to
design basic CNC milling machines. However, the firm recognises that
without design support from outside, it will not be able to develop a
machining centre.
Firm I
This firm developed a CNC lathe in a collaborative project with KIST
in 1978-79. KIST actually developed two lathes during this project: the
first was a simple retro-fit and the second a basic CNC lathe. Since this
second model was brought into production (in very small quantities), the
firm has not adapted or developed it any further. In 1985, the firm was
very anxious to increase its production of. CNC machine tools and to
develop new models. Although the firm had the design skills to develop
new conventional machines and, possibly, retro-fitted CNC machines, it did
not have the ability to develop a new basic CNC machine.
In order to enhance its design skills and start manufacturing a new
CNC lathe, the firm entered into a collaborative project with the SMIPC.
This project commenced at the beginning of 1985, and the firm was hoping
to start producing the machine by the end of that year. It was also
considering entering a licensing agreement with an American company to
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start producing a small CNC lathe. In 1982, this American firm
established a joint venture with another Korean company, which undertakes
casting and basic machining work for export to the US, as well as
producing a few conventional lathes, to the American company's design, for
the Korean market. Firm I has very close links with this American-Korean
firm and with engineers from the American parent company, who were based
in Korea to support the joint venture, the visiting American engineers
often advising Firm I in various technical areas.
252.
Analysis of Firms' Design Capabilities
There is a spectrum of design capabilities in the sample firms. The
large general purpose producers (B, C and F) have the highest levels of
such skills, and these three are also the largest CNC machine tool
producers, manufacturing the broadest range of CNC machinery. All three
firms have the capability to design new complex lathes, and Firms C and F
have both developed machining centres, although Firm F's machine has not
been particularly successful on the domestic market. The chaebol firms
dedicated to the manufacture of equipment for their own vehicle
production (A and D) both have substantial levels of design skills in the
development of special purpose machinery and in the customisation of
machinery. As these two firms have only acquired skills in the design of
general purpose machinery as a supplement to their other design skills,
their ability in this area is not as advanced as that of the large
general purpose producers. However, the two types of design skills are,
to some extent, transferrable and, therefore, the development of both
these design capabilities has been complementary. Of the remaining firms,
three (E, H and I) have the design capabilities to develop retro-fitted
machines and very basic CNC machines, but require design support for the
development of more complex CNC machine tools. Finally, Firm G has the
weakest design department of the sample firms and would have difficulties
if it wanted to develop any new machine tool independently. Most of the
sample firms undertake some custom design work, but, with the exception
of Firms A and D, this is not an area of design essential for their
future product development. However, for one firm in particular CC>, this
was becoming a more important design area, as its production of special
purpose machines was increasing.
The figures in Table 6.4 are only a very rough estimate of the
number and specialisation of personnel in each firm undertaking design
work, since firms' interpretations of core and basic design differed.
Nevertheless, the figures do reflect each firm's relative design strengths.
Firms A, B, C, D, and F have the largest design departments, each with
over 30 employees. Firms E, H, and I have sizeable design departments,
and a significant number of personnel are working in core design. Firm G
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had no core designers at all, and only four detail designers. With the
exception of Firm G, which employed no electrical engineers, the ratios of
mechanical to electrical engineers in each firm were approximately the
same (4:1). (The next section surveys in detail the mechanisms by which
electronics skills have been acquired.) While this ratio indicates the
growing importance of electrical engineers in an industry traditionally
dominated by mechanical engineers, compared to machine tool firms in
Japan this ratio is still high. (In Japanese firms, the ratio is more
commonly 2:1, and in some cases has equality.)
Table $,4 Design Personnel in Sample Firms
Fir# Number of Employees Ratio of
Total Core Detailed Mechanical/
in Firm Design* Design Electrical
A 314 30 SO 4:1
B 1800" 80= 3:1
C 3280b ISO" 20b ...
0 95S 30 11 4:1
E ... 20= 4:1
F 725 24 11 4:1
8 159 0 4 (All Mech,)
H 99 9 2 ...
I 185 5 5 4:1
a, Personnel employed in this area undertake core design,
custom design, and some new product development,
b, Includes personnel in other manufacturing areas as well
as machine tool production,
c, Total design personnel
— Figures unavailable
Source: Firm Data,
The build up of design skills from the development of basic and
retro-fitted machines to the successful development of complex CNC
machine tools has been an extended process. Firm B first developed a
retro-fitted CNC lathe in 1979, but took five more years to successfully
develop a complex CNC lathe. Firm F produced its first CNC lathe in 1976,
but it was only in 1984 that it too started to produce complex CNC
lathes. In several cases (E, H and I), even though the firms had many
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years of experience of basic CNC production, in 1985 they still did not
have the capabilities within the firm for complex CNC designs. For
example, Firm I developed its first CNC machine tool, a basic lathe, in
1978-79, and by 1985 had not developed a new model on its own.
The bigger firms have achieved greater success in the absorption of
design skills. These firms had the resources which enabled them to "buy
in" the skills they were missing, and, hence, to build up larger and more
able design departments. In the process of acquiring new design
capabilities, these firms extensively utilised foreign sources of
technology: licensing agreements, the employment of foreign technicians,
and sending their employees abroad for training. These firms now possess
a "critical mass" of skills within their design departments (they all have
more than 20 core designers) and are able to sustain future product
developments. For smaller producers, this sort of technical and design
development was not possible and, consequently, it is taking them longer
to build up their design departments.
In general, the bigger firms have been more successful in
indigenising the design skills for complex CNC lathes than for machining
centres. It might be thought that this situation stems from the firms'
longer experience with CNC lathes than with machining centres. However,
this is unlikely to be the whole explanation. The far greater complexity
of machining centres compared to CNC lathes seems to be,ar\important
consideration. The prevalence of foreign technology agreements for
machining centres indicates that this technology is harder to assimilate.
Indeed, repeat licences in this technology are not uncommon.
While many of the design techniques gained through the production
of lathes could be transferred to the production of other types of CNC
machines, the design of a machining centre is inherently more difficult
than the design of a complex CNC lathe. Compared to a CNC lathe,
machining centres have more axes to be controlled simultaneously than a
CNC lathe. This increases the complexity of the design as there is a
larger number of moving parts. Ensuring that the machine is rigid, and
therefore accurate, in operation is also far harder to achieve on a
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machining centre than on a CNC lathe. On a lathe, the bed and the main
spindle are rigid and static; movement on the axes is provided by moving
only a turret which holds the fixed cutting tools along slides on the bed.
However, the major parts of the machining centre - the bed and the head
including the main spindle and its motor - have to be mobile to provide
movement along the various axes. The movement of these fairly large and
heavy parts has to be achieved without excessive vibration or backlash in
the machine body, otherwise the machine's accuracy will be eroded and the
quality of the cut will be poor due to "chatter".4 The design of a
machining centre is further complicated by the requirement to fit an
automatic tool changer to the machine. On a CNC lathe different tools
are fixed in a turret when the machine is set up and these turrets
usually carry a maximum of twelve tools. Machining centres have to have
a larger supply of tools, and the cutting tool in the spindle must be
removed and replaced automatically from the tool store. This means that
tools cannot be pre-set in their cutting position when the machine is set
up, and some type of mechanical device to remove and replace tools has to
be developed.5
While the smaller and less dynamic firms still have many gaps in
their design abilities, the leading Korean CNC machine tool producers have
made significant progress towards acquiring a comprehensive design
capability. The leading firms are no longer totally reliant on foreign
technology, either through formal agreements or informal transfer (e.g.,
copying), in order to develop new models. Most of these firms have also
acquired some skills in the design of special purpose and customised
machinery. (These latter skills are mainly concentrated in those firms
which are directly linked to vehicle producers,) The acquisition of both
these types of skills means that machine tool producers are now able to
undertake one of their most important functions within the economy: the




Microelectronics skills have been regarded as a problematic area for
conventional producers, mainly because they have no existing knowledge in
this field. Generally, it was felt by the machine tool firms and staff at
research institutes that there had been little difficulty in learning how
to design and build interfaces, i.e., the circuitry required to connect
control unit and machine tool. Producers either trained existing
personnel within the firm or recruited new personnel. (It was noted in
the previous section that approximately a quarter of design personnel in
the sample firms are skilled in electronics design, and interfacing is one
of their main tasks.) In addition, all the producers at some time went
to outside agencies for help in acquiring or improving these skills.
There were four different means by which the firms could acquire
interfacing skills, although some of the firms used more than one
learning method. These are described in order of their importance.
The most important source of information and aid was the controls
producer, nearly always Fanuc, and much of this help came through a joint
venture Fanuc established in Korea in 1978. (This joint venture is
discussed in more detail later.) Secondly, researchers at KIST were an
important source of advice during collaborative projects. Many KIST
researchers were initially trained by Fanuc, during the course of KIST's
first CMC project in 1976. Thirdly, whenever the initial CMC machine
tools were manufactured under licensing agreements, the design for the
interface, and instructions on its assembly and attachment to the machine
body, were also incorporated in that agreement. Some of the Korean firms
established close ties with foreign firms in the design and development
of both conventional and CNC machines, and they continued to obtain
advice on the interface from the foreign companies even when they were
no longer using the original licensing agreements. Fourthly, an interface
could be bought "off the shelf" from the controls producer: however, this
was regarded as a very expensive and unsatisfactory option.
The most important point here is that firms received substantial
help from Fanuc, directly and indirectly, in the training of personnel.
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Any barrier to entry that may have been created by this new skill
requirement was therefore greatly lowered by the support offered by this
controls producer. In a related study, Fransman found that Fanuc had
assisted Taiwanese CNC machine tool entrants in solving problems they
encountered with interfaces. Fransman seems to find Fanuc's role in this
connection rather puzzling, commenting that, "somewhat paradoxically,
Fanuc, the major supplier of CNC controls to Japanese firms, was also
helping to cultivate competition for these firms from Taiwanese
producers" (Fransman, 1986a: 183). The paradox Fransman points to
involves the contradiction between this assistance to Taiwanese producers
and Fanuc's traditionally close links with Japanese CNC machine tool firms.
However, the paradox may only be an apparent one. Fanuc's main aim must
be to expand its own market share, not only of the domestic market but
also of the world market.6 Furthermore, if Fanuc was not receptive to
the approaches of the Korean (or Taiwanese) producers wishing to buy
control units and acquire interfacing skills, the new entrants would have
purchased controls from other, smaller Japanese producers or from
American companies. Entry into these markets may subsequently have been
very difficult for Fanuc, if another producer had established a high level
of customer loyalty, just as Fanuc have now made it very difficult for
other controls producers to enter the Korean market. For these reasons.
Fanuc offered not only comprehensive customer support and training, but
also provided similar training for research insititutes in the
anticipation that familiarity in training with their equipment would lead
to further sales to existing producers and new entrants. Moreover, it
needs to be stressed that Fanuc's technical support to both Taiwanese and
Korean producers does not extend beyond the interface to the "black box".
Fanuc has never offered assistance to any producer in the design and
construction of the more technically sophisticated and expensive control
unit, nor will it allow customers for its control units to "open up the
black box" and to modify it in any way.7 It would indeed be
"paradoxical", from the point of view of Fanuc's market interests, should
it offer the kind of assistance in control unit technology that it has
given in interfaces.
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Only one firm in the sample (H) chose first to buy an interface.
The firm bought a programmable control interface with a control unit from
Fanuc for its first CNC machine, as there was no one in the firm with
sufficient electronics capabilities who could be trained in the required
skills, and the firm did not want to employ a new engineer for a single
job. This small firm did later build up its own electronics design and
production capabilities by employing the brothei—in-law of the managing
director. (The brother-in-law had previously established his own small
electronics firm, but abandoned this project in order to work for Firm H.)
On joining the firm, he developed an interface for the CNC milling machine
that the firm produces, thus replacing the purchased interface, and in
interview expressed confidence that he would be able to develop new
interfaces if the firm commenced production of any new CNC machines.
All of the firms in the sample, except for the small Firm G, had
acquired the skills necessary to design and produce new interfaces for
newly developed machines. As CNC production has become an important
part of some producers' output, and as the indigenous design of these
machines is increasing, so electronics has become a more important
component of the design work undertaken. With the exception of Firm G,
approximately 20% of the personnel in the firms' design departments
specialised in electronics and electrical engineering, while the remaining
80% specialised in mechanical engineering. In the case of Firm G, since
its design department is so small and since the firm has experienced
great difficulties in employing new design and development staff, this
firm is unlikely to be able to develop its own interfaces in the near
future.
With the establishment of the SMIPC, a new source of help for small
firms became available. The SMIPC runs various schemes enabling small
firms to acquire new skills, either through financing technicians to
travel abroad to be trained at other controls or machine tool producers,
or by giving grants to finance foreign technicians to visit the Korean
firm and to teach the appropriate skills. The SMIPC has also taken over
some of the advisory and training functions that had been previously
undertaken by KIST. This will probably be an important source for new
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CNC entrants, and small firms like G will also be able to benefit from
this technical support.
6.4.3 Mechanical and Assembly Skills
A previous section described entry by sample firms into the
production of general machine tools. It was concluded that, as all of the
firms had experience in mechanical engineering manufacture and the
operation of machine tools, so the mechanical skills required for
conventional machine tool production already existed within the companies.
Similarly, since all the firms had experience in the production of
conventional machines before they entered CNC production, these mechanical
skills could easily be transferred to the production of CNC machines.
However, although the majority of the mechanical skills were available in
the firms, several firms did have reliablility and quality problems with
the CNC machines they first produced. Arguably, these problems serve to
demonstrate a gap between the mechanical skills adequate for conventional
production and those required by the new machines.
There were three main sources through which firms acquired more
knowledge about the operation and construction of CNC machines, and
assistance in improving their production techniques to solve these
problems. Firstly, through the purchase of new CNC machinery, workshop
personnel gained practical experience with these machines which helped
their understanding of the operating principles behind the new machines
they were assembling and testing. The purchase of new machinery also
improved the quality of the components and machined parts manufactured
by the firms. Secondly, in several of the licensing agreements outlined
above, production information was included in the technology package. For
example, in the licensing agreements entered into by Firm D for a
machining centre and a CNC lathe, information 3nd technical advice on
production processes were included, and this was regarded by the firm as
a significant input in the improvement of its production capabilities.
Similarly, the interviewee in Firm F noted the importance of detailed
technical information and production know-how included in the licensing
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agreement it entered into in 1977, even though it only produced a limited
number of machines under this agreement. These firms were able to
utilise such improvements in production techniques in all production
areas.
Thirdly, technical personnel in several firms were trained by skilled
foreign engineers. This training was undertaken in two ways: either
Korean technical personnel were sent overseas for training in an
established plant or skilled technical personnel from overseas firms
worked in the Korean plant to oversee production, help train production
personnel, and solve production and quality problems. Examples of this
type of skill transfer come from several firms. Firm F sent several of
its engineers to Japan and the US for such training, and in the case of
Firm A this transfer of personnel to the licensor's plant for training was
incorporated in its licensing agreements (these included training in other
skill areas as well as production and quality control). In the case of
Firm D, an engineer from its Japanese licensor worked in the Korean plant
for a time and trained some of its production personnel. Technicans in
Firm G were trained by a Japanese firm with which it had a close
relationship, and a Japanese technician worked at the Korean plant to
solve production problems. The other two small independent firms (H and
I) also received help from visiting overseas experts, subsidised through a
scheme run by the SMIPC. All the firms now seem to have few difficulties
with assembly and most have been able to improve the quality of their
product.
6.4.4 R&D Capabilities
R&D capabilities are an important indication of whether producers
have acquired an understanding of the principles of machine tool and
automation technologies. Moreover, these capabilities allow firms to be
innovative, enabling them to develop their own novel products, rather than
simply following, and copying, product developments made in other firms
and other countries. It should, however, be stressed that the work
undertaken by these departments is basically developmental in nature and
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there is no fundamental or basic research incorporated. Indeed, this is
the case for the majority of firms in the global machine tool industry.
Chapter 4 noted that traditionally there is little support for such basic
research in the industry. In fact, many important machine tool
developments have been the result of research undertaken either by users
(often the defence industry) or component suppliers (e.g., tool makers and
controls producers). Of the nine sample firms, only two (B and C) have
sizeable departments undertaking R&D specifically on machine tools and
related products. (The work of these two leading firms' research
departments and the projects undertaken are considered in greater detail
below.) The other chaebol firms (A, D, and E) all have R&D capabilities
within the groups, but they are specific to other major products of the
group. Of the independent firms, only F and H stated that they had a
particular section of the firm working on R&D, and in 1984 the annual
budgets for these departments were fairly small, at 200 and 150 million
won respectively. The work of these two departments was principally an
extension of the design departments, and, accordingly, is not considered
here.
Firm B
This is the firm best equipped for undertaking R&D. It has a large
team of engineers and technicians, based at the machine tool plant in
Changwon, to support the machine tool manufacturing process, and to
modify and adapt existing products. R&D work on new types of machines
and automated systems is undertaken at a separate technical centre at
Inchon, on the same site as the company's large engine manufacturing
plant. This centre was established in 1982 and employs a total of 460
engineers and technicians. Prior to its establishment, all development
work relating to machine tools was undertaken at the machine tool plant,
and its projects were directly supervised by that plant's management
team. The new technical centre does development work for all sections of
the company^ including diesel engine design technology, machine design and
component technology, and industrial electronics. There are three main
research groups within the centre whose work is directly related to
machine tool production— laser machining, robotics, and factory automation
— and the work of these groups will need to be more closely examined.
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Table 6.5 gives details of the number and disciplines of the 106
research staff working in these three groups. A major feature of these
groups is the heavy emphasis on electrical and electronic engineering,
with over 60% of the engineers working in this discipline, while the
remainder concentrate on mechanical engineering. Many of these employees
have master's degrees from KAIST or from other leading universities in
Seoul and a few have Ph.D.s from KAIST. Despite the fact that a high
proportion of the researchers were trained by KAIST, there are no
research links with this government institute at present. A small number
of employees were trained or educated in the US: a technical director of
the company obtained a Ph.D. in machine tool technology at an American
university and several of the employees in the laser machining group have
been trained in laser and optics technology in universities and laser
plants in the US.
The laser machining group has developed two different types of
laser machines: a laser machining centre and a laser marking machine.
The designs for both of these machines were internally generated. This
included the design of the control unit, but excluded the laser technology
which was licensed from a laser manufacturer in the US. The firm had by
early 1985 already sold several of these laser machining centres,
including one which was exported to the US. The laser marker has not
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enjoyed the same success, since the machine lacked a satisfactory
material feeding unit. The research centre approached three American
companies in an attempt to obtain the technology required to make this
unit through a licensing or co-production agreement. But, as the
technology was very new, none of these companies agreed. The technical
group was therefore having an initial attempt at designing its own. This
marking machine was developed specifically for the domestic market, since
over 50 such machines had already been imported into Korea for use by
the electronics industry. However, unless the materials handling problem
is solved, these domestic users will continue to import rather than buy
inadequate machinery from a domestic producer.
The robotics group has produced an articulated six—axis robot; this
project included the development of the robot's control unit, based on a
Motorola cpu. (This robot is a totally different development from the
simple robotic arm developed by the design engineers at the machine tool
plant in Changwon, and which is fixed to some of the firm's CNC lathes.)
The first proto-type of the robot was built within a year and a second
year was spent testing, re—designing and modifying both the mechanical
elements and the hard— and software in the control unit. The company
uses eight of its own robots in its various plants and has supplied a
small number of robots to two other companies (undertaking car and ship
production) within the chaebol. The robot was exhibited at the "Robot
9" trade fair in Detroit in 1984, and was subsequently marketed in the
US. In this market the robot was priced at US$30,000, approximately
US$5,000 less than similar Japanese robots. This price difference was
attributed to lower design, production, and overhead costs compared to
those incurred by Japanese producers. The firm hoped to sell between 50
and 100 robots in the US in 1986. The group was also in the process of
developing a new robotic materials handling system for the electronics
industry and painting robots for the chaebol's shipbuilding company.
The factory automation group studies the automation of different
manufacturing operations within the manufacturing divisions of the entire
chaebol. This group stipulates the engineering requirements for
automation and decides which components of the system may be produced
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in-house. Projects have included engine manufacture, fork-lift
production, and television assembly. The group includes FMS in its work
and has designed systems for use in its own air-frame production plant
and in the vehicle plant of which Firm A is a part. The group was also
in the very early stages of a design project for an FMS to be installed
in its sister company's car plant. As this vehicle company is a joint
venture with General Motors, the American company will provide the
specifications for the new system, but its design and installation will be
the responsibility of the Korean company.
Two important features of the work of these research groups should
be noted. Firstly, the research groups covered have acquired high levels
of microelectronics and controls knowledge, and the projects they have
undertaken indicate their capabilities in these areas. These capabilities
have been acquired by the company mainly through the recruitment of
graduates from Korean universities and institutes, and only a very few of
the company's research staff have been trained abroad. Secondly, while
the machine tool plant and its design team had little contact with other
divisions of the chaebol, the research teams covered here have all
developed new products for use within various divisions of the chaebol as
well as for other producers on the domestic and export markets. Thus,
other manufacturing divisions of the chaebol are benefitting from the
capability to manufacture complex production equipment that has been
built up in this research group. In particular, it is important to note
that technological links between the research group and the vehicle
division of the chaebol have been established. It is highly probable that
such collaboration may lead to much closer links between the vehicle
producing and the machine tool manufacturing companies within this
chaebol.
Firm C
This firm has a large design and development department at its
Changwon machine tool plant which undertakes research into new products
and systems as well as product design and development work.
Approximately 200 people work in this department, of which half work in
product research and new product development, and the other half in the
265.
design and modification of existing products and in the improvement of
the firm's production and quality control. Due to the firm's extensive
international connections, about half of the employees in design and
development are foreign; about 60% are Japanese and the remainder West
German. Most of the personnel in this department have bachelor's degrees
in science or engineering and 20 have post—graduate degrees.
A total of 60 employees work in mechanical engineering—based R&D;
of these 35 are involved in machine tool and tooling developments and 25
work in a group developing manufacturing systems. Of the 25 engineers
and technicians in the systems group, seven are core designers. The
group has undertaken two major automation projects. An automated
warehousing system, which stores small components and tooling, was
designed and built for use in the machine tool plant, These items are
loaded into the system and retrieved by a basic materials handling
robotic arm, which was also designed and developed internally as part of
the project. The other project focused on the installation of an FMS,
again in the machine tool plant, to undertake machining work on machine
tool components. The system is made up of eight machining centres. The
mechanical design and planning work for this system was undertaken by
Firm C, but the controls for the system were developed and fitted by
Fanuc. The automated warehousing system and the FMS have subsequently
been linked, by extending the range of the guided vehicles used in the
FMS. In 19S5, the development group was enlarging this FMS to 16
machines and it was anticipated that all the design and development work
for this system expansion would be undertaken internally.
Both these projects were directed at improving and automating the
firm's production facilities, but it was anticipated that the experience
they had gained through these projects would be used in the future in
sales of automated systems on the Korean market. The systems group has
also developed automated features which are included as options on its
CNC machines and are available on the domestic market. On the firm's
slant bed lathe, a simple pneumatic robot arm which can load and unload
workpieces is available. On the horizontal machining centres, the
automated features which may be added are rotary tables — which enable
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machining on several of the workpiece surfaces to be undertaken in one
set up — and a pallet set or pallet pool - which enables the machine to
automatically load and unload components already set up on pallets and
thus run unmanned. The development of these automated features was not
undertaken entirely by Firm C, as technology and specifications from the
firm's German subsidiary have been used.
-fcW-e,
A simple control unit designed by a group of 40 of /employees in the
development department was put on the Korean domestic market, attached
to machines built by Firm C, in early 1985. The controls group is made
up of 10 Koreans and 30 Japanese; all the Japanese engineers had
considerable expertise in microelectronics techniques before they joined
Firm C. In total, the group had spent two and a half years designing,
building, and testing this control unit. The control unit cannot be
compared to those which are available from Fanuc or from other
commercial control producers; firstly, the firm estimated that its
controls technology was about ten years behind that of the market leaders
and, secondly, the control could only be used on lathes or basic milling
machines (i.e., it cannot control more than 2% axes). (The market
viability of this control unit is discussed in Section 6.7.)
Obviously, this firm has a very high level of knowledge of the
technology behind the production and operation of machine tools,
automated manufacturing systems, and control units which has enabled it
to develop the systems described above. These capabilities were
principally acquired through the recruitment of foreign personnel, who had
already been trained in their countries of origin. However, the extent to
which these capabilities are being transferred to Korean nationals is
uncertain. Nor is it likely that any other Korean firm will be able to
follow the example of Firm C in recruiting such large numbers of foreign
specialists.
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6.5 Learning Methods Used by the Sample Firms
An important feature of the acquisition of capabilities by the
sample firms is the very wide range of learning methods which have been
used. Learning by searching - obtaining information and specifications of
other firms' products - and learning by using - installing one or more
CNC machines in the firm - were methods used by several firms to learn
about the principles of CNC machine tool design and to build up
information on their operating parameters before commencing CNC
development. Some firms bought in new technology by entering licensing
agreements. Other firms copied imported machines, and learnt the
principles behind their operation by reproducing and modifying them.
Firms also used various learning methods to acquire tacit knowledge:
learning by training — sending their own personnel to established plants
to learn different skills — and learning by hiring — employing foreign
experts to work in their production plant in order to train their
personnel and sort out problematic areas — to improve the technological
capabilities of their employees. Often these two learning methods were
incorporated in licensing agreements, but other arrangements for these
types of learning were instituted by the firms themselves and through
special government schemes. In one case (Firm E), a co—production
agreement with a Japanese firm was negotiated, which involved the Korean
firm undertaking mechanical design work in collaboration with the
Japanese firm. Through this project, the Korean firm improved its design
capabilities using the method described as learning by supplying. Finally,
one firm (C) increased its levels of technological abilities through a
very unusual method for a NIC firm, by taking over established producers
in an industrialised country. The acquisition of these foreign companies
gave Firm C access to the designs of complete product ranges and the
support of a well-established and experienced core design team.
There were three basic methods used by firms to acquire their first
design of a CNC machine tool: firms either entered a licensing agreement
with an established foreign producer, entered a collaborative development
project with KIST, or developed the model themselves. Entrants using this
last method either adapted an existing production model by retro-fitting
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controls to it or copied a CNC machine to which they had access. All
these methods of entry were used with equal frequency by the sample
firms. To further expand or improve their capabilities and to develop
new models, several firms used a succession of licensing agreements or
entered new collaborative projects with KIST. None of the firms has been
isolated from outside support, as all the firms have either used a
licensing agreement, or collaborated with KIST, or did both at some stage
of their development. In the acquisition of interfacing skills, most firms
took advantage of training schemes offered by Fanuc; other sources of
support in this technology came from KIST and through licensing
agreements. Production skills were enhanced and improved through
information contained in licensing agreements and from the visits of
Korean engineers to foreign firms and foreign engineers to Korean firms.
Capabilities in R&D have been acquired by the usual patterns of
employment, including the recruitment of qualified personnel from abroad.
Three particular methods of technology acquisition and enhancement
need to be discussed in more detail in order to understand their relative
effectiveness and importance in firms' development: viz., licensing
agreements, collaborative development projects with KIST and the transfer
of personnel in order to build up skills.
Utilisation of Licensing Agreements
Seven of the nine sample firms had entered licensing agreements for
CNC machines at some stage in their development. In three of these
cases, firms used licensing agreements to provide the design for their
initial entry into CNC machine tool production. Table 6.6 lists the
licensing agreements entered by the firms, the types of machines covered
by these agreements, and the licensor.
Only two sample firms (H and I) had not at some stage in their
development entered a licensing agreement; both of these firms were small
independent companies, and neither of them had yet made such agreements
because of difficulties, with only the limited resources of a small
company, in finding a potential licensor. In interviews, personnel in both
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firms stated that they wished to enter licensing agreements in the future
to develop new CNC machines: in the case of Firm H, a machining centre,
and a more complex lathe in the case of Firm I. Firm I has more recently
been able to build up close links with an American-Korean joint venture
company and hopes to license a lathe from the American partner. For Firm
H, the problem of finding a licensor remains great, especially as the
managing director, for political reasons noted above, did not want to
enter an agreement with a Japanese licensor.
Table 6.6 Licensing Agreements Entered by Sample Fins
Firm Year Type of Machine Licensor*
A 1984 Machining Centre Japan
Hobbing Machine Japan
Special Purpose Machines Japan
B 1976 Conventional Lathe
1977 Tool firinder Makino, Japan
1977 Boring Machine Ikega, Japan
1980 Machining Centre <Horiz,) Mitsu-Seiki, Japan
1983 Machining Centre (Horiz,)b Toshiba, Japan
1983 Machining Centre (Vert,) Chiron-Werke, FR6
C 1981 Machining Centre (Vert,) Yasuda, Japan
1984 Machining Centre Nanderer, FR8
0 1977 Milling Machine (Conventional) Hitachi-Seiki, Japan
1983 Machining Centre Hitachi-Seiki, Japan
1983 Turning Centre
E • Lathe and CNC Lathe Yanazaki, Japan
- Milling Machine Hitachi Seiko, Japan
Boring and Milling Machine Toshiba, Japan
F 1977 CNC Lathe Japan
1978 Surface Srinder Japan
S 1975 Milling Machine Sijtuoka, Japan
a, In some cases only the country of the licensor was revealed,
b, Co-production agreement to be re-negotiated to a licensing agreement,
Source: Firm Data,
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The majority of the licences used were with Japanese firms, and only
in two of the later agreements (in 1983 and 1984) were West German
licensors used. As Japan has dominated the market and technology of
small standard conventional and CNC machine tools for many years, it was
the main source of technology in the sector of the market into which the
Korean firms were entering and the obvious first source of technology.
In this reliance on Japan as the main source of technology agreements,
the Korean machine tool industry follows the example of many other
Korean industries which acquired the majority of their new technology
from Japan (see Chapter 5).
Of the ten licensing agreements for CNC machine tools, three were
for lathes and the remainder were all for machining centres. It should
be noted that the two largest machining centre manufacturers (B and C>
entered new licensing agreements in order to expand their range of
products and to learn more about the design of these machines rather
than to develop their own designs. In contrast, there were no cases of
re—licensing in the development of new CNC lathes. This bias towards the
licensing of machining centres may be explained by the far greater
difficulties in designing complex machining centres than simpler CNC
lathes. There were no formal agreements for the transfer of designs for
CNC milling machines, although Firm G did receive help from the licensors
of their milling machine in the design and development of a CNC version.
This firm has a very low design capability compared to the other CNC
milling machine producers. Other producers all had the capabilities to
retro-fit existing milling machines and found it relatively easy to
develop their own models, or, as in the case of Firm H, to collaborate
with KIST.
As well as procuring the design of machine tools in these
agreements, many of the licensees noted some of the other technological
capabilities that were passed on through licensing agreements. The case
of Firm A shows how one firm insisted on getting more than the design
and production method of the machine: considerable skill levels were also
built up by the training of design and other personnel from the Korean
firm at the licensor's own plant. The transfer of interfacing know-how
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was another important component of the technological contents of the
licences, helping firms to develop their own electronics capabilities. As
well as acquiring the design of a machine which was known to have been
successful, firms obtained many other benefits, including an improvement
in quality and an increase in the overall technological capabilities of
their own personnel. Importantly, enhancements in production technology
and skills were utilised in the manufacture of all the firm's products.
Such benefits were probably as important to the subsequent development
of the firm as any increase in design capabilities. One firm in
particular (F) observed that the quality of its output was considerably
improved by the agreement they entered in 1977, even though it only
produced a few machines under this agreement.
Only three firms licensed a CNC machine tool for their first CNC
production. The other firms first experimented with the design and
development of CNC machine tools before entering licensing agreements.
The development of CNC capabilities in Firms D and F in particular shows
how firms used licensing agreements only after the establishment of some
CNC production. Initially, these firms tried to develop new machines in
their own design departments and collaborated with KIST researchers.
Although several models of CNC machines were developed, and a few
machines were sold, in both cases firms' entries into CNC production were
not particularly successful. Having established some basic knowledge in
the design and operation of this new type of product, the firms entered
into licensing agreements in order to improve their products. The two
firms then utilised the knowledge they had gained through the licensing
agreement to develop new machines. Following its licensing agreement,
Firm F developed other CNC lathes, including one of complex design, while
Firm D used the increase in its capabilities to alter and improve the
design of the machining centre it had produced earlier in collaboration
with KIST. The initial base of knowledge acquired by these two firms was
particularly important to subsequent development. The firms were aware
of the areas of machine design and production in which they had
difficulties, and these skills were effectively acquired through the
licence. These two firms, therefore, had initially established a base of
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technical knowledge on which new foreign technology was quickly,
assimilated and utilised in the design of other products.
In some of the firms, close relationships were set up with the
licensors which continued through successive licensing agreements for
other types of machines. Furthermore, these relationships were used when
the Korean firms wished to consult with the licensors on the design of
new products developed in the Korean firms. These links were especially
strong in one firm (G) which had a very weak design department. This
firm continued to consult with its Japanese licensor when it wanted to
alter designs or manufacture new products.
The Role of KIST, KIMM, and the SMIPC
The five collaborative projects entered into by the Precision
Machining Group at KIST with the sample firms are listed in Table 6.7,
which also shows the types of machines developed and the dates of the
projects. In three cases (F, I and H), firms collaborated with KIST to
develop their first CNC machine tool. And in the case of two of these
firms (I and H), this has been the only outside technical help they have
had in CNC development, as neither of these firms have negotiated
licensing agreements. Firm F subsequently entered a licensing agreement,
but has used the machines it developed with KIST in its own factory for
many years.
Table 6.7 Collaborative Projects with KIST
Firm Year Project
F 1976 CNC Lathe
1978-79 CNC Lathe
H 1981 CNC Hilling Hachine
£ 1982-83 Hachining Centre
D 1983 Machining Centre
Source: Firm data,
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The other two projects (in collaboration with Firms D and E) were
both for the development of machining centres. Both of these firms had
already developed and produced CNC milling machines and were anxious to
expand their product range. However, neither of the machining centres
developed in these projects was successful. Firm D subsequently entered
a licensing agreement for the production of a machining centre, and, using
this experience, improved the design of the machining centre developed
with KIST. Firm E was unable to find a market for its machining centre,
and thus did not produce the machine commercially.
Between 1976 and 1983, KIST was an important source of technical
support for the sample firms, not only through the collaborative projects
listed above but through the training and introductory courses to CNC
technology that it ran. KIST not only helped firms in design but was an
important source of interfacing training and advice, (KIST engineers were
trained by Fanuc during KIST's first CNC project). Chapter 5 discussed
the reorganisation of the government—supported research institutes in
1981. Following this reorganisation, the researchers in the Precision
Machining Group were transferred to the new development centre at KIMM
in Changwon. However, only a few of the researchers remained at KIMM;
some started their own businesses while others went to work in the
research departments of various chaebol and technical departments in
Korean universities. The head of the group went to work in a university
in Taejon, and in this position continued to advise Firm H. However, in
1985 he left Korea to work for a Japanese company. KAIST has maintained
some interest in machine tool and manufacturing technology, but this is
principally in the fields of FMS and robotics development. Both these
areas are far removed from the type of technical support the majority of
the sample firms need.
As the NC centre at KIMM was established only in early 1933, the
centre was not involved in the development of CNC machine tools in any of
the nine firms. Furthermore, there seem to have been no significant links
between sample firms and the centre since its inception. One firm (A)
mentioned that KIMM had advised on the design of a standard machine tool
and Firm F hoped to undertake a specific project with KIMM to develop a
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high-precision spindle head. The main links that have been built up
between the firms and KIMM derive from KIMM's testing and inspection
functions. Most firms noted that for their machines to be approved they
had to liaise with KIMM, and advice on improvements they received in this
process was useful to them. Many of the firms' technical staff from the
firms also attended seminars on CNC and general machine tool technology
at KIMM.
The larger firms felt they had greater internal capabilities than
those available at KIMM, and, therefore, would not enter collaborative
projects with this institute. This was particularly noted by Firm A,
where the interviewee acknowledged that KIMM did advise on standard
machine tool design, but since they have no experience in the design of
special purpose machine tools, they were unable to help in the firm's main
product/design area. The firm also considered that it had developed
faster than the research institutes and for that reason received little
help from them. The R&D resources of Firms B and C were, indeed, both
technically far more advanced than KIMM. Firm B, however, recruited many
research students from KAIST to work in its own research centre. Firm F
was the only large producer to suggest a possible collaborative project,
but this was in the development of a specific component and not for the
development of an entire new machine.
While the large producers have become technologically self-reliant,
the small independent producers do not have the same resources, and, for
this type of firm, the KIST research group was a particularly important
source of technical support. Following the reorganisation of 1981, these
firms were therefore left without technical support. However, in the last
few years the small and medium firms have received technical help in the
design and interfacing of new machines through the SMIPC. Through this
organisation, firms have not only been able to collaborate with technical
personnel employed by the SMIPC, but through a special scheme some firms
have been given grants to employ foreign specialists to help with design
and production problems. The SMIPC also runs courses in CNC machine tool
operation, which prove beneficial both to the prospective CNC entrants and
to the growing number of small firms which are acquiring CNC machines.
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The Transfer of Technological Capabilities by the Transfer and Training
of Personnel
An important finding emerging from this study is that firms
acquired many technological capabilities, or improved existing
capabilities, through the direct training of their personnel by skilled and
experienced employees in other firms and institutes. Such transfer and
training of personnel was undertaken on both formal and informal levels,
and with both other producers and users. Formal transfer of these skills
came through the on—site training of personnel included in the details of
some licensing agreements and the employment of consultants to "trouble
shoot" and advise in Korean plants. Informal transfers occurred, for
example, when links were maintained with former licensors who continued
to advise Korean firms in their subsequent product developments, or when,
as in the case of Firm I, American engineers from a local joint-venture
company gave technical advice.
Table 6.8 below gives details of each firm's use of this technology
transfer method. ' (The transfer of interfacing skills from Fanuc, and
sometimes from KIST, has not been included as this occurred in nearly all
the firms.) Additionally, it should be noted that KIMM has also received
help and advice from several leading researchers into machine tool
technology from overseas. During these visits, the researchers advised
KIMM on its work, gave seminars for the research staff at KIMM and local
industrialists, and visited and advised local firms.
Amongst the firms, there are examples of this kind of technology
transfer in all four types of skill considered. One area which
particularly benefitted was production, where skills were transferred both
by personnel working and visiting in other plants and by visiting
specialists to the Korean plants. Benefits from improvements in
production techniques were two—fold: firstly, Korean producers were able
to raise the quality of the machines they were manufacturing, and,
secondly, they were able to improve their productivity. To a certain
extent, firms were also able to build up their own skills in this area
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through the operation of imported CNC machine tools, though the transfer
of personnel has proved more effective.
Table 6.8 Acquisition of Capabilities by Transfer and Training of Personnel in the Sample
Firms
Fin Capabilities Sained and Method of Transfer
A Most of the personnel in the design department have been trained either in Japan or
the US, Many engineers sent to licensor's plant in Japan for between three and six
months to undertake training, included in the licensing agreement,
0 Japanese engineers consulted with designers in Firm B as part of co-production
agreement to develop a machining centre, Several researchers in laser technology
sent to the US for training in both plants and universities,
C Large number of foreign engineers working in Korean plant, transferring some of their
knowledge to Korean workers, Many Korean employees have also been trained in Japan,
the US and Uest fiermany,
D Approximately 10 of the 40 engineers in the design department have undertaken some
training in Japan and employees from Japanese licensor trained personnel in Korean
plant, The firm has also maintained close advisory links with its former licensor,
E Close advisory links with former licensor have been maintained, Korean firm
undertook design work in co-production agreement with Japanese firm, One member of
staff was trained in Japan,
F Firm sent personnel to Japan and the US for training, Production engineering and
quality control both important aspects of this training, as well as acquisition of
new technology,
S Co-production agreement with Japanese firm which included several Koreans being
trained at the Japanese factory and Japanese engineer working in the Korean plant.
H Two members of the design staff had some training in Japan,
1 Technical advice in production from American engineers working at a separate
joint-venture company, Engineers and technicians in the firm were given some
training by a visiting foreign consultant, whose visit was subsidised by the SMIPC,
Source: Firm Oata
A high proportion of this type of technical transfer occurred as
part of the numerous licensing agreements Korean firms entered into:
Firms A, D, E, F and G, for example, all received training as part of their
licensing agreements. The collaborative work in the co—production
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agreements entered by Firms B and E also resulted in similar transfers of
knowledge. In this field, Firm A was the most aggressive: in interview, a
technical director stated that the firm always adds conditions for
engineers to be trained by the licensor whenever they buy in technology.
Rather suprisingly, many firms were able to maintain close advisory
links with former licensors, and through these links continued to obtain
advice on new product designs and interfaces, and on problems in
production and quality control. The reasons for licensors to allow these
links to continue are difficult to comprehend as they are no longer
receiving any financial benefit from giving this advice and they are
helping possible future competitors to develop more rapidly. Von Hippel,
however, suggests that in general, exchange of information in business
enterprises may proceed along informal channels constituted by personnel
with similar technical interests and may not Involve strategic business
deliberations (Von Hippel, 1987: 292)
Obviously, the greatest technical asset of Firm C has been its
ability to employ a very large number of highly qualified and experienced
engineers. For other firms, employment of foreigners on this scale would
prove very difficult. The chaebol firms which do have extensive links
abroad are able to employ consultants or send personnel abroad for
specific problems, but none of them have directly employed overseas
experts on a permanent basis. While the small firms have also obtained
help and advice from foreigners, for them the investment in such services
is costly and, consequently, are often regarded as an unaffordable luxury.
For these firms, the SMIPC has instituted a scheme which subsidises
visits of foreign consultants and which has made this source a more
feasible proposition for small firms.
In a similar fashion, the technological inter—firm linkages between
producers and users have also been important to the sample firms' overall
learning process. Although in these cases new technology was not
necessarily transferred, an enhancement of existing technological
capabilities did occur. This was the result of a build up of knowledge
of the operating parameters of machinery and an awareness of both
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potential problems and improvements. In this study the main examples of
this type of learning come from the interaction between machine tool and
vehicle producers. In the cases of Firms A and D, such links were
automatically created as they were an integral part of vehicle production
within their respective chaebol. However, other firms, including B, C and
F, have built up close links with vehicle and vehicle components producers
with similar effect. Two other user industries, mould producers and
electronics manufacturers, have also been important in this type of
learning process. In both these cases, the user industry provided the
main motivation for machine tool producers to expand their production
ranges and, as such, were an important spur to new technological
developments.
The general signifi^nce of personnel movement and on—site training
in technological transfer, and of interactive learning in capability
enhancement, must be underlined. Such direct methods of technology
acquisition are particularly important and effective when the skills
concerned are mainly or partly tacit in character. That is, certain skills
and capabilities cannot be easily formalised and incorporated in explicit
written directions. Indeed, the importance of tacit knowledge is very
great in many areas of engineering know—how. The depth of knowledge
that can be gained by watching others do things cannot in many cases be
secured through a set of instructions or blueprints, however explicit and
detailed.
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6,6 Made In Korea? The Indigenous Content of Korean CMC Machine Tools
Earlier chapters described and explained the reduction in vertical
integration in the production of CNC compared to conventional machine
tool manufacturing. For Korean producers, the majority of the components
required for CNC machine tool production have to be imported. Combined,
these components have a high value and account for a large proportion of
the final cost of the machine. This section examines the low indigenous
content of CNC machine tools manufactured by sample firms and discusses
the implications of firms' reliance on foreign components supplies. As
the lack of indigenous production of these critical components has been
noted as a major constraint on the development of an indigenous CNC
machine tool industry, this section also considers Korea's entry into the
production of components. Because the control unit alone is such a
high—cost component, and because of its importance to the production of
CNC machine tools, the relationship between sample firms and controls
producers is discussed separately in the next section, where attempts by
various Korean firms to enter production of control units are also
documented.
Respondents to questionnaires were asked roughly to break down the
total CNC machine cost into seven categories: viz., the costs of the
control unit, other components, raw materials, subcontracted work, factory
overheads and labour, combined design, development and research
expenditure, and, where applicable, payment of royalties. Typical examples
of these breakdowns for different types of machines covered are shown in
Table 6.9.
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Table Li Breakdown of CNC Machine Tool Cost (expressed as I of total costs)
CM Component Im al Machine







Control Unit 20 30 33 30 45
Other Components 5 20 22 IS 22
Raw Materials 30 15 5 10 9
Subcontracted Work S 5 0 20 2
Royalties 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Factory overheads
and labour costs
30 5 40 20 *>1» 1
Design, development
and research costs
7 15 0 5 0
a, Letters designate producing firm,
Source;Firm Data
This table shows that for the Korean producers a very high
percentage of the final cost of the machines manufactured is accounted
for by bought—in components: the control unit, other components, and raw
materials. Over the whole sample of firms, the proportional cost of these
three outlays accounted for between 557. and 86% of the total machine
cost. In all cases where royalties were payable, they were set at 3%, the
maximum value permitted through Korean legislation at the time. As Korea
does not yet have a network of specialist suppliers, a very high
proportion of the components which firms have to purchase also have to
be imported. Table 6.10 lists all the major components purchased by the
machine tool builders, divided into two categories: imported and
domestically produced.
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Other Small Machined Parts
Source:Firm Data and Interviews
This table shows that all the high precision, technically complex and
expensive components tend to be imported, while those with a relatively
low technical content are domestically supplied. This is the case for
both electrical and mechanical components. For most Korean producers,
imported materials and components account for at least 40% of the final
cost. Consequently, only a low proportion of the final CNC machine tool
cost is made up of labour costs, either directly in the firm or indirectly
through the production of components in Korea. Low labour costs, the
major traditional basis of Korea's competitive advantage in international
markets, therefore cannot contribute significantly to make Korea's CNC
machine tools cheaper than those produced in higher wage countries.
The high value and importance of imported components create further
disadvantages for Korean producers compared to manufacturers in countries
where these supporting suppliers are locally sourced. Firstly, the
barrier to entry of having to establish contact with potential suppliers
must be overcome in order to purchase the required parts. Korean firms
buy most of their imported components from suppliers in Japan. The
proximity of the two countries, and the widespread knowledge of the
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Japanese language amongst Koreans, have made It relatively easy for
Koreans to visit suppliers and discuss their requirements in detail. As
Japan is now the leading producer of CNC machine tools and has a thriving
components industry, this is the best source for the components that
Korean producers need to buy. Although Korean producers have an
advantage over more remote industries such as India's, through their close
proximity to a supplier nation, nevertheless, the Korean industry is still
at a disadvantage compared to those which can source components
domestically: the time delay in securing components can still be a serious
problem.
The second major disadvantage for Korean producers is the high cost
of imported components. Few Korean firms manufacture CNC machine tools
in such numbers that they can obtain quantity discounts from suppliers:
this applies to all types of components, including the control unit. Thus,
the components they import are very expensive compared to the price paid
by large-scale Japanese producers. In particular, all the firms stressed
that the price they paid for control units was very high compared to the
price paid by most Japanese producers. Jacobsson's analysis of possible
price reductions in components available to large manufacturers which buy
in bulk suggests that the total cost of raw materials and components may
be reduced by as much as 22% (1983: 200). In total machine tool cost,
this size of discount can give the large producers a 10% price advantage
over small producers. Jacobsson also claims (1983: 199) in the case of
one Korean producer (Firm B in this study) that this firm obtained
significant discounts in the purchase of control units from Fanuc.
However, interviews conducted in the course of this study cannot confirm
this claim.
Furthermore, the lack of a local network of specialist small firms
also means that very little of the basic machining work or part assembly
production is subcontracted by the sample firms. In general, the
proportion of total cost deriving from subcontracted work was less than
5%. In countries with a highly developed subcontracting system, producers
are able to reduce production costs by subcontracting this type of work.
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Reliance upon imported components and low levels of subcontracting
stem from the same problem, viz., the poor development of small specialist
firms. In the early 1980s, many Korean economists attributed the
relatively slow development of small and medium firms to the government's
earlier policy bias towards the heavy machinery and chemical industries
and the chaebol,* They also suggested that Korea may never develop a
network of small firms in this area. A "vicious circle" was identified
which was allegedly deterring development of new subcontracting firms: as
subcontracting was poorly developed, firms were discouraged from
specialising, and, by not specialising, the establishment of a
subcontracting network was further retarded, In Amsden and Kim's study,
this vicious circle was identified in the general machinery industry
(1986: 118-20). Their main evidence was that investment in new plant and
equipment by small and medium firms in this sector, and their expenditure
on R&D, accounted for only a small proportion of national levels compared
to their total share of the nation's employment and value added. However,
they also suggested other reasons for the retardation of these types of
firms. Firstly, they argued that subcontracting is typically undertaken
by many small firms clustered around large production units, but, as the
latter have only recently commenced manufacturing, the demand for
subcontractors is also a recent phenomenon. Secondly, they suggested
that subcontracting flourishes when large production units are unable to
cope with excess demand. But in Korea many of the large production units
continue to operate at less than full capacity, so there is little work
available for subcontractors to undertake.9 Nevertheless, they concluded
that with the maintenance of the government's defence-related support and
over—capacity in this industry, specialisation and subcontracting would
continue to be discouraged.
Although at the time of this study the indigenous content of the
machines being produced was low, there were then signs that Korea was
beginning to develop its components industry and that a network of
specialist producers and subcontracting firms was evolving. One of the
sample firms (C) commenced production of a small range of ball screws in
early 1985 and was planning to copy its imported precision screw cutting
machine in order to increase their output of this component. Although
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the lead screw thread and nut were being machined in Firm C's plant and
the finished components were being assembled in a special clean room, the
firm was still importing the precision ground steel balls used in the
rolling mechanism.
Another firm (B) had also begun to subcontract a large proportion of
its machining and assembly work. This firm had ceased its own
manufacture of some conventional machines and subcontracted their
production to smaller independent firms. Moreover, it has been shown
earlier that many of the chaebol are building up their own networks of
subcontractors. For example, a large market for Firm A's machine tools
are the subcontractors which undertake work on vehicle components for its
car production.
In 1985, a national plan to indigenise the production of certain
machine tool components was also published. Under this plan, KOMMA
announced that domestic firms would be "encouraged" to develop key
components of machine tools (Korea Economic Daily, 19 May 1985).1 0 The
Association had government backing for the plan through the Ministry of
Commerce and Industry. The plan designated one or more firms to develop
and produce ten different types of component. Significantly, the majority
of the firms nominated were medium-sized companies already producing
components, and only a few chaebol and machine tool producers were
chosen. The listed parts were: hydraulic valves, cylinders, motors and
chucks, steel balls, servo-motors, hydraulic terminal blocks, sol0noid
valves, pneumatic equipment, and safety equipment. Ball screws were not
on the list since limited production had already commenced, but the steel
balls which were being imported for their construction were included. It
should also be noted that the control unit was not included on this list.
The most technically complex part included in the plan is the servo¬
motor, and for its production two chaebols in the case study (B and C)
were nominated. While in the case of C the motors will probably be
produced by the machine tool division, in B it is highly likely that the
motors will be made by another division of the chaebol, which specialises
in electric motor manufacture. Other machine tool firms nominated to
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produce various parts were: Firm F for the production of hydraulic chucks,
and a non-CNC producer for the production of hydraulic terminal blocks.
Consequently, this study does not support Amsden and Kim's
conclusion that the general machinery industry has become stuck in a
vicious circle inhibiting the development of specialist firms. The
problem of a lack of small specialist firms may in reality only be a
transitory one for Korea's machine tool industry. It is quite plausible tKo.t
the production of components will only begin in earnest when there is
sufficient local demand, and thus the establishment of small specialist
firms depends on the prior build up of machine tool production. It
should not be expected to precede the development of this industry nor to
commence at the same time as its major user. Just as backward
integration into machinery production, discussed in Chapter 2, is widely
seen as a "natural" progression from manufacturing production, so the
development of specialist components producers and subcontractors should
also be thought of as a backward integration of the establishment of a
machinery industry.
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6.7 The Sourcing of Control Units and Korean Attempts at Controls
Production
Amongst components and parts bought in by machine tool producers,
the most expensive by far is the control unit. Table 6.9 shows that the
proportion of total machine cost accounted for by the control unit ranged
from 20% to 46%. This proportional cost varies significantly and is
dependent on the type and complexity of the machines produced. In
general, the cost of the control unit is relatively constant, so the
cheaper the machine is to produce, the higher the proportional cost of
the control unit. A lathe is the simplest and cheapest machine. It has
just one slide to be machined, and, since it has only two controlled axes,
it requires a small number of servo—motors. Thus, the proportional cost
of the control unit in a lathe is relatively high. By comparison, a
milling machine with 2^—axis control has more moving parts and three
machined slides; consequently, its construction requires more machining
and assembly work, as well as more servo—motors. Accordingly, the
proportional cost of its control unit is lower. Again, a machining centre
has even more complex mechanical parts and additional manufactured units,
such as the ATC, making the proportional cost of its control unit lower
still.11
The main supplier of control units to the Korean CNC producers is
Fanuc, and this company has been important in the training of Korean
personnel in interfacing skills. The first entrants obtained control units
direct from Fanuc in Japan, and Korean technicians, including several
researchers from KIST, undertook CNC courses at Fanuc's Japanese plant.
One early change in the relationship between the Korean machine tool
industry and Fanuc was the establishment by Fanuc 3nd Firm F of a
joint—venture company, Korea Numeric Corporation (KNC>, in 1978. Firm F
entered this joint—venture company with the intention of establishing
very close relations with Fanuc and developing new products with them.
At the foundation of KNC, Firm F had a 51% holding and Fanuc held the
remaining 49%. However, Firm F soon realised that it was not receiving
any of the anticipated technical or financial benefits from being part of
the joint—venture, and has since sold the majority of its holding to
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another Korean chaebol, retaining only a 7% holding. Despite its sale of
most of its holding in KNC, Firm F has maintained fairly close links with
KNC. The purchasing chaebol does not have any interest in the production
of machine tools, but it does have a separate agreement with Fanuc to
assemble, sell, and, eventually, to manufacture robots (Korea Herald. 2
June 1985).
KNC has four areas of business interest in Korea, namely, assembly
and sales of CNC control units, assembly and sales of mechatronics
products (electro-discharge machines and robots), cable winding, and
repairs and maintenance services for Fanuc products. The share of income
derived from each of these areas is shown in Table 6.11
Table 6.11 KNC's Income froi> Different Divisions





Repairs and Maintenance 7
Source: Fira data
In total, 90 people are employed by KNC, of which three are Japanese
and hold managerial positions; the remainder are all Korean. Of the
Korean employees, approximately 50 are women employed on cable winding.
This work is the simple manual task of winding different wires and cables
onto various looms. Most of the cables are shipped to Fanuc in Japan.
Eight people are employed to undertake repairs and maintenance work.
These services are arranged by Fanuc (in Japan) and Fanuc pay KNC for the
work done. The remaining employees are in the two assembly areas. For
this work, all parts and components are supplied by Fanuc and assembled
in the Korean plant, but the actual assembly work performed is very
limited. At the time of the interview, there were no plans to localise
the production of any of the parts or components used, although it was
suggested that if demand did increase substantially some parts may be
produced locally. All of the CNC control units, machines, and robots
produced at KNC are for the domestic market. Part of the work of the CNC
division is to assist and advise machine tool producers in Korea who are
developing CNC machines; it will advise on the choice of control unit and
motors, as well as on the general specifications of the machine.
The establishment of this joint venture was considered beneficial to
the existing CNC producers and to new entrants. Firstly, the domestic
location of a supplier reduced firms' waiting times for required parts.
Secondly, the domestic availability of a repair and maintenance facility
helped the sales of CNC machine tools on the domestic market, as users no
longer ran the risk of long down—times following a machine breakdown.
Thirdly, the advice and training available through this joint venture
considerably eased the cost and time involved in sending personnel to
Japan for training. In addition, the availability of local advice has
meant that producers can more easily discuss specifications of new
products and adaptations with personnel at KNC, rather than having to
deal with these over a distance. However, there has been no advantage to
the Korean producers in the field of controls technology, since production
was limited to very basic assembly work and all parts were imported.
Consequently, Fanuc has managed to keep its "black box" firmly shut.
Korean Attempts at Control Unit Production
While Firm F tried to increase its expertise in control units
through establishing a joint venture with Fanuc, there have been two
other attempts by firms to enter the production of controls units
independently. In 1980, a project to develop a control unit in the
Department of Industrial Electronics at KIST was initiated and funded by
Firm B.12 This firm had already gained some experience in the production
of CNC machine tools using imported (Fanuc) controls, but it was
becomCing especially apprehensive about potential increases in the price
of imported controls. This would make its CNC machines less competitive
on export markets, and anxiety about this possibility constituted a
primary reason for its interest in the indigenous production of controls,
Seven students, all with electrical/electronics backgrounds, worked on the
project, four of whom had originally been employed at Firm B's production
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plant. To familiarise themselves with the problems and technology of
machine tools control, the students all spent three months at the
Changwon plant learning how to operate CNC machines.
The development of the control unit took about two years, during
which time a working proto-type designed to control a lathe was built.
In 1981, three master's dissertations were submitted by researchers who
had been working on the project. These looked at the system design and
software, the servo-controller, and the manual data input and display
system (KAIST, 1981: 101). The project developed a differential analyser,
hardwired interpolator, servo-controller, and related software and
hardware. The hardware used three Motorola microprocessors, while memory
was mostly on ROMs. For the interpolator and software algorithms, RAMs
could have been used, but as the technology was still at an experimental
stage, and the most important consideration for the research team was
that the proto-type should be reliable and satisfy the original
specification, the researchers decided to use the more reliable ROM
technology. While the microprocessor technology did not cause any
problems, the differential analyser was very difficult to design. In the
final prototype, the differential analyser consisted of about 200 small
circuit boards.
In 1982, the division to which Firm B belongs was re—structured and
a technical centre for the division was established at Inchon (the R&D
work undertaken at this centre was discussed earlier). With this change
in location of R&D, and a change in technology policy in the division, the
controls project was dropped. The researchers from the project remained
in the employment of the heavy engineering division of Chaebol B, and all
went to work at the new R&D centre at Inchon.
While CNC control units have not been subsequently experimented
with at the research centre at Inchon, other forms of controls technology
have been developed by the original researchers from the KIST controls
project. As noted earlier, two types of laser machines have been
developed by this centre and they are both controlled by a basic
two—dimensional control unit designed and built by the research centre.
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A separate group within the research centre works on robot design and
development, and, again, the centre developed its own control unit for the
robot they produced. This unit controls five axes of movement on the
robot, and a sixth axis can be added by the firm if the client requires
it. The controller can also be connected to various sensory devices,
including visual sensors (Korean Business Review. Sept. 1985: 66).
Following the joint project between KIST and Firm B, the Department
of Industrial Electronics continued with the same type of work, but no
further work on machine tool controls has since been undertaken. In
1980, a simple point-to-point control was developed with an electronics
company; this control was for a machine which automatically inserted
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printed circuit boards. Subsequently, a continjpus path controller was
developed, and research on robot control has been undertaken. A few of
the controls researchers moved to the Numerical Control Centre at KIMM,
but most of their work there has centred on robotics and software
development.
One other firm (C) has produced a control unit. This was, however,
a very new development in 1985 and only a few had been fitted to basic
CNC milling machines which were solely for sale on the domestic market.
These units were not to be sold to other machine tool producers, and the
firm had no intention of becoming a controls unit supplier. As described
earlier, this control unit was developed within the firm principally by
Japanese engineers employed on the project. By the firm's own estimate
of its technology, this control unit was at least five, and probably ten,
years behind the control units being produced by Fanuc at the time. The
firm, however, hoped that it would be able to produce them at a lower
cost than it had to pay for bought—in components, and would thus be able
to compete at the very basic end of the domestic market.
It is difficult to evaluate the future prospects for this control
unit on international markets. With continued development to acceptable
standards, the firm does have a ready market in its two German
subsidiaries. Furthermore, having already established a service network
in the US and in Europe for its machine tools, the addition of controls
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repairs and maintenance would be fairly easy. With a suitable product,
entry into the international market would therefore not be too difficult
for this firm. Nevertheless, there are still large technical problems for
the Koreans if they are going to develop competitive control units.
Moreover, the Korean producer does not yet have adequate technical
back-up from the domestic electronics industry. Although Korea is a very
large chip producer, there is little design or production of customised or
semi-customised chips, the major electronic component of the control unit.
The development of a technically competitive product could take the firms
many more years. However, the introduction of higher capacity and faster
programmable chips may mean that future controls developments will be
more dependent on software skills than on electronics design and
production skills. Developments such as these would considerably help
Korean (and Taiwanese) producers in their controls developments. Even
with the production of a competitive control unit, Korean producers would
still have some problems introducing them into foreign markets.
Although no other producers were directly engaged in the research
and development of a control unit in 1985, there were indications that
some manufacturers were looking at alternative controls suppliers to
Fanuc. In Firm B some attempts at changing its reliance on Fanuc as its
major controls supplier were being undertaken. The firm uses a German
control unit on one of its machining centres and in 1983 it entered a
co—production agreement with Toshiba for the production of a machining
centre utilising Toshiba controls. Through this agreement, the firm was
hoping to undertake some of the production work on the control unit and
learn about its technology. The firm had found, however, that little of
the control unit technology was being transferred and was approaching
Toshiba to try to re—negotiate the agreement into a full licensing
agreement which would incorporate some rights to technical information on
the control unit. Firm I also suggested that in future it may buy
controls from the US. The control unit it anticipates using is a modified
IBM pc, which is utilised by the American firm with which it was
contemplating a licensing agreement. The Korean company would acquire




An adequate understanding of the means and problems of technology
acquisition in this area involves considerations usually thought to belong
to engineering, to business strategy, and to politics. Nor is it
appropriate, except by convention, to treat each element separately. For
example, government policy in Korea has directly influenced the business
environment for machine tool producers; discussions about entry into
technologically complex areas have taken into account government
initiatives affecting both machine tool makers and their users; and close
business links between producers and their customers have encouraged
specific types of technological innovations.
Chapter 3 noted that a range of skills ds required to design and
manufacture CNC machine tools, and the nature of these skills depends to
a great extent on the complexity of the machine being developed. What
are these skills, and to what extent have Korean CNC producers
successfully mastered them? Analysts of the CNC machine tool industry
have considered interfacing skills to be particularly problematic for
conventional machine tool firms, because these are not skills used in
conventional machine tool production. In fact, the acquisition of these
skills was not difficult for the Korean CNC entrants to acquire because
of the high levels of technical support offered by controls vendors.
Thus, the business strategy of controls suppliers considerably reduced
the potential barrier to entry formed by these skills.
The study has shown that experience in the use of conventional
machine tools greatly facilitated firms' entry into their construction.
Yet the same pattern is not observed in the case of CNC machines.
Although several producers bought CMC machines to learn about their
operation, they still needed additional help in raising the levels of their
production capabilities. In several firms, the initial quality of CNC
production was very low. In the main, skills in this area were gained
through the training of Korean personnel in foreign plants or the
employment of foreign experts in Korean firms. Firms have also had
considerable difficulties acquiring design capabilities, and there are
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still some gaps in this area. The complexity of the machines being
developed appears to have been a major influence on the extent to which
design skills have been absorbed. Firms have had little difficulty with
the development of either retro-fitted or basic CNC machine tools, but
have had serious problems with more complex machines, and especially
machining centres.
The mastering of controls production also presents very substantial
problems of technological complexity. The electronics and software
capabilities required for effective entry to controls production still
have not been attained to an adequate level in Korea. Moreover, because
the controls business also involves comprehensive repairs and maintenance
support, prospective entrants must not only invest heavily in the
acquisition of technology but also in the establishment of a network
which can offer such support. However, Korean firms have entered the
manufacture of less technically complex components used in CNC machine
tool production, e.g., the ball screw and. to a lesser extent,
servo—motors.
The study has also noted the importance of firms' size and
structure. Small firms have had great difficulties acquiring imported
technology, largely because they have been unable to negotiate effectively
with foreign technology suppliers. The large independent firm <F> did use
licensing agreements, and is now widely considered to be the leading
problem solver in the Korean industry. This firm has also established
close technological inten—firm linkages with manufacturers in several
industries. . The chaebol firms have entered the CNC industry either to
manufacture machines for the general market or, specifically, to support
their own vehicle manufacturing. In the latter case, products have been
directly related to and aimed at their own vehicle production needs. The
chaebol firms have developed very rapidly; they had the resources to
invest in training and the ability to import technology. Importantly,
they were able to negotiate effectively for the transfer of technology in
licensing agreements. Such firms have also benefitted from facilities
available to them through activities within the group. Two firms have
had access to design and development support from other parts of the
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group. Firms manufacturing for vehicle divisions enjoy very close links
with this production area, enabling them to collaborate closely on new
developments and to rapidly and automatically receive feedback on their
machines.
Most of the sample firms — chaebol or independent — have mainly
manufactured machine tools for the domestic market, and because of this
orientation, firms have been heavily influenced by the specific machinery
requirements of Korea's growing manufacturing industries. The Korean
government protected the domestic market in areas where indigenous
machines were of a satisfactory standard, but the government was careful
not to disadvantage users, by allowing them to import machinery if
domestically manufactured equivalents were sub—standard. The government
also delegated some areas of protection to a para^statal organisation to
which both machine tool producers and users belonged. As well as
protecting the domestic market, the government gave machine tool
producers a range of incentives, including subsidised credit. Whether
intentionally or not, it would appear that the government successfully
distributed these funds to the firms most able to accumulate
technological capabilities rapidly. Most of the loans went to chaebol
firms, but leading independent companies were also given extensive
financial and technical support. Although Korean CNC firms, with
government promotion, are building up an export capacity, this has so far
been a minor part of the Korean story.
This study also documents the wide variety of learning methods used
to acquire technology and to build up capabilities in the design and
production of CNC machine tools. The most effective methods have been
the use of licensing agreements, design and production support given by
KIST, and the transfer of skills by the circulation and interchange of
personnel. A notable feature of the learning process followed by several
firms was their initial experimentation with the new technology before
they entered formal technology agreements. That is to say, they
deliberately and effectively "prepared to learn". Firms frequently
imported CNC machinery and developed retro-fitted or basic machines, in
order to familiarise themselves with their technology and operation.
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These firms, therefore, built up a knowledge—base on the technological
capability requirements of the product, as well as an assessment of their
own abilities, and, importantly, the skills they needed to acquire and the
production areas which had proved problematic. The firms also became
aware of the high costs and difficulties they would encounter if they
continued to try to develop entirely new machines themselves. With this
knowledge in hand, firms were able to stipulate the precise terms of
agreements and ensure that the particular skills which they needed were
transferred. Having prepared to learn, the firms were able to take a
very active posture in the negotiation and operation of formal technology
transfer agreements.
In their initial CNC developments, several firms were given extensive
support by a group of researchers at KIST. As part of the government's
1982 reorganisation of industrial research institutes, KIMM was intended
to take over this support function, but this has yet effectively to
materialise. For the large chaebol producers, the lack of this
collaborative option in new developments is not important. These firms
have all developed adequate skills in-house, and have the contacts and
finances available to undertake their own R&D. For the independent firms,
the loss of such technical support could have been catastrophic,
especially for the smaller firms which have great difficulties in
importing technology. However, the services offered to these firms by
the SMIPC appear to have bridged this gap most effectively.
Finally, the study has emphasised the importance of personnel
movement, direct training and working contacts in the development of
technological capabilities. Such transfers occurred in all capability
areas: design, production, interfacing, 3nd R&D. These methods of
technology transfer enabled firms to build up capabilities of a tacit
nature, which could not be effectively transferred through written
instructions or drawings. The directness of contact between machine tool
builders and users, especially with firms in the vehicle industry, seems
to have been an important mechanism by which skills have been enhanced.
Through interactive learning, machine tool producers have been actively
engaged with users, have been able to gain a greater understanding of the
296.
special requirements of these firms, and to develop specialised skills to
meet their needs. The chaebol structure constitutes an environment for
the formation and maintenance of these kinds of interaction, though




1. Jacobsson (1983, 1984, 1985 and 1986) undertook fieldwork in Korea
on the CNC lathe industry earlier in the 1980s, and all of the firms
used in his study are also covered here. While the present study is
more detailed, many of the findings are basically compatible with
his work, and, where there is an overlap, points of contact are noted
in the discussion passim.
2. Obedience to the government's wishes by the chaebol was not entirely
an altruistic and nationalistic posture. For example, Chaebol B
received a considerable number of very large defence contracts, and
these may have been put in jeopardy if it had not entered industries
which the government wanted to promote. The government, therefore,
used "sticks" as well as "carrots" in its promotion of some
industries.
3. Most of these foreign workers are "Moonies", and this affiliation is
their main motivation for wanting to work for this Korean company.
4. Chatter occurs when the cutting tool vibrates during the cutting
process. This results in a very rough uneven edge.
5. There are some very advanced FMSs in which the tooling in the
turret may be automatically changed using robotic arms. However,
these advanced systems are rare and are not used on stand-alone
complex lathes or in FMCs. The design of this sort of tool handling
system is therefore not yet a consideration for the Korean
producers.
6. Since the NICs only manufacture and sell CNC machine tools in the
world market at the lowest end (i.e., the cheapest and most basic
types of machines), it may be considered that NIC producers are not
direct competitors with the Japanese. Further, as the NICs export
few CNC machine tools to Japan, they cannot be seen as competitors
to Japanese producers in their most important market. It is
therefore questionable whether Fanuc was actually selling to
competitors of Japanese CNC producers, or whether, by contrast, it
was selling to a different sector of the market.
7. Fanuc offers additional features on its control units which may be
utilised by the customer on payment of a higher price. These
features include items such as larger memories, "canned cycles"
(short programs of frequently used or complex cutting cycles which
may be run by a single command, and thereby considerably reduce
programming time), and the control of an extra axis. These features
may be software— or hardware—dependent and are sometimes built
into the control unit but only activated by a Fanuc technician
opening the control unit once they have been paid for. Although
some firms do open the "black box" in order to use these features,
to adapt other features, or to add components, this is strictly
against Fanuc's sales contract.
298.
8. See, for example, Kim Jae Won (1983).
9. Amsden and Kim (1986: 119) also comment that in some countries
subcontracting is stimulated by differences in wages and employment
practices between contractor and contractee. In this field, they
note that, as most chaebol labour is non-unionised, and wages and
conditions are only marginally above those in smaller firms, this
motive is weak in Korea.
10. The methods by which the firms would be encouraged was not
elaborated in the outline of this plan. However, it is highly likely
that the firms would be given a monopoly on domestic production of
the listed components for several years, and that the domestic
market would be protected to a certain extent.
11. This is not to say that all control units are of the same price, as
the price of control units does vary depending on their
sophistication and modernity, but this variation in price is much
less than the variation in the production costs for manufacturing
the different types of machines.
12. The department at KIST involved in this project was the Department
of Industrial Electronics. Collaborative projects on the design of
CNC machines (discussed in previous sections) were undertaken by a
different department at KIST, the Precision Machining Group.
CHAPTER SEVEN
The Development of the Korean Machine Tool Industry
in Comparative Perspective:
The Cases of Japan and Taiwan
7.1 Introduction
Korea's economic and technological development has not occurred in
isolation. Japan has provided a powerful model, while Taiwan has followed
a development strategy different from Korea's. Indeed, some writers
point to Korea as an imitator of Japan's successful development strategy,
and comparisons between Korea and Taiwan form a part of the literature
on NIC development.1 What can be learned by comparing the machine tool
industries of Korea, Japan and Taiwan? Is Korea, in fact, following the
Japanese model in this area? And is it likely to be able to do so with
similar success? How has Japan's prior entry into the machine tool
industry, and its current technical and market dominance, influenced
Korea's entry? What are the similarities and differences in the
development strategies of the two East Asian NICs, 'Taiwan and Korea? And
in particular, what have been the effects of Taiwan's concentration on the
export market for machine tools compared to Korea's relatively greater
focus on production for domestic consumers?
A major aim of this chapter is to examine how the factors which
were influential on the development of the Korean machine tool industry
affected the industry in these other two countries. The previous chapter
considered four major factors which influenced the build up of
technological capabilities in the Korean machine tool industry: the
domestic market, promotion of the industry by government, the structure
of conglomerate firms (.chaebols), and the acquisition of foreign
technology through licensing agreements, accompanied by learning by
hiring and by training. Accordingly, treatment of the Japanese and
Taiwanese experiences will focus on the same range of factors.
Obviously, certain factors relevant to the experience of some countries
will be less relevant to that of others. For example, in Korea's machine
tool industry dependence on foreign suppliers of critical components was
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important, as it is in Taiwan. However, given the self-sufficiency of the
Japanese industry, there is no such dependence.
There is a rich secondary literature on the general patterns of
Japanese, and to a lesser extent, Taiwanese industrial development.
Indeed, much of that literature is partly concerned with the machinery
sector. Since this chapter considers the Japanese experience almost
solely as a possible pattern for, and influence on, the Korean machine
tool industry, this secondary literature can only be briefly summarised
and pointed to in references. The secondary sources are supplemented by
data collected during a series of interviews undertaken by the author
with several large machine tool producers in Japan and Taiwan in summer
1985. Interviews in Taiwan followed a similar structure to the Korean
study, concentrating on sources of technology, acquisition of design
capabilities, etc. Interviews in Japan also assessed technological
development, the supply of technology and training from Japan to Korean
licensees, and Japanese perception of Korea's development.
7.2 Japan: Towards Technology Leadership
The comparison between the Japanese and Korean machine tool
industries is not a wholly academic exercise. Korea has been extremely
interested in the Japanese experience, and has sought, in many areas, to
emulate Japanese development patterns. For example, the important Korean
car industry has attempted to copy what it perceives as Japanese
structures, especially the development of in-house capabilities to produce
machine tools in order to support vehicle production. Similarly, the
chaebol are building up their own networks of sub—contractors, like those
surrounding the keiretsu. Nevertheless, Korea has not made a systematic,
coherent, and deliberate effort to understand and copy the Japanese
experience. The influence of the Japanese model has been largely
piecemeal, informal and pragmatic. Korea has recognised very significant
differences in its economic environment compared to Japan's. Importantly,
Korea's development has been financed by foreign indebtedness, making it
the fourth largest debtor nation in the world. Moreover, Korea's domestic
market is much smaller than Japan's, with enormous consequences for its
production strategies. Korea has had to be much more export orientated
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than Japan. As shown earlier, Korea entered some industries, e.g. colour
television production, solely for export purposes.
Such structural differences make a point-by-point comparison of
Japan and Korea problematic. Most significantly, the economic and
technological environment faced by Korean machine tool firms since their
entry in the mid-1970s has been fundamentally shaped by the historical
fact of Japanese technological and market domination. Following Japan's
industry into the world market presents both problems and opportunities.
The scale of resources needed to mount a sustained technological
challenge to a market dominated by Japan would tax the capacities of even
the most dedicated country. On the other hand, following such a
successful pioneer - even when it dominates the market to the extent
Japan does - makes learning easier and allows movement into gaps in the
market created by changes in Japanese competitiveness.2
The Japanese machine tool industry, of course, started to develop
more than 20 years before the Korean. In order to make a direct
comparison of factors, such as general industrial growth, market
orientation, and the effect of government measures, the status of the
Japanese industry in the 1950s and 1960s must be assessed. And the
differences between the present status of the two national industries
must also be examined: firstly, because Korean export industries are
having to compete directly on the world market against the fully
developed Japanese industries. If Korea is going to maintain its
industrialisation, it must ensure that its industries, both
export—orientated and import substituting, will be competitive with those
of Japan. (Those manufacturing mainly for the domestic market must, in
the long run, also become competitive since it is unlikely that they will
be afforded protection from imports indefinitely.) And, secondly, such an
examination of the later development of the Japanese industry will allow
an assessment of possible future development paths for Korea.
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7.2.1 Historical Differences
There are three major relevant differences in the character of the
industrial backgrounds from which Korea and Japan commenced their modern
machine tool production. These concern the available skills and plant at
the beginning of their respective enterprises, their development
strategies, especially in reference to military considerations, and the
sources of the technology drawn upon.
Japan and Korea started their major industrial expansions from very
different points. Japan began that expansion already possessing a basic
industrial structure, extensive infrastructure, and an accumulation of
technological and manufacturing skills acquired from high levels of
industrial production before and during the War. South Korea started
from a much lower point. It also commenced its development just after
the end of a war. The 1950-53 War had destroyed virtually its whole
infrastructure, most of its agricultural production, and decimated all its
cities except one. However, even before this mass destruction, South
Korea had no significant industrial experience: the majority of power
production and heavy industry was located in the north and was therefore
lost to South Korea after the 1945 division. Furthermore, the industrial
capability that had existed before and during World War II was controlled
by the Japanese occupying forces, and many skilled Korean workers had
been used as forced labour in Japan (over a million of these returned to
Korea between 1945 and 1950). Following Japan's surrender, 700,000
Japanese civilians, who had formed the core of managerial and technical
expertise, left Korea and returned home. Korea's industrial capacity
declined rapidly between 1945 and 1950, and there was mass unemployment
among existing workers, returning war workers, and the large numbers of
refugees from North Korea.3 The first stage of Korea's development post-
1953 was to re-establish an infrastructure and its agricultural base, and
early government priorities were focused on agricultural reform and the
re-establishment and expansion of an educational system. It was not
until these aims had been attended to that any serious form of industrial
development was considered. When Korea did start to expand her
industries, the only indigenous industry of any size was textiles. In all
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other industrial sectors, the country was basically starting from scratch.
Thus, while the only import Japan needed for its rapid industrial
expansion was technology, Korea required the whole range of plant and
skills, from choosing and buying equipment, installing, operating and
maintaining it, to the marketing skills needed to sell the final product.
Japan's and Korea's motivations for developing indigenous industries
were very different, and these reasons have been embedded in their recent
histories. After World War II, Japan's defence spending was severely
limited. The development of heavy industries was seen as a way of
raising the general wealth of the country and the standard of living of
its population. Conversely, the Korean government's main priority since
1953 was and still is national security and the maintenance of forces to
protect itself from the perceived threat of invasion from the North.
Chapter 5 noted that Korea's entry into the heavy and chemical industries
was directly related to its drive to build up its own defence industries,
especially following policy statements in the US during the early 1970s
that America's contribution towards defence forces in Korea was to be
reduced. Japan's industrialisation has therefore been directed towards
the expansion of civilian industries, whereas Korea's expansion was
orientated towards the support of its own defence production.
Both Japan and Korea were, of course, considerably influenced, in
different ways, by the US in their respective post-War years: Japan was
occupied by the US directly after World War II, American policy acting to
ensure that Japan did not rebuild its military machine, whereas Korea
continues to receive substantial military support from the US. A main
purpose of the occupation was the stabilisation of the Japanese economy,
so that Japan would, as soon as possible, cease to be a drain on American
resources. By the early 1950s, Japan was able to take advantage of US
needs for military procurement, and became a major workshop and arsenal
for the US forces during the Korean War. The Korean War also brought
Japan and the US closer together politically, as America realised that
Japan could be an important ally in the Pacific (Patrick and Rosovsky,
1976: 55). A major addition to America's military support of Korea was
development aid. (Up to the mid-1960s, the US was Korea's most important
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source of grant-aid.) It has also been suggested that Korea moved into
international trade and exports, rather than developing as a siege
economy, as the result of American aid and advice (Nolan, 1986: 92).
Moreover, the world in which each country was developing changed
significantly in the 20-year gap between Japan's and Korea's entry into
manufacturing industry and world markets. The main source of technology
licences was very different for Korea in the 1970s than it had been for
Japan in the 1950s. Japan had licensed most of its technology from the
US, whereas Korea was able to license most of its required new technology
from Japan. Korea also commenced exporting to a radically different
world market from the one that Japan first entered. From the 1970s
onwards, industrialised countries have been far more aware of the
damaging effects of large-scale imports from industrialising countries on
their own manufacturing industries, and, in general, the industrialised
world began then to defend its own markets by erecting trade barriers
which attempt to regulate imports from several NICs as well as from
Japan. In addition, in many of the world markets that Korea was and is
now entering it faces major competition from established Japanese
producers. Japan's competition as it entered world markets came from
established and relatively inefficient producers in the industrialised
world.
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7.2.2 Infrastructural and Governmental Support for Developing
Industries
In both Japan and Korea, the role of government in assisting and
directing the expansion of the machine tool industries and appropriate
infrastructure has been important. In this area, there have been
significant similarities in government action. Any industry requires
basic infrastructural support. Both Japan and Korea have invested heavily
in their infrastructures in order to support development. Korea's task in
building up its infrastructure was more difficult than Japan's, as Japan
had been left with some of its basic infrastructure intact after the
Pacific War. To help certain industrial sectors in their development, the
Korean government established special industrial sites, on which all the
required infrastructure was installed by government.
The level of education of a country's workforce, of course, affects
the type of work that can be successfully undertaken. The establishment
and continued funding of an educational system is an important role of
government and both the Japanese and Korean governments attended to this
at an early stage. In 1947, Japan made nine years of schooling
compulsory and introduced the basic organisational structure of the
American school system. Voluntary further education was expanded and an
increasing number of students took advantage of these opportunities. The
Japanese workforce is now one of the most highly educated in the world.
Korea has similarly emphasised education in relation to industry. By the
mid-1970s, the proportion of 17-year olds in formal education in Korea -
although still less than in Japan - exceeded the rate in the UK (Golladay
and King, 1979: 154).
Specific policies were also implemented by the government in each
country to encourage economic growth and industrialisation. The measures
introduced by the Korean government in the 1960s were mainly aimed at
the expansion of export (mostly light) industries and were different from
the Japanese government's early encouragement of domestically orientated
heavy industries. However, the policies of both governments (Japan's in
the 1950s and Korea's in the 1970s) promoting the development of heavy
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industries bear striking similarities, as do the specific measures
introduced to promote the machine tool industries. In both countries, the
expansion and entry into the heavy and chemical industries occurred as a
direct result of government policy. Large modern steel mills,
shipbuilding yards, oil refineries, chemical works, and metal working
factories were all constructed during this early phase of technology— and
skill—intensive industrial development. Entry into these industries by
Korea coincided with Japan's contraction of its polluting heavy and
chemical industries.
Government promotion of machine tool industries in both countries
included the use of subsidised loans encouraging producers to invest in
capital equipment. But only in Korea were firms encouraged to establish
new plants on an industrial site purpose—designed and built for machinery
production, and only in Korea were exporters favoured in the allocation of
subsidised loans. Low-interest financing was also made available to
domestic user industries for the purchase of new domestically
manufactured machinery in each country.* Such funding was of particular
importance to the machine tool industry, since it considerably increased
domestic demand, as well as allowing the industry to renew its own
production equipment.
Both governments also protected the domestic market, without
penalising machinery users, by only barring imports of machines which
could be domestically produced to satisfactory standards. In neither
country was protection given for very sophisticated machines nor for
domestically manufactured machines which were sub-standard. In Japan,
high-quality machine tools were allowed to be imported tariff-free from
1952, the government only restricting the import of standard machine
tools which would compete with domestically made goods. Tariffs
continued to be used as a mechanism to protect the domestic market even
after some areas of Japanese trade had been liberalised in the 1960s and
1970s. In the 1970s, tariffs of between 10% and 20% were applied to
imported machine tools, the size of tariff depending on whether or not
the imports competed with domestic production. Protection of the
domestic market ceased in 1983, when all tariffs on imported machine
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tools were finally lifted (Chokki, 1986: 137). Thus, Japanese machine tool
producers enjoyed varying degrees of protection on their domestic market
for over 30 years.
In contrast, in Korea the final reponsibility for regulating the
importation of high—value machinery was delegated to a parastatal
organisation, KOSAMI, to which all of the major machinery manufacturers
belonged. Because of mounting global pressure against trade restrictions,
especially from the US, and an increasing attitude of laissez-faire in the
mid-1980s, the Korean government has reduced the protection of its
domestic market. The effects of this early liberalisation of machinery
imports on the Korean industry are not yet known.s
The Japanese government at various times tried to limit competition
on the domestic machine tool market by restricting the number of
producers and encouraging firms to merge. Through the 1956 Temporary
Measures for the Development of the Machinery Industry Law, a
rationalisation plan for the machine tool industry was drawn up with the
aid of the Japanese Machine Tool Builders Association (JMTBA). This plan
called, firstly, for production of machine tools to be concentrated so
that producers would benefit from economies of specialisation, secondly,
for an increase in the standardisation of machine tool parts, and, thirdly,
for the establishment of collaborative research. In the implementation of
this plan, firms were encouraged to concentrate on their existing
products and not to enter new product areas. A later version of the plan
in 1961 (using a five-year extension to the 1956 law) also aimed to
concentrate production and recommended "appropriate" batch sizes for the
manufacture of various types of machines (Fransman, 1986a: 193). In the
mid 1960s, MITI considered that the industry was still not concentrated
enough and, as demand declined, that producers were becoming too
competitive. Firms were encouraged to cooperate in groups, and firms
manufacturing machines which were not of an adequate standard, or in
which machine tools only formed a small proportion of total output, were
recommended to discontinue production (Chokki, 1986: 142). While these
measures had some success in the short term, in the longer term most
producers re-entered and fierce competition on the domestic market has
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remained.* Similarly, Korea's government has limited competition by
declaring which firms can produce certain items. In particular, it limited
competition in the production of vehicles. The Korean government has
also forced firms to merge in an attempt to reduce the effects of some
of the mistakes of over-expansion in the heavy and chemical industries.
As shown in Appendix 2, this type of measure has been used recently to
merge a failing machine tool producing firm (Firm E in the case study)
with a more successful one (D).
In both countries, government—funded research institutes were
established to support the technical development of many industries,
including the machinery sector. In Japan, the major collaborative projects
were government— or Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)—
instigated and involved several firms, while in Korea the projects
involved only individual firms and the research institute - often at the
firm's request. Large collaborative projects in Japan have all included a
base of research work into new technologies and have been undertaken by
teams from several firms.7 The Korean projects, at KIST, were all
undertaken in the very early stages of CNC development and were directly
developmental and problem—solving in character with no significant
research content. Although the Korean government did reorganise its
research institutes to form laboratories which were more industrially
orientated, the institute for the machinery industries (KIMM) does not
seem to have carried out any significant development work with the CNC
machine tool producers.
The direct effect of government intervention on industrial
development is a fundamental issue in development economics. A notable
feature of government's action in both countries has been their control
of foreign exchange, enabling them to direct credit to the specific
industries they wanted to promote. The overall role of the government,
and especially MITI, in Japanese development has been greatly debated.
Patrick and Rosovsky suggest that the principal motor behind Japan's
growth has been the private sector, but they conclude that, by protecting
the domestic market, accelerating development of key industrial sectors,
and providing infrastructure, government has made growth easier (1976:
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20, 47-48). However, it is clear that the Japanese government did more
than provide an environment. For example, Ozawa argues that
CGlovernment control over technology imports was
tantamount to the control over the direction of
industrialisation and structural change. In fact, MITI
initially did use technology imports as a means of
orchestrating the reconstruction and expansion of Japanese
industry (1985: 229).
While MITI did have considerable influence over which companies were
given access to specific new technologies, the number of competing firms
and the size of newly constructed plants, its power over Japanese
industries should not be overestimated. Vehicle producers refused to
follow MITI's instructions to reduce the number of competing firms, and,
in the case of the steel industry, MITI was unable to stop two firms
obtaining different technologies from the one it was promoting at the
time.*
In both Japan and Korea, governments did actively influence and
promote the early and rapid development of their machine tool
industries.* The most important and effective measures introduced by
these governments were the initial provision of subsidised funding to
specific firms and the continuing selective protection of the domestic
market. These measures helped firms establish themselves and expand
their productive abilities, while ensuring them a market for their
products. Additional government measures were also used to enlarge
domestic markets and to encourage the purchase of domestically produced
machinery. (Chapter 4 showed that this measure was also effectively used
by the Italian government to support its machine tool industry.)
However, in both countries a machinery industry would almost
certainly have eventually developed without government intervention,
though probably at a later time. And, if this were so, then, during that
period of delay, each country's machine tool users, especially the vehicle
industries, would not have enjoyed the technical support of a developed
indigenous machinery industry. The absence of such support may have
been detrimental to their purchase, modification and expansion of
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manufacturing plant. The early competitiveness of machine—using
industries may therefore have been promoted by government policies
encouraging the existence of an indigenous capability in machine tool
production.
Unfortunately, the only material dealing with the direct role of
these governments in the acquisition of imported technology and in the
negotiation of terms pertains to other industries, mostly very large
technology importation projects such as steel production, chemicals, and,
in the case of Korea, nuclear power. In these sectors, the governments
of both countries were highly interventionist in their regulation of the
conditions of technology agreements, working to ensure that technology
was effectively transferred and assimilated.10 In the machine tool
industry, there does not seem to have been any explicit government
intervention in individual agreements, either in Japan or Korea. The
agreements were, of course, regulated by government—imposed general
conditions pertaining to all technology imports, such as set maximum
levels for royalty payments and duration of agreements.
7.2.3 The Domestic Market and Links between Users and Producers
Perhaps the single most important consideration in the development
of Japan's and Korea's machine tool industries has been the size and
nature of their respective domestic markets. The effects of these
markets on the career of the two industries are three-fold. Firstly, the
size of the domestic market influences which products can be made for
that market at an economic scale. Domestic demand below a certain level
means either that the product is not made indigenously, or that a part of
domestic production must be exported to make the enterprise economically
viable. Secondly, the structure of domestic manufacturing influences
which types of machines are required on that market, and, hence, the types
manufactured by the domestic industry and the capabilities which are
absorbed into the industry. Thirdly, the existence of a substantial
domestic market means that opportunities exist for the machine tool
industry to develop in concert with the needs of the users of its
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products. A close relationship between machine tool producers and local
consumers enables the former to understand and quickly to respond to the
changing requirements of its customers. In the absence of such domestic
links, machine tool producers may find themselves obliged to follow
technological leads of other national industries, and, moreover, at the
cost of some delay. Such industry-user links have, for example, been
noted in the case of the Swiss machine tool industry and its close
association with the high-precision watchmaking industry. In Japan, the
requirements of the vehicle industry have been decisive, and in Korea a
similar situation is evolving. Needless to say, such domestic capabilities
are of enormous benefit to machine tool users as well as producers, and
the long-term success of users works to the benefit of machinery
producers.
In both countries, the domestic market absorbed most of the early
increase in production. In order to supply increasing domestic
consumption of machine tools, between 1955 and 1961 Japan's production
rose 22 times by value while exports only increased three-fold (see Table
7.1). Production and consumption both slumped in the mid-1960s, but rose
again rapidly in the late 1960s and early 1970s. During this period MITI
set an export target of 20% to be reached by 1970. However, because the
domestic market was expanding, most machine tool builders concentrated on
supplying domestic requirements before exporting, and this export target
was not reached until the mid-1970s (Vogel, 1985: 74—76). Japan has
maintained a very high level of machine tool consumption, and, despite the
rapid growth of its machine tool exports since 1975, the domestic market
has continued to be its major customer; in 1985, less than 40% of Japan's
machine tool production was exported (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Korea's
machine tool output increased nearly nine times between 1977 and 1987,
and in the latter year less than 10% of this production was exported.
Although Korea has a large domestic market compared to other
industrialising countries (since 1985 it has been the largest NIC
consumer of machine tools), compared to Japan its domestic consumption is
still fairly small. In 1985, Korea's consumption of machine tools was
less than 10% that of Japan. However, with the rapid growth of the
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Table 7.1 Japan's Machine Tool Production and Trade 1945-81
(Unit: Weight in tons, value in millions of yen)
-• Production Exports Imports Domesticdemand Export ImportYear
# ratio depend
Units Weight Value (A) (B) (C) (A)—(B)+(C) ence
1945 7,316 11,810 130 0.1 0.04 129.0 0.1 0
46 4,791 4,289 106 0 106.0 0
47 5,544 3,228 150 0.9 , . . 149.1 0.6
46 8,051 4,690 500 1 . . . 499.0 5.2
49 6.680 4,473 861 51 42 862.0 37.9 4.9
50 4,039 2,948 566 214 133 452.0 37.8 29.4
51 9,139 4,714 1,066 286 134 930.0 26.8 14.4
52 11.587 5,946 1,707 352 848 2,203.0 26.8 38.5
53 18,722 7,747 3,738 411 2,254 5,319.0 11.0 42.4
54 18,124 10,541 5,385 549 5,229 10,066.0 10.2 51.9
55 18,147 6,591 3,680 715 4,042 7,007.0 19.4 57.7
56 28,068 11,626 7,174 527 2,523 9,170.0 7.3 27.5
57 34,824 21,406 15,549 724 12,201 27,026.0 4.7 45.1
56 32,652 26,290 21,113 479 13,777 34,411.0 2.3 40.0
59 47,830 31,443 24,318 497 10,449 34,270.0 2.0 32.3
60 80,143 59,619 45,169 1,624 19,701 63,246.0 3.6 31.1
61 114,959 110,102 81,882 2,434 38,899 118,347.0 3.0 32.9
62 104,701 127,105 100,892 2,587 47,581 145,886.0 2.6 32.6
63 120.541 126,558 95,132 4,295 22,796 113,633.0 4.5 20.1
64 131,053 121,538 90,906 6,509 21,319 105,716.0 7.2 20.2
65 90,356 89,242 70,349 8,943 13,963 75,369.0 12.7 18.5
66 107,969 98,373 76,453 14,611 7,586 69,528.0 19.1 10.9 ,
67 153,949 149,685 126,041 16,642 12,839 121,238.0 14.1 10.5
68 184,260 194,984 175,986 18,584 34,176 191,578.0 10.6 17.8
69 231,419 255,384 239,988 21,747 34,485 252,651.0 9.1 13.6
70 256,694 315,821 312,349 24,088 44,162 332,423.0 7.7 13.3
71 183,649 254,870 264,405 28,044 39,762 276,123.0 10.6 14.4
72 164,553 195,910 205,180 27,408 22,366 200,138.0 13.4 1 1.2
73 212,586 255,239 305,223 35,237 21,332 291,319.0 11.5 7.3
74 168,952 237,981 358,610 57,664 37,211 338,157.0 16.1 11.0
75 88,108 139,207 230,739 61,611 21,575 190,703.0 26.7 11.3
76 118,994 132,617 228,604 76,073 13,867 166,398.0 33.3 8.3
77 131,405 159,511 312,844 115,493 15,720 213,071.0 36.9 7.4
78 136,617 176,663 365,525 162,138 19,638 223,025.0 44.4 8.8
79 164,207 220,892 484,132 206,643 26,214 303,703.0 42.7 8.6
80 178,890 275,450 682,102 269,577 38,221 450,746.0 39.5 8.5
81 165,631 317,133 851,561 310,763 38,623 579,421.0 36.5 6.7
Source: Metalworking, Nov. 1982: 1
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Korean market, by 1987 Korea's consumption reached 22% that of Japan
(American Machinist. Feb. 1988: 62).
Although there were no major differences between the relevant
policies implemented by the Japanese and Korean governments, their
motivations for promoting the machinery industry, and in particular the
machine tool industry, were very different. In the case of Japan,
measures were introduced to encourage the development of the industry so
that it could support other sectors of domestic manufacturing. In Korea,
the major motivation for the initial promotion of the machine tool
industry was to support the development of an indigenous defence
capacity. However, despite this early military concern, defence
procurement now only accounts for a small proportion of Korean machine
tool output in comparison to purchases by the vehicle and other civilian
industries. While there is some production specific to military
requirements, a large proportion of defence work is undertaken by private
industry, and this has, where possible, been integrated with the
manufacture of similar civilian goods.
In Japan, competition on the domestic market was an important factor
in the rapid technological development of many industries. Competition
between Korean producers appears to be much less intense. There are far
fewer Korean machine tool producers in each product sector, which means
that each firm has correspondingly fewer direct competitors on the
domestic market. Korean firms confirmed in interview that their users
had few alternative domestic suppliers, and, consequently, that there was
little direct competition on this market. For exports, however, the
situation is different. Foreign buyers, of course, have a far greater
choice, and have little or no difficulties finding alternative suppliers on
the world market. Since the export of Korean machine tools has been
promoted by government, for Korean firms international competition may
act as a substitute for intense domestic competition in ensuring
continuing attention to cost, quality, and product development. The
reduction of protection on the domestic market should have a similar
effect, domestic producers being forced to compete against imports.
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In Japan and Korea, a large proportion of the growing demand for
machine tools came from the developing mechanical engineering sector, and,
in particular, the vehicle industry. This industry now forms the largest
single market for the machine tool producers of both countries.11 The
vehicle industry requires specialist equipment, as well as more standard
machines, and in both countries there are considerable technical links
between machine tool and vehicle producers. The large Japanese
components industry, which supplies the vehicle industry, is also a very
large machine tool consumer. Its requirements are less specialised than
those of the vehicle industry, as it uses mostly fairly standard general
purpose machines. In Japan, it was this large market that accounted for
a significant proportion of the early growth of CNC machine tool demand.
Korea's vehicle components industry is less well developed; however, it is
rapidly expanding and its demand for machine tools is growing
accordingly.
In both countries, the most consequential inter—firm linkages have
been between machine tool producers and the local vehicle industries.
Indeed, it is a characteristic feature of both countries that vehicle
producers have established their own machine tool capabilities. Most of
the major vehicle producers in Japan have their own machine tool
divisions or subsidiaries. Two of the large Korean vehicle producers have
followed this example and the third is increasing its links with a
machine tool firm in a different division of the chaebol In the main,
machine tool firms directly linked to vehicle producers manufacture
machinery that is specific to the latters' requirements, and, consequently,
a high proportion of their production is in special purpose machinery.
Even though many vehicle producers in both countries have their own
machine tool building capabilities, they still have very close links with
other domestic machine tool firms. Chapter 6 noted that the single large
independent firm in Korea has supplied lines of machinery to one of the
vehicle producers, and that one of the chaebol firms (which has some
links with its own sister vehicle producer) has supplied an FMS to a
vehicle producer in another chaebol Similarly, in Japan there are very
close links between all machine tool producers and the vehicle industry.
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Moreover, the requirements of the Japanese vehicle industry are an
important influence on product strategy and development in the machine
tool industry, even in the independent producers. These extremely close
inter—firm links between machine tool and vehicle producers in Japan were
an important feature of the technical development of NC and CNC machines.
The vehicle industry, and its complex network of sub—contractors, required
small, low—cost machinery, and this was the type of machine developed by
the industry. Indeed, it was these machines which led Japan's exports in
the early 1980s (see Watanabe, 1983: 20—26 for a detailed analysis of
these links).
Of course, while the vehicle industry is of crucial importance for
machine tool production in both countries, it is by no means the only
sector which can promote new product development. For example, in Korea
there is now a large industry manufacturing EDM machines for mould
producers, and CNC copy milling machines have also been developed
specifically for these users. The production of laser cutting and marking
machines by one firm started after a large domestic market for these
machines had already formed. At present in Japan the requirement of the
microelectronics industry for high—precision machinery has meant that
many Japanese machine tool producers are now developing new machines
specifically for this market. The internal market of the machine tool
industry itself is an important force in product development. In the
acquisition of FMS capabilities in Japan, machine tool producers were able
to use their own internal market to build and de-bug workable systems
before they started to install them in other industries. Similarly, in
two Korean firms the internal market was large enough to support the
development of FMS, either within their own manufacturing plants or
within the relevant chaebol.
Japan's production in many industrial sectors expanded in order to
meet increasing domestic demand, and a range of industries developed
products to suit its domestic market. The experience gained from
producing for the domestic market, and the establishment of long
production runs, enabled many Japanese industries, including the machine
tool industry, to enter world markets with a proven product and at a
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competitive price.12 The demands of Japan's domestic market were, and
still are, key elements in its product developments. As Korea's domestic
market is much smaller than Japan's, its scope for continuing to expand
production to meet increasing domestic demand is more limited compared to
the import substitution opportunities open to Japan's industry. This has
two consequences for the development of Korea's machine tool industry.
Firstly, it has to be more specialised than the Japanese industry,
concentrating on producing a narrower range of machines. Secondly,
Korea's producers have not been able to benefit from such large economies
of scale in production for the domestic market, and, therefore, must
export at an earlier stage in development in order to achieve such
economies. However, the domestic market is large enough for Korea to use
it to develop new products and refine its production techniques before
commencing export. The continuing importation of a large percentage of
domestic machine tool requirements (in 1987, imports still accounted for
nearly 50% of total machine tool consumption) indicates that there is
still some room for Korean producers to further expand their supplies to
the domestic market.
In summary, the most significant features of the development of the
machine tool industry in Japan have been the size and structure of the
domestic market, and the close cooperative links between users and
producers. These links have enabled Japanese manufacturers to produce
high-quality, low-cost machine tools, and, notably in the case of
manufacturing for the vehicle industry, basic and adaptable products
which are now world market leaders. Although the Korean domestic market
is only a fraction the size of Japan's, several of the characteristics of
that market show interesting similarities with the Japanese experience.
Most notably, close inter—industry links between machine tool and vehicle
producers have been established and the technological benefits of these
links are now being made manifest in both industries. It is plausible
that these characteristics of the Korean domestic market will enable its
machine tool industry to enhance its capabilities and increase its
competitiveness on the world market.
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7.2.4 Technology Acquisition
It is important to stress that the Japanese machine tool industry
took a very long time to develop from the basic technological level of
the immediate post-War years to technological parity with producers in
other industrialised countries. (A report by the JMTBA suggests that the
industry took at least 25 years to achieve such parity (Metalworking. Nov.
1982: 158).) During this time, the domestic market was protected and
manufacturers were given numerous government incentives to encourage
their commercial and technical development. In fact, the domestic market
was sheltered for over 30 years, firstly through foreign exchange control
and later with tariffs. Imported technology formed an important input
for technical development, but was accompanied by sustained indigenous
technological efforts, especially in the early development of NC.13 Until
the industry reached international standards in the mid-1970s, the
majority of growth in output was absorbed by the domestic market. Only
after the industry had attained a technical level similar to other
industrialised countries did exports become an important feature of its
sales. Korea's machine tool industry only started to expand in the mid-
1970s, and it is still in the process of acquiring new technologies and
learning new capabilities. Indeed, in many product areas, including CNC
production, it is even now at an infant industry stage.
Korea and Japan have both based their rapid industrialisation
programmes on the importation of foreign technology. In the case of
Japan, the major source of new technology was the US, and in the case of
Korea, the major source of technology was Japan. In both countries
technology was mainly imported through formal technology agreements, but
imported turnkey plant and machinery were also important sources of new
technology. In Japan, direct foreign investment was only permitted when
this was the only way in which technology could be acquired. In Korea,
direct foreign investment has been far more widespread, and in the free
trade zones it was actively encouraged. Even so, only a small proportion
(less than 10%) of investment in manufacturing in Korea in the 1960s and
1970s was in the form of direct foreign investment, and in the machine
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tool Industry there have been few Instances of direct foreign
investment.1 4
Economists have used the reversal of the direction of technology
trade as an indicator of technological development. Although the
payments for foreign technology by Japan in the early 1980s were larger
than its receipts, Lynn <1985) documents that many of these payments
were for agreements which had been made several years earlier. By
considering only the current trade from new technology agreements for
each year, Lynn shows that Japan has had a surplus in such trade since
the early 1970s. Initially, most of Japan's technology exports went to
developing and industrialising countries; however, American and European
firms are increasingly utilising Japanese technology and product designs
to try to regain some of their lost market share. The change in the
direction of technology exports by the machine tool industry itself
adequately demonstrates this point: early technology exports from
Japanese machine tool firms <in the early and mid-1970s) went to
manufacturers in countries such as Korea and Taiwan. By the mid-1980s,
Japan had become the main source of technology for both the US and
Britain, as well as remaining the most important supplier to the NICs.
For Korea, such a reversal of technology trade is yet to be attained
and technology imports still form a major component of new industrial
developments.15 However, Korea has commenced exporting technology; Enos
and Park (1988) show that in the iron and steel industry, technology and
know-how have been exported to Taiwan and Indonesia, and in the synthetic
fibre industry Korean engineers have participated in plant start-ups in
Thailand, India, and Taiwan. Westphal et al. (1984) also describe exports
of technology by Korea in the form of turnkey plant construction, direct
investments in manufacturing facilities, the licensing and sale of
technical services, and engineering and management consultancy. Any
export of technology indicates that a country has "accumulated skills and
knowledge [in that industrial sector] within its own borders, based on its
own experience and effort" (Lall, 1982: 9). Korea is still a long way
behind Japan in the process of industrialisation and technological
development, but is beginning to supply technology to less industrialised
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countries in the same way that Japan first exported technology.
Importantly, Korea has also become a direct foreign investor. However, it
is unclear in some of these cases, e.g., Hyundai's car assembly plant in
Canada, and other plants in already industrialised countries, whether
Korea is exporting technology or not. While in these cases the recipient
countries are not (or should not be) gaining new technologies, such
investments do show that Korea has a considerable level of manufacturing
skill and technological capabilities. Although the technology embodied in
the machine tools manufactured in Korea is exported, and may, as such, be
thought of as a technology export, the machine tool industry is not yet
exporting any of its technology in the form of design, consultation
services, or licensing agreements. The direct foreign investment in
Germany by one of Korea's machine tool producers (Firm C) is definitely
not a case of technology export. Indeed, it is the reverse, as the firm
bought already established companies and has used them as a source of
technology for its own development rather than supplying the purchased
firms with Korean technology.
Although Korea is no longer totally dependent on foreign technology
for its development, compared to Japan it has not assimilated imported
technology as efficiently. Korea has used repeat licences in many
technologies, including machine tools, and in other industrial sectors has
allowed far more direct foreign investment as a potential, although widely
debated, technology source. A major factor in the difference in the rates
of technology assimilation must be the different industrial structures in
Japan and Korea at the outset of their industrial development. As
already noted, Japan had the advantage of an established industrial base
on which to build and on which technological capabilities could be rapidly
assimilated and expanded, whereas South Korea had no such advantages
when it began developing its industries. Consequently, while Japan only
needed new technology, Korea has had to acquire a. far greater range of
technological and managerial capabilities.
The Japanese machine tool industry, like the Korean industry, used
licences to build machines of new designs and to acquire technology.
Although Metalworklng details the agreements entered by machine tool
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producers in the 1950s and 1960s, unfortunately the total content of
these licensing agreements is not available (see Metalworking. Nov. 1982:
156). However, as the industry already had substantial capabilities, it is
unlikely that the agreements contained much more than the designs of the
new machines. The Japanese producers did learn about the construction of
foreign machines through collaboration with the JMTBA, which imported new
machines and dissected them. (Vogel (1985: 71) documents that in the
mid-1950s a MITI grant of ¥25 million was given to a laboratory,
presumably JMTBA's, to support the purchase and study of foreign
machines, and in 1967 a further grant of ¥485 million was given to
support similar work on NC machines.) Korea and Japan have both
supplemented their use of licensing agreements with a wide range of
other learning mechanisms to build up their technological capabilities.
The most important of these mechanisms in both countries have been the
training of personnel in foreign firms and universities, and the
employment of foreign consultants to advise on indigenous production
facilities, assist in quality control, and train personnel.
Significantly, in both countries technology imports were accompanied
by indigenous technological efforts. Indeed, the development of NC
machines in Japan depended on such efforts and not on formal imports of
the new technology. Early NC machines were developed in Japan in the
mid-1950s by the Fujitsu research group, which later became Fanuc, and
various machine tool builders. This work used technical information from
the original MIT project. The major expansion of NC development and
production occurred in the late 1960s and early 1970s when the market
for NC machines was rapidly expanding and the technology was proven to a
greater extent. Again, these developments were mainly indigenous and
only a few licences were used. There are two plausible reasons why, at
different stages in development, licences were not extensively used.
Firstly, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, NC technology was still in an
embryonic stage. For several reasons, very new technology and product
developments are rarely transferred through formal technology agreements.
New producers are unwilling to license recently developed technology on
which they have not received a significant return on development costs.
Furthermore, Chapter 2 suggested that new technology which has not been
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widely tested and diffused is difficult and costly to transfer for both
the licensee and licensor. Secondly, in the early 1970s, when many more
Japanese producers commenced production, there were few machines being
manufactured abroad which were suitable for the Japanese market. Japan's
developments at this time were concentrated on small, low—cost NC
machines, while the majority of the machines being manufactured in Europe
and, especially, in the US were very large, high-precision, sophisticated
machines developed for defence production. Japanese producers were
therefore developing an entirely different product from those
manufactured abroad and would have found great difficulties in finding
the right technology suppliers in other national industries.
The collection and dissemination of information on market changes
and technology developments (learning by searching), especially through
trade missions and exhibiting at international trade fairs, has also been
an important input for firms in Japan and Korea. In this type of
learning, the two national industries have both been aided by their
manufacturers' associations. And these associations have also worked with
their respective governments in the formulation of development plans and
in determining the level of protection of the domestic market. However,
in general, KOSAMI and KOMMA appear to be much weaker organisations than
JMTBA and have not been so influential on the development of their
membership.
As already noted, firms also enhanced their product designs and
technological capabilities through collaborative projects with government-
funded research institutes. However, these projects have been
fundamentally different in each country; in Japan, they were large-scale
projects involving several machine tool producers, while the Korean
projects involved only individual firms. The scope of the projects was
also dissimilar, those in Japan containing some new research work, while
the Korean enterprises focused purely on product development.
Consequently, Japanese and Korean firms have benefitted to different
extents from these projects. Japanese producers thought that the
national MITI projects did have important benefits for them, but did not
regard them as a major element in their technical development. In Korea,
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firms considered that such projects were important for their initial entry
into CNC production, but few firms had subsequently taken advantage of
the development facilities organised for them. The chaebol firms had
developed greater skill levels within the conglomerate structure and so
did not need the support of the research institutes, while projects with
small firms were difficult to set up.
The Korean and Japanese machine tool industries have differed in the
nature and quality of the support received from controls producers. In
the Japanese case, close technical links between machine tool and controls
producers have facilitated concerted product development. With the entry
by machine tool producers into FMS, an understanding of electronics and
the ability to write software has become increasingly important. And a
machine tool industry that lacks this close technical support suffers
corresponding competitive disadvantages. In the development of NC
machines, Japanese firms benefitted from the support of the progressive
electronics producer, Fanuc. The producers have also been able to rely on
Fanuc to manufacture reliable equipment and to continue to develop new,
and technically more advanced, products. Korean machine tool producers
have to some extent benefitted from the technical support offered by
Fanuc, but they cannot collaborate with Fanuc in new product
developments. Furthermore, the simple economics of the relationship
between Fanuc and machine tool producers is a vital issue: Japanese firms
get their controls at a significantly lower price. Although Korea does
have an electronics industry, it is much younger than the machinery
industries and has not been able to offer similar support. However, the
electronics sector in Korea is growing rapidly, and in the future it
should be able to give more support to the machinery industries. Faster
microprocessors and easier production of semi-customised chips should in
future help Korean producers in this field.
As the machine tool industries of Korea and Japan have responded to
the particular machinery needs of their users, and in particular to those
of the vehicle industry, they have acquired a very broad range of design
and production skills.14 The Japanese machine tool industry has
developed to the point where there are few machines it now needs to
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import, and it has an excellent pool of skills required to design special
purpose machinery for its user industries. Importantly, the Korean
machine tool industry is developing in a similar fashion. Nearly all the
sample firms in Korea undertook some form of custom design and several
were also able to design special purpose machine tools. The Japanese
machine tool industry has, of course, been quite capable of supplying
machinery adapted for new product developments for several years, and
this is an important consideration in many of the industries in which
Japan is now a technological, as well as a market, leader. Although Korea
does not yet have this ability, the development of skills in the design of
special purpose machinery is an important step towards acquiring such a
capability.
7.2.5 Conglomerates
A characteristic feature of the industrial structure of both Japan
and Korea is the existence of very large industrial conglomerates, known
respectively as keiretsu and chaebol. Although the keiretsu and chaebol
are similar in the scope of their manufacturing activities, there are
significant differences in their structures and organisation. The
keiretsu are groups of companies clustered round one or more core banks
and trading companies. The firms in the group coordinate their industrial
policies, and their presidents meet regularly. The ownership of each
company is often very complex. As individual holdings in each firm by
other companies, or banks, is limited, cross-ownership within each group
is very common, and frequently a large proportion of stock in each firm
is held by several other companies within the same keiretsu. The core
banks are the major source of credit to each company, and the firms are
also often linked through purchasing arrangements. This conglomerate
structure only formed after World War II, following the limits placed on
company ownership introduced during the US occupation (Fransman, 1988:
117). The keiretsu formed out of 19th-century conglomerates known as
zaibatsu. These were groups of companies which all belonged to a holding
company, and were originally under the control of a single family. The
holding company, which controlled the production of each component firm,
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became more important as the zaibatsu grew and a larger number of
managers from outside the founding, or controlling, family were employed.
The structure of the Korean chaebol is quite similar to that of the pre-
War zaibatsu, and in several cases chaebol are still controlled by a
single family (Jones and Sakong, 1980: 259). Unlike the keiretsu, the
chaebol do not include banks in their structure, as all Korean banks were,
up to the early 1980s, under government control. However, during the
main period of chaebol growth in the 1970s, their leaders were in very
close contact with the Korean government and were the major recipients of
preferential loans arranged during the expansion of heavy industry.
Although the structures of the chaebol and keiretsu are different,
the benefits of membership are similar, The range of products
manufactured within each conglomerate is very broad, and, in general, the
products are complementary. Firms do not compete directly with others in
the group. The manufacture of complementary products enables
conglomerate members to take advantage of economies of scope. These
economies accrue from the ability to centralise certain functions. In
particular, trading for several companies is often undertaken by a single
firm. This reduces costs in export markets as only the single trading
company needs to establish an overseas presence. Also, companies in
similar manufacturing areas often have combined research and development
facilities, whose results are made available to all members. Trading
within the groups, such as exists between linked vehicle and machine tool
producers, is also common.
The sharing of technical and business information is a very
important benefit of group membership. Internal trading links
automatically ensure that there is information transfer and feedback
between firms and extremely close technical bonds can be formed. As the
range of industries in each group is very wide, individual firms have
access to a equally broad range of technical information, collaboration
and support. The trading companies also play a key role in the group's
information exchange. These companies have an international network of
sales offices which gather market and product development information and
transfer it to other companies within the group. Although many of the
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links between firms in the keiretsu are now informal, the obvious
benefits received through such links ensure that they are maintained.
The group structure enables direct information flow between machine
tool user and producer, and allows collaboration in plant development and
problem solving. Indeed, in some cases machine tool manufacture takes
place on the same industrial site as vehicle production. Such close
interaction would not be possible for an independent producer. The
intimate technical relationship between vehicle and machine tool producers
also enables new machinery to be developed in tandem with the new
vehicles for which it is intended. Thus, the method of production used in
the manufacture of the new model is considered while it is still on the
drawing—board and potential manufacturing difficulties may be eliminated
at a very early stage.
In both Japan and Korea, conglomerates have been an important aspect
of industrial and technological development. However, while in Korea the
major proportion of growth in the machine tool industry took place in
chaebol firms, in Japan, growth in independent firms has been as
important. In fact, many of the leading Japanese producers remain as
independent companies. One possible explanation for this difference is
that, at the outset of the development and growth phase in the late
1950s, several independent Japanese machine tool firms were very much
larger than the independent Korean firms at a similar stage of
development. Watanabe (1983) found that of six early NC producers five
had more than 1000 employees. Of these, at least two were independent
firms (as was the sixth firm which had less than 1000 employees). In
Korea, only one independent firm in the mid-1970s had more than 300
employees (Bendix et al., 1977). Thus, while in Japan some of the
independent firms had the resources and manpower to invest in expansion
and new product development, there was only one such firm in Korea. As
the majority of new funding in Korea in the 1970s was directed towards
the chaebol, these firms accordingly accounted for a large share of
growth in this sector.
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Although keiretsu membership was not a particularly important
feature of the expanding Japanese machine tool industry, such membership
was important for controls producers, and, especially, for Fanuc. (Other
major keiretsu controls producers include Yaskawa, Mitsubishi, Hitachi, and
Toshiba.) Fanuc was financially subsidised by Fujitsu for the first nine
years of its operations. It was also given technical support by other
members of the group; for example, in the early 1970s, Fanuc collaborated
with Fujitsu in the design and development of LSI circuits to be used in
control units (Vogel, 1985: 82-83). As noted in Chapter 4, Fanuc became
an independent firm in 1972; however, Fujitsu retained a large
share—holding in Fanuc, and there are still close technical and market
links between them. In Korea, some machine tool producers are members of
chaebol which also have microelectronics manufacturing interests. The
successful development of control units by either the machine tool or
microelectronics division in these chaebol could be considerably aided by
the links between the two divisions.
7.2.6 Exports
The world market for CNC machine tools has been dominated by Japan
since the early 1980s. In seeking to establish itself in that market, the
fundamental fact Korea faces is Japanese dominance. This presents both
advantages and disadvantages for Korean producers. What lessons can
Korea learn from Japan's successful export experience? How has Japanese
trading influenced Korea's ability to penetrate export markets? What new
techniques is Japan now developing to further enhance its efficiency and
competitiveness, and how may such techniques affect Korean exports? Is
it likely that Korea can come to compete with Japan, and, if so, on what
terms?
Korea's future depends on its ability to continue improving its
industrial capabilities and, eventually, to develop new products and
technologies. Korea's products have also to remain competitive on the
world market. However, as its domestic market is smaller than Japan's,
opportunities for economic import substitution are less, and exports must
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be used to finance the import of products which are not substituted.
Additionally, Korea needs to earn substantial sums of foreign exchange in
order to service and repay its huge foreign debts, an obligation it has
to date been well able to fulfil.
Japan initially exported machine tools to other Asian countries
before it commenced large-scale exports to the US and Europe. Korea's
early machine tool exports in the late 1970s also went to other Asian
countries, but the proportion of exports to the US and Europe has
increased in the early 1980s and reached over 80% in 1984. Korea has,
therefore, followed Japan's example of initially exporting to countries
which require the very basic machines it was able to produce in the early
stages of product development and, only then, when production experience
and capabilities were enhanced, entering the markets of industrialised
countries.
The export experience of the Japanese CNC machine tool industry is
very similar to that of many of its other high-technology industries,
such as vehicles, and consumer and industrial electronics products. Japan
achieved very rapid export growth and high levels of penetration in the
markets of industrialised countries by supplying competitively priced,
high-quality goods against which these countries' producers could not
effectively compete. Japan, therefore, entered markets in which there was
little potential competition for its superior, low-cost products and,
consequently, a very high potential for market growth. This type of
penetration is well demonstrated by Japan's domination of the American
CNC market to which it supplied over 40%, in terms of value (and nearly
60% in unit terms), of the CNC machines sold in 1985 (Metalworking. May,
1987: 21).
It is to this more competitive part of the world market that the
Korean machine tool industry is now exporting in very small quantities,
and Japanese producers are considered to be its major competitors. While
in some labour—intensive industrial sectors Korea was able to fill gaps
in the world market created when Japanese industry moved out, in more
high-technology industries, including CNC machine tools, Japanese
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producers show no signs of relenting in their quest for larger market
shares. Although Korean producers are concentrated at the "bottom end"
(the smaller, lower-powered, and less sophisticated part) of the market,
Japanese manufacturers are maintaining their share in all product sectors.
Consequently, if the Korean machine tool industry is going to increase its
levels of exports, it must ultimately be able to compete with Japan.
Important features of Japan's ability to maintain its competitiveness
in the world market include its establishment of highly efficient
manufacturing industries which benefit from economies of scale in
production, and the application of innovative manufacturing methods, which
give them high rates of productivity and better quality goods. While
machine tool production has traditionally been undertaken in small
batches, Japanese producers, by extending their production runs, have been
able to utilise mass—production techniques. As the main developers and
suppliers of FMSs, many machine tool producers have installed such
systems in their own factories. Japanese producers have, therefore,
automated certain parts of their production. Typically, these systems are
run on a three-shift basis. Methods collectively referred to as "Japanese
manufacturing techniques" have also enabled quality improvements and
further reductions in manufacturing costs. These methods of production
and production management include Just-in-Time (JIT), Total Quality
Control (TQC) and Quality Control Circles (QCC). Abernathy et al.'s (1981)
study of Japanese and American car manufacturing shows that an average
of 112.5 man-hours were required to assemble a small Ford, whereas, using
Japanese manufacturing techniques, a similarly sized Mazda used just 47
man-hours of Japanese labour. When expressed in terms of late 1970s
labour—costs, the contrast is even more marked: US$2,464 for the Ford and
US$491 for the Mazda. With allowances made for the different product
mixes of each company and differences in their vertical integration, the
employee cost difference was reduced to US$1,300.1 7 With further
adjustment for tariffs and supplier costs, the final landed cost advantage
of the Japanese producer in the late 1970s was about US$1,400.
In response to competition from the Japanese machine tool industry,
and its perTj^tration and dominance of the CNC machine tool market, many
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producers in industrialised countries have tried to maintain their
profitability by moving into more specialised production, and have found
so-called "niche markets". In the long term, there are likely to be many
problems for these producers. Japanese firms are extending their product
range into such areas, and, through their acquisition and establishment of
manufacturing facilities in many industrialised countries, are able to
supply special purpose machines and FMSs to these markets. Furthermore,
the very close links which have been established by Japanese vehicle
producers with several of the major vehicle manufacturers in the US and
Europe also give their machine tool divisions considerable opportunities
to supply machinery specific to that industry in these markets.14
The strategy of moving into a more specialised market in order to
avoid direct competition with Japanese producers is not an option open to
the Korean machinery industry, as it does not have the reserve of
development, design and manufacturing experience on which this strategy
was based by producers in industrialised countries. At present, the
ability of Korean machine tool producers to compete against the Japanese
in the least expensive sector of the world market is based on their lower
wage rates. But Korean wage rates are now rising, significantly adding
to overall production costs. And, in order for Korea to compete with
Japan in the long term on the world market, Korean firms must follow the
example of the Japanese by refining their production techniques.
Although the application of Japanese manufacturing methods by the Koreans
was not a part of this study, many firms mentioned their introduction and
several had already established QCCs in an attempt to improve
productivity and quality control. The implementation of JIT is, however,
more difficult for Korean producers. The CNC machine tool industry relies
on imported components, of which manufacturers must hold considerable
stocks, as delays in delivery would halt production, and foreign orders
have to be made and shipped in economic sizes. The potential for
reducing expensive inventories is consequently far more limited. Only the
establishment of an efficient supplier and sub—contractor network in
Korea will enable JIT to be utilised to full advantage.
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In the 1980s, many industrialised countries, with increasing
manufacturing trade deficits, have become far more protective of their
domestic markets and sensitive to penetration and expansion of market
share by overseas producers. They have imposed restrictions, mainly on
imports of Japanese goods, but also on imports from other industrialising
and industrialised countries. The rise in protectionism against Japan has
had benefits for Korean producers, as they have been able to exploit
markets where Japanese competition has been limited.19 But
industrialised countries have also become more alert to increased imports
from NICs and more inclined to place restrictions on their imports before
they gain a large market share. Japan's machine tool exports to the US
were limited by a voluntary restraint agreement in late 1986: exports of
machine tools from West Germany, Switzerland and Taiwan were also
restricted at this time. Accompanying the limits imposed on these
countries was a warning to Korea and six other countries not to increase
their exports to the US to take advantage of reduced competition.20
Korea has always been aware of such problems and has at various times
entered early negotiations, mainly with the US, to try to avert trade
friction. Korea has also opened up some of her markets at an early stage
to forestall the US, Korea's largest trading partner and the destination
of nearly 40% of Korean exports in 1986, from taking retaliatory measures
(EIU, 1987a).21
The dramatic appreciation of the yen value in the mid-1980s has
given Korea a competitive advantage over Japanese producers in some
industries, particularly since the won has not increased in value at
nearly the same rate. In the production of televisions, video recorders
and microwave ovens, Korean firms have been able to capture a large share
of the world market, while several Japanese producers have established or
expanded offshore production facilities in the Asian NICs to reduce their
manufacturing costs. The rise of the yen has not been entirely
beneficial to Korean industry, as it has meant that Korean imports from
Japan are much more expensive. In 1986, 34% of Korea's imports came
from Japan, and Korea's trade deficit with Japan in the same year was
US$5.4 billion (EIU, 1987a: 22). Korea's main imports from Japan are
capital goods and components, and these more expensive imports have, to
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some extent, limited Korea's increase in competitiveness. In particular,
for the CNC machine tool industry the rise in the value of the yen has
meant that its major components, including control units, which are
sourced in Japan, are now more expensive.
The implications of Japan's success are, of course, important for
many other areas of industrial production and for the future success of
many industrialised, industrialising, and developing countries. Japan's
production methods are now being applied in many industrialised countries,
with a view to improving their competitiveness and to attempting to
recoup some lost markets.2 2 For developing countries, the increase in
manufacturing productivity and factory automation in the industrialised
world, including Japan, may deprive them of industrial opportunities by
reversing the comparative advantage in the production of many
labour-intensive items (Kaplinsky, 1984: 157—59). These developments also
have a bearing on the continuing success of the NICs. Japan's
competitiveness on world markets has two major effects on NIC exports.
Firstly, Japan is no longer moving out of markets. Japan moved out of
labour—intensive and polluting industries in the 1970s, but it shows no
signs of restricting the overall exports of its vehicle, electronics, or
machine tool industries. This means that while early NIC exporters could
target industries which Japan and other countries were leaving because of
high labour costs, no such openings are now occurring. And this has
repercussions for other developing countries, as it means that the
current NICs are remaining in labour—intensive industries longer, and
fewer gaps into which other developing countries, such as Thailand,
Malaysia and Indonesia, can enter are being created. Secondly, the export
markets in which the NICs are having to sell are now highly competitive,
and the major competitors are usually Japanese. When Japan commenced
exporting items such as compact cars and CNC machine tools to the US and
Europe, the competition in these markets was low and Japan was able to
rapidly expand its market share by supplying high-quality but low-cost
products. For the NICs, such rapid expansion of exports in these markets
is now much more difficult, since competition is far more intense and the
main competitors (principally Japanese) are unwilling to relinquish any of
their market share. Korean firms have managed to penetrate some markets,
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notably in electronic consumer goods (e.g., microwave ovens and VCRs), and
they are making some headway in compact car sales (Manguno, 1989). In
these sectors, the Koreans are attempting to compete mainly on price,
although the Japanese appear quite able to meet such competition.
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7.3 Taiwan: An Export-Orientated Machine Tool Industry
The Korean and Japanese materials analysed thus far support the
view that the most important consideration influencing the development of
machine tool industries is the size and structure of a domestic market.
It must, accordingly, be pertinent to examine the machine tool industry of
an Asian NIC whose domestic market differs radically from those of either
Japan or Korea, and Taiwan offers a suitable case for such comparative
assessment. The purpose of this section is, thus, not to present an
exhaustive or definitive account of the Taiwanese industry, but solely to
draw out relevant contrasts with Japan and Korea arising from its
particular market and political environment.
There are several general structural features that characterise the
Taiwanese industrial environment. The Taiwanese government has been less
directive than either the Japanese or Korean government. Moreover, as a
military consumer of industrial goods the Taiwanese government has had
relatively little impact on domestic industries. The military
establishment is distinguished by its comparative dissociation from
civilian industries. Most Taiwanese manufacturing firms are small,
independent, and family run. In marked contrast to Korea and Japan, there
are few industrial conglomerates in Taiwan. Most importantly, Taiwanese
manufacturing industry is highly export orientated.
These general structural circumstances also shape the environment
for the national machine tool industry, and this section considers how
this specific industry has developed within the limitations and
opportunities provided by the Taiwanese setting. Why is it that Taiwan's
machine tool industry - in many respects so successful - has acquired a
relatively limited range of technological capabilities? The answer lays
special stress on the character of relations between Taiwan's machine
tool industry and its actual or potential consumers. Compared to the
situation in both Japan and Korea, the Taiwanese machine tool industry
has formed few technical links with users in the domestic market and is
strongly orientated towards exports. Thus, the Taiwanese material will
add further support to the argument developed in the Korean case—study:
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the acquisition of sophisticated technological capabilities is highly
dependent on close interaction between producers and users.
7.3.1 Historical Similarities
Like Korea, Taiwan, then a province within China, was occupied by
Japan up to 1945. During Japanese occupation, Taiwan had a purely
agricultural economy and supplied large quantities of rice to the
Japanese empire. Thus, unlike Korea, there was no significant industrial
activity in Taiwan before 1945. With the disintegration of Korea's
industry between 1945 and 1950, and its final destruction in the Korean
War, by 1953 Korea and Taiwan were similar in their almost total lack of
established manufacturing industry. However, while Korea had lost most
of its skilled managers and technicians— the occupiers who had returned
to Japan in 1945— the number of qualified personnel in Taiwan increased
dramatically, with the immigration of over a million and a half people
from mainland China, who arrived with the Nationalist government led by
Chiang K'ai—shek. While a large number of these immigrants were military
personnel, a significant proportion came from China's technical and
business community. With the installation of the new regime in Taiwan,
and the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949,
mainland China and Taiwan separated. Each government, however, still
formally claims sovereignty over the other. Taiwan sees the mainland as
a military threat and a major preoccupation is its own security.
Consequently, Taiwan, like Korea, maintains a huge standing army and
associated military enterprises.
During the 1950s and 1960s, Taiwan and Korea were close allies of
the US in its policy to contain the spread of communism in East Asia.23
The US gave both countries considerable military assistance, including the
training and equipping of large domestic armies, as well as economic
assistance. The Nixon Doctrine of the late 1960s, and the closer
relations between the US and the PRC, culminated in the diplomatic
recognition of the PRC by the US in 1978 (after which Taiwan
automatically severed its formal diplomatic relations with the US). This
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situation forced Taiwan to reconsider its military relations with the US
and promoted the build—up of an indigenous defence industry. Although
Taiwan continued to get some military support from the US during the
early 1970s, the government established new arsenals to supply its own
forces and invested heavily in communications, armoured vehicles, and
air—frames for jets. With the diplomatic recognition of the PRC, the US
abolished its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan and replaced it with the
Taiwan Relations Act, which included an agreement to supply arms to
Taiwan for purely "defensive" purposes. Following the introduction of
this Act, Taiwan has been denied much of the military technology it has
requested from the US, while the PRC continued its massive military
investment, thus encouraging even more internal investment in Taiwan's
defence sector.
Thus, like Korea, Taiwan perceived itself as pushed into developing
its own military machine by changes in US policy. Taiwan's development
of its own defence industry has, however, been very different from
Korea's. While the expansion of Korea's defence industry was included in
the overall promotion of the heavy and chemical industries, the promotion
of Taiwan's defence industry was not. (Nevertheless, there has been a
recognition by the Taiwanese government that it needs to develop the
country's technological base to support its military institutions.) The
Taiwanese defence industry was, until the early 1980s, totally owned and
operated by the government; unlike Korea, no part of production was the
preserve of civilian industry. So far as machine tools are concerned, the
military has the capacity to produce a small amount of its own
requirements in—house, but depends overwhelmingly upon foreign imports.
The civilian sector is therefore almost wholly separated from a local
military clientele. The dissociation of these two areas of production has
meant that several of Taiwan's industries have not been able to benefit
from economies of scope in the combined production of similar defence and
civilian goods. For example, while in Korea the manufacture of some
military vehicles and artillery was contracted out to the chaebol vehicle
producer, Kia, specialising in small van and truck production, in Taiwan
production of all ground-force equipment, including artillery and military
trucks, has been undertaken by government-run facilities, with only very
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limited sub-contracting to private firms. Consequently, possible
economies of scope and economies of scale, which may have been achieved
by manufacturing these items within the civilian vehicle sector, have been
denied to both the defence and civilian industries.
7.3.2 Taiwan's Economic Growth. Its Machine Tool Industry
and Main Markets
Like Japan and Korea, Taiwan has experienced very rapid and
sustained economic growth since the early 1960s. The annual growth of
Taiwan's GDP averaged 8.7%, in real terms, between 1952 and 1985 (EIU,
1987c: 9). In 1985, Taiwan's per capita GNP was significantly higher than
Korea's — US$3,444 to US$2,129 — though, of course, much lower than
Japan's.24 From the 1950s, the Taiwanese economy has changed from one
principally based on agriculture to one dominated by manufacturing. Since
the early 1960s, an important feature of Taiwan's growth has been its
exporting, and an export orientation continues to characterise the
economy: in 1985, exports accounted for 56% of GDP (ibid.). Taiwan, like
Korea and Japan, has virtually no natural resources: nearly all exports
are manufactured goods, while a large proportion of imports are raw
materials and oil. Taiwan's economy has gone through three distinct
phases during its rapid development. In the 1950s, agricultural growth
was promoted and most industrial development was geared towards import
substitution. US economic aid was also an important factor in Taiwan's
development at this time. During the second development phase, in the
1960s, exports of low—technology products and assembled consumer goods,
utilising imported components, were encouraged.
More recently, as wages have risen, eroding the country's competitive
advantage in labour-intensive production, Taiwan has entered its third
development phase, with most growth occurring in technology- and
capital—intensive industries, combined with import substitution of some
materials and components used in export goods.2 s Although the more
technology—intensive industries are growing, textiles (garments, fabrics
and yarn) and shoes continue to be major export items: in 1986, they
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accounted for almost a quarter (by value) of Taiwan's exports. The most
important export sector in the technology—intensive industries is
electronics, mainly consumer electronics goods, which accounted for 17% of
exports, while metal and plastic products made up 6% and 4% respectively
(EIU, 1987d: 2). As already noted, the structure of manufacturing
industry in Taiwan is characterised by a large number of small family-run
firms, and there are few large firms or conglomerates. In the early
1980s, nearly 60% of value added in Taiwan originated in firms with less
than 300 employees, and employment in manufacturing units with ten or
fewer workers accounted for approximately 70% of all jobs (Harris, 1986:
48).
Of the NIC machine tool industries, Taiwan's has had most impact on
international markets, principally because of the very high levels of its
exports to industrialised countries, and especially to the US. In 1983,
Taiwan became the third largest source of imported machine tools in the
US (NMTBA, 1985: 128). Taiwan's success in the US market has also meant
that its exports to the US (like Japan's) were limited by a "voluntary"
restraint agreement in December 1986. Taiwan ranked 14th in world
production in 1985, and, as such, is one of the largest NIC producers; in
this year, it was the 10th largest exporter in the world and was the
largest NIC exporter. However, Taiwan is a fairly small consumer of
machine tools; in 1985, it was only the 19th largest consumer, and its
consumption of machine tools was approximately half that of Korea
(American Machinist. Feb. 1986: 89). If the machine tool consumption of
Korea and Taiwan is compared in relation to their respective populations,
the "per capita" consumption of machine tools in each country is similar
(Korea's population being approximately double that of Taiwan's). If,
however, machine tool consumption is compared to the component of GDP
originating in manufacturing, then Korea is proportionately a much larger
consumer than Taiwan.24 Korea's investment in new machine tools for its
manufacturing industry is, therefore, at a much higher level than
Taiwan's.
Although Taiwan's machine tool industry had its origins in the late
1940s and 1950s, production became significant, and the industry expanded,
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in the 1960s in line with the economic growth experienced by the whole
economy. In particular, the industry benefitted from increased domestic
demand created by the expanding export producers, especially those such
as sewing—machine and bicycle firms, but other light industries also
helped enlarge domestic demand. Manufacturers of electrical appliances
bought basic drill and punch presses and the textile industry also
secured some of its machinery domestically. Taiwan's manufacturing
environment is still dominated by light industries, and these continue to
be the major domestic consumers of machine tools.
Machine tool manufacturers typically had two origins: small repair
shops which began to manufacture copies of the machines they repaired,
and textile machinery producers which used their existing skills to
expand their range of machinery output. In one respect, the machine tool
industry which developed in Taiwan from the mid-1960s resembled general
global patterns: a relatively large number of small firms and a few quite
sizeable companies. In the mid-1960s, only 20% of machine tool firms in
Taiwan had more than 20 workers. Whether large or small, all Taiwanese
machine tool producers displayed high levels of vertical integration.
During the 1970s and early 1980s, the Taiwanese machine tool industry
has become rather more concentrated. One conglomerate has entered
machine tool production and the larger producers have become relatively
more important. Nevertheless, the basically dual structure of Taiwan's
machine tool industry persists; in 1973, over 50% of firms still had less
than 20 employees while a few had more than 100. Of the 200 Taiwanese
firms manufacturing machine tools in the early 1980s, only 64 employed
more than 50 workers and, of these, only 25 had over 80 employees
(Amsden, 1977: 223; 1985: 276; Asia Research Bulletin. 30 June 1980: 693).
The larger firms, however, now account for a very significant proportion
of total output. The fifteen major producers forming the Precision
Machinery Development Association of Taiwan together manufacture between
60% and 70% of total Taiwanese machine tool output (Metalworklng. March
1987: 24). The biggest of the Taiwanese producers employed over 500
workers in the mid-1980s, which, although large by NIC and Taiwanese
standards, is small in comparison to the larger Japanese manufacturers.27
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Thus, while the Taiwanese machine tool industry resembles Korea's
with respect to concentration and distribution of firm size, there is one
major and highly consequential difference. In Korea, membership in a
conglomerate structure is a significant feature of the environment for
machine tool producers, while in Taiwan only one firm is part of such a
group. This one firm excepted, all the rest of Taiwan's machine tool
producers are independent.
The machine tools being manufactured in the 1960s were very basic
and of low quality: their estimated life span was only two years.
Consequently, domestic consumers requiring higher quality machine tools
imported the machinery they needed.2 • Although the Taiwanese machines
were of poor quality compared to those sold by the developed countries,
they were nevertheless adequate for basic metal cutting and their low
price compensated for their deficiencies. Demand for this type of machine
expanded generally in Southeast Asia during the 1960s, and Taiwan
increased its exports to meet this demand (see Amsden, 1977 for a more
detailed examination of this market). By the late 1960s, Taiwan was
exporting about 50% of its total machine tool production, principally to
Thailand, South Vietnam, and the Philippines.29 Machine tool production
and exports continued to grow rapidly in the early 1970s; the value of
total production rose from US$10 million in 1970 to US$33 million in
1975, and exports, still principally to the markets of Southeast Asia,
grew from US$6 million to US$19 million for the same years. Again, the
low quality of the machines was not seen as a drawback by buyers in
these markets. Typically, these buyers had a limited budget and wanted a
quick return on their investment. As long as the machines were adequate
to manufacture their products, then cost was the main consideration
(Jacobsson, 1986: 146—48; Amsden, 1977: 220—26).
Even with its perceived low levels of quality and technical
development, the Taiwanese machine tool industry continued to expand
rapidly in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Exports also continued to
increase. Most notably, exports to developed countries grew from the
mid-1970s. Table 7.2 shows Taiwan's production and trade statistics for
1976 to 1985. Of special significance in these figures are the very high
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levels of machine tool exports and imports. Overall, Taiwan has been a
net exporter of machine tools since 1977, and it exports an extremely
high proportion of its total output (between 64% and 86% of total
machine tool production in the years covered). In comparison, in 1985
Japan exported 40% of its total production, West Germany 60%, and Korea
a mere 14% of its output (American Machinist. Feb. 1986: 89). However,
Taiwanese industries have continued to rely on imports for a very high
proportion of their domestic machine tool consumption: between 57% and
86% of total domestic consumption was imported in the years covered.
Table 7.2 Taiwan Trade Statistics for Machine Tools (Cutting and Forming)
Year Production Imports Exports Consunptioi
(P) (I) (E) (OP+I-E)
■>< in million US$—
1976 35,0 35,7 30,0 40,7
1977 58,3 35,7 49,8 44,2
1978 126,0 58,3 94,0 90,3
1979 198,0 91,4 144,3 145,1
1980 245,1 125,1 178,3 191,9
1981 249,4 99,2 182,6 166,0
1982 185,6 79,7 124,4 140,9
1983 204,9 109,8 131,5 183,2
1984 244,1 118,6 172,5 190,2




















Source: American Hachinist (compiled from various issues),
From 1975 to 1981, the latter being a peak year for Taiwan, machine
tool production increased seven times in value, and exports increased six
times. In particular, this rapid growth of production and exports was
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attributed to the growing demands of the US market, which became Taiwan's
major customer (Amsden, 1985: 275; Jacobsson, 1986: 149). The industry
suffered severely in 1982, a year in which global production declined by
more than 20% and the global market was depressed. Taiwan's exports
were reduced by 30%, domestic consumption also fell by 15%, and domestic
production declined by 25% (American Machinist. Feb. 1983: 77).30 While
Taiwanese producers had benefitted considerably from the growth of their
main export markets, they were severely affected when these markets were
depressed. Furthermore, the cycles of demand in Taiwan's export markets
had an amplified effect on the rates of growth and contraction of
Taiwan's machine tool production. Output recovered from the low levels
of 1982, and, by 1985, exceeded the high production and export levels set
in 1981. Domestic consumption also rose from its low in 1982. In part,
this increase came from the machine tool industry itself which began to
re-tool in anticipation of increased domestic demand following
announcements that a major Japanese company was to commence large—scale
vehicle production in Taiwan (Metalworklng. July 1985: 13).
The direction of Taiwan's exports changed in the 1970s, from a
dominant orientation to other developing Southeast Asiqn countries
towards an increasing focus on developed country customers. The majority
of growth took place in exports to the US, from US$2.7 million in 1975 to
a peak of US$102 million in 1981. Subsequently, the value of Taiwan's
exports to the US has stabilised at around US$90 million. During this
period of growth, the US market became the largest foreign consumer of
Taiwanese machine tools, and in 1980 and 1983 took 60% and 54%
respectively of Taiwan's exports (Amsden, 1985: 275; NMTBA, 1986: 232).
Although Taiwan has become the third largest exporter to the US, the
levels of its exports are fairly small in comparison to the two leading
exporters to that market, Japan and West Germany.31
This change in export destination has been discussed by both Amsden
and Jacobsson. Amsden (1985: 275—76) suggests that the re—orientation
was to a large extent forced on Taiwanese producers because demand in
Southeast Asia was declining with the end of the Vietnam War, and
competition in the reduced market was increasing due to the entry of new
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producers (e.g., the PRC, India, and Eastern Europe). Alternatively,
Jacobsson (1986: 148) argues that a major influence on this change of
export destination stemmed from a visit to Taiwan by a group of US
distributors looking for producers of cheap machine tools. The change
that did take place was arguably the result of a combination of these two
factors; Taiwan needed to find new markets if it was to continue to grow
and was fortunate that a new market was then opening up. Importantly,
the distributors had sales networks in the US, thus enabling Taiwanese
producers easily to enter that market. The establishment of trading links
with a new export market can be very difficult and costly for small NIC
firms. However, as Amsden (1985: 276) perceptively notes, this transition
would not have been possible for the Taiwanese industry without its
accumulated technological experience and the profits gained through its
exports to Southeast Asian countries, resources which were then used to
finance new investment.
Although the distributors established sub—contracting relationships
with Taiwanese producers, supplied technical information on the design of
machine tools, and persuaded producers to invest in some higher quality
machinery, the machines being exported were still low—value, basic
conventional machines with only marginally improved quality. Exports
were also concentrated in a few types of basic machine tool; in 1980,
five types (bench lathes, high—speed lathes, bench drilling machines,
vertical milling machines, and band saws) accounted for 73% of total
exports (Amsden, 1985: 274). Some of the larger exporting firms, having
established a niche in the US market, and having built up a reputation
among small machine tool users by selling through various distributors,
have established their own sales networks in the US, and one firm has
even built its own US assembly plant.sz
When the fieldwork for this study was undertaken in July 1985, the
Taiwanese machine tool industry was in a depressed state compared to the
growth and expansion that had taken place since its previous slump in
1982. There were three reasons for this. Firstly, investment in the
domestic market was depressed, due to high Taiwanese interest rates.
Secondly, the expansion of the domestic market anticipated by producers
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with the news that large—scale Japanese car production would commence in
Taiwan did not materialise. (The Japanese firm, Toyota, withdrew
following a disagreement with the Taiwanese government over export
requirements (King, 1986a).> Several machine tool builders had borrowed
heavily to import precision and sophisticated equipment to be in a
position to supply machinery to the proposed vehicle and vehicle
component industries, and so, with a depressed market and high interest
burdens, many of them were experiencing considerable financial
difficulties. Thirdly, exports were adversely affected by continuing
trade friction with the US.33 The depression was, however, only a short-
term one. Production of machine tools by Taiwan rose to US$367 million
and US$579 million in 1986 and 1987 respectively, and exports to US$261
million and US$378 million for the same years (American Machinist. Feb.
1988: 63). Nonetheless, Taiwan's machine tool exports to the US have been
restricted. The voluntary restraint agreement of December 1986 limited
Taiwans share of the conventional milling machine and lathe markets in
the US to 1981 levels, and their share of the US CNC lathe, milling
machine and machining centre markets to 1985 levels. Taiwan also agreed
not to change its export product mix by increasing the number of
higher—value products. These limits were set to operate until 1991 (Wall
Street Journal. 17 Dec. 1986: 4).
Growth of CNC Production
In the mid-1970s, a few Taiwanese producers started to develop and
produce CNC machine tools. The production, import, export and domestic
consumption of these machines is summarised in Table 7.3. CNC production
has become a more important part of Taiwan's machine tool output: the
ratio of CNC machine tool production to total machine tool output was
less than 5% up to 1982; in 1983, 7% of production came from CNC; in
1984, this proportion almost doubled to 13%, and had reached 15% by
1985.34 In 1984, all the CNC machine tools being produced were lathes,
milling machines, or machining centres. Of total CNC production, 45% were
machining centres, 42% were lathes and 12% were milling machines.
(Between 1980 and 1984, nine CNC boring machines were manufactured, but
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their value was insignificant compared to the value of the other three
types of machines.)
Table 7.3 Taiwan's CNC Machine Tool Production and Trade Statistics









1976 891 (7) 4,832 (20) 505 (4) 5,218 (23)
1977 1,838 (14) 7,665 (25) 1,160 (9) 8,343 (30)
1978 5,985 (44) 13,979 (37) 3,952 (31) 16,012 (50)
1979 15,728 (113) 34,245 (101) 9,603 (84) 40,370 (130)
1980 25,556 (176) 46,327 (126) 14,652 (116) 57, 231 (186)
1981 36,318 (262) 40,998 (120) 21,423 (150) 55,893 (232)
1982 38,875 (229) 48, 208 (113) 26,657 (165) 60, 426 (177)
1983 56,224 (396) 72, 453 (162) 35,564 (254) 93,113 (304)
1984 128,808 (1061) 89,032 (213) 66,692 (675) 151,148 (599)
Source: Figures supplied by ITRI, Taipei.
As with its conventional machine tool output, Taiwan's CNC machines
have low average values compared to those manufactured in most other
countries. In 1984, the average values of CNC lathes and machining
centres were about US$40,000, and the average unit value of CNC milling
machines was US$11,000.35 In comparison, Japanese CNC lathes and
machining centres had an average value of US$63,000 and CNC milling
machines an average value of US$53,000 (NMTBA, 1986: 200).
The major contrast to Korea's CNC output is the large proportion of
Taiwan's production destined for export: in the years from 1980 to 1984,
between 51% to 70% (by value) of Taiwanese CNC machine tools were
exported. Just as the Taiwanese machine tool industry became an exporter
of cheap and basic conventional machines in the 1970s, in the 1980s it
345.
became an exporter of cheap CNC machines. (The average unit value of
exported machines was similar to that of overall production.) CNC machine
tools are becoming a more important feature of Taiwan's machine tool
exports: in 1980, they accounted for 2% of total exports by value; in
1982, this increased to 6%; and in 1984, to 10%. As with conventional
machines, developed countries are the major destination of Taiwan's CNC
exports. Unfortunately, the export figures by destination for lathes and
milling machines are not broken down into conventional and CNC categories,
but the export destinations of machining centres are available. In 1983,
89 of the 94 machining centres exported went to industrialised countries:
48 went to the US and 38 to Europe (of which 17 went to the UK); a
further two were sold to Australia and one went to Canada (NMTBA, 1985:
231-32). (There is little reason to suppose that the export destinations
of other types of CNC tools are radically different.)
The structure of Taiwan's imports of CNC machine tools also closely
follows the pattern set by its imports of all types of machine tools -
imported CNC machinery having very high unit value in comparison to
machinery produced and exported by Taiwan. In 1984, the average unit
values of imported CNC lathes, CNC milling machines, and machining centres
were US$63,000, US$154,000 and US$164,000 respectively. Most of these
machines were imported from Japan; other large supplier countries were
West Germany, the US, and Switzerland. Again, the only precise data on
the origins of imported CNC machine tools are available for machining
centres. In 1983, Taiwan imported 39 machining centres, of which 36 were
Japanese, two were American and one Swiss (NMTBA, 1985: 230). The
domestic market, therefore, continues to import the high—value machinery
it requires, since this is not produced indigenously. In terms of units,
Taiwan is now a net exporter of CNC machine tools; however, in terms of
value, Taiwan remains a net importer.
Taiwan's export orientation arises largely from the structure of its
domestic market. While in Korea and Japan a large proportion of demand
originates in the vehicle industry and its component manufacturers, in
Taiwan most machine tool users are small firms in light industries, which
require standard, basic, and cheap machines. The machinery requirements
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of these firms are irregular, and, individually, their consumption is very
low. Consequently, there is no reason for such small firms to form
technological links with machinery producers. There is no single large
domestic machine tool consumer with which machine tool firms could
effectively collaborate. The vehicle industry in Taiwan consists of six
joint-ventures assembling vehicles from imported and locally—produced
parts to the designs of their foreign parent companies. And the
requirements for more sophisticated machinery by the defence sector are
met overwhelmingly by machine tool imports. Only the single conglomerate
•to
firm has been able/establish significant links with domestic machine tool
users with whom it can collaborate in the development of new or special
purpose equipment.54 None of the other firms, large or small, has been
able to form such ties with any domestic industrial sector.
Nor have Taiwanese producers been able to establish close links with
their users in export markets. On foreign markets, a large proportion of
Taiwanese output is sold through dealerships, and for many producers
these dealers have been an important source of technical and market
information. Several of the larger exporters have now established their
own foreign sales networks through which information is similarly
transferred back to the firm. While technical information on the changing
requirements of producers in the main export markets is thus
communicated back to Taiwanese machinery producers, they do not have any
direct technological links or feedback from their foreign users. The high
levels of exports mean that Taiwanese producers are affected, both
favourably and adversely, by changes in global demand, and especially by
market changes in the US. These influences have had more effect on the
prosperity of the Taiwanese industry than have changes in demand from
its own domestic market.
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7.3.3 Government Policy and the Taiwanese Machine Tool Industry
In comparison to the machine tool industries of Korea and Japan, the
Taiwanese industry has received relatively little specific government
promotion. All manufacturers, regardless of industrial sector, were given
government export subsidies from the late 1960s (Amsden, 1985: 281).
According to Jacobsson (1986: 151), this support declined in the 1970s,
giving exporters only a marginal subsidy, or only compensating them for
increased costs caused by some import controls, and, in effect, yielding
no net subsidy. Exporters in Taiwan were, therefore, in a similar
situation to those in Korea which were operating in a virtual free—trade
environment.
In the early 1980s, at a time when the indigenous defence industry
was being built up, the Taiwanese government did introduce certain
limited measures to promote the development of chosen "strategic"
industries and to accelerate the structural transformation of Taiwanese
industry.57 The selected industries were all low energy users, high
value-added manufacturers with high linkage effects and high skill
content. In total, 150 products were so listed, including CNC machine
tools, FMSs and CAD systems. Four measures were used to promote these
industries: higher tariffs, provision of risk capital, incentives for
exports, and support of industrial R&D. Tariffs on imported machine tools
were increased from 10% to 20%; however, this level was only set for a
limited period of three to five years in order to give producers the
opportunity to exploit the domestic market and increase their production
volumes. Risk capital to a total of US$250 million was provided by the
Bank of Communication to various industrial projects, at 2% below base
rate, but only up to 65% of the total capital required. However, as so
many different product areas were covered, this was only a very small
amount of money per product, and a large proportion of the finance
allocated by this scheme went to the shipbuilding industry, which was
also the main recipient of subsidised credit allowed to exporters through
the Export-Import Bank. This bank ran other schemes for the benefit of
exporters, including loans to foreign institutions (to be re-lent to the
purchasers of Taiwanese equipment), an export insurance scheme (financing
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exporters before they actually shipped the goods), and import credits (to
help with the purchase of raw materials). While all these schemes
included the machine tool industry, their effectiveness in promoting the
development of that industry is unclear. Only a few of the producers
interviewed by the author felt that they had benefitted from these
measures. And one interviewee remarked that the government's measures
were principally in the form of "psychological" support and were of little
practical use to individual firms.
Although there was slight specific promotion, there was a measure of
protection of the machine tool industry. Tariffs and import licensing
were introduced and applied to control machine tool imports. Some
machine tools could be imported duty—free, and, for others, tariffs were
low. The nominal tariffs for importing conventional lathes were 13% in
the 1970s and 15% for CNC lathes in the early 1980s. Given the high
proportion of Taiwan's domestic consumption met by imported machine
tools, the licensing system evidently presented no substantial obstacles.
However, imports by machinery distributors and from certain countries
were restricted. Significantly, these countries included Japan, Korea, and
Hong Kong, so that Taiwan's main competitors on export markets and those
which could most effectively compete with domestic producers on the
Taiwanese market were practically excluded from this market (Jacobsson,
1986: 151; Amsden, 1985: 282). Furthermore, the licensing system
prevented the importation of machinery similar in price and quality to
that produced domestically (Fransman, 1986a: 199). Thus, like Korea and
Japan, the Taiwanese domestic market was effectively protected in sectors
in which the indigenous industry was most at risk from foreign
competition and this protection was applied in such a way that domestic
users were not disadvantaged.
The Taiwanese government's most direct influence on the machine tool
industry has been through its support of technological development. The
Metal Industry Research Laboratories (MIRL) were originally founded in
1969 to undertake research in metallurgy, materials science, mechanical
engineering, and industrial management, and in 1973 tk&j iJ£fg,combined with
other institutes under the umbrella of the Industrial Technology Research
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Institute (ITRI). In 1977, a machine tools centre was created on the
Hsinchu campus of MIRL, and it is here that development work on machine
tools, including CNC and automated machinery, is undertaken. There are
over 200 researchers and engineers at this centre, of which almost half
are in electrical, electronics, or controls disciplines. MIRL offers
technical and design support to Taiwanese machine tool producers, and it
played a key role in the early introduction and development of CNC
machines in Taiwan. MIRL sent some of its engineers abroad for training
in CNC technology, and also imported three CNC machines for its own use.
These machines were shown and demonstrated to producers at local
machinery exhibitions, as well as being experimented upon (Jacobsson,
1986: 166). With this basic stock of knowledge on the operation,
production, and design of CNC machine tools, MIRL has subsequently entered
collaborative development projects with many Taiwanese producers. By
1983, a total of 22 machines had been designed by MIRL, in collaboration
with 18 firms (Fransman, 1986a: 197). Each firm pays MIRL a lump sum and
a royalty for its work on new machine designs, but these do not cover all
the development costs, and new designs are, therefore, subsidised. <In
total, firms pay approximately 60% of development costs, and the
government pays the remainder.) At the end of the project, all the
blueprints and assembly diagrammes for the new machine are given to the
firm, along with supplier lists for all critical components. MIRL also
undertakes national projects involving several firms, which attract much
higher rates of government subsidy. These projects have included the
development of control units, robots, and FMSs. Finally, MIRL also does
project work for machinery users, designing several special purpose
machine tools specifically for user firms.
The scope of MIRL's work far exceeds that of most countries'
government—supported research institutes: as well as aiding firms in
their product development and the manufacture of prototypes, it also, by
its provision of certain specialised equipment, acts as a sub-contractor
to the machine tool industry. For example, MIRL has a well equipped heat
treatment plant which machine tool producers can use; it makes precision
gears which are supplied to the industry; and it also has a large CAD
centre offering manufacturers training and design support. MIRL is a
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much bigger organisation than that its current Korean equivalent (KIMM),
and has been far more successful in its technical support of domestic
producers than the corresponding Korean institutes. However, because of
the large size or chaebol links of Korean producers, they have been able
to build up quite large and effective design departments. But the
comparatively small scale of Taiwanese firms has meant that they have
been handicapped in acquiring significant design capabilities.
Consequently, technical support from government continues to be crucial in
Taiwan, whereas in Korea most producers have now developed to a point
where they have design self—sufficiency.
7.3.4 Technological Development in the Taiwanese Machine Tool
Industry
Although machine tool output and exports grew dramatically in the
early 1970s, the Taiwanese industry made few technical advances. Amsden
<1977: 230) concluded that the technological development of the industry
up to 1974 was not a "monumental achievement", pointing to five faults in
production which curbed quality improvements. These included the lack of
investment in specialised machinery and heat treatment, the use of
low—grade castings (even though better foundries could have been used), a
lack of standardisation, and the absence of quality control in production.
Moreover, with cost as the principal consideration, she saw little
prospect of any of the firms increasing the quality of their output: any
investment in better machinery or higher quality materials and parts
would result in higher production costs and reduced competitiveness.
Amsden (1977: 221) suggested that one reason for the lack of
technological development in the Taiwanese machine tool industry in the
early 1970s was the absence of close technical links between
sophisticated machine tool users and producers. Domestic users, including
the defence sector, continued to import complex and high—precision
machinery. The defence sector manufactured a small number of its own
machine tools, with foreign technical support, but, because of security
considerations, technology was not transferred to the private (civilian)
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sector. Similarly, government-owned shipyards and large machinery works
were self-contained. There was therefore no technology transfer or
stimulation for the domestic industry from the local sophisticated
machinery users. Moreover, Amsden believed that the structure of the
machine tool industry in Taiwan also impeded its technical development.
Although by the mid-1970s a few larger firms had evolved, the majority of
firms were still very small, highly vertically integrated, with a low
degree of specialisation. These circumstances resulted in low utilisation
of production equipment, especially in the foundries connected to many of
the firms, the dispersion of skills over a wide range of jobs, and complex
management. Even the larger producers were highly vertically integrated
and undertook production work which in many other countries would have
been sub—contracted to smaller specialist support firms.
By the early 1980s, the Taiwanese machine tool industry had
undergone significant changes (Amsden, 1985). Since the early 1970s the
industry had entered the production of more complex tools, including CNC
machines, and had marginally raised its quality levels. As already noted,
the industry had become slightly more concentrated and several large
manufacturers had evolved. A sub—contractor and specialist producer
network had now emerged; many of these were, in fact, machine tool
producers which had integrated backwards into the large—scale manufacture
of parts. This also included MIRL which had established its heat
treatment facility and precision gear production to support the industry.
These changes were the result of a number of different factors, including
increased technological effort by the larger firms, technical support
given by MIRL, importation of new production equipment (which provided
models for new products as well as improving production quality), and
advice from US distributors.
The Taiwanese machine tool industry began the development of CNC
machines in the mid-1970s, acquiring the capabilities for this entry from
a variety of sources. Unlike Korea or Japan, licensing agreements were
not used to acquire the new technology: by 1985, a total of 36 firms were
making CNC machines, of which only one, the single firm which belonged to
a conglomerate, had entered a formal technology agreement. A main source
of technology for the development of CNC machine tools came from
imported machines which were copied.®8 The learning process involved,
however, was not simply crude copying, as adaptive innovations were
included in the resulting designs. For example, one engineer interviewed
by the author in 1985 stated that his firm had taken features from
several imported CNC machines and combined these ideas in its own model.
For most of the manufacturers visited in 1985, copied machines still
formed the main bulk of their output. And in these cases foreign
machines are still used as the base for new product developments. As
well as introducing new design concepts to the firms, imported machines
also helped them raise their productivity and the quality of their final
products.
The design and production support offered by MIRL was crucial to
many Taiwanese firms. Researchers at MIRL helped to diffuse CNC
technology among machine tool producers, both through direct collaborative
projects and by exhibiting MIRL's imported CNC machines to users and
producers. A small number of larger Taiwanese firms now have adequate
design capabilities to develop their own new CNC models, and a few have
already successfully designed complex CNC machines, including four—axis
CNC lathes and machining centres with ATCs. However, most Taiwanese
firms only have the capabilities to copy machines or to adapt and modify
their existing products, and for these manufacturers the development of
new models can only be undertaken with the technical support of MIRL.
In the design of interfaces, machine tool firms were helped by two
agencies. Firstly, as in Korea, the Japanese controls manufacturer Fanuc
supported Taiwanese firms in their technological developments, offering
training and technical support (Fransman, 1986c: 1384). Secondly, the
technical support given by MIRL included interface design. However,
unlike Korea, there appears to have been some initial difficulty in the
purchase of controls by Taiwanese producers. One producer observed that
when his firm first developed a CNC machine tool in 1974-75, it initially
approached Fanuc, but Fanuc refused to supply the company with the tiny
quantities it then required, and so the firm purchased controls from the
US. Later, Fanuc did agree to supply the firm with controls and has
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remained its sole supplier. Another firm noted that it too initially had
difficulties in finding foreign supppliers for major components, the
control unit, DC servo-motors, and ball screws. Having established
contact with a suitable supplier, the firm experienced further problems
with the importation of the components. Importantly, for firms which
collaborated with MIRL on the development of a new machine tool, such
problems were eliminated as a list of component suppliers was supplied
along with the design and production instructions.
Machine tools manufactured in Taiwan have typically been cheap and
of low quality. In the mid-1980s, a few of the larger manufacturers
visited were anxious to improve the quality of their output. In part,
this move was in anticipation of an increase in domestic demand for
higher quality machines, but it was also in response to increasing
competition in this product area on international markets from other NICs.
In order to improve quality levels, a few firms had imported new
machinery. This included large sophisticated machine tools from West
Germany and Japan, very high—precision machinery (e.g., jig borers) from
Switzerland and the US, and coordinate measuring machines from the UK.
In the early to mid-1980s, one firm in the Taiwanese machine tool
industry stood out as a technological leader (Jacobsson, 1986: 154—59).
Alone among Taiwanese companies, Yang Iron systematically started to
design and manufacture more highly automated systems, while it had for
some time been producing more complex CNC equipment. Accordingly, a
brief analysis of this firm's experience in entering the "top—end" of the
CNC machine tool market permits a more detailed analysis of the
possibilities and problems posed by the Taiwanese industrial environment.
The experience of Yang Iron shows how Taiwanese producers can relatively
successfully acquire more sophisticated technological capabilities,
including design capabilities, while it also highlights continuing problems
for that acquisition and consolidation thrown up by the nature of the
domestic market.
Yang Iron originated in the 1940s as a textile machinery
manufacturer, entered machine tool manufacture in the mid-1960s, and by
354.
the late 1970s was one of the largest machine tool manufacturers in
Taiwan. It subsequently ceased manufacturing textile machinery, but in
1977—78 entered a new area of production, fork-lift trucks. In 1985, the
firm had a total of 800 employees (in both machine tool and fork—lift
truck manufacture) and is therefore large by Taiwanese standards. The
firm started exporting to the US in the mid-1970s after being contacted
by an American distributor, and it continued to export through this
distributor until 1982, when it established two branch offices in the US,
in which year it also set up a Japanese branch office. In the early
1980s, Yang Iron was the leading Taiwanese exporter of lathes and was
one of the top three exporters of machining centres (Metalworking, March
1985: 62). In 1984, over 507. of its total machine tool production, by
value, was exported, principally to the US, but exports to Japan and West
Germany were becoming increasingly important.
Yang Iron retro—fitted one of its engine lathes in 1974 (the first
CNC development in Taiwan), but only a few of these machines were
produced and most were used within the firm's own production plant. This
machine was re—designed and improved in the following year. A new CNC
lathe was further developed in 1980 and two more CNC lathes, on similar
lines, were designed in 1982 and 1984. All three of these later lathe
developments were purpose—designed CNC machines with two—axis control
and one had a slant bed. In 1979, the company commenced production of a
rudimentary vertical machining centre and in 1980 an ATC was added to
this model. In 1982, a horizontal machining centre was developed and two
more vertical machining centres, of a similar design to its earlier model,
were added to the range in 1984. The three CNC machines introduced in
1984 were intended, according to a director, to "integrate the product
series", thus giving the firm a complete range of machining centres and
CNC lathes. By 1985, the manufacture of these seven models accounted for
about 607. of the company's output.
Yang Iron's acquisition of CNC design capabilities has been a lengthy
process; in CNC lathe production it took the firm at least eight years to
progress from the production of a retro—fitted lathe to a complex one.
Its developments in machining centres were more rapid, but these used the
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base of skills which had been built up in lathe design. The firm has a
large design department of 40 employees, including ten core designers and
five electrical/electronics engineers. The work undertaken by this
department is entirely in product development; virtually no custom design
work is done and the firm does not develop or make any special purpose
machines.
As well as designing a complete range of CNC machine tools, Yang
Iron has also developed and used automated equipment. In the late 1970s,
the firm bought a CAD system. The training of personnel to work on the
system was undertaken by an engineer from the foreign supplier, who
worked at the plant for about two months. The firm estimated that it
took about four years for the system to become fully operational and cost
effective. During this time, a data base was built up incorporating the
designs of existing products and their components. In this process
approximately 75% of the components used in different models of machines
were standardised, and these can be easily re—called and incorporated
into new designs, giving the firm substantial savings in time and money
in such developments.
In the early 1980s, Yang Iron developed several automated production
systems and was also a collaborator in automation projects undertaken at
MIRL. The firm made a fairly basic FMS with two machining centres and
installed it in its own plant. An automated warehousing system, with
computerised stock control, was designed and installed in the machine tool
plant. A basic pick—and—place robotic arm, attachable to its lathes to
transfer parts, was also added to the firm's product range. (A hydraulic
system was used to control the movement of this arm rather than a more
expensive servo-system, and the arm was activated by a programmable
controller with very limited memory.) All of these developments were
undertaken with the aim of becoming a supplier of automated factory
equipment; however, only a few robotic arms had been sold by 1985 and
there had been no buyers for either the warehousing system or the FMS.
Having successfully undertaken these ambitious projects, Yang Iron
found no domestic market for their developments. The resulting economic
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problems were exacerbated by more general difficulties confronting the
Taiwanese industry in 1985. In that year, the firm was declared bankrupt
and was obliged to reconsider its product strategy. Yang Iron was being
assisted at this time by a national bank under the Corporation
Rehabilitation Act. Following the implementation of a rescue plan, the
firm laid off about a third of its employees, sold off some unprofitable
divisions, and changed its production strategy. Machine tool production
was now to be concentrated solely on the manufacture of general purpose
machines, and all plans to manufacture more automated systems were
abandoned (Metalworking, Nov. 1986: 152-54).
The experience of Yang Iron in this enterprise shows that some of
the larger Taiwanese machine tool producers do indeed have the skill-base
to enable them to acquire significant design capabilities in the more
sophisticated part of the CNC market. Nevertheless, the environment in
which they operate makes the consolidation of these capabilities and
their effective application in an economically viable production strategy
extremely difficult. At present, there is hardly any sector of the
domestic market into which such machinery can be effectively sold. Yang
Iron's products were too sophisticated for its domestic market, and,
because of the high levels of usei—producer consultations and discussions
which need to take place during the development of FMSs and automated
warehousing systems, sales to foreign markets were impossible.39
The career of Yang Iron notwithstanding, the acquisition of design
skills by the Taiwanese machine tool industry in general has been an
arduous and lengthy process, which ultimately may be limited by
structural considerations. Taiwanese producers have principally built up
their design capabilities through innovatively and adaptively copying
imported models— a process which indeed does require high levels of
technical understanding and skill. This type of learning has been highly
effective in building up adequate capabilities to develop and manufacture
narrow ranges of standardised products. However, even in the most
technically advanced firms, the main design work undertaken is the
introduction of incremental changes to existing models. None of the
major Taiwanese machine tool producers undertake any significant custom
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design work or manufacture special purpose machinery. The design and
development capabilities that have been built up by Taiwanese firms are,
therefore, those of adept and quick technology followers.
The build up of skills in CNC production has taken Taiwanese firms
many years. In comparison to Korea, the Taiwanese industry in 1985
probably had slightly higher capabilities in the design of standardised
CNC machine tools, but considering that many of the Taiwanese producers
entered the industry in the mid-1970s, about five years earlier than most
of the Korean producers, their build up of skills has been slower.
Arguably, the shorter time taken by Korean producers to acquire design
and production skills is due to their active use of formal technology
transfer agreements and a much higher level of personnel transfer with
foreign firms.
Amsden's first study (1977: 221) emphasised disadvantages arising
from the lack of close contact between machine tool producers and the
more sophisticated machine tool users, and this has been a continuing
feature of that industry. Significantly, Fransman's comparison of the
Japanese and Taiwanese machine tool industries found that while in Taiwan
the products of competing firms were the most important source of design
improvements, in Japan, users, in both domestic and foreign markets, were
considered to be more important (1986c: 1386). Small parts of the
machine tool industry have entered new product areas in response to
domestic demand. For example, Taiwan has a large EDM industry which,
like Korea's, supplies machinery to plastics and mould producers. This
industry does receive a small amount of feedback from its domestic users
but, in comparison to Korea or Japan, there is a general absence of
technological intei—firm links. This is caused by the peculiar industrial
structure of Taiwan. Large and technically sophisticated machine tool
users, which in other countries have traditionally tended to collaborate
with producers, do not do so in Taiwan. The indigenous vehicle industry
is small, divided between many producers, and, unlike Korea, its production
is almost entirely for the domestic market. The defence industry is
separated from the civilian machine tool industry which neither sells to
the military nor benefits from technology transfer. Finally, the
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electronics industry, which promoted the development of high-precision
machines in Japan and initiated the development of laser machines in
Korea, is in Taiwan primarily assembly-orientated and has no technical
links with domestic machinery manufacturers. Such links cannot be
substituted by users in export markets. Here distance and communication
difficulties make it impossible for producers to react to specific
machinery requests. Consequently, Taiwanese producers can only alter
their product-mix and designs in response to general changes on the
market.
This lack of technological inter—firm links has meant that few
skills in the design of special purpose machinery, the custom design of
existing products, the production of lines of machinery, or the automation
of production machinery have been gained by the Taiwanese industry. And
when these capabilities were built up, they could not be applied in any
outside industry since there was insufficient local demand for them.
While the lack of these links has not hindered Taiwanese firms in their
acquisition of new technologies and their ability to follow technological
trends on the world market, it is unlikely that the industry will ever
become a technology leader without radical changes in its domestic
circumstances.
7.3.5 Components and Controls Production in Taiwan
Amsden (1977: 227) also pointed to early difficulties in the
technical development of Taiwanese firms arising from the poorly
developed state of component and sub—contractor networks. During the
1970s and early 1980s, an extensive network of sub-contractors was
created and the indigenous production of several components commenced.
Two machine tool firms integrated backwards into the production of ball
screws, supplying other firms within the industry. MIRL also became a
supplier to the industry, with its heat treatment plant and its gear
production. Thus, the Taiwanese industry is now much better supported
domestically in its requirements for complex mechanical components.
Servo-motor production, under licence from Fanuc, commenced in 1985.
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However, several producers suggested that these motors would be no
cheaper than those bought directly from Fanuc, and said that they were
still ordering from Fanuc. As in Korea, Taiwanese CNC producers mainly
use Fanuc controls on CNC machines produced for the domestic market, and
exported machines have been fitted almost exclusively with Fanuc controls.
Fanuc have a sales office in Taipei, which also operates a repair and
maintenance service for Taiwanese firms.40 And, as in Korea, Fanuc
trained most of the Taiwanese CNC producers in interfacing skills.
However, in contrast to Korea, the Taiwanese effort at designing and
producing control units developed earlier and has been undertaken by
different agencies. In the early 1980s, several Taiwanese electronics
firms commenced control unit production, independently of a similar
earlier effort by MIRL. Neither endeavour has, however, proved viable.
MIRL initially undertook work on control units in the mid-1970s by
entering a servicing agreement with the American controls producer,
General Electric (GE). Under this agreement several engineers from MIRL
were trained in the US in the repair and maintenance of GE's control
units. The agreement did not operate for very long, since MIRL found
that GE was not willing to give them the required back—up and support.
An interviewee at MIRL suggested that GE was not as prepared to invest
in servicing and training in Taiwan as was the independent branch of
Fanuc, and, consequently, GE lost its share of that market. Following this
venture, MIRL researchers developed units to control milling and boring
machines, basic lathes, and grinding machines. Most of the units
manufactured by MIRL are used for training purposes, since they are
relatively unreliable. A few are, however, sold on the domestic market
and one machine tool producer had approached MIRL with an interest in
manufacturing them for its own machines.
lr\ j'.ieldwork undertaken by Fransman in 1983, it was reported that there
were five firms in Taiwan manufacturing machine tool control units
(1986c: 1384—85). He noted that of these five firms, four specialised
only in the production of control units, while the fifth also manufactured
calculators, cash registers, and microcomputers. At the Ninth Taiwan
Machine Tool Show in 1983, 27% of the CNC control units utilised were of
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Taiwanese origin. The quality of these controls was far below those
supplied by Fanuc, and, as these controls had not been produced in
sufficient numbers, their reliability was unknown. These controls were
only fitted to machines supplied to the domestic market, since producers
did not have the resources to offer aftei—sales and service facilities to
foreign buyers.
When Taiwanese fieldwork for the present study was undertaken in
1985, only two of these five firms were still operating in the controls
sector. However, neither of them was making controls for general purpose
machine tools. One firm had found a very small niche market in Taiwan,
making custom controls which could be retro—fitted to special purpose
machine tools, and the other firm had become an agent for Mitsubishi. A
third firm, the only Taiwanese machine tool company which is part of a
conglomerate, was then considering entering the production of control
units. An associated division of the group had commenced making Fanuc's
servo-motors and the two divisions had entered negotiations with Fanuc to
manufacture control units. Fanuc had offered them some rights to produce
control units for milling machines and lathes from its "6" series, a
fairly old range of control units. However, they would not enter this
agreement since they wanted to make controls from Fanuc's more advanced
"10" series.
Taiwan's controls market has changed radically with the entrance of
Mitsubishi, which increased competition in a market previously dominated
by Fanuc. This was further augmented by a West German controls
producer, Haidenheim, which also entered the Taiwanese market in the
mid-1980s. Many machine tool producers and personnel at both MIRL and
ITRI said that the price of control units sold by the major Japanese
companies had already been reduced and they anticipated further
reductions. Against this sort of competition, and without the back—up of
either a large internal market or a larger company prepared to support
their production, the small domestic producers could not survive.
It should be stressed that two Korean firms (B and C) which have
experimented with control unit production are very different from the
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Taiwanese controls producers in two respects: they are both machine tool
producers, and they are both part of conglomerates. In the case of Firm
B, there are considerable interests in microelectronics production in
another division of the chaebol, which could in future provide important
technological support for the development and production of control units.
These differences mean that the Korean firms, unlike their Taiwanese
counterparts, are not economically dependent on selling control units.
Furthermore, in both Korean cases the firms were intending to produce
controls only for use on their own internal market. Should these firms
decide to export their control units, they would also enjoy an advantage
over Taiwanese producers, since both have already established their own
sales outlets in the US through which repairs and maintenance services
could be organised.
Developments in the Taiwanese control unit market may offer certain
encouragement for Korean CNC producers. Enhanced competition in Taiwan's
market may ultimately develop in Korea's. It is unlikely that Mitsubishi
and Haidenheim entered the Taiwanese market because of increased
domestic activity in this sector. Rather, it is highly probable that the
main factor influencing these firms was the expansion of Taiwanese CNC
exports to the US and Europe. Controls producers wanting to increase
their global market share must get their controls onto the machines which
are sold to industrialised countries and Taiwan's industry was
targetted because of its obvious importance in such markets. And, while
Korea's CNC industry is still far more orientated to its domestic market
than Taiwan's, there is clear evidence of a shift. On the one hand,
increasing CNC exports from Korea are beginning to attract other controls
producers, while, on the other, Korean firms, dissatisfied with the high
price of Fanuc controls, have actively sought out alternative suppliers.
It is plausible that price reductions in controls in Korea will occur
because of increased competition on its market between international
suppliers, and not because of the commencement of domestic production.41
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7.4 Conclusions: What Model for NICs?
Generally speaking, the Taiwanese machine tool industry displays an
arguably successful development pattern in strong contrast to that
adopted by Korea. Taiwan's CNC industry was, and continues to be, a
highly export—orientated enterprise, producing standardised, basic,
low—cost machines for sale to industrialised countries. The Taiwanese
economy lacks a strongly developing machine—using sector into which the
indigenous machine tool industry could sell sophisticated goods and with
which it could collaborate in innovatory processes. Similarly, it might
plausibly be said that the Japanese machine tool industry has provided
Korea with not only an abstract pattern but, crucially, a model it has
actually followed and an important constraint on its future development.
Japan in the past, like Korea at present, initially concentrated on
supplying and supporting its domestic machine-using industries which were
themselves in a position to demand more sophisticated tools appropriate
for mass production. Only when, through supplying its domestic users,
Japan had reached a position of high productivity and cost
competitiveness did it then systematically enter the world market, with
the remarkable effects that now constitute a major obstacle to Korea
wholly imitating the Japanese career.
More specific comparisons between the three national machine tool
industries have been made throughout this chapter and need not be
repeated here. Indeed, a more general question arises as a result of
these comparisons. Were the government of a hypothetical NIC now to be
considering establishing or re—orientating a CNC industry, which, if any,
of these models should it follow and on what terms? What features of
its own economy should it bear in mind in making such decisions?
The first consideration in any decision must be political as well as
economic: what development objectives does the country envisage for its
economy and which of these can be sustained by its resources? While
Japan and the US represent exemplars of what it is to be a fully
developed industrial economy, there is no point in equating "success"
solely with the effective imitTation of those patterns. In Japan, for
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example, the machine tool Industry performs a valuable support function
for Its machine—using sector. In Taiwan, it does not. Nevertheless,
because of its high levels of exports, it is entirely proper to describe
the Taiwanese machine tool industry as a success. And, as such, it
represents an entirely plausible pattern for an LDC or a NIC to follow.
NICs contemplating the institution or re—orientation of a machine
tool industry might be well advised first to analyse the constitution and
potential of their domestic markets, including the military sectors. Are
such markets in a position to absorb a given quantity and quality of
machine tool output? If they are not, then the promotion of a domestic
machine tool industry must mainly be justified by its potential
significance as an employer and foreign exchange earner. Small industrial
economies, such as Hong Kong and Singapore, are prime examples of
industrial environments which would not benefit significantly from the
existence of an active machine-building sector, and in which such a
sector will only survive if the industry has a competitive advantage over
producers in other countries.42 If the NIC is in this position, then
there is little reason why the machine tool industry should be picked out
by government for special promotion and protection, but the industry
might be included in general measures used to encourage all industrial
sectors. However, if there are particular security considerations which
seem to require an indigenous machine—building capability, governments
may consider it desirable to intervene more directly.
Alternatively, if analysis of the domestic market identifies
significant potential to absorb quantities of machines, especially of more
complex or special purpose types, then a different strategy may be
indicated. In these cases, governments may consider it beneficial to
nurture the industry by selectively protecting the domestic market and
actively encouraging firms to invest in this sector. There should,
however, be caution in such an approach: total import substitution, as the
Indian example demonstrates, can lead to highly inefficient industries,
which ultimately put their domestic users at a disadvantage (Lall, 1987:
227-28). Promotion of the industry should take into account the
interaction of the machinery sector with other parts of industry and how
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such interaction might be initiated and positively managed. No doubt, the
benefits of the support functions performed by a machine tool industry
are difficult to quantify.*3 However, they are qualitatively easy to
establish; they are widely recognised by machine tool users; and, as a
number of analysts have convincingly argued, such benefits count as the
major justification for the encouragement of the machine tool industry in
industrialising countries (Datta Mitra, 1979; Rosenberg, 1976: 99—100).
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Notes
1. See, for example, Foster-Carter <1988), Enos and Park (1988), Petri
<1988), and Harris <1986).
2. For example, the growth in Korea's textile exports occurred when
Japan was reducing its textile industry. Korea's entry into heavy
and chemical industries in the 1970s coincided with Japan's move
away from polluting industries. In shipbuilding, when Japan
rationalised its industry in the early and mid-1970s, Korea rapidly
expanded with very high investment, and, with the advantage of lower
wage rates than other industrialised countries and low steel prices,
was able quickly to gain a significant share of the world market.
All these industries had a high labour content, and Japan's
competitiveness had declined as labour rates had risen.
3. Manufacturing activities in the Korean industries that had existed
during World War II rapidly declined following Korea's partition in
1945. Japan, which had been Korea's major export market before and
during the War <consuming 99% of exports in 1944), virtually ceased
importing goods from Korea. Resources to maintain and repair
manufacturing facilities created, but also severely worn out, during
Japan's war effort were no longer available. In addition, the
Koreans had difficulties obtaining supplies of raw materials. The
ownership of most industries was, as enemy property, transferred to
the US military government, which knew nothing about the economy
and little about the country's industrial structure. The US military
could not efficiently operate Korean manufacturing facilities;
frequently, unqualified US military personnel were left to manage
industrial plant. Much of the existing manufacturing plant, and
several of Korea's mines, were cannibalised and allowed to decay to
such an extent that they were inoperable and could not be rescued.
By 1947, industrial employment decreased to about 60% of its
pre-division level, and, by the end of 1948, it is estimated that
industrial output was about 10-15% of its capacity at division
<Henderson, 1968: 136-38).
4. In Japan, the Temporary Measures for the Development of the
Machinery Industry Law <1956) aided the modernisation of a selected
21 industries, including the machine tool industry. Through this
act, MITI provided long-term and low-cost government loans, through
the Japan Development Bank, for investment in new equipment: special
interest rates of 6.5% were given on these loans, while the standard
rate at the time was 9%. The machine tool industry was a main
beneficiary of this aid, receiving 20% of the loans allocated under
this programme between 1957 and 1961 <Chokki, 1986: 131-46).
5. A KOSAMI spokesman did suggest that for many of the new machinery
producers, which were still in an infant industry stage, increased
competition on the domestic market would make survival difficult.
6. In Watanabe's survey of the Japanese CNC machine tool industry he
noted that "[mlost firms felt that competition was 'extremely
intense' at home and abroad" <1983: 45).
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7. MITI has run several large scale projects which have supported the
Japanese machine tool industry's development of NC and CNC machine
tools. In 1957, MITI's Mechanical Engineering Laboratory commenced
a three-year project on the "Automatization of Machine Tool
Operation". Between 1973 and 1981, it was engaged in a project to
design a model of an unmanned, automatic factory for manufacturing
machinery. In 1977, a high—profile project was initiated to develop
an FMS utilising lasers (Metalworking. July 1987: 20). In the 1980s,
MITI's research and development projects have been concerned with
the development of new machining technologies for cutting and
shaping new materials, including ceramics.
8. The example of the vehicle industry is cited in Chokki <1986: 142),
and the steel industry in Lynn (1985: 260).
9. Indeed, it has been suggested that the international and competitive
success of the Japanese machine tool industry is "in part, a result
of more than 20 years of [Japanese] government intervention in the
machine tool industry". It must, however, be uncertain how the
industry would have developed without government support and
promotion (quotation from an International Trade Commission Study,
cited in DiFilippo <1986: 115)).
10. See Enos and Park (1988) for the Korean case and Peck and Tamura
(1976) for the Japanese situation.
11. The vehicle industry is the largest single machine tool consumer in
Japan, in the early 1980s absorbing approximately a quarter of
Japan's total machine tool production (Japanese Machine Tool '85/85
Guide, 1985: 14).
12. See Abegglen and Stalk (1985: 54-66) for a comprehensive analysis
op this entry method.
13. For a description of the development of NC machine tools by the
Japanese machine tool industry, see Metalworking. Nov. 1982 and July,
1987 (Special editions on machine tool history and NC development
respectively); Watanabe, 1983: 32—35; Chokki, 1986; and Vogel, 1985:
Ch. 3.
14. Westphal et al. (1984: 296) note that the contribution of direct
foreign investments to gross investment in these years was
approximately 8%.
15. Enos and Park <1988: 38) show that the number of technology
contracts approved by the Korean government steadily increased
through the early 1980s. In one particular sector, factory
automation technologies, Kim Linsu (1987) shows that in 1985 and
1986 compared to previous years a large number of licensing and
direct foreign investments were made in the field of programmable
automation technologies.
16. This close relationship was described in Chapter 4. For a detailed
analysis of the evolution of this relationship and its effects on
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the technological development of the machine tool, see Watanabe
(1983).
17. Of course, more recently the differential between Japanese and US
labour costs has shifted dramatically, even enabling the economic
re-importation into Japan of cars produced by US subsidiaries. In
general, American and European plants are far more vertically
integrated than Japanese plants. In GM's vehicle production,
purchases account for 50% of the value of sales, but for Toyota this
figure is 80% (Abernathy et al., 1981). The Japanese plants rely on
a vast number of small sub—contractors to manufacture parts for
them and it is not unusual for the main producer to have an equity
interest in these firms or to stipulate the machinery and methods
used for production.
18. See Sciberras and Payne (1985: 151-52) for an analysis of potential
problems in following this strategy. See also Garnett (1987b) for a
description of Japan's expansion and developments of more specialist
machinery and its extension anto industrialised country markets,
including the supply of cai—building machine technology.
19. For example, Korea's sales of DRAM chips have increased dramatically
following limits on the sale of Japanese memory chips in the US
(Electronics. 28 April 1988: 21).
20. The other countries warned were Britain, Spain, Italy, Sweden, Brazil,
and Singapore. For details of the restraint agreements, see Mall
Street Journal. 17 Dec. 1986: 4, and Metalworking. May 1987: 20-23.
21. For example, US insurance firms have been able to set up
joint-venture companies in Korea. Sales of US cigarettes have been
permitted on the domestic market which was previously a total
government monopoly. US cigarettes are, however, sold through the
government monopoly at a high price compared to indigenous brands.
Tariffs on imports of US wine have been reduced and imports of some
other agricultural products have been liberalised (Ford, 1988).
22. For a description of the application of "Japanese manufacturing
methods" in industrialised countries, see, for example, Abernathy et
al. (1983).
23. See Nolan (1986: 19-45) for a detailed account of the influence of
the US on the development of indigenous defence industries in Korea
and Taiwan.
24. Per capita GNPs for 1985 given in EIU, 1987a, 1987c.
25. Between 1975 and 1985, manufacturing wages rose over three and a
half times; during the same period, consumer prices less than
doubled and wholesale prices rose by 50% (EIU, 1987c: 15).
26. All ranks in global industry have been formulated on the value of
machine tools manufactured as given in the "World Machine Tool
Production and Trade" data in American Machinist. Feb. 1986: 87-92.
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In 1985, the contribution to Korea's GDP from manufacturing amounted
to US$25 billion (EIU, 1987a: 12). Taiwan's figure was similar at
approximately US$24 billion. (This statistic has been extrapolated
from the 1986 and 1985 figures for Taiwan's GDP, and the 1986
figure for the contribution of manufacturing to GDP, assuming that
this element of GDP did not change radically between these two
years (EIU, 1987c: 12-13).
27. This structure of Taiwanese machine tool firms seems unlikely to
change. Fransraan notes that Taiwanese firms are unwilling to merge
or join larger groups, preferring to follow the Chinese proverb
"Better the head of a chicken than the tail of a cow" (1986a: 206).
28. In 1969 and 1970, imported machine tools accounted for over 60%, by
value, of machine tools consumed on the domestic market (Jacobsson,
1986: 148).
29. One Taiwanese interviewee suggested that many of the machine tool
exports to Vietnam at this time were fictitious, their putative
purchase being used by the overseas Chinese in South Vietnam as a
way of getting money out of the country.
30. Surprisingly, Jacobsson (1986: 148) does not include the production
or trade statistics for 1982 in his time series data, although he
included the figures for 1983, and does not comment on the causes
of depressed machine tool production in Taiwan in 1982 and 1983.
31. In 1984, the US imported machine tools valued at US$1,356 million,
of which Japan contributed US$683 million (50%), West Germany US$205
million (15%), and Taiwan US$99 million (7%) (NMTBA, 1986: 128).
32. It should be noted that there is still a significant market in
Europe and the US for small standardised machine tools (both
conventional and CNC) which are used by small workshops and repair
shops.
33. See Metalworking. July 1985: 13 and Nov. 1986: 152-57, for a more
thorough survey of the problems in the industry at this time.
34. Calculated from figures in Tables 7.2 and 7.3. 1985 figures are
taken from American Machinist. Feb. 1986: 90.
35. The extremely low value of CNC milling machines may be explained by
the fact that many of these machines are manufactured on an OEM
basis and are actually exported without their electronics or control
unit. These are later fitted in the country of destination. The
reason for this practice is that the Taiwanese producer has to pay
a tariff on the import of these items, and, although this is repaid
on re-export, the time delay in repayment creates an extra cost for
the producer. In total, over a third of all CNC machines
manufactured in Taiwan in 1984 were not fitted with control units
(data supplied by ITRI, Taipei).
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36. For example, the conglomerate producer has collaborated with another
firm In the group in the Installation of transfer lines.
37. For background on these measures, see Jacobsson (1986: 163-68) and
Fransman (1986c: 1387—88).
38. This was also a general finding of Amsden (1985), Jacobsson (1986),
and Fransman (1986c).
39. The firm could have possibly exported its lathe with robotic arm
attachment, but this would have considerably increased the work of
its branch offices. Furthermore, the main markets for Taiwanese
machine tools in the US were fairly small job shops, which, like
Taiwanese domestic users, were not at that time installing such
automated equipment.
40. This office is a branch of Fanuc's overseas affiliated company in
Singapore. Fanuc may have established the company in this^way so
as not to have direct links with Taiwan and, therefore, jeopardise its
licensing and production agreements with mainland China.
41. With a general increase in the number of machine tool producers
commencing production of their own control units, and increasing
competition between existing controls producers, there is a high
probability that controls prices may be reduced globally.
42. As shown in Chapter 4, the Hong Kong machinery industry, which
evolved in the early 1980s, subsequently declined because it could
not compete with very cheap imports from China.
43. Jacobsson concludes that, compared to Taiwan, "Korea has a slightly
lower benefit to cost ratio on account of the implementation of
general trade restrictions" (1986: 238). He bases his analysis of
the benefits and costs of fostering the machine tool industry in
Argentina, Korea and Taiwan on measures of the performance of the
respective industries derived from the size of their output, their
export performance, and their ability to adjust to the manufacture
of CNC lathes. Against this he calculates the direct financial costs
of promoting the industry (1986: 201—09). He does not, however,
consider that Korea's machine tool industry is radically different in
orientation and product range, and that the major benefits deriving




This thesis has focused on a particular industry at a specific
period and in one country. The experiences of other industries and other
countries have been drawn upon mainly to flesh out an understanding of
the career of the CNC machine tool industry in Korea. Nevertheless, if it
is indeed a "case study", then this analysis ought to have relevance for a
series of more general concerns. Firstly, it ought to be visible as
methodology. While the problems this thesis has addressed have usually
been the province of development economists, the approach taken here
differs in certain respects from those that typify economists' analyses.
What special contribution can an analyst with a predominantly engineering
background and orientation make to the study of technology transfer and
the acquisition of technological capabilities? Secondly, the thesis has
intermittently argued that the machine tool industry, while tiny in terms
of the value of its own output and significance in world trade, has an
absolutely central role in any machine-using economy. What, precisely, is
that role? What functions does the machine tool industry perform within
an industrialising economy? Should countries endeavouring to
industrialise support an indigenous machine tool industry, and, if so, for
what reasons and on what terms vis-A-vis the availability of machine
tools on the world market? Thirdly, the history of the machine tool
industry has been intertwined with both civilian and military clienteles
for its goods. It appears that in both Japan and Korea the influence of
the military has been relatively limited compared to the situation in
countries such as the US and the UK, and, conversely, that the influence
of links between indigenous machine tool makers and mass-producers of
civilian goods such as automobiles has been enormous. What have been the
consequences of these contrasting environments for the different national
machine tool industries? Are there lessons to be learnt by Western
industrialised countries from Korea and Japan? Fourthly, the study of the
machine tool industry in Korea (as well as in Japan) has discerned the
pervasive role of government policy and government intervention.
Governments in these countries have had both the power and the will to
take a range of measures to encourage, direct, and discourage the
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development of their indigenous industries. To what extent, if at all,
can such governmental policies be replicated in Western countries, or, for
that matter, in other developing countries? Finally, as the thesis title
indicates, the overarching concern of this study has been with the
acquisition of technological capabilities. The acquisition of requisite
skills in the Korean CNC machine tool industry has been taken as a
special case of a process necessarily implicated in the industrialising
process. How do countries at the outset of industrialisation go about
building up the capabilities they require? What is the relationship
between the nature of the technology and the ease or difficulty with
which the relevant capabilities are acquired? What learning methods can
be used? Which are likely, in given circumstances, to be the most
effective? And, importantly, what attitude towards learning is most likely
to make the use of any learning method most productive? What relations
are there between the organisational and business structures within which
production takes place and the facility of learning? The concluding
sections summarise, refine and develop materials in this study which
engage with these, and related, questions.
8.1 An "Engineer's Approach"
This thesis is different from many studies of technology transfer in
one significant respect: it devotes much attention to the specific nature
of the technologies concerned and strives to show some analytic benefits
of doing so.1 In this respect, it might fairly be said to display an
"engineer's approach" to understanding technology transfer and the
acquisition of technological capabilities, processes which have
traditionally been the preserve of economists and students of politics.
It is arguably a general feature of academic analysis that the domain in
which the analyst has expertise is regarded as problematic while other
domains are taken as given. Thus, the valuable work of development
economists in these areas has tended to see the acquisition of
technological capabilities in terms of "relative factor prices",
"comparative advantages", and the like, while implicitly treating radically
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varying technologies as essentially similar. Yet there are analytic
prices to be paid for "black-boxing" technology in this way.
As a general matter, technology ought to be viewed as a problematic
variable because technologies differ in their application in different
environments and because they change over time. For these reasons alone,
technology cannot be regarded as a constant between settings or in a
specific setting over time. More specifically, technology ought not to be
conceived as a discrete product which may be bought and utilised with
equal ease in every country, whatever that country's stage of development.
One should not black-box technology because the nature of the technology
is a major factor in the industrialising process, a factor which varies
from technology to technology, and which interacts with other variables
influencing the process.
Thus, the case study materials show that different aspects of CNC
machine tool technology made different capability demands upon Korean
industry and infrastructure. Interfacing and assembly capabilities were
relatively easy to acquire, since they called upon knowledge and skills
which were already present in Korean industry or for which foreign
assistance was readily available. By contrast, the technological demands
of complex CNC design and almost all aspects of control unit production
still have not been met by the Korean industry. The complexity of the
technologies concerned presents a major obstacle to Korea, given its
existing pool of capabilities. Moreover, the case study indicates that
this sort of orientation allows an understanding of which transfer
processes are likely to be most effective, given the demands of the
technology and the reservoir of capabilities which exists in a setting.
Nevertheless, it would be wrong to claim too much for the "engineer's
approach" to technology transfer. The capability demands made by
specific technologies are worth analysts' attention, and they are
important considerations in themselves, but they are be no means wholly
independent variables. Economic environments and political decisions can
importantly lower or raise the barriers to entry posed by technological
complexity.
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8.2 The Machine Tool Industry as Part of an Industrial Structure
This thesis has repeatedly pointed to and stressed the central and
strategic place of the machine tool industry in a machine-using economy.
The relationship between machine tool users and producers is symbiotic—
the users supplying the initial skills to establish a machinery industry
and continuing to demand of it new types of machines, the producers
contributing to the overall productivity of users and supporting their
product developments. Such technological guidance cannot be offered to
users by any other industry, and it can be offered only with great
difficulty by a machinery industry in another country. It is because of
these externalities that the machine tool industry is often given infant
industry status, and, indeed, special measures were introduced to promote
its formation in both Korea and Japan. For all that, Little (1982: 240-
59) has been sceptical of these arguments and has suggested that such
benefits from an indigenous machine tool industry may either never occur
or may take an unsatisfactorily long time to be realised. Yet the
findings of this thesis count as evidence against Little's scepticism.
The Korean machine tool industry is already beginning to contribute to
the productivity of local user industries and to new technological
developments, even though a full range of technological capabilities has
not yet emerged in the industry. Even a partially developed machine tool
industry can perform valuable support functions for its local user
industries.
The Japanese case is perhaps the best illustration of close
technological links between machine tool producers and civilian users.
However, there is no necessity about such links between an emerging
modern national machine tool industry and domestic user industries.
Indeed, Taiwan offers an example of a successful export-orientated
machine tool industry which has not evolved close links with national
users. At the same time, the Taiwanese experience shows that an industry
which develops in this manner only acquires a narrow range of
capabilities and can therefore offer only limited support to the machine-
using economy. The Taiwanese manufacturing sector remains highly
dependent upon imported machinery and foreign sources of expertise. And
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the national machine tool industry seems set on a course which will keep
it a technology-follower instead of a technology-leader, with clear
consequences for its own long-term profitability.
An important difference between the Korean machine tool industry
and many other sectors of Korean manufacturing industry is its
orientation towards the domestic as opposed to the export market. It is
important to note that this orientation is not necessarily, as Jacobsson
suggests, an indication of weakness in the industry. Several producers
are, indeed, active exporters, but in an industrial climate where home
demand is expanding it is not surprising that they focus on supplying the
domestic market. Even though such machine tool firms are not direct
exporters, they perform a critical task by directly enhancing the
competitiveness of other Korean manufactured exports. In this
orientation, the Korean machine tool industry is very similar to Japan's,
as it was in the 1960s and early 1970s.
Trade is, however, an important aspect of the global machine tool
industry, each country specialising in particular sectors, and user
countries importing machinery unavailable domestically. But
specialisation does not immediately appear with the promotion of a
machine tool industry; it takes many years to evolve and is dependent on
the demands of its users. Japan took at least 25 years to fully acquire
machine tool capabilities and to find a specialist sector of production in
which it could effectively compete on the world market. Similarly, Taiwan
has now also found a specialist area — low-cost, moderate—quality machine
tools - and has been able to exploit its concentration in this sector.
The Korean industry is not as yet focused enough to benefit from such
specialisation.
The importance and benefits of intei—firm linkages for both
technology acquisition and for innovation are not, of course, limited to
machine tool producers and users. Indeed, such mechanisms have been
identified in other industrial sectors. For example, Von Hippel has
recently pointed to the advantages of close links and geographical
proximity between semiconductor equipment manufacturing firms,
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semiconductor producers and users, a situation which once advantaged US
producers and currently obtains in Japan. He suggests that when such a
system operates efficiently many different manufacturers within the
system benefit significantly.2 And the absence of such close liaisons
does not just remove such benefits but places all producers at a distinct
disadvantage <Von Hippel, 1988: 121). Thus, an adequate understanding of
the development of any industry and the conditions for innovation within
it requires an examination of the industrial structure in which it
operates.
8.3 Clienteles and Consequences
Chapter 4 noted the work of Melman (1983a, 1983b) and DiFillipo
(1986) on the relations between the US machine tool industry and the
military. While military patronage has, indeed, been influential on
technological progress in the machine tool industry (as witnessed by the
decisive role of the US military in the original development of numerical
control), these writers document the long-term damaging effects on the
American industry of concentration upon production for specialised
defence requirements. Why have such links had negative consequences for
the machine tool industry when it is so generally agreed that close links
with such consumers as the civilian manufacturing sector have been
beneficial? What lessons are there to be learnt from the US experience
by emerging machine tool industries in countries such as Korea?
The problem with production for the military is four-fold. Firstly,
the market for the specialised machine tools demanded by the modern
military is extremely limited. Firms which make machine tools for
military requirements find that they cannot sell them to any other client,
even if security considerations allow them to do so (which they often do
not). Secondly, once producers orientate themselves to specialised
military needs they are usually unable to effectively supply the larger
market for general purpose machine tools constituted by the civilian
manufacturing sector. Such producers, therefore, become more vulnerable
to an exaggerated form of the demand cycles which afflict the machine
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tool industry in general, as they cannot easily shift from supplying the
military to either civilian or export markets. Thirdly, the cost
environment for military producers is substantially different from that
affecting machine tool firms catering for the general manufacturing
industry. In this respect, the machine tool industry is little different
from other industries selling primarily to the military. Cost-plus
contracts, to take one example, do not encourage the cost discipline
required for mass-production for the civilian sector, and, especially, for
the export market. Finally, a national machine tool industry which is
highly orientated towards production for the military can only with
difficulty fulfil a role of supporting the local civilian machine-using
economy. For all that, it must be noted that military patronage may have
a number of positive effects on machine tool firms. Civilian machine tool
producers may be able to benefit from either economies of scope or scale
from supplying the more standardised requirements of the defence sector.
In addition, military demand may serve an important role in stimulating
technological innovation, though whether, when and at what expense local
industries benefit from that stimulation is problematic.
The experience of Japan tends to reinforce Melman's and DiFilippo's
arguments. Many analysts agree that the lack of a significant military
orientation in the Japanese machine tool industry has not hampered its
development and probably has positively aided it. Thus, Japan's machine
tool industry has not become a specialist in the manufacture of machinery
which may only be used by one specific user, but has developed machinery
which can be utilised in many different production situations. In fact,
the Japanese industry has been characterised by its very close links with
civilian mass-producing industries, and, in particular, with the vehicle
industry. The requirements of this industry have disciplined the Japanese
machine tool industry to design and make machines which can be used by
mass producers, in which the main production requirement is cost
effectiveness and repeatability rather than precision. From this base,
the Japanese industry has been able to expand by supplying other users
and producers in different markets, with the spectacular results noted in
Chapters 4 and 7.
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Moreover, the Japanese machine tool industry has used this base to
expand into the manufacture of more complex and special purpose
machinery. It is important to note that the reverse path does not appear
to be as easy to travel. The machine tool industries of the US and
Europe which entered specialised niche markets following the expansion of
Japan's general purpose exports have not been able regain any of their
share in the more general market. Indeed, these producers are now facing
increased competition in their niches from Japanese producers.
It would seem, therefore, that the examples of the US and Japan
provide an important lesson for Korea in considering its future
development. Although Korea's heavy and chemical industries, including
its machine tool industry, were in fact particularly promoted in the mid-
1970s in order to support the military, there is little specialised
production for this sector. And where such production does occur in the
Korean machine tool industry, the machines produced can often be used in
the civilian sector. In fact, since the early 1980s the emphasis of
Korean machine tool output has strongly moved away from a defence
orientation towards one more similar to that of the Japanese industry,
with increasingly close links between machine tool firms and vehicle
producers. The future for Korea is extremely difficult to predict. If
government policy alters— as it might well do in light of changed
security considerations— the focus of Korean machine tool production
could shift accordingly. Nevertheless, there is some evidence that Korean
policy-makers are well aware of the Japanese and US experiences, and, in
particular, of the risks that such specialisation would pose to a small
and sensitive product area and, by extension, to Korea's general
technological and economic development. To some extent, Korea's own
experience of problems resulting from ovei—expansion in the heavy
industries has reinforced this lesson.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that the Taiwanese
industry has gone to the other extreme from the US. While its civilian
industries are very efficient and its machine tool industry even supplies
some defence contractors in other countries, Taiwan's military is totally
closed to its civilian machine tool industry and is highly inefficient in
378.
producing for its own requirements. Thus, Taiwan's civilian machine tool
industry is unable to secure some economies of scale or scope that could
be gained from producing for the military. Accordingly, there is a case
for taking steps to ensure that the two parts of the market for the
machine tool industry— civilian and military— are both catered for, since
there can be technical exchanges as well as market advantages arising
from a balanced orientation. The danger seems to stem from situations in
which military requirements become predominant, driving a national
machine tool industry up a cul-de-sac from which there is no easy escape.
8.4 Government Intervention
to
Many analysts have pointed j^the importance and pervasive role of
government intervention in Korean industrialisation. Particular
government policies designed to promote and direct the machine tool
industry have been repeatedly noted in this thesis, although it is
probable that some form of such an industry would have developed in
Korea without intervention from above. Of course, an active and
interventionist government is by no means unique to Korean
industrialisation: a broadly similar pattern has been widely noted by
analysts of Japanese industry.3
It is not necessary here to summarise the precise thinking and
direction behind relevant government policies vis-A-vis the machine tool
industry. Nor would it be correct to assume that government intervention
in Korean industry has invariably produced results that government itself
has regarded as beneficial— as witnessed, for example, by the results of
government's promotion of the heavy industries in the mid-1970s. Rather,
it is important to stress four general aspects of Korean government
policies in relation to industrial development as a whole and in relation
to the machine tool industry in particular. Firstly, since the early
1960s Korean governments have understood it as their role to take a long
view of national development, both economic and social. Following
policies laid down in a series of five—year plans, the government has
intervened in such a way as to encourage the realisation of relatively
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long-term industrial development goals. It has been able and willing on
occasions to sacrifice short-term commercial demands for immediate
profitability in exchange for long-term benefits, and it has aimed at the
creation of an industrialised economy able to support its own capital
goods requirements, to enter export markets in a fully prepared position,
and ultimately to become not just a technology-follower but a
technology—leader.4 The Korean government has invested heavily in the
establishment of technical institutes to support industry and to promote
new technological developments, and, although the machine tool industry
currently receives little support from such institutes, they were an
important resource at an earlier stage of development. Nor has the
government felt obliged to over—rush such developments or to adopt
short-term expedients such as wholesale import bars in order to
encourage domestic industry. In addition, the Korean government was able
to take an overall view of development and to implement an integrated
approach, as was manifested, for example, in the 1970s when government
encouraged the expansion of the national industrial base, in order to
reduce dependence on the manufacture of light export goods and to enable
support of the defence industries.
Secondly, government has worked in concert with non-governmental
organisations also able to take a relatively long-term view. Although
government promotion of the chaebol, especially in the machine tool
sector, was criticised and modified accordingly (as noted in Chapter 5), it
was in the conglomerates that government found partners similarly able to
take a long view and to adopt the measures which government analysts
felt were most likely to yield success. The Korean government was
actively concerned to encourage the assimilation of technology and found
in the chaebol organisations that were generally able to do so
effectively. Indeed, some of the chaebol have developed their own
research facilities, effectively taking over parts of the support function
initially performed for the machine tool industry by government
institutes. Smaller independent firms in the main lacked the chaebol's
proven record in acquiring technological capabilities and implementing
them in production, but, where such firms had given evidence of their
380.
technical ability, government was quite willing to give them extensive
support.
Thirdly, government interventions in the machine tool industry in
particular and in the industrialisation process in general have manifested
a high degree of selectivity, being continually adjusted and amended in
light of experience from prior planning efforts and from changing market
conditions. For example, Korea has now recovered from the unwise
investment decisions of the mid-1970s and has reduced the military
emphasis of its earlier policies. Government has been both active and
selective in its role in negotiating the terras of large technology
importation projects. Indeed, Enos and Park's major conclusion (1988: 248)
was that the success of technology absorption in these projects was
largely due to the terms stipulated by government in such agreements,
maximising the transfer of technological capabilities. Perhaps the best
instance of government's selectivity and policy eclecticism was its use of
trade restrictions. Although such analysts as Datta Mitra <1979: 32),
Lall (1987: 240) and Jacobsson (1984: 290) have criticised aspects of the
protection of the domestic market for the purpose of promoting indigenous
industries, the Korean government's use of a range of protective measures
(like Japan's) has proved highly selective and apparently productive in
the machine tool industry. Only sectors which could be reasonably
expected to catch up fairly quickly or to manufacture goods of an
adequate standard were accorded blanket protection from imports.
Moreover, special efforts were made to ensure that users, and especially
exporters, were not disadvantaged by protection. Korea has also been
aware of its vulnerability to import restrictions imposed by its major
trading partners and has adjusted its trading and manufacturing policies
to take this into account.
Finally, government has taken a particular view of the connection
between the machine tool industry and the machine-using economy as a
whole, and it has directed its policies primarily towards the realisation
of this connection. While the Korean government's initial promotion of
the heavy and machinery industries in the mid-1970s was largely informed
by military concerns, emphasis soon shifted towards the promotion of
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industries with high linkage effects. In the late 1970s and early 1980s—
the period in which the domestic CNC industry was taking shape- the
Korean government was seeking to encourage those industries which would
support the overall thrust of development of the civilian manufacturing
sector. Indeed, it was largely for this reason that the machine tool
industry was the recipient of significant government promotion.
Furthermore, government identification of the central support function
that could be performed by the machine tool industry was broadly shared
by some chaebols. They too sought to build up important machine tool
production within the conglomerate structure, for the specific purpose of
supporting their machine-using manufacturing activities. These policies
are already producing results: the sorts of links between machine tool
makers and vehicle manufacturers that characterise Japanese industry have
begun to develop in a very significant way in the Korean context.
8.5 Acquiring Technological Capabilities
Two important features of the process of acquiring technological
capabilities need to be emphasised here. Firstly, capabilities take a long
time to acquire and build upon. Accordingly, it would be a mistake on
the part of either analysts or governmental and industrial planners to
expect industries to mature within a few years. Learning is typically
neither a straightforward nor a quick process, and, if planners really
intend to build up a mature industrial economy, they must be prepared to
take a long view. Secondly, although a range of learning methods can be,
and have been, used to acquire technological capabilities, none of these
is guaranteed of success unless there is substantial effort and
investment in their implementation.
Although acquiring a complete range of capabilities may be a lengthy
process, this does not necessarily mean that the industry in question has
to be inefficient for the whole of this period. The acquisition of design
skills may be the best sign of an industry that is no longer in the
"infant" stage, but, even during the phase in which these skills are still
under-developed, a machine tool industry may still be efficient in other
respects and may be in a position to offer support to machine-using
industries. Thus, Westphal et al. have shown that by the late 1970s and
early 1980s many successful Korean industries had acquired high levels of
ability in plant operation, but few in product and plant design (1984b:
291). This pattern, they say, is a natural part of the development
process: operating skills are learned before a capability for design can
be acquired, i.e., know-how has to be indigenised before know-why is
secured. The case study has shown that the Korean CNC machine tool
industry has started on this second stage of development and has acquired
some, though by no means all, of the skills needed to design complex
machine tools. And, as noted, this process is to a marked extent
dependent on the complexity of the technology being transferred. Even
within the small industrial sector considered here, there was considerable
variation in the rate of capability absorption, depending upon a range of
technological factors, as well as upon factors distinguishing the
capability-base of different firms.
The Korean machine tool industry has not relied upon any single
learning method. In its build—up of technological capabilities it has, in
fact, used to varying extents practically all the learning mechanisms
categorised by analysts such as Lall (especially 1987) and Bell (1984).
What appears to be far more important than the specific learning method
used is the attitude in which Korean firms have approached the learning
process. An important feature of their use of foreign technology appears
to have been the fact that many, so to speak, "prepared themselves to
learn" before they made any decisive learning investment or commitment.
For example, firms prepared to learn by first using CNC machine tools,
experimenting with them, and attempting to develop them, before they
undertook to manufacture them. When these firms subsequently entered
negotiations for licensing agreements, and during the operation of these
agreements, they were rapidly able to learn and to improve the quality of
their product. Several firms were also able to use these agreements as a
base for enhancing their own design capabilities. This finding therefore
complements the Korean study of Enos and Park (1988: 233-34). They
documented that in several cases of large government-organised technology
imports, for example in the steel industry, there was intensive learning
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about all the various technical options open to them before they finally
entered into a technology agreement. In general, Korean firms, aided and
encouraged by government, used licensing agreements in such a way as to
maximise the efficiency of capability transfer.
Finally, an aspect of capability acquisition which has received
relatively little attention needs particularly to be underlined here. This
is not, perhaps, so much a discrete learning method as a mechanism by
which almost any form of learning may be most effectively realised.
Chapter 2 pointed to a process designated as "interactive learning":
technological capabilties might be built up and innovation encouraged
when machine tool producers, users and suppliers were in close contact
with each other, aware of the other's problems, and in a position
efficiently to exchange technical information. Indeed, partly owing to
the chaebol structure, the Korean machine tool industry is characterised
by a high degree of effective interaction between the relevant firms. It
is just because of the importance of such interaction to the productivity
and efficiency of the machine-using sector that the existence of an
indigenous machine tool industry is widely considered important to an
industrialising country.
Yet the interaction by which learning occurs has a quite small-scale
and pervasive pattern which analysts have not, in the main, noticed. As a
practical matter, learning seems to proceed most effectively when people
are moved about and not merely machines, blueprints and instructions.
Thus, among many examples, Korean firms have actively sought to learn by
sending their personnel to foreign plants in order actually to see the
technology and technological processes in operation. The Korean
government has intermittently provided incentives enabling foreign
engineers and designers to come to Korea to transfer their expertise at
first hand. And the close proximity of machine tool producers and users
on such sites as Changwon, and within the chaebol structure, has enabled
personnel involved in machine making and machine using to come together
and to interact intensively and on a day-to-day basis that would not be
possible if they were physically separated.
One analyst of technology transfer In a setting far removed from
Korea or the machine tool industry has, In fact, noted the Importance of
such informal mechanisms. Earlier chapters have briefly alluded to von
Hippel's (1987) study of "informal know-how trading" among personnel in
US steel minimills. Von Hippel's work deals with firms which are
nominally rivals, but even here he notes the importance of networks of
exchange between technical personnel, especially as built up and
maintained through patterns of face-to-face interaction, at conferences,
through on-site visits, and the like. This writer stresses that these
kinds of informal mechanisms may be fully general, containing "no inherent
restriction as to the nature of the know-how traded or as to the nature
of the trading parties". Indeed, von Hippel actually points to research in
the sociology of science which he believes makes a strong case for the
pervasive operation of informal and tacit mechanisms in the transfer of
skills. In particular, he cites the work of H. M. Collins on the transfer
of skill in laser building (von Hippel, 1987: 301). Collins (1974, 1985: Ch.
3) develops a general argument that skills cannot be acquired solely
through formal and verbal means and that the experience of seeing skills
in operation and sharing the "culture" of a skilled person is at some
point essential in skill acquisition (cf. also Rosenberg 1976: 154-56).
Moreover, there are several other recent studies, e.g., those of Kusterer
(1978) and Harper (1987), which similarly emphasise the importance of the
tacit dimension of knowledge and skill and the importance of direct
interaction in its transfer.
This thesis was not undertaken with the design of contributing to
any wholly general debate over learning methods. Nevertheless, the case
study of the acquisition of technological capabilities in the Korean CNC
machine tool industry strongly supports the views of von Hippel and
Collins. Indeed, any national machine tool industry, it may be argued,
best acquits its support function for the machine-using economy when its
skills can be effectively transferred by intense and close interaction
between its skilled personnel and the skilled personnel in its supplier
and user industries. It would appear that the Korean machine tool
industry is characterised by this sort of interaction and is, accordingly,
beginning to fulfil the support function intended for it.
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Notes
1. A few more recent studies have also paid greater than usual
attention to technology; see, for example, Enos and Park <1988).
2. Von Hippel <1988: 121) suggests that process equipment innovations
made by semiconductor producers not only improved their own
competitive position, but were easily transferred to local equipment
builders which, because of their proximity, were usually the first in
the field to introduce the new technique. Other equipment users in
the same area, which had not been involved in the original
innovation, but which were supplied by the same equipment
manufacturer, were usually among the first to implement the new
development. In addition, the purchasers of the semiconductors
gained access to the improved <or cheaper) product before their more
distant competitors. If such a system is not operating, producers
relying on imported equipment will be late users of new innovations
developed in other countries, and will consequently remain several
steps behind leading producers in those countries.. Local equipment
manufacturers no longer have access to developments made to
equipment at the leading edge. And semiconductor producers
requiring the newest and fastest chips will also have to rely on
foreign supplies.
3. As already noted, the precise role of government in Japan's
industrial development has been greatly debated. However, the
Japanese government did implement many measures to encourage and
support the expansion and technical development of the machine tool
industry.
4. The Korean government's high levels of subsidy to the vehicle and
shipbuilding industries, and the length of time over which these
were available, demonstrate the government's commitment to
industrialisation and its preparedness to support infant industries
over an extended period. The Korean government's continuing
long—term perspective on economic development is illustrated in a
recent collection of papers considering the country's "transition to




Case Study Methodology and Questionnaire
The case study was undertaken by the author, who visited Korea from
March to July 1985. During this time the author received considerable
assistance from many Korean academics and researchers, who introduced her
to industrialists and other researchers in the CNC machine tool and
related industries. In particular, Mr. Kim Hwan Suk aided by interpreting
in some interviews and undertaking translation work. Data were obtained
from the sample firms by interview and by questionnaire. (The selection
of the sample firms is described in Chapter 6.) The author also
conducted extensive supplementary interviews in Korea with academics and
staff at research institutes, industry associations, machine tool users,
and non-CNC machine tool producers.
Each sample firm was visited at least once; in some cases several
visits were made either to the same plant or to different plants or
offices of the same firm. On each visit personnel in the firm were
interviewed and, where possible, manufacturing facilities were directly
observed. Brochures on the firms' products and, in some cases, annual
reports on the firms' organisation and development were collected during
these visits. A questionnaire, in Korean, was left with the interviewee
at each of the firms (a copy, in English, is included at the end of this
appendix). Responses to this questionnaire were highly satisfactory. All
were returned; most supplied information in reasonable detail. In some
cases, after the questionnaire had been returned, it was possible to
revisit the firm to discuss information given in the questionnaire. All
the firms were willing to help and there was little secrecy about their
history, products or strategy. Secrecy was only encountered in respect of
defence work undertaken by many of the firms. In some firms, defence
production meant that it was not possible to visit the entire production
plant.
All the interviews were undertaken at the plant or office of the
interviewee and usually lasted between one and two hours. Interviews
were conducted in both English and Korean; in the latter case, Mr. Kim
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Hwan Suk interpreted for the author. Comprehensive notes were taken
during the interview and were transcribed shortly thereafter. The jobs
of the interviewees and their positions in the management structure of
the firms varied. In the majority of cases interviewees were in product
development or technical managerial positions. Typical interviewees
included the development director, the general manager of the development
ana
or design office, ^the chief mechanical engineer or section manager of the
production engineering department. Interviewees all had considerable
knowledge of the technical features of the machines being produced and
developed by the firms, the technological capabilities of personnel, and
plans for future product developments. In some cases, the president of
the firm, its managing director, and other directors were also
interviewed. All interviewees had been with their respective firms for
several years and, therefore, knew the histories of any foreign technology
agreements entered into, collaborative projects with research institutes,
and the development of various models of machine tool manufactured.
The interviews centred on the technical development of the firm, its
entry into CNC production, and details of subsequent product and
production developments. Securing data on the origins of the firm, its
initial entry into the production of conventional machine tools, and its
entry into CNC machine tools formed the initial part of the interview.
Detailed case histories of the development of the firm's complete range
of CNC machine tools were then built up. Critical information in these
case histories included the type of design used, sources of technical help
in the design and production of these machines, and modifications and
improvements made to the design. Attention was also given to the
acquisition of electrical/electronics and software skills in the design
and manufacture of interfaces, and the operation of control units. The
work of the design department was fully considered. This covered both
the number and capabilities of the personnel within the department and
the type of design work they were undertaking, Problems with access to
component vendors and subcontractors, and any technical or production
support from these suppliers, especially controls suppliers, were also
investigated. Finally, interviews discussed entry into the production of
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(i) critical CNC machine tool components, and (ii) FMS, FMC, and other
automated systems.
In the case of the chaebol firms, additional information on the links
between the machine tool producing division and other engineering
divisions within the conglomerate was gathered during the interview.
This included details of the internal market within the chaebol for
machine tools, and technical links with other divisions and central
research and development facilities. Where possible, any such central
research and development facilities undertaking collaborative research on
either CNC machine tools or automated systems were included in the
investigative visits.
Direct observations of the firms' production facilities provided
in-depth knowledge of the machinery and production methods being
utilised. For example, the number of CNC machines being used in
production and the origins of production machinery were easily visible.
Moreover, from this visit a general assessment of the vertical integration
of the plant could be made. Problems in production and assembly of
machine tools, quality control, and stock control were also frequently
discussed while surveying production facilities.
The questionnaire left with the firms was designed to elicit
supplementary information about the company, its development and
products; it also covered many details of the firm's production and
development which could not be discussed in detail during the interview.
Statistical data dealing with the firm's turnover during the previous four
years, its profitability during this period, size of machine tool
production (by value and units), and the proportion of this production
devoted to CNC machinery were all gathered in this way. Most of the
production and export data used in the study come from questionnaire
responses, but some additional figures have been taken from Machine Tool.
a Korean journal published by KOMMA, which lists production and trade
data by product and by firm. Other sections of the questionnaire covered
employment and training in the firm, technology agreements, the firm's
major markets (both domestic and export), and the sourcing of key
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components. The brochures collected on the firm's products provided the
technical specifications of its products, and the details of the range of
machine tools produced, both conventional and CNC.
In order to obtain more information on the Korean machine tool
industry as part of an entire industrial system, two other types of firm
were included. Firstly, several large machine tool users were visited and
interviewed, in order to find out how close the technological inter—firm
linkages between users and producers were and to make some assessment of
the current market for CNC machine tools. In some cases, these machine
tool users were part of the same chaebol which had divisions
manufacturing machine tools. A main aim of these interviews was to map
the transfer, if any, of skills and capabilities from machine tool
producers to users, and to establish the internal market provided by the
chaebol for its own machine tools. Secondly, the main supplier of control
units and servo—motors to the Korean producers was visited. This firm
was a Japanese-Korean joint venture. Again, the interview focussed on
the transfer of skills and capabilities between users and this supplier.
To complete the case study, further interviews and visits were
conducted at research institutes and industry associations which have
close links with the machine tool industry: these included KAIST, KIMM,
KOMMA, KOSAMI, and SMIPC. In the case of KAIST and KIMM, details of
collaborative development projects with machine tool producers and
training programmes for CNC machine tool producers and users were
discussed. Interviews at the industry associations, KOMMA, KOSAMI and
SMIPC, considered the promotion of the industry in the domestic and
export markets, governmental policy and measures specific to the machine
tool industry, and international trade relations. The interview with
SMIPC also covered the training schemes and design consultancy service it
runs for its members.
QUESTIONNAIRE
(This questionnaire was translated Into Korean for distribution to the
sample firms.)
I. General Background Information
1. Name of firm:
2. When was the firm established?
3. What was the firm's original product area?
4. When did the firm start to produce machine tools?
When did the firm start to produce CNC machine tools?
5. Is the firm part of a larger group?
What are the group's other major products?
6. What is the size of the firm in terms of:
(a) Capital: Is any of this foreign equity?
(b) Annual turnover, over the last four years
(c> Number of employees, over the last four years
(d) Approximate pre—tax profits as a percentage of
gross value of sales
(e) Sales of machine tools, by value, over the last four years
7. Of the machine tools sold in the last four years, how many
were conventional and how many were CNC?
8. What are the firm's two most important products, in terms of
sales value?
9. What are the firm's two most important CNC machines, in terms
of sales value?
Note: These two machines are later referred to as CNC 1
and CNC 2.
II. Product Design and Improvement
1. Where did the design for your first conventional machine tool
originate? And for your first CNC machine tool?
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2. In terms of the design of the machine body, how do your CNC
lathes and milling machines differ from your conventional
lathes and milling machines?
3. What are your two newest models of machine tool?
4. When did you start to produce these?
5. Are these totally new products or just improvements on
existing models?
6. Which of the following have been important in the development
of CNC 1 and CNC 2?
CNC 1 CNC 2
(a) Licensing agreements 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
(b) Joint ventures/ 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
foreign investment
<c) Parent company 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
<d> Foreign consultants 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
(e) Domestic consultants/ 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
research institutes
(f) Other (please specify) 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 = Very important
2 = Important
3 = Some importance
4 = Unimportant
N.B. These numbers are
used throughout the
questionnaire.
7. For CNC 1 and CNC 2, have you made any alterations to these
since their original launch? Were these improvements in
quality or cost?
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8. Which of the following in your machine tools are you anxious
to improve?
<a> Drives and motors 1 2 3 4
<b) Sensors 1 2 3 4
(c) Control 1 2 3 4
<d> Rigidity 1 2 3 4
<e> Other (please specify) 1 2 3 4
9. For CNC 1 and CNC 2, how standardised are these products?
—What sort of optional extras can you supply?
—How much custom design will you undertake to meet the
requirements of a particular customer?
10. How important are the following as sources for product
improvements?
(a) Purchase of turnkey plant/equipment 1 2 3 4
<b) Licensing agreements/joint ventures 1 2 3 4
(c) Foreign consultants 1 2 3 4
(d) Domestic consultants or research institutes 1 2 3 4
(e) Parent company or other part of group 1 2 3 4
<f> Technical staff within the firm 1 2 3 4
<8> Worker suggestions 1 2 3 4
<h) Customer suggestions - Domestic 1 2 3 4
— Foreign 1 2 3 4
<i> Competitors' products 1 2 3 4
<j> Professional or trade publications 1 2 3 4
(k) Other (please specify) 1 2 3 4
11. Do you have any formal or informal methods for identifying
changes in user needs in:
Ca) the domestic market
(b) the export market
12. Among the components you buy in to fit to your machine tools,
do you have any plans to produce any?
13. Could you list any licensing agreements/Joint ventures your
firm has entered into.
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14. What do you consider to be the most important benefits you
gained from these agreements?
15. Does your firm have, or plan to acquire, a CAD system?
16. In the next five years, what do you think will be the major
changes made to your products?
III. Controls
1. Whose control units do you fit to your CNC machine tools?
2. Have you ever considered, or are you considering, in-house
production of the control unit?
3. Do you do all the interfacing work for your machines tools?
- Have you ever had any help in this area from anyone?
4. Do you adapt in any way the control units you buy in?
5. For the solution of problems in control, how important are the
following?
<a) Controls producers 1234
(b) Foreign consultants 1234
(c> Domestic consultants/ 1234
research institutes
6. What is your relationship with the controls supplier?
7. With the increasing trend towards further automation, how do
you think this will affect your firm and your range of
products?
IV. Market Structure and Competition
1. What proportion of your machine tool production is exported?
2. What proportion of your CNC machine tool production is
exported?
3. Of your machine tool exports, what proportion of this goes to:
<a) Industrialised countries
<b) Less developed countries
(c) Newly industrialising countries
(e.g., Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong)
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4. Where are your major export markets?
5. On the domestic market, how important are sales to the
following?
(a) Large companies Please, list in order
(b) Medium sized firms of importance in terms of
(c) Small firms sales value.
(d) Other parts of your group
6. What are your customers' major products?
7. If you stopped producing CNC 1 or CNC 2, how much difficulty
would your customers have in finding an alternative supplier?
(a) On the domestic market
(b) On the export market
8. Which of the following areas are you most concerned about
improving to make your CNC machine more competitive?
(a) Price Please, list in order
(b) Quality/performance of importance.
(c) Delivery
(d) Repairs and other customer services
(e) Other (please specify)
9. In the next five years who do you think will be your main
competitors (by nationality) in foreign markets?
V. Costs
1. What are the prices of CNC 1 and CNC 2?
(a) On the domestic market
(b) On the foreign market
2. For these prices approximately what percentage is made up of:—
(a) Cost of the control unit
(b) Cost of other components
(c) Cost of materials
(d) Cost of sub—contracted work
(e) Factory overheads and labour costs
(f) R and D
(g) Payment of royalties
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3. Of the bought—in components, which of these have to be
imported into Korea and which are produced by other Korean
firms?
Manpower and Skills
1. What number of your employees are in the following areas?




(e) Repairs and maintenance
(f) Skilled work in production
(g) Manual work in production
For employees in sections a. b. and c only
2. How many of these employees are involved in mechanical
engineering activities, and in electrical/electronics activities?
3. How many of these employees have the following degrees or
formal technical training?
(a) Post—graduate degrees in science or engineering (Ph.D. or
M.Sc.)
(b) Bachelor's degree in science or engineering (B.Sc.)
(c) Some form of other technical training after leaving high
school
4. Did any of these people obtain their technical training abroad?
— If yes, how many and in which countries?
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5. How many people work In the following activities and for
approximately what percentage of their time?
Number % of time
(a) Quality control
(b) Product improvements




6. Does the company have any formal or informal policy for
furthering the technical education of its employees?
7. If a key person in areas a—f left, in which areas would you
have difficulty in finding a replacement?
8. If the firm decides to develop a new area of skills, are you
most likely to recruit from within and train or recruit from
outside?
9. Do you have a formal R&D department?
-What was its annual budget for the last four years?
—Is this department just for machine tool development or for
all your company's products?
VII. Production
1. Of your production machines, how many are CNC?
-How many are machines you have produced in—house?
-How many are Korean made?
(Please give approximate percentages)
2. Have you automated any of your production processes?
—Are you planning to?
3. How is your production planned and controlled?
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4. What significant changes have you seen in your production
methods in the last five years?
How important have the following been in motivating these
improvements?
(a) Reduction in product price 1 2 3 4
(b) Improvements in product quality 1 2 3 4
(c) Reduction in labour costs 1 2 3 4
(d) Reduction in energy costs 1 2 3 4
<e) Reduction in material costs 1 2 3 4
(f) Government grants or 1 2 3 4
incentives (Please specify)
(g) Other (Please specify) 1 2 3 4
5. Which of the following have been important sources of
technology for improving your production methods?
(a) Purchase of turnkey plant/equipment 1234
<b) Licensing agreements 12 3 4
<c> Joint ventures 1234
(d) Foreign consultants 1234
(e) Domestic consultants or research institutes 1234
(f) Parent company or other part of group 1234
(g) Technical staff within the firm 1234
<h) Worker suggestions 1234
(i) Customer suggestions 1234
6. In the next five years in what ways do you think your
production facilities will change?
APPENDIX II
The Korean Machine Tool Industry after 1985
This appendix briefly summarises some developments in the Korean
machine tool industry subsequent to the time of the case study research
in 1985. Korea's demand for machine tools has continued to grow rapidly
and, in the main, this growth has been the result of continuing
investment and automation in the domestic vehicle industry. The Korean
machine tool industry has expanded at a rate equivalent to that of its
consumers maintaining its share of the domestic market. The orientation
of the industry towards this domestic market has been continued, and
exports have increased only slowly. (As a proportion of total output,
exports have actually decreased significantly.)
Table fll Korean Machine Tool Statistics 1985-87
(in million US$)
1985 1986 1987
Production 184,0 333,5 505,5
Export 25,0 27,0 40,0
Import 150,0 358,0 400,0
Consu»ption 309,0 664,5 865,5
Source; ftaerican Machinist, various issues,
There are also indications of continuing technical development. A
further six machine tool firms have commenced CNC production, and the
overall share of CNC output in total production had reached 32% by 1986
(Lee Hae, 1987; 4). The leading machine tool firms have continued to
develop and install more automated equipment in collaboration with users,
thus fulfilling their support role. For example, Firm B has developed two
FMSs, which are used to manufacture cylinder blocks and crankshafts in
the group's diesel engine plant. While a few Korean firms have acquired
or enhanced their capabilities in the design and assembly of FMSs, there
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are still many gaps in their electronics and software capabilities.
Korean CNC producers remain as dependent as they were in 1985 on
imported electrical and electronic components. Although the domestic
manufacture of servo—motors has been promoted, only prototypes have so
far been made and there have been no advances in control unit production.
The manufacture of automation equipment in Korea includes robotics,
and developments in this field have been confined to the chaebol firms.
In general, their robot developments have been closely aligned to each
chaebol's internal demands, i.e., those chaebol which concentrate on
vehicle manufacture and large—scale engineering production have developed
robots to undertake such tasks as welding, while those in the electronics
sector have concentrated on assembly applications (Lee Chong Won, 1987:
12-17; Kim Linsu, 1987: 15). Requirements of large divisions of the group
have dictated the direction of technical developments, and the extremely
close collaboration of producer and user has aided the learning process.
Thus, patterns of interaction and innovation in the production of
automation equipment appear to be proceeding along lines familiar from
the machine tool industry itself.
Although the Korean government has been less directive in industrial
development since 1984—85, it has continued to watch over industry and,
where it considered it necessary, to reorganise sectors by merging failing
firms. Included in such government actions was the takeover of
Chaebol E by Chaebol D in early 1986. The transfer of ownership was
accompanied by many incentives, including tax exemptions and reductions,
and some of Chaebol E's debts to the government were written off. As
well as the financial incentives, a major benefit for Chaebol D from
taking over this firm is the acquisition of extensive property holdings of
the company throughout Korea. (Normally the process by which groups
acquire large landholdings is made difficult for the chaebol by various
government regulations.) Of these properties, it is widely anticipated
that the very large area of land on the Changwon Industrial Complex,
where Firm E was located, will be used for a new vehicle assembly plant
that Chaebol D plans to build as a joint venture with Ford (Butler, 1986).
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The Korean government's strategy of avoiding retaliatory trade
restrictions by negotiating with the US authorities at an early stage
appears to have been successful. As noted earlier, in late 1986 Japan,
Taiwan, West Germany, and Switzerland were forced to enter "voluntary"
restraint agreements limiting their machine tool exports to the US, and
Korea, along with several other countries, was warned not to rapidly
increase its exports to the US. In mid—1987, following trade talks, the
US Secretary of Commerce pledged that Korean exports of cars,
semiconductors, and machine tools to the US would not be restricted <EIU,
1987b: 11).
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